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OCI No. 1496/65

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Office of Current Intelligence  
2 May 1965**

**INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM****Situation and Outlook in the Dominican Republic****1. Military Position**

The rebel forces continue to dominate the military situation and are apparently using the tenuous cease fire to strengthen their positions. Numbering between two and five thousand, they are concentrated in the southeastern area of the city. The rebels appear to be well armed, adequately supplied and determined to continue the fight.

**2. Loyalist Forces**

The loyalist forces are completely inadequate even to police the cease fire. Most of the troops under Brigadier General Wessin y Wessin, numbering about 1,250 men, have withdrawn to the east side of the Duarte Bridge for their own safety. Brigadier General Salvador Montas Guerrero with about 200 men has apparently abandoned the National Palace leaving the entire southeastern area under rebel control. Army Chief Rivera Cuesta is commanding about 400 troops in the northwestern part of the city and 1,200 naval combat troops are deployed around the fair grounds. Approximately 2,400 police are defending their headquarters and the police radio station. There are no other loyalist troops in the city.

**3. US Forces**

As of 0430 EDT US military forces in the Dominican Republic totalled 7,874--including 2,955 Marines and 4,919 Army troops. Marine casualties are two killed and 20 wounded; Army casualties are one

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killed, another probably killed and 16 wounded. A large gap still remains between the 82nd Airborne and the Marine phase line in the western part of the city. Many of the Army casualties occurred early last night when a patrol was sent from the Army beachhead at the Duarte Bridge to the Marine phase line.

#### 4. The Interior

Various reports show that the interior generally remains calm and this may indicate a lack of sympathy for the rebel cause. The longer the present situation exists, however, the greater is the chance that the countryside will grow more restive. A report via ham radio last night from the US Consul in Santiago, the country's second largest city, stated that while all communications are out, conditions in the consular district are generally good, with Dominican military and police units in effective control. The highway to Santiago remains closed since rebels reportedly overran a police post at Villa Altigracia yesterday.

#### 5. General Political Situation

Neither the rebels nor the loyalists now appear to have the ability or the means to form an effective instrument of national political control. The rebels, aside from their insistence that the "constitutional forces" take over the government, are believed to be thoroughly divided over how this should properly be done and who should play what role. This fragmentation serves only the purposes of the Communists and extremists who now dominate the rebel movement. Another factor favoring the Communists is an apparent lack of widespread popular support for Bosch himself to return and take over the government. [REDACTED] yesterday found more enthusiasm for "constitutionality" per se than for Bosch during their talks with Dominicans in Santo Domingo hospitals. In addition, the loyalist force and its junta have no one in whom the public has any confidence.

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## 6. Latin American Reactions

Reaction thus far has generally been fairly restrained, except in the case of Castro's Cuba, but an increasingly active role by US military forces now present in the Dominican Republic would probably result in an almost universal condemnation of the US and in a flurry of violent attacks on US installations around the hemisphere. Most informed Latin American officials at the moment probably have little or no sympathy for the Communists and extremists whom they have learned are dominating the Dominican rebel forces. By the same token, however, neither do they have any sympathy for the military forces such as General Wessin and other officers leading the loyalist forces. Any sudden change for the better in the loyalists' fortunes would be viewed with deep suspicion by most other Latin American countries.

## 7. Conclusions

(a) Neither of the contending forces in the capital is now capable of imposing its will on the other. The loyalists are weak, disorganized, and lack popular support. The rebels, although strongly ribbed by well-trained extremist leaders and in command of the most populous parts of the capital, cannot significantly expand their position in the city as long as US troops remain.

(b) The rebels probably have two immediate goals: (1) to use the present lull to consolidate their positions in the capital and to stimulate provincial areas to declare for them; and (2) to insure themselves a "large piece" of whatever arrangement the OAS authorities are finally able to put together.

(c) As the present situation becomes more fixed, we believe the status of the rebel forces will receive increasing if grudging support from other Latin Americans. Certainly the international repugnance to any effort to "clean out" the rebel area will grow as each day passes. This could, of course, be reversed if the rebels should become aggressive and persistently violate the truce.

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