

4 OCT 1965

Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House


Dear Mac:

I am enclosing several copies of a declassified version of our recent memorandum on the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam for whatever use you feel might be made of it in the public information field.

Although we can vouch for the accuracy of the facts in the document and can defend the judgments made on the basis of these facts, I would suggest that the draft be subjected to a careful review in the light of policy considerations and from the viewpoint of those who may have to answer questions about its content from Congress, the press and the public.

I do think that whatever is done with it, this Agency's role in the process should end at this stage. I will, of course, be happy to make available the services of the principal authors for consultation, as we did for the production of Aggression from the North. I am sending copies to Bill Jordan and have on hand two dozen more for delivery to whomever you may designate to carry the project forward.

Sincerely,




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Ray S. Cline
Deputy Director for Intelligence

Enclosures: as stated

cc: Mr. William Jordan

SECRET



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22 September 1965

MEMORANDUM:

THE ORGANIZATION, ACTIVITIES, AND OBJECTIVES
OF THE COMMUNIST FRONT IN SOUTH VIETNAM

The National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV) is ostensibly a democratic and independent organization. In reality, it was established by and receives its over-all guidance from North Vietnam. The NFLSV provides the Communists with a banner under which all facets of insurgent political and military activity in the South are organized. The Front is also designed to provide an alternative to the Government of South Vietnam. The Communists have set out in the Front's name a program of broad political and economic objectives which can be accepted by the majority of people in the South. A phalanx of affiliated front organizations has also been created to give the impression that the NFLSV embodies every significant social, ethnic, religious, and professional group.

The top public posts in the NFLSV were studied with a number of "progressive" South Vietnamese, most of whom are crypto-Communists. Behind these men are the hard-core Communist leaders in the South who are members of the "People's Revolutionary Party" (PRP)--the southern branch of the Communist party in North Vietnam. The evidence indicates that PRP committees exist down to the hamlet level in insurgent-controlled areas. With the intensification of the war in the past few months, the PRP has begun to take a more open role in directing NFLSV affairs.

NFLSV committees have also been established down to the hamlet level throughout most of the insurgent-held area. These committees, controlled by the local Communists, often exercise a wide variety of governmental-type functions, including the collection of taxes and the organization of the local economy. Even in the areas held firmly by the rebels, however, the NFLSV has failed to pick up an independent following of any size, and its authority is based mainly on insurgent coercion. The Front has also been unable to attract any significant support from any of the politically influential groups, such as the Buddhists and the labor unions, outside the Communist-held sectors.

On the international scene, aided and abetted by the DRV, Liberation Front efforts to publicize the activities and program of the insurgents have steadily expanded since the first permanent NFLSV office was opened abroad in 1962. There are now seven permanent Front missions abroad, several of them in Free World countries. During the past few months, the Vietnamese Communists have waged an increasingly vigorous campaign to gain Free World acceptance of the NFLSV as the "legitimate representative" of the South Vietnamese people. This campaign has involved a broadening of Communist claims on the extent of Front control in South Vietnam, and a further open assumption of government trappings by the NFLSV. So far, the Communists have stopped short of declaring the formation of a provisional Front government at the national level in South Vietnam.

THE ORGANIZATION, ACTIVITIES, AND OBJECTIVES
OF THE COMMUNIST FRONT IN SOUTH VIETNAM

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STATINTL

The Formation of the Front

1. The Ho Chi Minh - led Communists in Indochina have persistently operated under the cover of a large "front" movement. While resisting the Japanese during World War II, Ho and his comrades functioned behind the facade of the old Viet Minh league. In 1946, they formed the Lien Viet, or Vietnam United Front, to conceal Communist direction of the war against France. When the struggle shifted to South Vietnam following the Geneva agreements of 1954, the North Vietnamese organized the Vietnam Fatherland Front to garner support for "reunification" with the South.

2. This organization, headquartered in North Vietnam, had little success in luring public backing in the South. In late 1958, Hanoi apparently began to plan to revitalize its Front apparatus in South Vietnam. Viet Cong documents captured in that period disclosed the Communists' chagrin at their failure to win a significant following in the South. These documents also indicated that the Viet Cong fully appreciated the importance of winning popular favor if their rebellion was to have any chance of eventual success.

3. The theory underlying the Communist front movement in Vietnam has been to establish very broad, general objectives which can be accepted by the majority of people, and then to enlist support from every section of the population in an all-embracing political organization. If properly carried out, "all the people" will unite in one organization against the "enemy"--in this case the Saigon government. This theory is implicit in the treatise on revolution in Vietnam, People's War, People's Army, written by the North Vietnamese minister of defense in 1961.

4. By September 1960, Hanoi had apparently completed its general plans for a new and widely based front organization, ostensibly indigenous to the South. At a North Vietnamese party congress in September, Le Duan, the party first secretary, called for the creation of a "broad united front" in the South which would have the long-range goal of establishing a "national democratic coalition government."

5. The abortive coup against the Saigon regime in November 1960 provided the final impetus for the formation of the Front. The insurgents announced the establishment of the "National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam" on 20 December. In order to sustain the fiction that the NFLSV was the product of an indigenous band of patriots in the South, Hanoi itself gave no publicity to the new organization until January 1961.

6. The Front's manifesto was first aired in a Hanoi radiobroadcast on 29 January 1961--a procedure which itself testified to North Vietnam's guiding role in the formation of the organization. When broadcast again from Hanoi on 11 February, the manifesto contained several significant changes. These changes eliminated material the DRV, on second thought, apparently believed would tend to undercut potential support for the Front in South Vietnam. Some passages which suggested Communist origin or ambitions were altered or deleted. The term "agrarian reform," for example, was dropped. Vicious and bloody excesses had been carried out under this slogan in North Vietnam, and had caused widespread revulsion in the South.

The Manifesto's Ten Points

7. In its final version, the manifesto bore a remarkable similarity to Le Duan's speech before the party congress in Hanoi, even using his words to describe some of the Front's aims. Outlining a ten-point program, the document declared that the Front's most immediate task was to overthrow the Saigon government, implicitly through armed revolution. When this was achieved, the Front would form a "broad national democratic coalition administration" to "negotiate" with North Vietnam on "reunification." These and other goals of the Front, such as the adoption of a foreign policy of "peace and neutrality," and the redistribution of land in the South were identical with the actions long advocated for South Vietnam in Hanoi propaganda broadcasts. The goals were phrased in such a manner, however, that the politically inexperienced masses in the South would understand them to mean little more than the replacement of the current Saigon government by a more "representative, humane" administration.


8. The manifesto contained several highly generalized statements on the necessity for social and economic reforms. These were designed to appeal to many of the politically and socially dissatisfied elements in the South. Such words as democracy, social justice, full employment, higher wages, and lower rents, were liberally used. A general amnesty to all political prisoners of the Saigon government was promised. The document also played on Vietnamese sentiments of nationalism, calling for the elimination of foreign cultural influences and a return to Vietnamese traditions.

9. Partly because the Front manifesto concentrated on the political aims of the insurgency, and also because early Front propaganda primarily stressed the political activities of the NFLSV, the impression was created that Hanoi intended the new organization to serve mainly as the "political arm" of the Viet Cong. In fact, however, Hanoi intended that the NFLSV provide a facade covering all facets of Viet Cong activity in South Vietnam, military as well as political. Shortly after the Front's formation, for example, it was publicly announced that all the insurgent forces had been organized into the "Liberation Army of South Vietnam" under the leadership of the NFLSV. Today, the Communists attempt to carry out as much insurgent activity as possible in the name of the Front, whether it is a military directive for an attack on a government post, a propaganda harangue at gunpoint in a village compound, or an official public statement on policy.

Staffing the Front's Top Public Posts

10. In order to support the assertions in the Front manifesto that the NFLSV was a broadly based organization embracing many shades of popular opposition to the Saigon government, the Vietnamese Communists studded the announced leadership of the Front with a number of "progressive" South Vietnamese who could not be positively identified as card-carrying Communists. These men were to run the day-to-day activities of the Front's public administrative apparatus, while remaining fully pliable to hard-core Communist direction in the background.

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NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM



11. The objective was to give the Front the appearance of broad representation among workers, religious orders, soldiers, farmers, and intellectuals in South Vietnam. The Viet Cong also attempted to select persons who would add prestige to the NFLSV and who would be capable of winning active public support. Reports of the organization of bodies affiliated with the Front suggest that the Communists always made sure that at least the secretary of the committee was a Communist.

12. It appears that the Communists had a good deal of difficulty in securing enough of the right type of personnel for all of the top public posts in the Front. Although the first NFLSV central committee announced in March 1962 reserved places for 52 members, it contained only 31 names, most of them unknowns even in South Vietnam. NFLSV propaganda claimed that the meeting at which the central committee was elected was "truly representative of the people" and heavily attended. Actually, fewer than 200 people participated.

13. The second central committee, announced in January 1964, had only 41 members. Of the original 31 placed on the first committee, only about half retained their posts, suggesting that a number of the original appointees proved incapable of fulfilling their duties. Despite Hanoi's wish to conceal the real Communist domination of the Front, the Communist associations of those chosen to fill the top public posts in the NFLSV stand out clearly.

14. Most of the top NFLSV leaders are known to have long histories of cooperation with Ho Chi Minh's old Viet Minh league. The chairman of the central committee, Nguyen Huu Tho, is a lawyer who has been involved in pro-Communist political agitation in Vietnam since 1947. Tho acts as the major public spokesman for the NFLSV. Although Tho claims in public to be a "socialist," and to represent an affiliated socialist party in the Front, he is clearly a crypto-Communist.

15. Nguyen Van Hieu, the first secretary general of the Front central committee, was a leftist journalist who had spent most of his career propagandizing in favor of the Communists and North Vietnam. In 1963, Hieu relinquished the post of secretary general


THE
LIBERATION FRONT
SPOKESMEN



Nguyen Huu Tho
Chairman



Huynh Tan Phat
Secretary General



Nguyen Van Hieu
A Leading Official Abroad



Phung Van Cung
A Leading NFLSV Propagandist

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and went to Prague to direct some of the Front's foreign activities. Hieu's eventual successor as secretary general, Huynh Tan Phat, has apparently been under North Vietnamese tutelage since he took his "democratic" party into the Viet Minh fold in the early 1950s. Phung Van Cung, who heads up both the Front Red Cross and the Front Peace Committee, is also a former Viet Minh. Another top public leader of the NFLSV is Tran Buu Khiem, who heads the Front's Foreign Affairs Commission. He is reported to have been one of the organizers of the Viet Cong military effort and a former chief of security for the Communist organization in South Vietnam.

The People's Revolutionary Party

16. Behind the publicly acknowledged leaders of the NFLSV, there is another, clandestine, group of professional revolutionaries, most of whom are apparently fullfledged members of the Lao Dong Party, the name taken by the North Vietnamese Communists. They also belong to, and are the leaders in, the so-called "People's Revolutionary Party" (PRP), the southern component of the Communist party in the DRV. This southern branch was apparently organized in late 1961, about a year after the formation of the NFLSV. Its founding was announced publicly by a Liberation Front spokesman in January 1962. Although the announcement admitted the PRP's lineal descent from the original Indochinese Communist Party, it was phrased so as to give the impression that the decision to organize the PRP was taken by the Communists in South Vietnam.

17. The fact that the PRP and the Lao Dong Party are identical was revealed in a secret Lao Dong central committee resolution of November 1961:

First of all, it must be clearly understood that this is only a name change. Although the overt name is different from what it is in North Vietnam, nevertheless, secretly... the party segment in South Vietnam is a segment of the Lao Dong party under the leadership of the party central committee, headed by Chairman Ho...except for the name, there is no change whatever.

18. All of the hard-core Communist leaders in the South are shadowy figures, but several have become known from the interrogation reports of defectors and captured Viet Cong. Hanoi inadvertently revealed in 1960 that some members of the DRV party central committee were operating in South Vietnam.

19. One Muoi Cuc was among those listed. Muoi Cuc, or Nguyen Van Cuc as he is also known, now is reputed to be the top Communist military-political leader in the South, and is said to run the over-all Communist headquarters, the so-called Central Office for South Vietnam. He was the Viet Minh political commissar for the Saigon area during the war against France, and is a southerner by birth. He is reported to have been a Communist for more than 20 years.

20. The major military and political posts in the northern half of South Vietnam--called Military Region V by the Communists--are believed to be under the Command of Major General Nguyen Don. It is not unusual to find the same man overseeing both the military and political program of the Vietnamese Communists, particularly in a war situation. Don was the commander of the North Vietnamese 305th Division in 1961, but by 1962 he was operating in the South. There are a number of other mysterious figures, known only by their names, who hold top posts in the insurgent command structure in the South. One, a Major General Hoang Khiem, has appeared in the DRV to talk to soldiers being trained for infiltration into South Vietnam.

PRP Rationale

21. The organization of the PRP furthered Hanoi's efforts to depict the insurgency in the South as an indigenous patriotic movement. It also permitted the Communists to gain an open and readily explicable voice in the NFLSV. Front conferences attended by affiliated non-Communist organizations in the Front, for example, could be more easily manipulated through the use of the FRP operating openly at the meetings.

22. The connection of the PRP with the Front was explained in carefully phrased terms in the original NFLSV announcement of the PRP's formation. The impression was given that the PRP was to form

only a constituent element of the NFLSV with a voice equal, but certainly not superior, to the non-Communist groups active in the Front. In its own initial statement, the PRP was more candid, terming itself the "vanguard" of the insurgency. The statement also placed the PRP first when calling on members to "carry out the program of the party and the program of action" of the NFLSV.

23. During the first two years of its existence, the PRP was given only a very small amount of publicity in both DRV and insurgent propaganda. Recently, however, Front propaganda has been less discreet in concealing the influence of the PRP in directing the NFLSV. Why the Communists are now less concerned with masking their guiding role in the Front is not really clear. They have also, however, been more candid during the last four months in alluding to the existence of bloc material support for the insurgency, and to the true nature of the DRV's backing.

24. Recently, Vietnamese Communist propaganda has publicized the speeches of PRP officials before NFLSV military conferences. The contents of PRP journals have also been disseminated over the Front's radio. PRP statements which clearly reveal Communist-type domestic objectives and programs for the revolution in South Vietnam are beginning to be publicized on a limited scale. On 25 April, the Front radiobroadcast PRP plans for a future government in South Vietnam in which the party admitted that it was not feasible to rely on coups d'etat to create a "genuinely revolutionary government" or a "worker peasant alliance led by a working class." The Communist Party would lead the future government, which would be a "people's democracy" with the participation of four Communist-style "revolutionary classes" (workers, peasants, and petty and national bourgeoisie). The Front also reorganized its movement for workers in April, renaming it in typical Communist terminology the "Liberation Trade Union," and placing it under the direct leadership of the PRP. The announced purpose of the reorganization was to "reshape the working class into a more revolutionary vanguard."

25. The evidence indicates that the PRP organizational structure is a duplicate, in so far as possible, of the North Vietnamese party. Committees of the PRP exist at the regional and provincial levels, and where possible at the district, village, and hamlet levels.

26. The North Vietnamese Communist Party and government have carefully avoided establishing any direct, public organizational ties with the National Liberation Front. Close links clearly exist, however, and DRV directives can be quickly implemented. Hanoi's control over the Front is organizationally maintained through the Communist leaders in South Vietnam to whom the DRV issues over-all guidance and instructions. The evidence indicates that these instructions are channeled through special departments of the North Vietnamese Central Committee tasked with the direction of the insurgency in the South. One of these is the Reunification Department of the Central Committee, which is headed by Major General Nguyen Van Vinh. Vinh also heads the Reunification Commission of the DRV Council of Ministers. The North Vietnamese Army high command, moreover, is tightly integrated into the DRV hierarchy which directs the insurgency in the South.

27. The Front does not, publicly at least, maintain an office or permanent representative in Hanoi as it does in many other bloc capitals. When the activities of Front delegations in the DRV are publicized, the delegations are carefully linked officially with the DRV's own mass front organ, the Fatherland Front, and not with the DRV Government or party. This facade, of course, is designed to add substance to Communist claims that the insurgents are completely self-propelled revolutionaries.

28. Unofficially, Hanoi has adequate opportunity for close liaison with the top public leaders in the Front. Some of these individuals apparently visit the DRV frequently, traveling via Cambodian or Chinese transportation routes into North Vietnam. Moreover, DRV and Front delegations frequently travel together on tours abroad, with the NFLSV representatives usually using DRV passports.

29. Occasionally, DRV and Liberation Front propaganda differ somewhat in their treatment of developments related to Vietnam. These differences do not appear to indicate significant policy fissures between the DRV and the insurgents in the South. They apparently stem mainly from the tactical considerations facing the two groups, and do not relate to their accord on over-all objectives.

30. An example of the propaganda differences can be seen in the treatment by Hanoi and the NFLSV of the question of foreign "volunteers" to assist the insurgent fighting forces. The Front, since it is in the van of the fighting, has taken the lead in threatening to call in "volunteers" from the DRV and elsewhere. The threats are hopefully intended both to deter massive US involvement in Vietnam, and to bolster the morale of the insurgents by promises of outside assistance to match any all-out participation in combat by US troops.

31. Hanoi has rebroadcast the Front threats and has held rallies at which elements of the DRV populace pledged their willingness to volunteer. On the whole, however, Hanoi has been restrained in its treatment of the subject. It appears that the DRV's careful handling of the question is partly designed to avoid adding any unnecessary fuel to charges by Washington and Saigon that North Vietnam is the real fountainhead of the insurgency. At the same time, by rebroadcasting the threats, and by indicating over-all approval of the NFLSV policy statements, Hanoi manages to get across the impression that it will respond when and if it judges the time ripe for an open move to South Vietnam by outside personnel. Meanwhile, one indication of the over-all coordination between Hanoi and the insurgents is the continuing clandestine infiltration of personnel from North to South Vietnam. Several thousand reportedly have come in already in 1965, running the total during the last four years to more than 40,000.

NFLSV-Affiliated Organizations

32. In addition to acquiring the proper personnel to fill the top offices in the Front, the Communists have expended considerable effort in fleshing out the NFLSV with a phalanx of affiliated "liberation" organizations. These groups have been added to give the impression that the Front is representative of every significant social, ethnic, religious, and professional group in South Vietnam. The complexity of this task was mitigated by the fact that the Communists already had experience in conducting a similar operation during the war against the French.

33. In the first several months after the formation of the NFLSV, associations specifically for farmers, students, women, youth, and urban workers were set up. Many others have been added since that time. By early August 1964, the Front had publicized the operation of some twenty affiliated bodies. The top echelons of most of these groups appear to be maintained with very small staffs, if any at all. The Communists have put more effort into the organization of active farmer, women, and youth groups of the Front at the local levels in South Vietnam, where advantage could be more effectively taken of the natural inclinations and aspirations of these elements of society.

34. Where possible, the affiliated organizations of the NFLSV have been tied in with corresponding international Communist front organizations. This gives them an international character, stimulates publicity about them, and makes them appear far more important than they actually are.

35. Two "political parties" in addition to the PRP have also been attached to the Front as constituent bodies. They are the so-called Radical Socialist Party and the Democratic Party. It is interesting to note that the only two political parties permitted to exist in North Vietnam, aside from the Communist Party, bear almost identical names to those in the South. In the North, they supply a facade of democracy to the political process in the country, and operate in such a manner as to attract support from the intellectual and "bourgeois" classes. They have the same function in the South. Similar groups existed in the Communist front during the war against the French, and it is probable that some of their members were ordered by Hanoi to remain in the South after the 1954 war settlement.

The Front's Grass-Roots Structure

36. Efforts to develop the NFLSV at the local level in South Vietnam began shortly after the Front was established. A captured Communist document issued in March 1961 urged the immediate organization of full NFLSV committees in villages and towns. It was apparent that the Vietnamese Communists intended to follow the pattern already established in North Vietnam, where general committees of Hanoi's Fatherland Front exist alongside Communist party committees

down to the local level. The available evidence indicates that regular NFLSV committees now have been formed at these levels throughout most of the Viet Cong - controlled area where, according to the most reliable statistics available, approximately 20-25 percent of the rural population resides.

37. To assure broad representation on these committees, the number of card-carrying Communists, according to captured documents, is limited to two fifths of the total membership. In one village, which has been controlled by the insurgents for more than two years, the NFLSV committee is composed of representatives of all classes and organizations existing in the village. There is a representative for the landowners, one for the farmers, one for the women, and representatives for other groups. In this village, the secretary of the Front committee represents the local PRP element, since he is also a member of the village PRP committee. The PRP chapter receives its orders from the higher district party committee. These orders are passed to the village Front committee, which is responsible for carrying out the orders.

38. It appears that the regular Front committees in Communist-controlled areas exercise a wide variety of functions. They are the body used by the Communists insofar as possible to collect taxes, conscript manpower for military and economic services, organize the local economy, and to run rudimentary schools, hospitals, and courts. The Front committees provide an organization with a potential for winning the voluntary support of the population by various activities of a welfare or civic-action nature. Working through the Front, the Communists try to show that the insurgency is a more efficient, honest, and humane administration than is the Saigon regime.

39. At the grassroots level in the Communist-controlled areas, the insurgents appear to be following much the same strategy with the NFLSV as they did with the local "administrative-resistance" councils set up by the Viet Minh in rebel-held territory during the war against the French. Captured Viet Minh documents frequently dealt with programs carried out under the authority of the councils to raise the living standards. Such documents often contained statistics on the establishment of schools, numbers of children and adults in school, medical dispensaries, sanitation efforts, and other civic responsibilities.

40. In the rebel-dominated areas, there appeared to be an initial surge to participate in the NFLSV as a reincarnation of the former Viet Minh. The Front thus picked up former Viet Minh activists and recipients of land redistributed by the Viet Minh. This surge appears to have been short-lived, however. For one thing, informants and Viet Cong prisoners indicate that early attempts to force "middle-class" peasants to give land to the poor were too harsh and resulted in a considerable loss of popularity for the NFLSV. The subsequent growth in influence of local Front organizations appears to have been largely the result of rural passivity, combined with the growing threat from the expanding insurgent military arm.

41. Because it lacked attractiveness, the grass-roots structure of the NFLSV appears to have required greater direct Communist control than originally expected. A captured TOP SECRET PRP document directed the use of the NFLSV during 1965 to "positively implement the party's policy" in the countryside. In some villages in the insurgent-controlled areas, the PRP unit has had to engage openly in such activities as the collection of taxes, and the organization of the local economy.

42. Outside the areas held firmly by the rebels, NFLSV activity varies in intensity and effectiveness. It is most intense in those rural regions where irregular insurgent bands and sympathizers are able to operate almost at will, and where there is often little in the way of effective governmental machinery answerable to Saigon. Organization and proselization activities in the name of the Front are carried on actively in these areas, where about 25 percent of the rural population resides. In the rural regions where the government has begun planning or has begun to implement pacification programs, there is less Front agitation. Approximately 10 to 15 percent of the rural population lives in such regions. NFLSV influence is nearly negligible in the remaining sections of the rural area where government military and civil control is firm. Some 35 percent of the rural population lives in these areas.

43. Probably only a few NFLSV committees exist at the local level in those rural areas not firmly controlled by the Communists. In the contested regions, the greater part of the influence exerted by

the insurgents appears to stem directly from Communist Party action. For example, one source from a village of 8-9,000 people in the delta, where a negligible amount of security was provided by the government, indicated that the PRP openly exercised direct administration over village affairs.

44. Front influence among the nearly 3,000,000 residents in the major cities and towns of South Vietnam is also nearly negligible. One Communist Party member reported that as of November 1964, Front organizations in the Saigon - Gia Dinh Special Zone were purely nominal. Communist organizers had been unable to establish either a Front committee or set up any of the Front's mass organizations. In practice, the hard-core Communist underground located in the area acted in the Front's name. A captured TOP SECRET PRP document recently stated that increasing the prestige of the NFLSV, specifically in the urban areas, was an urgent, critical problem that must be solved. There is no evidence that the NFLSV has been successful in attracting significant support from any of the politically influential groups in South Vietnam. Both overt propaganda and extensive clandestine penetration nevertheless continue to be directed at the Buddhists, students, labor union members, and armed forces personnel.

Front Propaganda Machinery

45. The NFLSV boasts an especially well-organized propaganda arm, the Liberation News Agency (LNA). The LNA was set up early in 1961, parallel with the establishment of the Front itself. The LNA provides an easily controlled mechanism for the information dissemination which the Communists have found so essential and effective in coordinating and backstopping their political agitation activities. Several major LNA broadcast stations produce a steady diet of propaganda for public dissemination in the South.

46. Hanoi often rebroadcasts NFLSV statements within an hour or two of the time they were first issued by LNA. NFLSV propaganda publications are printed in several languages in Hanoi by the government's official publishing houses, apparently to be distributed abroad under the aegis of the North Vietnamese Government. English-language editions of Front documents, for example, have been distributed in England by the correspondent of the DRV newspaper Cuu Quoc.

47. In France, NFLSV publications reach the large resident Vietnamese community through the North Vietnamese economic mission in Paris. Presumably the material is sent to Paris from Hanoi through official DRV channels. The several permanent Front offices abroad also distribute mountains of NFLSV propaganda; several of them put out periodic information sheets which are distributed to local leftist press sources for inclusion in local newspapers.

NFLSV Program Abroad

48. One of the main aims of the Front since its formation has been to publicize its activities and programs abroad. By representing itself as an organization struggling to free Vietnam from "colonialist and imperialist aggression," the NFLSV has made a special effort to enlist the sympathy and support of the newly emerging countries in Africa and Asia. A steady flow of telegrams of greeting and congratulations go out from the Front to foreign governments and heads of state. Coordination and advice for this kind of activity probably comes from the more experienced bureaucrats in Hanoi.

49. The Front has long been sending representatives on overseas tours, at first mainly to the Communist bloc, but with increasing frequency to Africa and Asia. Front delegates have also been attending meetings of leftist- and Communist-sponsored conferences abroad since late 1962. The attendance of Front representatives at foreign conferences and meetings has been gradually accelerated. Under Hanoi's sponsorship, these delegates now often appear at Communist-sponsored world or regional conferences on an equal footing with national delegations. It is believed that a hard core of "delegates" for the Front is stabled in North Vietnam, where entrance and egress is easier than from South Vietnam.

50. The first permanent Front office abroad was opened in Cuba in August 1962. By mid-1964, permanent Front "missions" had also been established in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Algeria, Indonesia, and the UAR, where the NFLSV man is accredited to the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization.

51. In view of the long history of Algerian opposition to French "colonialism," the Vietnamese Communists doubtless view Algeria as a fertile area in which to enlist support for the insurgency in South Vietnam. The organization and operation of the Front office in Algiers thus provides a good illustration of the NFLSV techniques and activities abroad. This mission was established by Huynh Van Tam in February 1963. Tam had arrived in Africa in October 1962 to attend an Afro-Asian lawyers' conference in Conakry.

52. Tam has contributed articles to French-language newspapers in Algeria and has undertaken many other quasi-political activities, including film showings and speeches to leftist youth meetings. In May 1963, for example, he addressed a conference of "Anti-Colonialist Youth" in Algiers, and appealed for world-wide support of the Viet Cong. Tam also attended the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity meeting in Algiers in March 1964. His speech, predictably, dealt with the "certainty of final victory for the South Vietnamese people" and appealed for moral and material support.

53. One of the most active of the NFLSV posts abroad is the office in Peking, which was established in September of 1964. Its representatives have been invited to Chinese receptions for foreign dignitaries and have been increasingly successful in arranging audiences with the stream of Afro-Asian personalities flowing through Peking. In April of this year, the NFLSV also opened an office in Moscow--its seventh full-time post abroad. The Communists probably hope that Soviet propaganda support derived from this new publicity outlet will significantly boost their cause, and that the office will also open new avenues for NFLSV contact with the non-Communist world.

Recent Activities Abroad

54. In Asia during the past year, the Vietnamese Communists have concentrated mainly on pumping up NFLSV relations with Cambodia. They have tried to elicit statements and actions by the Sihanouk regime supporting the Front's claim to be the "legitimate" representative of the South Vietnamese people. With Chinese encouragement and the active backing of the North Vietnamese, Front representatives sat down with Cambodian officials in Peking last December to discuss a formal treaty defining and guaranteeing the Cambodian-Vietnamese border. Although the negotiations failed to produce an agreement, Sihanouk's publicly demonstrated willingness to engage in treaty discussions with the NFLSV was a decided plus for the Communists. Sihanouk has also insisted that the NFLSV should represent South Vietnam in any international conference to guarantee Cambodian neutrality.

55. The Front has also found some support this year in Indonesia. In late April, at Sukarno's invitation, Front delegates attended the tenth anniversary celebrations of the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung as the only representatives of South Vietnam. They were feted by the host Indonesian Government and readily mixed with many of the visiting Afro-Asian state officials.

56. By far the strongest international initiative by the NFLSV this year was undertaken in connection with the now-postponed Bandung II meeting which was to have been held in Algiers in June. Throughout the late spring, NFLSV and other Asian Communist representatives maneuvered behind the scenes to line up support for excluding Saigon from the gathering and to have the Front accepted as the representative of South Vietnam. Both Chinese and North Vietnamese foreign ministry officials made preconference trips to friendly African countries to enlist support. An NFLSV delegation later toured the same circuit.

57. Just before the Algiers meeting was scheduled to start, the Front released a memorandum supporting its claim to represent South Vietnam. While castigating the Saigon government, the memorandum catalogued all the "evidence" that the Front operates

as a de facto government in South Vietnam and that it also has widespread popular support. The memorandum claimed that the Front "wields genuine, steady, and widespread power, whose basis is the self-managing committees elected by the population in liberated areas." The memorandum in effect summed up the propaganda line of the NFLSV during the past six months, which has stopped just short of announcing the formation of a provisional Front government at the national level in South Vietnam. The chief NFLSV representative to the Algiers conference told the Cairo press that the Front "is a government, but it is not yet official."

Recognition Strategy

58. This past March, Hanoi and the NFLSV began to put greater emphasis on their long-standing demand that any settlement of the war in South Vietnam be "in accordance" with the Front program. In a major policy statement of 22 March, the Front asserted for the first time that it must have the "decisive voice in any negotiations to end the Vietnamese war."

59. In apparent support of such assertions, the NFLSV and the DRV suddenly increased their propaganda claims concerning the size of the "liberated areas" under front control in South Vietnam. Throughout 1964, the Front's standard claim was that it controlled about two thirds of the territory and about half of the population in the South. Beginning in 1965, however, the claim was expanded to four fifths of the territory and almost 75 percent of the population.

60. The long-standing allegation by the Front that it is the "genuine" or "legitimate" representative of the South Vietnamese people was also given greater emphasis this spring. In a 22 March statement, the Front proclaimed itself the "only" legitimate representative. At about the same time, propaganda from Hanoi, Peking, and Moscow began to give greater play to NFLSV claims of legitimacy, identifying the Front in some cases as the only "legal" agent of the people in the South. This line, intended as a counterpoint to the slipping prestige of the Saigon regime, also appears to have reflected a Vietnamese Communist hope that Saigon and the United States

could eventually be brought around to deal directly with the Front as an independent political entity, thus strengthening the Communist position in any war settlement.

61. The Vietnamese Communists appear to believe that it is no longer possible to force a bilateral settlement of the war on a weakened Saigon government. They have probably concluded that, because of the direct and growing US participation in the conflict, an end to the fighting can be obtained now only in a multilateral, internationalized arrangement of the type which ended the Indochina War in 1954. In the course of such a settlement, the Communists realize that a strong image of NFLSV prestige and physical control in South Vietnam will be extremely important. It will not only help undermine the standing of the Saigon authorities, but will also assist the Communists in gaining an effective position in any postwar political establishment in South Vietnam.

Additional NFLSV Goals

62. Beyond broad statements of Front policy such as the intent to form a "national, coalition government" and to move toward "reunification" with North Vietnam, the Vietnamese Communists have been very vague concerning specific NFLSV goals when the fighting ends. An intent to leave considerable maneuvering room seems to lie behind the basic Vietnamese Communist line that any settlement of the war must be in "accordance" with the NFLSV program.

63. It is probable, however, that at a minimum the Communists would seek to gain the key defense, foreign policy, information, and economic offices in any coalition government so that they could make a quick move toward implementing such policies as land redistribution and socialization of industry. The Front's secretary general, Huynh Tan Phat, reportedly

told a Western newsman recently that a "socialist economy" would be developed in the south after the war at the same time as the war devastation was being repaired. Possession of the key offices in a coalition government would enable the Communists, operating through the Front, to stifle quickly any opposition to a full and open Communist take-over. The Communists sought such offices during the political settlement in Laos in 1962, under which a coalition government was set up.

Forming a Provisional Government

64. The NFLSV's failure so far to declare the formation of a national provisional government is due partly to its failure to attract support from the grass roots and from individuals of stature in South Vietnam. This was implicit in the recent remarks of a DRV newsman in Moscow who claimed that the question of forming a provisional Front regime was under active consideration. The NFLSV has gone so far as to set up committees--"ministries in embryo"--for military affairs, external affairs, information, education, and public health. According to the newsman, however, before such a government is proclaimed the NFLSV needs wider popular representation, including some elements of the Republic of Vietnam armed forces; it also lacks sufficient well-trained cadres to run a government.

65. Formation of a national government of obscure personalities at this time would reveal the Front's lack of volunteer backing. It could also provoke considerable active opposition from other politically ambitious groups in South Vietnam, such as the Buddhists, who themselves aspire to a position of influence in any postwar government.

66. The DRV newsman in Moscow also implied that the Communists were holding off on the formation of a provisional government until they obtain control of more real estate in South Vietnam. In reality, they still lack a fairly extensive, unified geographic base. The major Communist "war zones" are still


scattered and vulnerable to government raids and interdiction. It would be difficult at present for the Communists to set up a "capital," receive foreign visitors, or conduct business securely in South Vietnam. Current Communist military activities may be designed to cope with this problem. They are in part aimed at eliminating government influence from a large area of the central highlands of South Vietnam contiguous with the Cambodian border.

67. If the Communists believed that for political reasons the situation now was propitious for the establishment of a provisional government, they would probably do so regardless of the amount of territory they control in South Vietnam. It would be possible to conduct the government's activity from outside South Vietnam, possibly under bloc protection. Such a decision based on political considerations might come following acceptance of the Front as the sole representative of South Vietnam at an influential international conference like the now-postponed Bandung II meeting. The Communists might see this as the possible fulcrum with which to tip the balance in favor of the NFLSV.

68. The Communists at the moment, however, are clearly concerned with the political repercussions of such a move while the Viet Cong power position in South Vietnam is still fluid. DRV and NFLSV efforts to develop international pressure on the US and the Republic of Vietnam to agree to Front participation in settling the war would almost certainly be complicated by the official establishment at this time of a formal Front government. Some Afro-Asian states which have urged direct negotiations with the NFLSV might be less forthcoming if their support were suddenly tied in with the question of recognizing the Front as a legal government. Moreover, the Communists may feel that the interjection of a formal Front government into the picture would make it more difficult for the US and the Saigon regime to concede any role to the Front in settling the war. In sum, it appears that the Communists do not intend to proclaim the formation of a provisional NFLSV government in the near future.

PREFACE

The following study of the NFLSV organization attempts to identify as many of the leaders of the front as possible. Most of the affiliated associations have been identified by Radio Hanoi and the NFLSV Liberation Broadcasting Station, and others have appeared in Communist publications and documents. Many of the groups exist only on paper, and it has not been possible to identify the membership of a number of these organizations. It should be noted that some of the names may have been used without permission and that some may be totally fictitious. In many instances names are received orally and may be spelled incorrectly or rendered phonetically.



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Agricultural Association)
Liberation Youth Association
Liberation Women's Association
Liberation Students and Pupils Association
Liberation Writers and Artists Association
Association of Former Resistants
Patriotic and Democratic Journalists Association
South Vietnam Patriotic Buddhists Association
South Vietnam Patriotic Teachers Association
Highland Peoples Autonomy Movement
Liberation Red Cross
Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity
Committee for Solidarity with the Latin American People
Committee for Protection of World Peace
Military and Civil Medical Council
Liberation Army and Popular Armed Forces
People's Revolutionary Party
Radical Socialist Party
Democratic Party
Liberation Press Agency
Liberation Broadcasting
Association of Writers and Artists of the Saigon-
Cholon-Gia Dinh Area
*People's Liberation Youth Group
*Industrialists and Businessmen Against the
US-Diemists
*Democratic Lawyers Association
*Council of Heroic Disabled Servicemen
*South Vietnam Veterans Association
*Association of the Families of Patriotic Soldiers
*Association for the Improvement of Morality (of the
Hoa Hao Buddhist sect)
*Patriotic and Peace-Loving Boys and Girls Group
*Reformed Cao Dai Sect
*Group of Fighters for Peace, Reunification, and
Independence of the Vietnamese Fatherland-Patriotic
Servicemen in the Ranks of the US-Diem Army
*Committee for the Peace and Amelioration of South
Vietnam

*Membership not available

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ASSOCIATED ORGANIZATIONS (cont.)

- *Association of Patriotic Teachers of the
Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh Area
- *Association of Patriotic Teachers of the Western
Region of South Vietnam
- *Vietnamese Nationals of Chinese Origin
- *Saigon-Cholon Peace Committee
- *Patriotic Khmer Monks Solidarity Association
- *Khmer Buddhist Research Institute of South Vietnam
- *Group of Soldiers Who Have Returned to the People

IV. REGIONAL ORGANIZATION

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V. [REDACTED]

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STATINTL

NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM

Presidium

Chairman *NGUYEN HUU THO

Vice Chairmen *HUYNH TAN PHAT
*PHUNG VAN CUNG
*THOM ME THE NHEM
*TRAN NAM TRUNG
*VO CHI CONG
*Y BINH ALEO

Members *DANG TRAN THI
*NGUYEN HUU THE
*NGUYEN THI DINH
*NGUYEN VAN NGOI
*PHAM XUAN THAI
*THIEN HAO (Thich)
*TRAN BACH DANG
*TRAN BUU KIEM

Secretariat

Secretary General *HUYNH TAN PHAT

Deputy Secretaries General *LE VAN HUAN
*HO THU

Members *UNG NGOC KY
HO XUAN SON

Members of the Central Committee (elected January 1964)

DUONG TRUONG THANH
*HO HUE BA, Joseph Marie
*HUNG TU, aka Hong Lien, aka Nhan Tu
*HUY SON
*HUYNH BAI
*HUYNH CUONG
*HUYNH VAN TAM
LAM TRI CHANH
*LE THANH NAM
*LE THI RIENG
*LE VAN THA
*MA THI CHU
MAI VAN TI
*NGUYEN HOC

STATINTL



Members of the Central Committee (elected January 1964) (cont.)

*NGUYEN NGOC THUONG
NGUYEN THI ()
*NGUYEN THI BINH
*NGUYEN VAN HIEU
*NGUYEN VAN TI
*NGUYEN VAN TIEN
*PHAM XUAN VY
*ROCHOM BRIU
*TRAN HUU TRANG
*TRAN VAN THANH
*VO DONG GIANG
*VO VAN MON
*VU TUNG
*XAT

Members of the First Central Committee (elected in 1962)

*DANG TRAN THI
*HO HUE BA, Joseph Marie
*HO THU
*HUYNH CUONG
HUYNH DANG (1)
*HUYNH TAN PHAT
*HUYNH VAN TAM
*LAM KIEN KHANH (1)
*LE NGOC QUANG (1)
*LE THANH NAM
LE THI DUONG (1)
*LE THI RIENG
LE VIET HUNG (1)
*MA THI CHU
NGOC TU (1)
NGUYEN CUU BICH (1)
*NGUYEN HUU THE
*NGUYEN HUU THO
*NGUYEN NGOC THUONG
NGUYEN THACH (1)
*NGUYEN THI BINH
*NGUYEN VAN HIEU
*NGUYEN VAN NGOI
NGUYEN VIET MAU (1)
NHU SON (1)
*PHAM XUAN THAI
PHAN TUYEN (1)
*PHUNG VAN CUNG
*ROCHOM BRIU

(1)not currently a Central Committee member

Members of the First Central Committee (elected in 1962) (cont.)

SON VONG (died March 1963) (1)
*THIEN HAO
*TRAN BACH DANG
*TRAN BUU KIEM
*TRAN HUU TRANG
*TRAN NAM TRUNG
*UNG NGOC KY
*VO CHI CONG
*XAT
*Y BINH ALEO

Central Committee Departments

MILITARY COMMITTEE

Director *Tran Nam Trung
Members Le Van Tien
Bay Quan

INFORMATION, CULTURAL, AND EDUCATION COMMITTEE

Chairman *Tran Bach Dang
Deputy Chairman Muoi Tai

EXTERNAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE

Chairman *Tran Buu Kiem

DEFENSE OF BUDDHISM COMMITTEE

Representative Thich Vinh

PUBLIC HEALTH COMMISSION

Commissioner *Phung Van Cung

INSPECTORS GROUP

Representative *Nguyen Van Hieu

Quasi-Diplomatic Representation

ALGERIA *Huynh Van Tam
*Vo Cong Trung
Truong Van Loc

Quasi-Diplomatic Representation (cont.)

CHINA	*Tran Van Thanh *Nguyen Minh Phuong Nguyen Trong Kha
CUBA	Hoang Bich Son *Ly Van Sau Hoang Kinh
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	*Nguyen Van Hieu *Dinh Ba Thi *Ma Thi Chu
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC	*Nguyen Van Hieu *Duong Dinh Thao Tran Huu Kha
HUNGARY	*Le Phuong
INDONESIA	*Le Quang Chanh *Huynh Van Ba
USSR	Dang Quang Minh Nguyen Van Dong *Nguyen Thanh Long Luu Xuan Thanh Ngo Ton Hoan
UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC	*Huynh Van Nghia *Nguyen Van Tien

ASSOCIATED ORGANIZATIONS

LIBERATION FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS (Formerly Liberation Labor Association (HOI LAO DONG GIAI PHONG))

Chairman	*Pham Xuan Thai, aka Xuan Thai
Vice Chairman	*Dang Tran Thi
Standing Committee Members	*Dinh Ba Thi *Huynh Van Tam *Le Thanh Nam *Nguyen Minh Phuong *Tran Hoai Nam *Tran Van Thanh

LIBERATION PEASANTS ASSOCIATION (HOI NONG DAN GIAI PHONG)

Chairman *Nguyen Huu The
Member Tu Lap

LIBERATION YOUTH ASSOCIATION (HOI THANH NIEN GIAI PHONG)

Chairman *Tran Bach Dang
Vice Chairman Nguyen Van Chon
Secretary General Nguyen Van Yen
Deputy Secretary General Cao Van Tai
Members Anh Theo
Cao Van Sau
Cao Xuan Bo
Do Duy Lien
Ho Bao Hon
Ho Phong
Huynh Van Tuan
*Le Phuong
*Le Quang Chanh
Minh Tanh
Nguyen Dong Ha
*Nguyen Thi Binh
Nguyen Van Phuc
Nguyen Van Tai
Nguyen Van Tan
Nguyen Xuan Thuy
*Thanh Hai, aka Luu Thanh Hai
Tran Tien Dung
Tran Tri Dung
Tran Van An
Tran Van Thuan
Trinh Van Thanh

LIBERATION WOMEN'S ASSOCIATION (HOI PHU NU GIAI PHONG)

Chairman, Standing Committee *Nguyen Thi Binh
Vice Chairman *Mi Doan
*Le Thi Rieng
*Thanh Loan

LIBERATION WOMEN'S ASSOCIATION (HOI PHU NU GIAI PHONG) (cont.)

Standing Committee Members

*Nguyen Thi Thanh
*Nguyen Thi Tu
Phung Van Cung (Mrs.)
Tran Thi Lieu

Members

*Bui Thi Me
Buu Hoa
Do Duy Lien
Hai Lua
Ho Thi Buu, aka Ho Thi Buoi
*Ma Thi Chu
Ngoc Dung (see *Nguyen Ngoc Dung)
*Nguyen Thi Chon
Nguyen Thi Duoc, aka Nam Ly
Nguyen Thi Ha
Nguyen Thi Hoa
Nguyen Thi Sang
Thua Hoa
Tran Thi Dan
Tran Thi Dau
Tran Thi Dinh
Tran Thi My
Tran Thi Tu
Tran Thi Trung
Truong Thi Hue

LIBERATION STUDENTS AND PUPILS ASSOCIATION (HOI LIEN HIEP SINH VIEN
HOC SINH GIAI PHONG)

Chairman

*Tran Buu Kiem

Members

*Ly Van Sau
*Nguyen Ngoc Dung
*Nguyen Thi Binh
Tran Van An
Tu Le
Viet Hung

LIBERATION WRITERS AND ARTISTS ASSOCIATION (HOI VAN NGHE GIAI PHONG)

Chairman

*Tran Huu Trang

Vice Chairman

Van Tung
Tran Hieu Minh

LIBERATION WRITERS AND ARTISTS ASSOCIATION (HOI VAN NGHE GIAO PHONG) (cont.)

Secretary General	Ly Van Sam
Secretariat Members	Giang Nam Pham Minh Hoa Bui Kinh Lang
Members	Bui Xuan Lang Ly Van Phung Nguyen Hien Nguyen Van Vinh Pham Van Hoa Phan The *Thanh Hai *Thanh Loan Thanh Quy Minh Trieu Van Truong Binh Tong Truong Thanh Tung Long Van Nam

ASSOCIATION OF FORMER RESISTANTS

Secretary General	*Tran Bach Dang
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PATRIOTIC AND DEMOCRATIC JOURNALISTS ASSOCIATION (HOI NHA BAO YEU NUOC VA DAN CHU)

Chairman	*Vu Tung
Vice Chairman	*Tam Duc *Nguyen Van Hieu Nhi Muc
Secretary General	Thanh Nho
Deputy Secretary General	*Nguyen Thi Chon *Thanh Huong
Members	*Duong Dinh Thao Hieu Chan Hoang Xuan Ba *Nguyen Thi Binh *Nguyen Van Tai

PATRIOTIC AND DEMOCRATIC JOURNALISTS ASSOCIATION (HOI NHA BAO YEU
NUOC VA DAN CHU) (cont.)

Members

*Phan Lac Tuyen
*Rochom Thap
Thach Thien Chi
Tu Chung

SOUTH VIETNAM PATRIOTIC BUDDHISTS ASSOCIATION (TRUNG UONG HOI LUC
HOA)

Chairman

*Thien Hao

Members

*Hung Tu
Giac Hao

SOUTH VIETNAM PATRIOTIC TEACHERS ASSOCIATION

Chairman

*Le Van Huan

Vice Chairmen

*Bui Thi Me
*Nguyen Ngoc Thuong
*Nguyen Thanh Long

Secretary General

Le Thuoc

HIGHLAND PEOPLE'S AUTONOMY MOVEMENT (UY BAN DAN TOC TU TRI TAY
NGUYEN)

Chairman

*Y Bihh Aleo

Vice Chairman

*Mi Doan
*Rochom Briu
*Rochom Thap
*Xat

Members

Ba Quan
Rochom Ban

LIBERATION RED CROSS (HOI HONG THAP TI GIAI PHONG)

President

*Phung Van Cung

Chairman, Executive Committee Vu Ngoc

COMMITTEE FOR AFRO-ASIAN SOLIDARITY (UY BAN DOAN KET A PHI)

Chairman	*Nguyen Ngoc Thuong
Vice Chairman	*Thien Hao
Secretary General	*Huynh Cuong
Members	*Huynh Van Nghia *Huynh Van Tam *Le Thanh Nam *Ma Thi Chu Ngo Tan Dao *Nguyen Van Tien *Rochom Briu *Tran Hoai Nam

COMMITTEE FOR SOLIDARITY WITH THE LATIN-AMERICAN PEOPLE (UY BAN DOAN KET DAN TOC MY LA TIN)

Chairman	*Le Van Huan
Member	Chau Hoang Nam

COMMITTEE FOR THE PROTECTION OF WORLD PEACE (UY BAN BAO VE HOA BINH THE GIOI)

Chairman	*Phung Van Cung
Members	*Ma Thi Chu *Ho Hue Ba

MILITARY AND CIVIL MEDICAL COUNCIL

Director	*Phung Van Cung
Member	*Ho Thu

LIBERATION ARMY AND POPULAR ARMED FORCES (GIAI PHONG QUAN VAN CAC LUC LUONG VO TRANG NHAN DAN)

Deputy Commander	*Nguyen Thi Dinh
Members	Sau Hoang, aka Cao Dan Chiem, aka Dom, aka Sau Cia, aka Sau Rau *Tran Nam Trung Nguyen Van Luong Nguyen Van Huu

PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY (DANG NHAN DAN CACH MANG VIET NAM)

Chairman	Nguyen Van Muoi, aka Muoi Cuc
Secretary General	Nguyen Trung Thua
Executive Committee Member	*Vo Chi Cong
Member, Youth Group	Nguyen Chi Trung

RADICAL SOCIALIST PARTY (DANG XA HOI CAP TIEN)

Secretary General	*Nguyen Van Hieu
Deputy Secretary General	*Nguyen Ngoc Thuong
Member, Standing Committee	*Le Van Tha

DEMOCRATIC PARTY (DANG DAN CHU)

Chairman	Ngo Ngoc Sang
Secretary General	*Huynh Tan Phat
Secretary	*Nguyen Thanh Long
Central Committee Members	*Duong Van Le Ho Kim Son Nguyen Van Lan *Tran Buu Kiem Tran Van Huong *Ung Ngoc Ky

LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY

Deputy Director	Lam Thinh
Director, East German Bureau	*Duong Dinh Thao

LIBERATION BROADCASTING

Director	*Tam Duc
Deputy Director	Thanh Khenh

ASSOCIATION OF WRITERS AND ARTISTS OF THE SAIGON-CHOLON-GIA DINH AREA

Chairman	Vo Hoai Linh, aka Hoai Linh, aka Truong Vinh Tong
Vice Chairmen	Son Anh, aka Hoang Minh, aka Phong Anh *Thanh Loan
Members	Ngoc Tung Pham Huy Tran Chinh Truc *Tran Huu Trang Tran Tan Thanh Tran Thanh Dat Tran Van Choi, aka Chin Choi, aka Tran Van Chau Vu Hien Thinh

Regional Organization

SAIGON-CHOLON-GIA DINH ZONE

Chairman	*Huynh Tan Phat
Vice Chairmen	*Le Van Tha Phan Trong Dan Phuoc Thang *Tran Huu Trang
Secretary General	*Nguyen Van Tai
Assistant Secretary General	Nguyen Dong Ha
Members	Doan Cong Chanh Hoang Hai Hoang Minh Dao Lu Sanh Loc Ngoc Dinh Nguyen Thi Phan Nguyen Van Cung Son Anh, aka Hoang Minh, aka Phong Anh Thanh Tam

EASTERN REGION ZONE

Chairman	*Nguyen Thanh Long
Vice Chairmen	*Hung Tu Lien Van Chan, aka Le Van Chan Nguyen Kien Quoc Nguyen Van Chi Tran Van Son
Secretary General	Nguyen Dinh Nho
Secretaries	*Huynh Thanh Mung Le Sac Nghi Vo Thanh Nguon *Vo Van Mon
Members	Ho Chi Tieng, aka Ho Chi Tong Luu Kiet Nguyen Bach Tuyet Nguyen Duc Quang Nguyen The Phuong, aka Nguyen Thi Phuong Nguyen Van Hung, aka Nguyen Van Trung Nguyen Van Nong Nguyen Van Xuan Nguyen Viet Hong Sorc Phrum Thieu Nhu Thuy Tran Van Binh Truong Thang Vo Van Voi, aka Vo Van Doi Waifa Sam, aka Wai A Sam

CENTRAL REGION ZONE

Members	Bui Duc Tam, aka Bui Duc Tan Cao Van Sau *Ho Hue Ba Le Hong Thang Luc Ta Soc Ngoc Binh Thang Nguyen Thai Binh Nguyen Thi Dinh Nguyen Thien Tu, aka Huynh Thien Tu Nguyen Trong Xuat Nguyen Van Chin
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CENTRAL REGION ZONE (cont.)

Members

*Nguyen Van Ngoi
*Thien Hao

WESTERN REGION ZONE

Chairman

*Duong Van Vinh

Vice Chairmen

Tran Van Binh, aka Bay Thang
Tran Thanh Dai

Secretary General

Ngo Tan Dao, aka Ngo Dai Dao

Commissar (Current Affairs)

Nguyen Thi Duoc, aka Nam Ly

Commissar (Interprovincial
Committee)

*Nguyen Van Nhon

Commissar (Central Commit-
tee)

*Huynh Cuong

Commissioner, Standing Com-
mittee

Ma Ha Thong, aka Muoi Thong

Adviser

Le Van Phien

Members

*Bui Thi Me, aka Thi Me
Khiet
Le Minh Thanh, aka Minh Tan
Le Thi Toi
Nguyen Thi Sang
Pham Cong Chanh
Pham Minh Ly, aka Muoi Ly
Pham Van Be
Phan Huu Phuoc, aka Thanh Quynh
Phan Van Nam, aka Thuc Nguyen,
aka Luc
Tran Van Phan
Tran Van Thuan

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