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**SUBJECT: Vulnerabilities of the USSR and the Eastern
 European Nations To Psychological Warfare**

1. For a variety of reasons the populations of the Soviet Bloc countries are not susceptible to psychological warfare programs designed to induce them, or their organized military units to undertake active resistance against the Soviet Communist regime, the Eastern European communist controlled governments or their military forces prior to the initiation of hostilities between the West and the Soviet bloc or, with one possible exception (see #3), during such warfare. This would hold true for all-out nuclear war, a conflict in which only tactical nuclear weapons are being used, or a limited non-nuclear conflict.

2. Unlike World War II the probable nature of a future conflict precludes enough lead time in which to conduct an effective psychological warfare program for the USSR or for Eastern Europe. Also, as the following discussion demonstrates, conditions and popular attitudes today in the USSR and Eastern Europe do not lend themselves to the psychological warfare techniques employed with some success twenty to twenty-five year ago.

3. Only in the event that organized Western military ground forces actually are in control and clearly successfully on the offensive in a given Eastern European country or area of the USSR could there be any expectation of active resistance in support of Allied objectives. Even this generalization is subject to further qualification depending on the nationality of the Western forces in place.

4. This does not mean that there is no dissidence, or dissident groups, in Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union. It does mean that such dissident individuals or groups as may exist would not be willing to expose themselves except in isolated cases, until they were convinced they were not going to be abandoned once again to the local and Soviet security forces. Words alone can not alter the bitter lessons learned in Berlin in 1953 or in Hungary in 1956. Moreover,

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one important aftermath of these lessons has been the gradual working out of a live-and-let-live relationship between the populations of Eastern Europe and their respective ruling Communist governments. While this may not seem very satisfactory in terms of human aspirations, it is the best that these people have been able to achieve and to them it seems reasonably satisfactory. They would be unwilling to jeopardize this relationship except under conditions assuring no risk of a return of Communist overlordship.

5. A concomitant aspect of the adjustment by the population to the realities of its circumstances is that the goals hoped for in the event of war have changed. It may once have been accurate to say that the population hoped for liberation and a return to something akin to pre-World War II political forms. This is no longer true. Not all the communist reforms in Eastern Europe would be or could be tossed aside willy-nilly.

6. The Eastern Europeans, it must also be remembered, no longer are sanguine about the prospects of a war. Whatever the circumstances of a war between East and West they firmly believe that their countries will be the battlefield, even in a nuclear war, and that they will be destroyed. Their entire inclination is to work to prevent a war and, failing in that, to avoid taking any steps which would tend to involve themselves. The willingness to engage in resistance activity would be low indeed, if not non-existent.

7. It must also be taken into account that in recent years the Eastern European regimes, with the exception of Albania and Bulgaria, have been able more and more frequently to adopt policies reflecting the national interests of the country--as opposed to those of the USSR or the bloc as a whole. As time goes on and this trend becomes a fixed and acceptable element in bloc affairs, it is reasonable to expect a further lowering of dissidence potential.

8. In the USSR dissatisfaction with various aspects of the system is widespread, but the gulf between dissidence and resistance--with the possible exception of certain national minorities--is greater than in the Eastern European countries. Pride in the Soviet state and a strengthened sense of Soviet patriotism have flowed from the successes of the USSR during and after World War II, particularly its economic improvements and technological achievements. Moreover, the dissidence that does exist does not necessarily indicate opposition to the present government, to Communist ideology, or to the Soviet

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system, although there are some stirrings in that direction among the intelligentsia. It is, rather, a manifestation of discontent over the neglect or denial by the regime of popular needs or desires. Generally speaking, however, Soviet citizens appear to feel that their lot has improved and is going to improve further. The existence of a resistance potential cannot be ruled out but it is obviously on a level that differs considerably from that of the other Bloc countries.

9. With the foregoing qualifications in mind, it must also be remembered that the information available on the sources and causes of dissidence and dissident groups in the Soviet Bloc nations is sketchy at best. The attached country studies attempt to identify the various possible ethnic, political, social and religious groups which might broadly be considered susceptible to Western blandishments under the particular conditions set forth in paragraph 3.

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In the event of war between the West and the USSR, Albania would probably remain neutral, regarding such a war essentially as being one between competing imperialist powers. If China should come in on the side of the USSR, Albania would probably remain at least a de facto neutral. Rather than taking any offensive action, Tirana would prepare to defend itself against an attack from one or more of its neighbors--Yugoslavia, Greece, and Italy (Albania and Greece are still technically at war).

Although the Albanian populace does not generally support its Communist masters, these people are extremely nationalistic and would probably rally around the regime in the face of an onslaught from any of their traditional, neighboring adversaries. Resistance in these circumstances would probably evolve eventually into a guerrilla war of the type waged against the Italians and Germans in World War II from Albania's mountain fastnesses.

Should no invasion of Albania be undertaken by any forces, the Albanian populace would probably grow restive but generally abstain from any overt action. In this case, however, possibilities might arise for psychological and unconventional warfare, particularly if those engaged in this work could hold out the possibility of an eventual invasion of Albania by such Western forces as American, French, or British troops.

Ethnic: Albanians are divided between the Tosks in the South and the Gegs in the North. There is also a large Albanian Geg minority in the Kosmet region of Yugoslavia. The Tosks have traditionally made up the bulk of city populations and supplied the leadership to the Albanian Communist regime. The Gegs and Tosks, while rivals, are not, strictly speaking, antagonists. In Albania, and particularly among the Gegs, family ties are the most important of various personal loyalties. Blood feuds between families (clans) were relatively common until world War II.

Under the conditions of an East-West war not involving an invasion of Albania, certain of the Gegs' mountain clans might consider the possibility of again settling old scores, particularly against Tosk clans or rival Geg clans that have collaborated with the Hoxha regime. These dissident clans might provide the fertile soil for psychological warfare and collaborate in unconventional warfare ventures.

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Party: There are no important divisions within the Albanian Communist regime, which has been thoroughly purged by the Hoxha leadership both after its break with the Yugoslavs in 1948 and with the Soviets in 1961.

Religious: Although several religions are practiced in Albania, the population is overwhelmingly Moslem, and religious differences are of little, if any, importance.

Social: Social groups as generally understood in the West are only beginning to form in Albania and do not represent cohesive forces which could be the target of or participants in psychological or unconventional warfare.

Military: The Military forces of the regime would probably remain loyal until Albania was actually invaded, at which time individual--as opposed to unit--desertions would be the likely result.

Security: The Security forces of the regime would remain loyal to the bitter end.

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SECRET**BULGARIA**

The fortunes of Bulgaria are tied to those of its big Slavic brother, Russia, under whose protection it has come closest to realizing its national aspirations in modern time. Even when compelled by political expediency during World War II into an alliance with Nazi Germany, no Bulgarian units were sent against the Russians. Although the advent of a Soviet-imposed Communist regime in Bulgaria has dissipated this sentiment in some measure, it seems likely that the regime would fight loyally on the side of the USSR and would enjoy the passive support of the people, particularly if in such a war, they were fighting against their traditional enemies, the Turks and Greeks. Few possibilities for psychological and unconventional warfare would be available under these conditions.

Ethnic: Bulgaria has a large Turkish minority (656,000 in 1956, or 8.6 percent of the population) which is disenchanting with the regime and Bulgaria in general. The dissatisfaction of this group was dramatically demonstrated last year when, following the spread of inaccurate rumors about new possibilities for emigration to Turkey by Bulgarian Turks, riots occurred in front of Turkish diplomatic missions between the Turks and Bulgarian police. This minority group would be particularly vulnerable to psychological warfare and might supply manpower for unconventional warfare adventures.

Party: Although the Bulgarian party is the most faction-ridden in Eastern Europe, none of these factions would be willing to collaborate with the West against the USSR.

Religious: Significant religious differences generally follow ethnic lines--i.e., Moslem Turks against Christian Bulgarians and might be subject to exploitation.

Social: None of Bulgaria's social classes are politically enough aware as groups to supply fertile ground for psychological or unconventional warfare.

Military: The Bulgarian officer corps has a tradition of interference in the political life of the country. The military figured prominently in the 9 September 1944 coup--which led eventually to the Communist take-over--and a plot against the present Zhivkov regime involving primarily military officers was discovered as recently as April 1965. According to the best available information, however,

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dissidence in the Bulgarian officer corps currently concerns which faction of the Bulgarian Communist party should be on top. We doubt, therefore, that this dissidence is exploitable by the West, for none of the factions of the Bulgarian party advocate ending the country's basic allegiance to the USSR.

Security: The Bulgarian security forces would remain loyal to the regime and the USSR in any eventuality.

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The vast majority of the Czechoslovak population for one reason or another is potentially vulnerable to psychological warfare depending upon a wide range of circumstances. An estimated 75% to 90% is opposed to the regime with the intensity of feeling ranging from the violent hatred of those persecuted by the regime to the disgruntled acceptance of present conditions by the more favored industrial workers.

Both Czechs and Slovaks are masters in the art of passive resistance, but a highly effective police apparatus and disillusionment with the West as a result of the "sell-out" of Czechoslovakia at Munich in 1938 and the latter "lesson of Hungary" have generally prevented open or organized resistance. These factors would still be significant impediments to open collaboration or active resistance in wartime. Also, there is no strong tradition of an anti-Russian feeling, despite the longstanding Western orientation.

If the West were clearly involved -- including the US -- in conventional warfare and clearly on the offensive with the likelihood of defeating the Soviet Union, passive resistance, and possibly limited active resistance, could be elicited from the civilian population. Unit defections among the military would be most unlikely but covert resistance by certain specialized units might be induced. If, however, West German troops were deployed in Czechoslovakia or used for an offensive into or out of Czechoslovakia both the military and civilian population would most likely remain entirely loyal to the communist regime.

Ethnic: The Slovak minority, which makes up approximately one-third of the population, has traditionally been bolder in its resistance to communism than the Czechs. Never satisfied with the domination of the Czechs over them, the Slovaks have long been responsive to promises of autonomy or independence. The Germans on the eve of World War II successfully exploited this ethnic friction and established a puppet state in Slovakia. Although the ethnic animosity continues, aggravated by their distaste for communism, the Slovaks today are less interested in independence than in greater autonomy or greater representation in the central government in Prague. Nonetheless, the appeal of independence is still quite strong among the general Slovak public.

Of the other minorities in Czechoslovakia, the Germans and Hungarians, depending on the specific war conditions, might respond to psychological warfare approaches. These

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minorities are dissatisfied and would probably work towards return to or reunion with their homelands. The Germans, who are mainly in the Czech lands, would probably not remain loyal to the Prague government, just as in the pre-Munich days they were more German than Czech in allegiance and activity. They might be induced again to engage in active resistance, at least of a covert nature. The Hungarians, the largest minority in Czechoslovakia next to the Slovaks, for the most part reside in parts of Slovakia which have been the subject of dispute with Hungary. Although this minority is not as unreliable as the Germans, the Hungarians would probably prefer to have their areas brought back under Budapest's jurisdiction.

Social: With nearly the entire population opposed to the Communist regime, almost every group within the society is a potential source of dissidence. The Communists have been singularly unsuccessful in forming a Communist-minded youth. In fact, young people, be they workers, students, farmers, Czech or Slovak, are one of the greatest irritants to the regime. In particular the young resent the loss of the right to choose freely their educational courses and future careers, the regimentation of their leisure time, the regime-imposed isolation from the social and cultural values of the West, and the fear engendered by the arbitrary rule of the party. Curiosity about, and popularity of, the West have increased among Czechoslovak youth. In some cases sons and daughters of pro-Communist working class parents have been among the more vocal dissidents against the regime. More daring in showing their dissidence than their elders, Czechoslovak young people have been responsible for numerous riots and demonstrations and have harassed the regime with vandalism, work absenteeism, and what is called "hooliganism."

Intellectuals across the land constitute the most effective group in opposition to the Communist regime. Non-Communist as well as disaffected or liberal Communist intellectuals have combined since 1962 in a bold campaign which has brought about cabinet changes and forced the party to reexamine almost every aspect of its policies. These dissident intellectuals have outlets in the press, television, and cultural centers throughout the country, but mainly in Slovakia. This articulate and relatively powerful group, however, is not likely to turn on the regime in time of war. It is the group most aware of the past, i.e., Munich of 1938 and the political-geographic realities of today. They might, however, be induced to engage in covert or passive resistance but are unlikely to engage in overt resistance to subvert the regime's war efforts.

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Neither the peasantry nor the industrial workers are satisfied with the Communist "workers' paradise." Passive resistance and strong dissidence in rural areas have been important factors in the failure of Czechoslovak agricultural production to meet planned goals. The rural population is predominately Catholic, attached to its ancestral holdings, anti-Communist and opposed to collectivized farming. In addition to passive resistance, there are frequent cases of vandalism and acts of violence.

Industrial workers are generally dissatisfied with their material lot, often pointing to the higher standard of living in nearby West Germany. Skilled workers, who had once regarded Communism as a more militant form of social democracy, have become disillusioned with Communist political repression and the non-fulfillment of promises of rapid improvement in their living conditions. Unskilled workers, once the firmest supporters of the Communists, have undergone great economic hardships and have particularly resented various forms of "labor competition" and a system of wage differentials and favoritism toward those whose political attitudes and work performance are considered by the regime as "exemplary." The thousands of former tradesmen, farmers, civil servants, professional men, and housewives who have been forced to become industrial workers have added to the unrest since they resent their loss of freedom and opportunity to practice their former occupations or properly to care for their families. Spontaneous, unorganized actions have been the chief expressions of discontent among the workers. These include slowdowns, absenteeism, evasion of regulations, poor quality or erratic production, willful negligence, theft, vandalism and occasional strikes and demonstrations. Even in peacetime under strict police state controls there have sporadic appearances of illegal trade union leaflets and anti-regime pamphlets.

Religious: None of the organized religions as such offer resistance to the regime, even among the deeply religious Slovaks. The Czechs have a generally anti-clerical tradition and would not be likely to rally around a religious group as such to work against the regime. Moreover, the Church hierarchy itself in Prague is not entirely united in its ideas on how best to survive communism. The Church carries much greater weight in Slovakia--where it has been generally more defiant of communist decrees and efforts against religion--but it has lost most of its notable leaders and therefore much of its leadership ability.

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Communist Party: There is a great deal of dissension within the Czechoslovak Communist party and within its adjunct, the Slovak Communist party, as well as between the two parties, but these problems are an internal party affair which basically has not or would not affect the loyalty of the party leaders to communism. As Communists they would see very little likelihood of survival after a Soviet defeat by the West.

On the other hand, the Czechoslovak party is permeated with opportunists who at the lower party levels might be vulnerable to psychological warfare. As opportunists, however, their willingness to engage in active or overt resistance to the communists would be limited.

The political parties dating from pre-Communist years still exist as part of the national front in some form or another in Czechoslovakia and might provide a source of resistance. Their willingness to collaborate would, however, be greatly limited by their lack of influence upon society or the population. The communists have, over the years, disposed of the members of these democratic parties capable of forming a dangerous opposition and, by taking over the parties as puppet organizations, so infiltrated them as to assure their impotence.

Military: Czechoslovakia does not have a strong military tradition as such and, because of the survival of old nationalistic ideals, the conscript armed forces are not regarded by the regime as wholly reliable. There has been, however, a thorough Communist take-over and indoctrination of the officer corps. The likelihood of regular army units defecting is negligible. For certain conscript units, particularly the labor units which consist of politically unreliable or undesirable elements, the situation might be different. There also have been reports of friction between Czech and Slovak units.

In the paramilitary units such as the workers militia and Union for Cooperation with the Army, vulnerability to psychological warfare or potential for active resistance would depend largely on the individuals' ethnic-social background.

Security: The interior guard and secret police are undoubtedly loyal cadres of the party. They would have nothing to gain by resistance.

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Czechoslovakia has a highly efficient and effective police-security apparatus. The security forces are best equipped for the conditions of a strict police state, and, therefore, have shown certain inadequacies in dealing with the effects of the less repressive policies of the past few years. Riot dispersal is efficient, but military units often must be called upon to aid the police or peoples militia. The security forces are currently undergoing beefing up and improvement, even though years of a repressive police state have provided dossiers on everyone of even the slightest interest to the police and created networks of informants and "helpers" throughout the country.

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EAST GERMANY

The promise of reunification with West Germany under a non-Communist regime is still sufficiently compelling to induce the vast majority of East Germans to side with the West in any East-West conflict. Because of the West's failure to help the June, 1953, uprising and the Hungarian revolt of 1956, and its failure to act when the Berlin Wall went up in 1961, this majority would be reluctant to commit itself, however, unless the West clearly were winning any conflict. Any opportunity for active popular resistance, moreover, would be minimal in time of conflict because of the large numbers of Soviet troops and security units, and the probable continued existence of local security forces, in what would probably be a major combat zone extending throughout the country.

Ethnic: There are no ethnic differences within East Germany to exploit. It would be unwise to seek popular East German support by promising restitution of the territory lost after World War II to Poland, the USSR and Czechoslovakia. The West already has the sympathy of most East Germans, and this promise would gain it little more. It would, however, increase Polish and Czechoslovak willingness to remain allied to the Soviets.

Party: Such factionalism as there may be within the East German party (SED) is not significant and in any case is not exploitable. The so-called collaborating political parties within the GDR National Front are similarly not exploitable -- they have no power, no following and their leaders are tainted by long years of collaboration with Ulbricht.

Religious: Although most East Germans are either Evangelical (80%) or Roman Catholic, there is little friction between the two religions. The churches, furthermore, appear to exert little day-to-day influence over the lives of most East Germans, and have never become the repositories of nationalism or anti-Communism that they have in some other Eastern European countries.

Social: The available evidence indicates that the majority of the peasants continue to oppose the collective farm system, but incidents, such as barn burnings, which reflect their attitude are declining.

The industrial workers generally dislike the production norms, the absence of a good incentive system, and the low pay. They tend to admire the higher standard of living in

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in West Germany. There are signs, however, that they are beginning to accommodate themselves to the regime, and the chances of another June, 1953, type of uprising are remote.

The youth are the first social group in East Germany to display even the beginning of an East German consciousness. They are distressed, however, by their physical and cultural isolation, and many see better opportunity in West Germany. At this juncture their attitudes are ambivalent and they would be a difficult group to target.

The intellectuals resent the ideological strait-jacket imposed on them by the regime, but, except in a few isolated instances, have been unwilling to oppose the regime.

Military and Para-Military: The reliability of the East German armed forces depends on whether the Warsaw Pact is winning. The continual escape of border guards across the Berlin sector borders, for example, suggests mass defections of enlisted personnel would occur in time of war if there were no fear of eventual apprehension and retribution. Volksarmee units probably would cease fighting after East Germany was overrun by NATO forces.

Security Forces: The well-trained and effective security forces are hated by the populace as henchmen of the oppressive regime. In a conflict in which the Communists were winning, they would prove effective and loyal; if the West were winning, they would dissolve and seek, in one way or another, to conceal their past role in the regime.

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HUNGARY

Hungary has a long tradition of anti-Russian, anti-Slavic prejudices and an equally deep-rooted affinity for Western political and social ideals. Contemporary political realities, however, have strongly influenced these concepts, with the result that Hungarians generally are unwilling to take any action that might jeopardize the gains in their well-being acquired since 1957.

Only in the event of a Western military offensive successfully penetrating well into Hungary is it likely that segments of the population might be induced to turn against the regime. Moreover, the extent of popular response would probably be significantly less if the Western troops in question were not American; it is possible that the response would be almost nil if the troops were German.

Assuming the offensive to be successful and the troops American, the time lapse between their entrance onto Hungarian soil and the first encounter with Soviet forces would be extremely brief. The Hungarian sources which might be vulnerable to Western blandishments during this time span would probably be limited and their potential for effective resistance small.

Ethnic: Hungarians are an ethnically unique race in Eastern Europe, unrelated to their Slavic and Rumanian neighbors. The strongly nationalistic population -- over 96 percent Magyar -- contains no separatist elements, nor is there any tendency towards regional autonomy. Moreover, Hungarians have traditionally sought to assimilate neighboring areas of Slovakia and Transylvania inhabited by Magyar minorities. These lands, under Hungarian administration before 1920, remain a major source of dissention between Hungary and Rumania in particular. Psychological warfare supporting Hungarian irredentist claims would undoubtedly find a high response, but would require considerable time to be effective. Such an approach would have to be considered of course in terms of its negative effects in Slovakia and Rumania.

Party: The organization of both party and government is essentially stable and carefully controlled by the present leadership. Dissident elements in the party have either been purged, put out to pasture, or reeducated along the lines of Kadar's policy of national reconciliation.

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In any case it is highly unlikely that this group -- essentially hardliners -- would cooperate with any non-Communist forces.

Religious: Over two-thirds of the population are -- at least nominally -- Roman Catholic. The role of the Church, however, is a passive one. The clergy did not, for example, participate in the 1956 revolt. The Church's open endorsement of resistance measures would play an important role, however, in influencing some segments of the population, especially the peasants.

Social: Though intellectuals played a major role in the dramatic prelude to the 1956 revolt, their active participation in resistance groups was quite limited. The Hungarian intellectual community is far more likely to react sharply to internal pressures than to external influences. At present, Hungarian intellectuals enjoy -- and know they enjoy -- greater freedom of expression than their colleagues anywhere else in Eastern Europe. There would be little pre-disposition therefore to respond favorably to any psychological warfare blandishments.

Hungarian youth and the urban industrial workers -- who were the backbone of the revolt in 1956 -- would again be the element most susceptible to psychological warfare. At the same time, they would probably remain indifferent to external propaganda influences -- as they now are to the exhortations of the Kadar regime -- unless a Western victory seemed assured. Once Western troops entered Hungary, however, the emotional momentum would be likely to carry across the entire country and give rise to widespread and unpredictable insurgency. It would then be difficult, if not impossible, to mould the youth into a cohesive force with definite objectives.

Security Forces: Hungary's internal security personnel are the most carefully selected, the most highly paid, and the most frequently purged personnel in the Hungarian government. They are among its most avid supporters, as well.

Military and Para-Military Forces: The loyalty to the regime of its military forces is dubious at best. While it is likely that Hungarian military units would refrain from direct action against their countrymen, the fear of communist reprisal is likely to lead them to adopt an attitude of inaction or neutrality during the crucial period. They would not constitute an effective opposition either to advancing Western forces or to indigenous resistance efforts.

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There are no known subversive organizations operating in Poland on a national scale, but there is evidence that passive, small-scale, localized, potentially subversive groups do exist. However, members of these groups, primarily youths, do not appear to be identified with any specific social or political group and appear to be motivated by little beyond their general resistance to authority as exemplified by the Communist regime.

In general, the attachment of the people to the Catholic Church, and their predominantly anti-Communist, anti-Russian, and anti-German attitudes are balanced by political realism. Tightening of internal discipline, the steady retreat from the relatively liberal policies of the immediate post-1956 era, and continuing poor economic conditions have engendered a rise in dissatisfaction among all strata of the population. These factors, however, have been more than outweighed by a concurrent rise in public apathy and the increased effectiveness of the reconstituted police apparatus.

The Polish people are strongly nationalistic and traditionally Western-oriented. Their nationalism, however, is dominant and they would oppose any regime which they would consider imposed either from East or West. Circumstances surrounding the outbreak of World War II and the subsequent occupation of the eastern half of the country by the USSR further strengthened the predisposition of the average Poles toward the Western powers. Wartime underground resistance was also predominantly Western-oriented, and Poland was the only country in Eastern Europe where Communist rule was significantly resisted by force of arms--with covert Western help--in the postwar period.

However, the courageous but futile resistance of Polish military forces to the German war machine in 1939 had a significant effect on postwar attitudes toward active and organized resistance. Together with the unsuccessful postwar resistance to Communist rule, and the failures of the East German and Hungarian uprisings in 1953 and 1956 respectively, the sobering effect on the people of the 1939 defeat has resulted in a decline of the reckless, heroic element in the Polish national character and in a growth of political apathy and fear of war.

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Ethnic: Ethnic minorities form an insignificant part of the Polish population. The largest of these are some 300,000 Ukrainians and White Russians, predominantly peasants, residing in the eastern portions of the country, and some 100,000 to 300,000 remaining ethnic Germans, mainly industrial workers, in the so-called Western Territories. Neither of these two groups, however, possess the cohesion to make them vulnerable to psychological warfare. Although the German minority is especially closely watched by the regime, the strong anti-German attitudes of the Poles alone would probably be sufficient to obviate any subversive activity on the part of this minority.

Party: Although policy differences exist within the Communist leadership, all members of the ruling class owe their present position and power to the fact of Communist rule. Certainly none of them entertain the idea that they could survive in any manner an overthrow of the present system. Although a large part--if not the overwhelming majority--of the Communist party rank and file composed of people who are not ideologically convinced Communists, and of outright opportunists, these people would probably be no more impelled toward subversive activity as party members than as members of the specific population groups to which they belong.

Religious: Although the regime and the Roman Catholic Church in Poland--to which almost 95 percent of the people belong--have been locked in an ideological struggle throughout almost the entire postwar period, the regime would probably seek to make peace with the Church in the event a conflict were imminent. For this reason, the vulnerability of the people on religious grounds would probably be minimal. For its part, the Church hierarchy probably realizes that its pre-World War II influence on the political and social order of the country would not be regained even under a non-Communist regime. Its traditionally strong support of Polish nationalism would generally make it subject to the same considerations of national survival as the bulk of the population.

Social: The vulnerability of most educated Poles, especially the youth and the intellectuals, has been lessened by widespread apathy and fear of the effects of any conflict on Polish national existence. Although these elements would probably support the establishment of a non-Communist regime brought about by external forces and presented as an accomplished fact, most of them would probably be unwilling to take part in the preliminary subversive activity under conditions which would likely involve open conflict.

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Few educated Poles would consider a return to the prewar political and social order. Most of them favor a Western type of social democracy as a social order and believe in Polish nationalism based on a vague allegiance to Europe as an entity. While these beliefs are strong, people do not appear prepared to struggle for them.

Most average Poles of working class or peasant origin, while hoping that Communist rule will someday be replaced by some other order, no longer envisage war as a viable instrument for such a change. Most of them fear that Poland as a state would cease to exist in the event of another world conflict, and that even a limited action in Central Europe would again find Polish territory devastated.

Military: The vulnerability of the Polish armed forces to psychological warfare would probably depend almost entirely on the circumstances surrounding the development and escalation of an East-West conflict, the specific issues involved, and the nationality of the opposing forces. Unit defection to Western forces in the event of a conflict would probably occur provided, however, that destruction of Polish territory could thereby be mitigated, and that German forces did not play any large role in the Polish sector. Individual desertion could occur on a more widespread basis particularly if troops were convinced that their presence "at home" would be more beneficial to Poland than armed resistance in the field.

Although numerous, the Polish para-military forces do not form a cohesive exploitable element. In spite of increasing controls over the para-military forces by elite security units, they would probably respond to psychological warfare directed at the specific population stratum from which individual members originate.

Security: The regime's prime security forces, having most to lose from an overthrow of the present leadership, would probably be unresponsive to psychological warfare.

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RUMANIA

In the event of any future war in Europe between the West and the Communist world, the Rumanian regime could be expected to side with the latter. The country's geographic position and military strength would offer it no other choice, at least in the first stages of any future conflagration. Moreover, the country's territorial integrity could not be genuinely guaranteed by any Western country or alliance at such a point. Faced with this stark situation, the Rumanians would undoubtedly prefer -- as the lesser of two evils -- to have foreign Communist troops on their territory as allies rather than as occupiers.

If the war became protracted, however, circumstances could arise which would lend themselves to exploitation by psychological warfare techniques. Thus, if the Rumanian leadership believed that it was on the losing side, the entire regime might transfer its allegiance, as it did during World Wars I and II. In such circumstances, traditional Rumanian Russophobia could be exploited and the country's territorial aspirations against the Soviet Union (Bessarabia) and Hungary (Transylvania) could be used as incentives.

If the war reached a point at which non-Communist foreign troops were on Rumanian soil, the success of psychological warfare methods probably would be largely influenced by the nationality of these troops. Thus, French and US troops would almost certainly be best received by the Rumanian populace. France was Rumania's patron during the period between World Wars I and II. US troops would be well regarded because of the large reservoir of goodwill extant between Rumanians and the US. The inclusion of German troops in an Allied army probably would not cause any significant problems. Conversely, in the unlikely situation that allied forces included large elements of Hungarian or Bulgarian troops, they would be very poorly received, because these nationalities constitute Rumania's traditional antagonists.

Ethnic: The only serious minority problem in Rumania is that of the Hungarians living in Transylvania and in the Banat. The antagonism between Rumanians and Hungarians has deep historical roots and stems from their linguistic, religious, and cultural differences -- an almost insurmountable barrier to assimilation or adjustment. Thus, the Rumanians regard the Hungarians as foreigners, whereas the Hungarians look upon the Rumanians with disdain, considering them both racially and culturally inferior.

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Tensions between Hungarians and Rumanians are exacerbated by remembrance of Hungarian attempts to Magyarize the Rumanian population of Transylvania before 1918, when the area was under Hungarian jurisdiction. Since the Communist takeover in Rumania following World War II, the Rumanians have seized the opportunity to "Rumanianize" Hungarians living in Transylvania. Without respect to which side Rumania joins in the event of war, the traditional antagonisms between Hungarians and Rumanians offer a fertile area for application of psychological warfare techniques, but support for one side in this problem will antagonize the other.

Party: The strength and stability of the Rumanian party leadership now and during the past decade has stemmed from its unusual unity. There is little or no likelihood of successfully employing psychological warfare methods against this leadership core to create divergencies and differences. The only exception would seem to be in the event that some elements of the leadership concluded it was on the losing side of the conflict. Lower levels of the Rumanian party also are free of factionalism, according to usually reliable sources.

Religious: There is no significant religious divisiveness to exploit in Rumania, because the people overwhelmingly adhere to the Orthodox Church.

Social: Neither Rumanian social classes nor the Rumanian people have a record of successful nationwide resistance. As a result of frequently being under foreign domination, Rumanians have developed a capacity for passively resisting actions they do not wish to take as well as an attitude of considerable caution toward foreign overtures.

Military: Like the Rumanian populace, the Rumanian military establishment is essentially nationalistic in outlook. In the event of war, however, the military and paramilitary forces at least initially would follow the regime's leaders. However the possibility that the military leaders might seek to take matters in their own hands and establish a military dictatorship loyal to their winning side can not be ruled out.

Security: Regime security forces are loyal to the regime and would not be vulnerable to psychological warfare techniques. Indeed their personal well-being would depend on supporting the regime.

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YUGOSLAVIA

In the event of a US-USSR war, Yugoslavia would probably declare a pro-Soviet neutrality. At the same time its armed forces would prepare to defend the country's borders from any attack -- either East or West. The army ultimately would expect to repair to the mountainous hinterland from which they would wage a partisan war as in World War II.

In the initial phase of a limited, non-nuclear conflict, it would be difficult for the West to kindle an active resistance campaign since the Titoist regime would maintain effective control.

However, if the war became prolonged and there was an imminent threat of invasion, expressions of the suppressed differences between Yugoslavia's nationalities would be likely, particularly in Yugoslavia's two northern republics -- Slovenia and Croatia -- and among the Albanian minority in the Kosmet. In Croatia, popular hopes would revive for establishing an independent Croatian state. Unconventional warfare might break out, since the Croatian Liberation Movement -- the most important of the nationalist subversive groups in Yugoslavia and a successor to the wartime Ustashi -- has some support within Croatia. While part of the Ustashi remained in Yugoslavia after the war, a large number of its leaders and members fled to the Americas, Italy and West Germany. Presently, its free-world headquarters is in Buenos Aires.

In Western-oriented Slovenia, hopes of eliminating the Communist regime would be reborn. Furthermore, the Organization of Slovene Anti-Communists -- the Slovenian underground movement -- would become more active.

In the Kosmet, the possibility of reunion with Albania would arise. Among the Serbs, remnants of General Mihailovic's Yugoslav Army probably would reorganize. Subversive activity would probably appear in Bosnia-Herzegovina -- the area of greatest concentration of non-Albanian Yugoslav Muslims.

For an Eastern invasion the population would provide little, if any, support. US backing for a partisan war, as in World War II, would be welcomed. However, the regime would not welcome the presence of organized Western units; on the contrary, their entry would be actively resisted by the regime.

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However, in the event of a Western invasion, the populations of Croatia and Slovenia would probably actively support Allied forces. In Serbia and the other Yugoslav republics, the populace would probably remain apathetic and passive for the most part.

In any event weighing and balancing off the competing interests of the Yugoslav nationality groups would be a difficult and discouraging task.

Furthermore, Western-inspired agitation among minorities would present a difficult, if not impossible task to clean up should the Western forces assume occupation of the country.

Ethnic: There are four major ethnic groups in Yugoslavia -- Serbs, Croats, Slovenes and Macedonians, as well as two sizeable minority groups -- Albanians and Hungarians. As indicated above, the Croats and Slovenes would be susceptible to Western psychological warfare techniques, and furnish recruits for unconventional warfare ventures. The possibility also exists that under these circumstances, the Slovenes and Croats would unite to help the West. The Serbs and Macedonians would tend to remain passive, unless Yugoslavia were invaded by the USSR. Partition of Yugoslav lands in order to return minority groups to their native areas would not encounter the same adverse reaction as would, for example, a similar move in Rumania. Except for the immediate geographical area affected, Yugoslavs in general would remain apathetic to this development.

Party: The regime would remain united and unsusceptible to Western efforts. The party hierarchy would probably run to the hills, and try to establish a second front.

Religious: The Croats and Slovenes are Roman Catholic, while the Serbs and Macedonians subscribe to the Orthodox faith. There are also a number of Albanian Muslims and Slavic stock in the Kosmet and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Religious frictions for the most part parallel competing aspirations among Yugoslavia's nationalities. Because during World War II, the non-Albanian Muslims sided with the Croats the former would provide some potential for Western psychological warfare successes.

Social: The nationality problem, more than social position, would be vulnerable to Western psychological warfare efforts. At the present time, the intellectual movement is not sufficiently organized and has no single spokesman to provide a good entré for Western psychological warfare attempts.

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The Yugoslav man-on-the-street tends to be apathetic and passive in his outlook. As a social group, peasants and workers would be apathetic to psychological warfare efforts since this group is primarily interested in its own existence. The young would also be passive in outlook essentially because the regime has succeeded in keeping youth from developing into an organized political force.

Military: The military could be expected fully to back the regime at least initially. In the event of a takeover by either the East or West, the military would probably be an ineffective opposition and remnants of the military hierarchy would probably follow the regime into the hills. Enlisted men, where possible, would tend to return to their native regions and participate in whatever activities their nationality groups would be undertaking.

Security: The security forces would be unlikely to defect to the West and would remain loyal to the bitter end to the Communist regime realizing full well that they are despised by the population at large and would have no other recourse.

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USSR

1. Since the death of Stalin, dissidence in the Soviet Union has decreased. There has been grumbling and criticism, particularly following the denigration of Stalin at the 20th CPSU Congress in early 1956 and again following the disastrous harvest of 1963. But, on the whole, this criticism has not been "counter-revolutionary" nor has it envisaged the overthrow of the Soviet state. On the contrary, during the past four decades widespread identification with the Soviet national state and many of its institutional features has unquestionably developed.

2. The people of the USSR have had to endure extraordinary hardships for years. Improvements in their standards of living and the relaxation of political terror since 1953 served to decrease the intensity of dissidence and probably have eliminated, for the time being, actual resistance potential. Although the improvement of living standards has lagged far behind over-all rates of economic growth, the Kremlin has been putting increasing emphasis on raising levels of consumption. Discontent arising from economic causes will diminish as consumer welfare improves, although this effect will be partially offset as expectations aroused by regime promises are disappointed and as familiarity with Western standards grows. It should not necessarily be assumed, however, that closer contacts with the West will inevitably generate more dissatisfaction among the Soviet rank and file. The spectacular successes of Soviet science have almost certainly strengthened the allegiance of the people to the regime. Many have come to believe that the eventual supremacy of the USSR is certain and that ultimately the Russian people will be better off than the peoples in the free world.

3. There remain, however, some sources of dissidence that continue to create difficulties for the regime. The national minorities, constituting 45 percent of the Soviet population of a little over 229 million have for many years provided centers of resistance. The degree of dissidence has varied sharply; many of the more backward have viewed Russian dominion favorably and would probably remain as loyal to the regime as Russian citizens generally. Ethnic-national feelings, however, remain particularly strong in some areas. The principal ones are discussed below:

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a. The Baltic Republics

1) Resistance potential in the Soviet Union is probably highest in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The most important single factor in Baltic opposition to Soviet rule is the experience of national independence between the world wars. The bitter memory of forced Soviet annexation is intensified by the brutality of Soviet rule, which brought the exile or liquidation of hundreds of thousands of natives, by the radical depression of living standards, and by the imposition of the rule and immigration of the traditionally hated and feared Russians. Outright Communist sympathizers comprise only a minute fraction of the native population. Many native Communist Party leaders lived in the USSR when the Baltic states were independent and returned only upon Soviet annexation of their native countries; Balts in general look on them as renegades.

2) The regime brought the Baltic states under control through the use of militarized security forces and Army troops. Suspect elements of the population were deported during the 1945-50 period and later replaced by other ethnic groups, mainly Russian. Subsequent penetration of resistance groups by security organs along with individual deportations, depleted the Baltic states of resistance leadership, organization, and activity. Russification of government organizations has proved effective in keeping potential resistance in check. Feelings of dissidence are widespread but cannot be evaluated accurately because the populations have little opportunity to translate dissidence into action. Both because of the strategic position of the area and the known disaffection of the native population, security measures in the Baltics have been more stringent than elsewhere in the USSR.

3) The outbreak of war between the Soviet Bloc and the West would undoubtedly increase resistance potential in the Baltic states. In any future war, however, Soviet security measures would probably be adequate to prevent large-scale organization of military and political warfare in the Baltics of more than nuisance value. Only if the Soviet control force were demoralized and its communications disrupted could widespread resistance be expected. Under anti-Soviet occupation, native Balts would be unlikely to participate in pro-Soviet partisan activity and most would lend their hearty support to the liquidation of Russian partisans or pro-Soviet native elements in the area.

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4) Baltic resistance potential in wartime would be little affected by such matters as the nationality of the attacking forces or which side initiated hostilities. Even German rule would be considered preferable to Soviet (the Nazi occupation of the area having been comparatively mild), although Balts might resist Soviet rule with somewhat greater determination if the attacking forces were non-German.

b. The Ukraine

1) Ukrainian nationalism, although of dwindling importance, continues to be a political factor with which the Soviet regime must reckon. The Ukrainians are the largest minority group in the USSR and the political, economic and strategic importance of the Ukraine is second only to the RSFSR.

2) The intensity of Ukrainian nationalist feeling is difficult to measure. A great many Ukrainians, probably the majority, are loyal members of Soviet society, particularly now that living standards are gradually rising and police controls have been slightly relaxed. Russification has probably gone further in the eastern Ukraine than in any other of the non-Russian lands and has been much more successful in industrial cities, which now contain large numbers of Great Russians, than in towns and villages. Russians and Ukrainians have mingled together there for hundreds of years and the educated members of society know both languages equally well. Nationalistic sentiments increase as one moves westward in the Ukraine away from the Russian lands. Opposition to Soviet rule is believed to be most intense in the territories absorbed during World War II along the Soviet Union's western borders, where memories of Sovietization are freshest. Resentment of the Russians is not confined here to Ukrainians alone, but is shared by such other minority groups in the area as Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, and Rumanians.

3) Ukrainian nationalist tensions, however, although a continuing nuisance for the Soviet administration, do not now represent any serious threat to the regime. Only in the event of a disintegration of Soviet central controls might Ukrainian nationalism rise to the surface and serve as a focus for an anti-Soviet resistance movement. Since the suppression of the Hungarian revolt, there is reportedly little sympathy for a violent form of resistance. Instead, sophisticated Ukrainian nationalists, staying within the

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bounds of the law and officially approved behavior, work for the maintenance and fostering of a Ukrainian national feeling. Apparently it is hoped that this nationalism can be kept alive and that it will serve as an ideological basis for a free Ukraine in the future. Meanwhile, however, life within the Ukraine is becoming more tolerable, thus acting to decrease resistance potential.

4) In the event of war, Ukrainians would probably not try to engage in large-scale resistance activities while Soviet military controls remained in force. They remember the tragic results of their resistance to the Soviet regime during World War II. They would be unlikely to commit themselves to resistance against the Soviet regime unless they were convinced the USSR would lose the war. In other words, Ukrainian dissidence could not be expected to serve a potential enemy of the USSR until the outcome of a war were largely determined. In fact, most Ukrainian soldiers would probably fight fiercely on the Russian side. The question of who initiated the war probably would matter little, nor would the nationality of invading forces, with the exception of Germans, who almost certainly would be fiercely resented even as part of an international force. Their presence on Ukrainian soil would seriously impair the development of anti-Communist resistance.

c. The Caucasus

1) Any evaluation of disaffection in the Caucasus must take into account the differing peoples of this area. While there are elements of discontent common to all the indigenous peoples of the area which unite them against the regime, there are also factors which set the Georgians, Armenians, and Azerbaydzhani peoples apart from each other. The Georgians and Armenians, for reasons of longer independent nationhood and a common religion (Christianity), feel superior to the Azerbaydzhani, a Moslem people. At the same time, the Georgians, because of a longer and more unbroken period of independence than the Armenians, feel superior to the latter, who harbor a latent distrust of their mountain neighbors. The underlying basis for regime oriented dissatisfaction and discontent, however, is to be found in an anti-Russian attitude on the part of all the native peoples. Such factors as non-Slavic lineage, distinct languages, different cultural and historical heritages have imparted a sense of national distinctiveness which make the peoples look upon the Russians as interlopers, late-comers, and foreign colonizers.

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2) While difficult to document as to scope and intensity, anti-Russianism is demonstrated by the limited amount of social contact between minorities and Russians. Certain areas of large Caucasian cities appear to be separated into Slavic and non-Slavic sections. Intermarriage does not appear to be too common and is frequently frowned on. Apart from the Party and government elite, discontent would appear to extend to all strata of the population in varying degrees. The politically more mature Georgians have been most vocal in expressing dissidence in the post-Stalin period, followed by the Armenians and the Azerbaydzhani in that order. Among the Georgians, students and intellectuals are the most noteworthy dissident elements. In Armenia, the most disaffected group appears to be the Armenians who returned to Soviet Armenia in the early post-World War II period. Estimates of the numbers who returned range from 25,000 to 100,000. Their disaffection results mainly from very poor economic conditions and the fact that they are not completely accepted by the local population. Nowhere in the Caucasus, however, does discontent appear to be intense enough to translate itself into resistance activity. Furthermore, the post-war history of dissidence in the Caucasus suggests that while there was some resistance, it was on an unorganized basis and without particular goals in mind.

3) Anti-regime resistance under conditions of actual warfare would depend considerably on the type and location of war being fought. As long as the theater of operations remained outside the Caucasus, the likelihood of resistance operations would remain small because of the increased security measures. If the tide of battle turned conclusively against the Soviet regime, the potential for organized resistance on an expanded basis would increase sharply. Otherwise, the memory of Soviet punishment of World War II collaborators would militate against resistance movements. The optimum conditions for organized resistance would, of course, occur if the Caucasus became a theater of war or if the collapse of central authority were imminent. If either should occur, resistance activities would probably be limited to assistance to enemy forces in providing intelligence information, harassment of Soviet security and armed forces, and help in escape and evasion operations. Independent military activity against Soviet forces probably would be beyond the capacity of resistance groups.

4) With the exception of the Germans who might encounter hostility because of their World War II policies, only the Turks might arouse Armenian antagonism; the Armenian

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massacres in the late 1890's and during World War I are not yet forgotten. The question of the responsibility for the instigation of hostilities would have little effect on resistance activities. However, the occupation policies of the invading force would have a strong impact on the local populations. The Soviet postwar propaganda campaign depicting the horrors of German occupation in other parts of the country was designed in part to overcome any latent sympathy in such areas as the Caucasus for future "liberating" forces.

4. Despite efforts by the Communist rulers to establish complete control over the thinking of the Soviet people and to ensure their loyalty in all contingencies, there is evidence that each social class and occupational division has its own set of grievances, a number of them common to all groups. Among the more important of the latter are the extensive interference of the state in the lives of the citizenry and the unremitting pressures for the fulfillment of national economic plans. All groups also resent the saturation of the citizenry with propaganda and the limitations on free intellectual inquiry which are characteristic of Soviet rule. Dissidence within defined groups is discussed below:

a. Intellectuals -- The intelligentsia, in general, stands high in Soviet society in terms of income and prestige, and many of them, particularly among the bureaucrats and engineers, have a vested interest in the regime. Most scientists, moreover, seem to enjoy both official support and relative freedom of pursuit in their fields. The limited relaxation of controls in recent years has emboldened intellectuals in many less favored fields to protest against party controls, though usually by implication only. These protests show that virtually all prominent writers, artists, composers, and scholars would welcome more freedom of expression. Although the post-Stalin regimes have somewhat relaxed the extremely stringent Stalinist conformism, they have maintained most of the old doctrines, and merely enforce them with greater flexibility and leniency. Strictures on creative expression remain tight enough to cause widespread dissidence among the more sensitive intellectuals. The dissidence of Soviet intellectuals is not necessarily one of hostility against the Soviet system as such, -- although questioning of the system has become increasingly implicit in recent years--but is more often directed against specific abuses and the excessive conformism demanded by the Soviet leaders.

b. Students and Youth -- There is some student dissidence, and there have been demonstrations by young people

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against the discipline and the drabness of Soviet life. As a result of a higher intellectual level achieved by improved Soviet education, of the atmosphere of relaxation following the death of Stalin, the lessons of the Hungarian revolution, the 1963 harvest failure, and the fall of Khrushchev, youth has turned an increasingly critical eye on the disparity between Communist theory and practice. But in spite of the fact that students are now at least better equipped to think for themselves and that the regime apparently allows for greater leniency in dealing with young deviationists, it would be incorrect to consider Soviet youth a generally disloyal group. Young people remain Soviet patriots even though their understanding of ideology may be superficial and their adherence to it perfunctory. The fact remains that they as yet know comparatively little of the Western world and that their thinking is strongly influenced by state-defined ideological indoctrination. It is doubtful, therefore, that their dissidence constitutes a serious threat to the regime; it is much more likely to be directed towards gradual reform than revolution.

c. Peasants -- Of all social groups, the peasants have perhaps suffered most under Soviet rule. During the all-out collectivization drive in the 30's peasants resisted the central authorities by burning crops, destroying farm implements and slaughtering livestock wholesale. The regime resorted to ruthless methods to impose collectivization and as a result some 1,000,000 peasants died from famine. Many of the present rural population have vivid recollections of those days and hostility continues strong toward the collective farm system and the low living standards identified with it. These living standards have risen substantially since 1953 because of successive increases in the prices paid for compulsory state deliveries, but they generally remain below what the peasant thinks he could obtain from a free market. In addition, bureaucratic rigidities and past attempts to eliminate their private plots and personal livestock offend the peasants' sense of individuality and tend to alienate them from the regime. Nevertheless, they have been virtually free from police terror in recent years, and with the older generation dying out, the agricultural workers' resistance potential is decreasing.

d. Industrial Workers -- Grievances of the workers stem mainly from low pay, strict discipline, and bureaucratic arbitrariness. The semi-skilled and unskilled, receiving much lower pay and fewer privileges than the highly skilled, are probably the most disaffected. However, their living standard has steadily improved and there is now less emphasis

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on the harsh labor discipline that was once a chief factor of dissidence among workers during Stalin's rule. Generally, the resistance potential of this group is low, and, with further economic improvements as well as over-all successes of the regime, may further decrease.

e. Armed Forces -- The Soviet armed forces form the backbone of the country's security system and its members are one of the most favored groups in Soviet society. Besides purchasing loyalty through material benefits, the regime maintains an extensive system of Party controls and secret police informants in an effort to insure the reliability of military personnel and uncover any instances of subversive activity. While there seems little reason to doubt the over-all loyalty of the armed forces, areas of discontent do exist. Some dissatisfaction among conscripts is a reaction to unpleasant aspects of military life, such as low pay, harsh discipline, and lack of free time--conditions which are considerably more severe for the ordinary Soviet soldier than for his American counterpart. Servicemen's attitudes also reflect various forms of discontent found among the population at large, such as minority nationalism or dislike of the collective farm system. However, aside from occasional individual defections to the West, there is little evidence of resistance on the part of Soviet military personnel. While the Soviet enlisted man detests compulsory political indoctrination, his patriotism, as distinct from his "political consciousness," is believed to be high. Moreover, the permanent cadre of officers and non-commissioned officers, which constitute about 20% of the total strength of the armed forces, is composed of patriotic and, at least in the highest ranks, thoroughly indoctrinated men. The majority of officers are Party members, and virtually all in the highest ranks belong to the Party. On the whole, there is little if any resistance potential to be found in the Soviet armed forces.

5. The regime seeks to inhibit dissidence by a vast propaganda campaign designed to popularize the Communist Party and the Soviet system and to discredit all Western countries in the eyes of the populace. The regime also maintains a secret police organization under the control of the Committee of State Security (KGB) of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, for the purpose of maintaining complete surveillance over the population and ferreting out any individuals or organizations exhibiting actual or potential anti-regime tendencies. A large number of militarized security forces (most of them Border and Interior Troops) are kept in constant readiness to quell anti-regime

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uprisings. Punitive measures, including prison sentences and exile to remote areas of the USSR, serve both to remove active resistance elements and to discourage further resistance activity. The effectiveness of the government's actions is reflected in the evident stability of the regime. While the trend in the Soviet Union appears to be toward less stringent application of security controls, there is every indication that the security apparatus itself has lost none of its effectiveness.

6. The regime has shown its ability to control local and sporadic disturbances. In the event of a revolt in a national minority area, Soviet military units in the area, which usually consist of cross sections of many Soviet nationalities, would hardly be vulnerable, as were the Hungarian and Polish forces, to any nationalist appeal. In case of a simultaneous or rapidly spreading revolt in several heavily populated areas, the Soviet regime, due to its formidable security apparatus, would appear to be in a better position to defend itself than any other government in the world.

7. Present capabilities for resistance are virtually nonexistent. The maximum that can be expected from the overwhelming majority of the Soviet people, and particularly the Russians, is dissidence of a type that is not necessarily directed against the system as such. On the other hand, in a monolithic state, opposition to a part of the system can be regarded as tantamount to opposition to the system as a whole; the Soviet leaders almost certainly so consider it. A steady improvement in the living standard would almost certainly reduce an important source of dissidence, but not that of intellectuals and students, for example. A deterioration in living conditions would add to other sources of dissidence and raise resistance potential in time of crisis.

8. Anti-Communist or anti-regime resistance in the USSR in wartime would depend largely on the length, severity, and location of the war and on the course of its military operations. The mere initiation of hostilities would not ipso facto increase the resistance potential. It is almost certain that the regime's appeal to Soviet patriotism would not fall on deaf ears and that most of the Soviet peoples, with the exception of some national minorities, would work and fight for the defense of their homeland. Moreover, security control would undoubtedly be stepped up and dissidents would find it more difficult to organize and more dangerous to state their views than in peacetime.

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9. If the war were prolonged and the USSR suffered major reverses, resistance potential would probably increase. However, in view of Soviet behavior during World War II and considering the fact that since then the USSR has become stronger and has acquired more prestige, it cannot be assumed that popular suffering from great hardships, tensions, and tighter controls would in itself catalyze dissidence into resistance. Only if war damage were sufficient to cause a breakdown of central authority would organized resistance develop. Short of this contingency, even if the regime were weakened, anti-regime resistance would still be regarded as treason and enough security controls would remain to render organization of resistance very difficult.

10. Active resistance would become more likely if the tide of the war turned definitely against the USSR and foreign troops entered the country. Until that point, many anti-Soviet elements would be afraid to act, remembering the severe penalties imposed on collaborators with the Germans after World War II. Particularly in minority areas along the border, extensive anti-Soviet activity could be expected as anti-Soviet forces approached. Many natives inspired with the vision of liberation would take to the woods and form partisan bands, as they did during and after World War II, raiding supply lines, performing acts of sabotage, providing intelligence and helping in escape and evasion operations. Some groups in other parts of the USSR would be willing to offer assistance if communication could be established with them. Many exiled Germans, North Caucasians, Crimean Tatars, and Balts in Central Asia, the Altay territory, and Siberia probably would be willing intelligence collectors. However, it would be difficult to organize active resistance in areas still under Soviet control.

11. In the event of an impending collapse of the Soviet government, anti-Soviet elements of the population could attain significant resistance capabilities, particularly with external support. But apart from these elements, resistance among the broad masses of the Great Russian people would be difficult to organize. Patriotism, indoctrinated respect for Soviet authority, and apathy probably would render them passive and disinclined to active opposition. Therefore, even if the security apparatus were seriously weakened, little resistance activity could be expected from the mass of the Great Russian population beyond local harassing operations and defections. Similarly, the most common reaction to a foreign occupation of Soviet territory probably would be passivity and suspicion. Memories

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of the last war are still fresh and the people have not forgotten the brutality of the German occupation, as well as the subsequent Soviet revenge for collaboration. Since Soviet propaganda would try to equate the activities of the invaders with those of the Germans in the last war, occupation policies would be crucial in determining the attitude of the masses.

12. A nuclear attack on any scale is unlikely immediately to either increase or decrease resistance activities among the survivors to any appreciable extent. However, within a short period of time the extreme hardships brought about by even a small nuclear attack would tend to create actions of desperation which, whether intended or not, would have the effect of resistance. At the same time inevitable disruption of the control structure resulting from such an attack would reduce the regime's capability to deal with such elements. If a limited nuclear attack were planned and executed so as to reduce Soviet administrative, political and military control but to minimize general population casualties in national minority areas, such as the Latvian, Estonian and Lithuanian SSR's, the Georgian SSR, and to a lesser extent the Ukraine, it is probable that resistance activities in these areas would become greatly intensified, particularly if they received external support.

13. Such resistance potential as does exist would probably not be affected by the question of which side started the war. It can be taken for granted that the Soviet government would do all it could to shift the blame to the free world in general and the United States in particular. It may be assumed that potential resisters as well as many dissidents would anticipate such propaganda and not pay too much attention to it. The population as a whole, even if impressed with Soviet arguments at the beginning of the war, would in the long run be influenced by the trend of the war rather than by the question as to who attacked whom first. Also, the nationality of the attacking forces would probably have little effect on long-range popular attitudes, except that popular opposition to the invaders would almost certainly be much stronger against Germans than other nationalities.

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