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15 September 1965

OCI No. 0581/65

Copy No. 51



INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

REVIEW OF INSURGENCY PROBLEMS

This publication provides a periodic review of internal security in underdeveloped countries where there is a threat from Communist-supported insurgency.

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Office of Current Intelligence

State Department review completed

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REVIEW OF INSURGENCY PROBLEMS

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
15 September 1965

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Review of Insurgency Problems

1. Congo

The over-all military situation in the Congo continues to improve, but the activities of rebels in and around the Fizi region on the northwestern shores of Lake Tanganyika are still of some concern.

In the last few days there has been a spate of rumors suggesting that a rebel offensive may be in the offing north of Fizi, toward Bukavu, the largest city in the eastern Congo. Rebel activity above Fizi has in fact increased, but its dimensions are difficult to measure. The American consul in Bukavu believes that rebel pressure is likely to grow in the coming weeks and thinks that reinforcements for the region are needed.

several small groups of Cubans have arrived there in the last three weeks, according to a report from the US ambassador on 10 September. The Cubans may be planning to join the Fizi partisans. At least four Cubans were known to be with the rebels last June. Any substantial increase in the number of Cuban advisers in Fizi would vastly complicate the problems facing Colonel Hoare, the mercenary commander, whose Albertville-based offensive has now been postponed until late October.

In the last few weeks Hoare has gradually built up his Albertville contingent. As of 28 August he had 250 South African and Rhodesian mercenaries in the city. He hopes to increase his force to 350

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before commencing operations toward Fizi. Although Hoare acknowledges that he is getting better logistic support than ever before, he is worried about the relatively poor quality of his current recruits. Apparently bad publicity about pay and working conditions in the Congo has scared off the more able soldiers of fortune.

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
Supporting Hoare are four Albertville-based T-28 aircraft and a small fleet, now consisting of an old 75-foot steamer and four 28-foot high-speed motor boats.



2. British Guiana

The pro-Communist People's Progressive Party (PPP) probably is giving some paramilitary training to its activists, but thus far has engaged only in isolated terrorist incidents. The most recent serious incident occurred on 1 September when a bomb was thrown at a truck (reportedly supplied by US AID) carrying 23 workers of the Ministry of Works and Hydraulics. Nine victims were hospitalized but no one was killed. Three men found in the area of the explosion have been detained by the police.

The PPP is currently experiencing a wave of internal dissension which is probably keeping it from developing a concerted and effective anti-government program. The sporadic incidents of sugar cane arson, property damage, and explosions are of considerable nuisance value, but so far they have not been serious or frequent enough to convince the British that they should postpone the constitutional convention scheduled for 2 November. This convention is expected to set the date for the colony's independence. The PPP wants to block independence under the present government, feeling that as head of an independent "Guyana," Premier Burnham will be in a better position to prevent the PPP from regaining power.



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
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

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4. Colombia

The split between the orthodox Communist Party (PCC) and the Communist Party/Marxist-Leninist (PCC/ML) may lead to efforts by each to outdo the other in terrorist and guerrilla activities.



The PCC-ML, having broken with the PCC, has been seeking funds for guerrilla activity and urban terrorism, which it has already begun on a small scale.



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The government, already absorbed in dealing with new tensions arising from its recently announced program of increased taxation and exchange reform, may have difficulty countering an intensified Communist effort to exploit public discontent. It is equally possible, of course, that renewed violence by Communists would result in such widespread revulsion that the government's task would be easier.

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5. Peru

The resignation of the cabinet on 13 September portends no threat to President Belaunde despite the relative decline in stability. It does, however, play into the hands of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), whose guerrillas will undoubtedly benefit by political dissension in Lima. Counterinsurgency operations are continuing against the MIR but with little result thus far. In Cuzco Department, where the southern grouping of MIR camps is located, government forces reportedly have sealed off the general camp site area and are preparing for a major offensive against the guerrillas. An intense roundup of suspected subversives has been under way in the department for several weeks.

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
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