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## INTELLIGENCE STUDY

DISSIDENCE AND THE POTENTIAL FOR  
RESISTANCE IN COMMUNIST CHINA

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE  
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## SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Excluding troubles in the ethnic minority regions of China, the Communist regime has been confronted with major outbreaks of resistance on three occasions during the past decade. These outbreaks--during the "Hundred Flowers" campaign of May 1957, in Honan Province during the severe food shartage of 1960, and across the Kwangtung - Hong Kong border in May 1962--at no time seriously threatened the regime's strong and pervasive security controls. On each occasion the dissident elements of the population demonstrated a strong sensitivity to the threat of suppression by force.

These same examples, however, show that large unorganized groups of intellectuals, youth, and peasants in China have a somewhat unique capability of acting in a coordinated way to take advantage of basic weakness in the regime's control apparatus.

In mid-1962 Peking showed its recognition of this capability and the presence of control weakness when it began the extensive reindoctrination effort that continues today. The mass campaigns of the past three years have focused on the above groups with particular emphasis upon basic-level peasant cadres.

There is strong evidence that Peking's effort has failed to reduce the general level of dissidence throughout China. Top level leaders have been unusually frank about the great amount of dissidence that continues, and the tempo and content of the campaigns of the past three years have reflected a sense of frustration among the leaders.

In view of the earlier outbreaks of resistance, perhaps the most important development of the past three years has been the over-extension and straining of the control apparatus that the regime's reindoctrination efforts have involved. This has brought top-level changes in the party's organizations for control of youth and intellectuals and the revival of peasant associations to

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supplement the basic-level rural cadres, but it is probable that fundamental weakness remains.

If control weakness continues, it may again combine with food shortages or inadequate leadership to cause dissident elements to resist openly. When this occurs, though, it is probable that lack of organization for resistance and the innate self-limitation of Chinese acting in groups will prevent a Hungarian-style revolt, so long as overwhelming force is still available to the Communist regime.

While the regime at present can command compliance and obedience, it is unable to arouse the population from its political apathy. Since the failure of the Great Leap Forward and the economic disasters of 1959-1961, the gap between the revolutionary goals of the leadership and the individual materialistic goals of the people has widened. The regime would like to recover some measure of the revolutionary elan that the populace and the lower level cadres once had and has been conducting persistent and intense political indoctrination programs for this purpose. It is clear, however, that these programs have been largely ineffective and that dissidence remains high.

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
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<b>DISSIDENCE</b>	a state of mind involving discontent or disaffection with the regime.
<b>RESISTANCE</b>	dissidence translated into action.
<b>ORGANIZED RESISTANCE</b>	resistance which is carried out by a group of individuals who have accepted a common purpose, agreed upon leadership, and worked out a communications system.
<b>UNORGANIZED RESISTANCE</b>	resistance carried out by individual or loosely associated groups which may have been formed spontaneously for certain limited objectives, without over-all plan or strategy.
<b>PASSIVE RESISTANCE</b>	resistance, organized or unorganized, which is conducted within the framework of the resister's normal life and duties, and involves deliberate non-performance or malperformance of acts which would benefit the regime, or deliberate nonconformity with standards of conduct established by the regime.
<b>ACTIVE RESISTANCE</b>	resistance, organized or unorganized, which expresses itself in positive acts against the regime. It may or may not involve violence, and may be conducted openly or clandestinely. It may take such forms as intelligence collection, psychological warfare, sabotage, guerrilla warfare, assistance in escape and evasion, open defiance of authority, or preparatory activity for any of the above.

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I INTRODUCTION

Past examples of resistance to Chinese Communist rule provide a useful background for analysis of the dissidence and potential resistance that currently appears to be of major concern to Peking.\* On three occasions in the past 10 years --during the period of "blooming and contending" in May 1957; in the fall of 1960 in Honan province; and in May 1962 on the Kwangtung - Hong Kong border-- dissident groups actively resisted authority with some effectiveness for significant periods of time.\*\* In each case control was restored without great difficulty, but not before fundamental weakness had been revealed in the Communist regime's control apparatus. The three dissident groups of the past are the same ones toward which the regime is directing its greatest indoctrination effort today-- the intellectuals, the youth, and the peasants.

The task of identifying resistance in China, particularly at the time it is happening, is a difficult one. Many months passed before refugee reports revealed the extent of student resistance in May-June 1957. A full year passed after the large-scale open resistance in Honan in the fall of 1960 had been suppressed before word of it reached the outside



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The exodus from Kwangtung Province to Hong Kong was, of course, closely observed from the beginning, but early information about possible reverberations elsewhere in China was not available. In order better to foresee and identify resistance in Communist China existing definitions need to be filled out through analysis of actual resistance.

\*See facing page for definitions of key terms.

\*\*This study does not address the problem of dissidence and resistance among ethnic minority groups in Tibet, Sinkiang, and other parts of China.

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The three cases analyzed here have been studied in some detail with the benefit of hindsight. The following resumés attempt to bring out in a few words the extent to which Peking was untuned to the amount of dissidence in the groups concerned and initially unclear on the amount of resistance being generated. From these case studies certain conclusions are drawn about basic factors of resistance in Communist China.

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## II. RESISTANCE 1957-1962

### Resistance of Intellectuals and Students, May-June 1957

At the beginning of May 1957 Peking launched a major "rectification" campaign with an invitation to intellectuals to criticize the working style of party cadres. The resultant criticism got badly out of hand and led students to resist authority with violence. The first step in the campaign was to convene forums among leaders of the non-Communist "opposition" parties, outstanding professional people, and academicians. These gatherings were kept small and it was probably assumed by the regime that only such evils as bureaucratism, subjectivism, and party sectarianism would be criticized and not basic Communist policies and programs. Criticism did begin cautiously, but it remained within the usual limits only for a few days. By the middle of May it had become a torrent of outspoken criticism by a large number of intellectuals aimed at the regime's basic policies and programs as well as the working style of its officials. The worst of the criticism was confined to the discussion groups, but enough of it appeared in newspapers throughout China to make it clear to all that Peking had badly misjudged the tractability of the country's intellectuals.

Student criticism caused Peking the greatest embarrassment and trouble, for it was entirely spontaneous and soon led to violence which spread rapidly from Peking University to widely scattered colleges and middle schools. Students had not been encouraged to engage in the criticism of party cadres and no special forums had been organized for them. Nevertheless, students at Peking University began on May 19 to put up posters voicing their objections to school administration. This quickly led to open criticism of the same basic policies and programs being attacked by the country's intellectuals. Disciplinary actions within the schools brought student demonstrations and these led to violence, which was ultimately suppressed by force in several places. Subsequently, three student leaders at a middle school in the Wuhan area were

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publicly executed in a show of the regime's concern for preventing any revival of the traditional role of Chinese students in resistance.

By the middle of June the criticism of intellectuals and students had been silenced, but the harsh antirightist campaign which followed served to point up the fundamental gaps and weaknesses that had caused the rectification campaign to get out of hand. Peking's assessment of the amount of anti-Communist feeling near the surface among intellectuals had been completely wrong. In addition, its reliance on cadres in many institutions, including the schools, to keep the criticism within bounds was misplaced. The leaders, themselves, showed initial confusion and disbelief in dealing with the unexpected response to their invitation. Finally, the transparent effort in the antirightist campaign to identify an organization and a plot behind the resistance, and to blame certain prominent non-Communist Party men for leading it, showed Peking's embarrassment over the fact that so many dissidents had been able to act spontaneously in the same way, at the same time.

#### Peasant Resistance in Honan Province, 1960

In the late summer and early fall of 1960 resistance took place in many parts of Honan Province as a result of severe food shortages. Large groups of people were involved, but their resistance was essentially unorganized and remained in pockets. In some cases leadership was provided by disaffected militia units, while in others militia men turned bandits provoked the resistance of peasants. In most cases the resistance involved raids on state grain stocks and open defiance of authority. Honan was but one of several provinces which had severe food shortages in 1959-60, but the Honan peasants had suffered particularly under the national pattern of extreme change in collectivization and experimentation in agriculture and industry. The hardship in Honan was probably traceable, in part, to rivalry at the top level of provincial authority.

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In October 1960 the resistance in one county of Honan reached a scale that brought forceful suppression throughout the province. The "Hsin-yang Incident" probably involved the killing of several hundred peasants and it prompted Peking to make a high-level investigation of the security situation throughout Honan, and to dispatch army work units to the "disaster areas." The investigation in Honan and other provinces revealed a state of deterioration in the militia that shocked Peking into dismantling the militia organization throughout China. The process of restoring control in Honan brought out the great demoralization that had occurred in the ranks of the lower level cadres. It also showed that it was the deterioration of local authority that had emboldened the peasants to express their dissident feelings in resistance over a period of several months.

The Exodus of Young Industrial and Farm Workers  
From Kwangtung Province to Hong Kong, May 1962

In May 1962 the program for relieving urban population pressure in Kwangtung Province got out of hand and revealed that dissidence among young industrial and farm workers was both widespread and easily surfaced. Peking had ordered Kwangtung officials to reduce urban population in the province by some 30 percent--without resorting to force. Officials tried to meet this insoluble problem in part by encouraging further emigration to Hong Kong, mainly of unemployed relatives of Overseas Chinese.

The granting of exit permits from Kwangtung to a selected portion of the population had increased steadily since the fall of 1961 as the program for moving surplus urban residents to the rural areas became bogged down in the face of their resistance. The imposition of new high quotas for urban depopulation in April 1962 caused Kwangtung authorities to encourage further emigration. Heavy issuance of exit permits by the cadres concerned brought a clogging of the normal emigration route through Canton by land to Macao and by sea to Hong Kong. In an effort to facilitate the movement of authorized emigrants, the holders of exit permits were encouraged to cross the land border to Hong Kong in numbers far exceeding the quasi-official

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quota acceptable to the Hong Kong Government. All normal restrictions on this exit route were lifted by the Communists on the first of May. News of this change spread quickly throughout the counties adjacent to Hong Kong and within three weeks some 100,000 people had surged toward the border. In the same period, the emigrant group came to be dominated by young people without exit authorization leaving from the rural counties in the border areas. A total of more than 50,000 people from Kwangtung made it through the weak controls on the Hong Kong side before these were greatly tightened and rumors of a clamp down by Kwangtung authorities caused the flow to slacken.

On 24-25 May the flow of people toward the land border was suddenly shut off altogether with no great difficulty, but by then Peking's initial miscalculation of the people's readiness to act, and basic weakness in the provincial control apparatus had been made clear. When the land barriers were thrown up again on the Kwangtung side, many of the would-be emigrants who held exit permits were siphoned off through the cleared-up Macao route despite increased efforts of the Hong Kong police to prevent illegal entry by water. The frustration of many of these who had hoped to leave without exit permits led to rioting in Canton during the first week of June, but the actions of regular security forces and the conspicuous presence of regular army troops kept the situation there under control. The rapid subsidence of the surge toward the border from adjacent rural areas tended to confirm the basic tractability of the peasants that had probably weighed heavily, along with the natural difficulties of the overland route and the expectation of effective Hong Kong deterrence, in the initial decision to open the Kwangtung border. The spontaneous rush for the border by so many young people had clearly not been anticipated, and it is doubtful that a clear picture of this development in the exodus got through quickly to the top leaders in Peking. They were apparently preoccupied with other problems at the time, but the major reindoc-trination effort initiated in the following September showed that the Kwangtung exodus had been

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recognized by Peking as an important example of the problem of dissidence and control in China.

### Basic Factors of Resistance

The above cases of resistance have certain aspects in common. In all three cases Peking's leaders miscalculated the people's readiness to go against the expectations of the regime and also their alertness to the opportunities for doing so, which local circumstances offered. Delay in top-level recognition of the extent of people's actions in each case probably stemmed from reluctance to admit basic miscalculation of the amount of dissidence being manifested, but it may also have been due in part to misinformation.

In all three cases above, the same basic factor caused the resistance to get going, to develop its momentum, and to subside. This was the propensity of the people involved to act in the same way at the same time without plans, organization, or more than word-of-mouth coordination. During the period of "blooming and contending" intellectuals and students sensed that the opportunity had come for them to criticize the regime's basic policies with relative impunity. Once the chain reaction started the multiplication of participants was very rapid. In the same way, though, group instinct caused the atmosphere of resistance to evaporate once the regime's signal of counterattack was sounded. This cycle can be seen also in the Kwangtung exodus. A great many people hit the road for the border on the assumption that many others would be doing the same, at the same time, and that local authorities would be temporarily overwhelmed. Then, when rumors of a clamp-down spread and time appeared to be running out, the pressure behind the flow suddenly dropped. In the case of peasant resistance in Honan, the instinct for survival probably had the effect of limiting group action in many parts of the province. At the same time, there undoubtedly were instances other than the "Hsin-yang Incident" when sheer hunger and the chain reaction of mutual encouragement among peasants simply went to completion and brought forceful suppression. A mob, after all, is a mob anywhere in the world. The examples above

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indicate, however, that group instinct for self-limitation in the face of superior force may be particularly well developed in China.

The amount of multiplication and limitation of resistance in the above examples indicates that the terms "passive resistance" and "active resistance" may have special meaning as applied to Communist China. In these examples, dissident individuals engaged in malperformance of required actions or openly resisted authority with limited immediate objectives, but their sensitivity as a group to weakness in the control apparatus considerably magnified their resistance efforts. At the first sign of strong suppressive action, however, contraction of the group's "active" resistance was accelerated by the individual's basically passive instincts.

The examples show that the Communist regime's control apparatus had been effective in preventing the formation of significant resistance organizations in China, but that it was not able to prevent dissidence from becoming resistance under certain circumstances. In the three cases the circumstances triggering the resistance ranged from the regime's own misjudgment to severe food shortages. All the examples had one thing in common--the presence of weakness among government and party cadres at the basic level of direct contact with the people.

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### III. DISSIDENCE, 1962-1965

The major developments in the control process over the past three years have concerned those three segments of the Chinese population which previously demonstrated their readiness to resist. In addition, the Communist regime has shown its concern that unreliable and ineffective cadres might again provide an opportunity for resistance to occur on a large scale in some locality. Individual attention is given below to the groups that Peking is most concerned about--youth, intellectuals, peasants, and cadres. Youth are dealt with in the greatest detail partly because there has been less analysis of intelligence on them in the past years than on intellectuals and peasants. Cadres are not treated here as a separate group but as selected leaders among youth, intellectuals, and peasants respectively.

#### Youth

The large number of young people in the exodus from Kwangtung Province to Hong Kong in May 1962 helped to focus Peking's attention on rising disillusionment among youth throughout China. The regime's creation of widespread educational opportunity during the "Leap Forward" had made it meaningful to think of all China's youth as one group. There was common disillusionment amongst the youth, then, when two things became clear in the spring of 1962. Economic setback had postponed indefinitely the employment hopes which most students had been given by the regime beginning in 1958, and most of those youth not yet in school could no longer look forward to an education because of drastic closing down of primary and high schools and reduction in college enrollment throughout China beginning in 1961. College entrants for the year 1961-62 were cut by some 50 percent, creating a situation in which for the first time since 1949 high school graduates could not find places in the colleges and universities. Most students already in college were allowed to continue toward graduation, but of the 170,000 college graduates in 1962, some 100,000 were required to return to the countryside for employment, according to an official announcement from Peking on 25 April 1963. The disillusionment that

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came with these changes caused some 10,000 out of 11,000 high school and college students, who were vacationing with their relatives in Hong Kong, to remain there at the end of the summer in 1962. This was in marked contrast to the few hundred who decided not to return to China each summer in previous years.

In the course of trying to check this disillusionment during 1962-63 and regenerate revolutionary fervor among China's youth, the Communist regime launched a major indoctrination campaign. Peking's problem was two-fold. First, it was necessary to engender in young people an acceptance of frustration and the commonplace where impatience and achievement of the improbable had so recently been fostered. At the same time, China's youth had to be spurred on in their role as the successors to the Communist revolution. In order to achieve this dual objective the regime launched a major campaign, which sought to develop a new model for China's youth.

On 7 January 1963 the Lei Feng campaign was launched in the province of Liaoning with a joint People's Liberation Army (PLA) -- Young Communist League (YCL) directive to organize soldiers and youth for study of the "heroic feats" of the young engineering squad leader, Lei Feng, who had died the previous August. A month later the general political department of the PLA and the central committee of the YCL directed all young people in Communist China to study the "immortal deeds" and spirit of Lei Feng. The 7 February People's Daily carried a front page story on the campaign and Radio Peking claimed that the campaign had reached mammoth proportions as early as October 1962 in Liaoning Province. Lei Feng was held up as a model Chinese Communist youth, who had willingly given up schooling to return to the farm, where he had lived frugally and worked tirelessly before becoming an exemplary soldier. In these early stages of the campaign much of Lei Feng's dedication to duty was attributed to his previous exposure to revolutionary circumstances. It was claimed that his father had been buried alive by the Japanese; that his mother's rape by a landlord had led to her suicide; that Lei Feng himself had been stabbed by

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25X1 a landlord; and that his soldier brother had been killed in action.

Clarification of the circumstances of Lei Feng's own death and de-emphasis of his "revolutionary" background marked a turning point in the campaign. At the end of February, details of Lei Feng's death were made clear that had been glossed over before. It was stated that he had died in the hospital from a blow on the head by a pole. Since he had been directing traffic when the pole was knocked down by a skidding car, his death was described as being "in the line of duty"; but beginning in March 1963 the propaganda stress was clearly on the noncombatant, ordinary nature of the accident. At about the same time, Lei Feng's childhood experience with capitalist-imperialist atrocities began to be played down. [redacted]

[redacted] this change reflected adverse response to the campaign among China's youth. The point was apparently raised often in discussion meetings that struggle and personal sacrifice are more difficult under peaceful conditions than in time of war.

25X1 In early March the China Youth journal in an entire issue devoted to the campaign stated that heroes are the same regardless of the period in which they appear, and that the important thing for youth to strive for is anonymity. In the same issue much new "evidence" from Lei Feng's diaries, reports, and other "documents" was introduced to show that faithful study of Mao Tse-tung's works had been the "inexhaustible source" of Lei Feng's accomplishments. The Lei Feng material began to stress a slavish following of Mao, his works, and the Chinese Communist Party. General Lo Jui-ch'ing, chief of staff of the PLA, stressed in a March 5th editorial that study of the "spiritual atomic bomb" and "rustproof screw," Lei Feng, was but a means toward properly learning the works of Chairman Mao Tse-tung.

By mid-April, when Lei Feng was quoted as having said that "the revolution needs idiots like me," the flood of propaganda had become a deluge and reports indicated that organizational activity connected with the campaign had reached unprecedented

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dimensions for an emulation-type campaign. Participants in the discussion of learning from Lei Feng described incidents of insubordination in meetings that indicate a prevailing atmosphere of cynicism among the youth and some daring distortion and criticism of the campaign's content. The incidents also indicate, of course, a certain permissiveness on the part of basic-level cadres concerned with conduct of the campaign. It is possible, therefore, that the unprecedented tempo of the campaign was a significant manifestation of defensiveness among these cadres.

Further indication that cadre weakness was present during the Lei Feng campaign lies in the fact that the YCL and its subordinate Young Pioneer Organization were having fundamental problems at that time. The 20 million and 50 million members of these respective organizations were the major force relied upon for carrying out campaigns among China's 130 million youth, as part of their training for eventual party membership. Cadres within the membership actually conducted discussion meetings, but the vast majority of these YCL and Young Pioneer members were expected to help promote campaigns through their ardent participation. The regime's particular concern about morale within the youth organizations had become clear in the fall of 1962. The party central committee having announced at its 10th Plenum in September 1962 the decision to renew political and ideological indoctrination on a broad front, the central committee of the YCL met on 20 December to deal with the problem of disillusionment among youth. A National Conference of the Young Pioneers was convened at the same time. The meeting of the YCL leadership lasted 10 days longer than normal and almost certainly dwelt on the problem of passivity among its members. The depth of this problem was indicated in numerous articles in official publications, which criticized pro-forma YCL programs, poor attendance at meetings, and the incompetence of YCL cadres.

One difficult problem to be dealt with in the YCL was that of overage members. The Kuang Ming Daily on 6 September 1962 had decried the adverse effect of overage membership on the vitality of the league. On 8 September the China Youth Journal

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had blamed overage YCL cadres for having "no enthusiasm for work or any interest in common with the youths." Shortly after the YCL central committee finished its plenary conference on 11 January 1963 the People's Daily (of 23 January) published a revealing "Letter to the editor" from a league member complaining that "when I leave the league in the future /without acquiring party membership/ my teachers and comrades will certainly look down upon me. Besides there will be no organization to take care of me."

A year after the Lei Feng campaign reached its peak of frenzy, the YCL instituted organizational and operational changes that revealed the previous depth of its weakness. These changes were formalized at the 9th National Congress of the league, which convened in Peking from 11 to 29 June 1964, three years overdue according to the provisions of its constitution. At the meeting a revised constitution was presented, which contained some significant new provisions. First, the thought of Mao Tse-tung was specifically declared to be the official guideline for the league, and First Secretary Hu Yao-pang gave this change paramount importance in his announcement. Second, provision was made for more centralized supervision of the one million basic cell groups (branches) of young people under the league. Third, the revised constitution called for bringing new members into the league and making room for them by retiring (gradually) all members over the age of 27, except those holding "leading positions."

Official comment on these changes at the national congress made clear the situation within the league which they reflected. Great stress on the party alone giving direction indicated that the league had become something other than "the right hand of the party." Emphasis upon the "decisive role of extreme importance" played by county and commune supervisors, and the requirement that they "must maintain a firm grip on the work from beginning to end," indicated that the lower echelons of the league had been exercising a considerable amount of independence. The call to "go all out to smash conservative ideology and the force of inertia" among veteran league members and cadres, while at the same time being

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"particularly cautious" about carrying out youth activities in a "compulsory or rash manner," showed the need for both new blood and tighter control. Finally, league members were called upon to "take a warning from the past" and resolutely expose, struggle against, and wipe out the evil and degraded elements" in the league. More significant, however, was the admission that the nature of the mistakes made by members had been serious, and the blunt warning that "if they are not checked in time, the capitalist force will inundate the whole league and the organization of the league will disintegrate."

Many other comments and new constitutional provisions on the need to relate league activities to concrete local circumstances and to report accurately on them; the desirability of a gradual approach emphasizing quality and not quantity in the study of Mao Tse-tung's works; hatred of other members and anger directed at the league in "struggle sessions," and the need for uncompromising discipline: all these gave further confirmation of basic weakness within the Young Communist League.

Information about the state of the YCL in the past year has been sparse, although the regime's programs for mobilizing youth have increased. Sometime before February 1965 the league's long-time leader Hu Yao-pang was transferred to the post of first secretary in Shensi Province, under circumstances suggesting this was a form of exile. It was also reported this year that two new youth organizations were being set up on a trial basis to supplement the work of the Young Pioneers, particularly in the rural areas. At the same time, the regime has been steadily increasing its program for moving ex-students permanently out of the urban areas. In 1964 alone some 300,000 such youth were moved to Sinkiang, Tibet, and other frontier areas for extended periods of farm and construction work. In the past twelve months members and cadres of the Young Communist League have been heavily involved in mobilizing students by the tens of thousands to go to rural areas for periods of several months to farm or to participate actively in the socialist education campaign. The sending and leading of "shock brigades" of students to gain experience in

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"real class struggle" has involved their collecting information from peasants about cadre failings and from cadres about peasant misdeeds, and participating in the "remolding" of both through criticism and punishment. Reports have established the general friction caused by this use of students for farming and indoctrination in rural areas, and the adverse reaction of many such youth to the interruption of their studies in this way.

In addition to these tasks, the YCL has been called upon to help promote "a profound educational revolution of far-reaching political significance" in the rural areas of China. On 22 July 1965, the Peking Kuang Minh Daily reported a series of conferences on rural education held in more than ten provinces. As examples of rapid progress in development of the new "part-farming and part-study system" various provinces were cited for their achievement in opening new institutions or enrolling additional students. Shansi Province claimed an increase in agricultural middle schools from 133 to 1,244 in the year 1964. Kwangtung claimed an increase in county-run "labor universities" from 4 to 87 in less than one year. With regard to primary education, the claims have been even more spectacular. Chosen as a model for other parts of the country, the Chanchiang administrative district in Kwangtung claimed (in the Southern Daily on 7 July 1965) to have increased the number of children in its primary schools by 30 percent in one year.

The regime's concern with the practical problem of literacy as a prerequisite to effective political indoctrination, and the resultant flimsy educational structure now being thrown up are best revealed in the development of "spare-time" primary schools, which the Young Communist League is being called upon to promote. In an editorial on 5 December 1964, China Youth Journal pointed out that development of schools run by the state and the rural collective and introduction of the part-work part-study and part-farm party-study system is:

still not enough. The Young Communist League must extensively develop rural spare-time education and establish spare-time schools of different types. League organizations at all levels are required

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to recognize clearly the heavy responsibility they shoulder in developing spare-time education."

The holding of literacy classes, the gathering of peasant children into classes between fall harvest and spring planting, and even itinerant tutoring in rural homes have long been activities expected of YCL members in order to facilitate Communist indoctrination in rural areas. For the past six months the pressure has been on not only to step up this organizational and teaching activity greatly, but also to do it by "spending as little as possible" and entirely with simple indigenous equipment. Recognizing that in relying on full-time cadres alone "we shall find it difficult to push the work ahead," the China Youth Journal called for giving "a free hand to the rural league branches to go ahead with their work--under the leadership of party organizations and with their support."

It must be concluded that these indoctrination and participation-type control efforts are currently putting a heavy strain on a key organization, the YCL, that is still suffering badly from previous over-extension, inadequate supervision, and extensive deterioration. Six months after the 9th National Congress of the YCL China Youth ran a series of articles on the "vitally important historical significance" of the June reforms, which it complained had been forgotten "like a gush of wind." Presenting "letters to the editor" from both rural and urban YCL branches, the journal made it clear that the spirit of the congress "had not been transmitted to a broad surface but was confined to only a circle of activists." On 1 June 1965, China Youth devoted most of its issue to further recollection of the previous year's National Congress. The lead editorial stressed that "from beginning to end in the course of carrying out league work, the thought of Mao Tse-tung must be put in command," and the spirit of seriously studying Chairman Mao's works:

must be embodied in our quarterly, monthly, and even daily work schedules, in every piece of work, at every meeting, in every activity, and among all of us. In this way

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our Young Communist League will become a dynamically run school for studying the thought of Mao Tse-tung.

The regime recently revealed its concern over dissidence and potential resistance among China's youth in its angry reaction to a specific act of subversion. In December 1964 blatant antiregime propaganda woven into a Communist-style painting was reproduced in China Youth, the official publication of the YCL. Not only were millions of copies of the magazine distributed throughout China, but several weeks passed before orders were given to return them all. Since the doctoring of paintings was a time-honored means of subversion in pre-Communist China, it is probable that the YCL has a regular control element in its organization designed to prevent subversion by this means. Furthermore, it is almost certain that calling in the magazine brought widespread speculation about, if not knowledge of, the cause. The delay in the decision to call in the magazine indicates either that the regime was hesitant or that word of the control breakdown was slow in reaching the upper echelons. In any case, the high degree of concern shown by the regime in the aftermath of the disclosure indicates that reform of the YCL may still be considered a key problem, and that the susceptibility of China's youth to subversion is thought by Peking to be very high.

### Intellectuals

The four million or more professional people who make up China's academic, artistic, and managerial intelligentsia have been a prime target of indoctrination, or thought reform, since the Communist victory in 1949, and party supervision of their activities has been particularly close since the unexpectedly vehement "blooming and contending" of the intellectuals in May 1957. Events of the past twelve months or more have indicated, however, that dissidence among intellectuals is very great. In the spring of 1964, Peking revealed its anguish over the slow pace of the drive for drama reform, which had begun a year earlier. It was acknowledged that playwrights, actors, critics, and audiences were all resisting efforts to make traditional plays and operas serve the class struggle. In

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June 1964 the director of the party's propaganda department, Lu Ting-i, strongly denounced the revival of "ghost operas" in thousands of troupes around the country as "an unbridled attack against socialism by the bourgeoisie and the feudal forces." It was just at this time that Mao reportedly communicated to all cadres working in the arts his displeasure with the results of the "four clearances" campaign among them and changed its emphasis from investigation of cadre corruption to clarification of their ideological positions.

The demand for clear-cut support of the regime's antirevisionist line became particularly strong in Peking's approach to academicians and writers. This shift in approach began in June 1964 with public criticism of a philosopher named Yang Hsien-chen. A member of the party central committee, Yang had formerly headed the regime's Higher Party School (for cadre training) and was now accused of having propagated since mid-1963 a theory of "combining two into one," which implied reconciliation with the Soviet Union. Yang's theory was criticized for being diametrically opposed to Mao Tse-tung's basic teaching that "one thing tends to divide into two." Under the full-fledged indoctrination campaign that was launched with this rare open criticism of a central committee member, intellectuals throughout China were herded into forums to "discuss" concrete themes like the inevitability of class struggle within a society and the naturalness of a split in the world Communist movement as well as the two symbolic themes attributed to Mao Tse-tung and Yang Hsien-chen. By the end of August more than 90 articles on the meaning of the themes, and where the campaign was leading, had been published and there was almost certainly a jumble of contradictory phraseology in the minds of the great majority of those participating in the campaign.

In its September issue Red Flag began to reconstruct a conspiracy behind Yang's "provocation of the polemic." It was claimed that his "idea of reconciling contradictions and negating struggles was formed a long time ago," and his "repeated, painstaking" propagation of it at the Higher Party School was now traced from November 1961 (when he

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was still a lecturer at the school) through November 1963 and up to April 1964. Finally, Yang was identified with an "antiparty group" in China by analogy with Deborin, whose antidialectical views, it was pointed out, had later become the ideological weapons of Trotsky and Bucharin. The September Red Flag went on to claim that Yang's propagation of his theory just at the time the Chinese Communist regime was "carrying out a wide-spread movement for socialist education in the cities and the countryside," was not only "precisely and deliberately designed to aid the modern revisionists" but also "the bourgeoisie and the remnant feudal forces at home by providing them with so-called theoretical weapons for resisting the socialist education movement."

At the same time, the attack upon Yang Hsien-chen became diffused and the campaign merged with a renewed drive for following the individual leadership of Mao Tse-tung. First, other faculty members at the Higher Party School were identified as co-conspirators and then several prominent academicians began to be publicly dragged over the coals. The most sustained attack was made on Deputy Dean Feng Ting of the Peking University Philosophy Department. In the course of several months, three of Feng's works, which had been published prior to 1957 were picked over word-by-word in party magazines and newspapers to prove both that he had propagated revisionist ideas and that he had criticized the cult of personality. On 21 November Red Flag devoted nearly its entire issue to criticism of Feng Ting, accusing him of deliberate heresy in not removing statements in support of class harmony from the 1959 and 1960 editions of his works, after Mao Tse-tung in 1958 had "strongly advocated continuation of class struggle." During the time of the attack on Feng there was considerable increase in the number of references in various publications to Mao's works in rebutting revisionist points. By the end of 1964 the call to study the works of Mao had become a major drive with nearly all literate people being pressured into buying versions of his works and studying them for use at indoctrination meetings. A sampling of the publications at that time shows that Mao's thought was being held up

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as the guiding force for an amazing assortment of activities including: flight training, weather forecasting, grenade throwing, and changing low-yield paddy fields to high-yield ones.

December 1964 brought unusually frank expressions of top-level anguish over the continuing problem of reforming the thoughts of China's intellectuals. In addressing the National Peoples Congress in December, Chou En-lai went into considerable detail in his criticism of recalcitrant party members and dissident intellectuals. This clearly reflected the personal anguish that Mao reportedly expressed at about the same time over the extent of anti-Communist feeling among intellectuals. In his work report to the congress, Chou En-lai stated that it "is utterly wrong to depart from the proletarian stand of class struggle in examining and handling the questions of the bourgeoisie, the democratic parties, and the united front." He went on to stress that "the process of remolding bourgeois elements is one of protracted, complicated, and repeated class struggle." He also explained that the "democratic parties' long-term coexistence and mutual supervision vis-a-vis the Communist Party constitute the process of their gradually remolding themselves into a political force which serves socialism under the leadership of the Communist Party." Finally, Chou called for "consolidation and expansion of the people's democratic united front."

The failure of Li Wei-han, the director of the united front work department of the CCP to attend the December National Congress, and his removal shortly thereafter confirmed the impression given by Chou that the massive complex of offices and committees responsible for directing the work and thoughts of China's intellectuals was in for a thorough investigation.

In January 1965 directives again went out from Peking to all writers, artists, dramatists, and musicians to display violent revolutionary themes in their works, and there has since been a stream of intellectuals of all kinds, particularly government and party cadres going to rural areas to participate in labor. In June, the regime used prominent rocket expert Ch'ien Hsueh-shan to call upon China's scientists to study Mao's works more

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conscientiously and to engage in manual labor. Scientists and engineers have previously been spared such indoctrination, for the most part. The fact that Ch'ien was required to apologize publicly for having become a symbol of the conflict between expertise and "redness" is probably a significant indication of the regime's concern about the subtle resistance which intellectuals have shown they will engage in when there is weakness in the apparatus designed to control them.

### Peasants

Peasants in China have engaged in no resistance similar to the 1960 example in Honan since that time, but it is probable that a large number of peasant farmers have not been carrying out various production tasks in the way required of them by the state. To the extent that malperformance of tasks has been engaged in deliberately by peasants in a group, at the same time, in common expectation of its having additional resistance effect, this kind of foot dragging is an important thing to analyze. It must be approached through an appraisal of current dissidence among peasants and the state of controls at the basic level.

There have been some direct reports of work slow down on individual production teams, and the regime's intense nationwide exhortation to work harder on the farms can reasonably be assumed to reflect less than satisfactory effort in work directly benefiting the state, as opposed to the individual peasant farmer himself. There is clear evidence of weakness among the cadres directly responsible for controlling the peasants. The great concern by the Communist regime over this control weakness could, on the one hand, be real fear of recurring large-scale open resistance in Honan or elsewhere in China as a result of future food shortages. On the other hand, Peking may be concerned about an amount of group foot-dragging that is capable of forestalling the further mobilization of peasants for collective production. In either case, as shown by the three examples of actual resistance above, the extent to which dissidence

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is translated into resistance tends to be in direct proportion to the weakness of the cadres involved at the basic level.

The difficulties encountered by Peking in its efforts to strengthen cadre ranks at all levels reflect the evolution of the basic level cadre's position from the beginning of Communist rule in China. Almost as soon as peasants with activist qualifications were first given the position of cadres on a large scale in 1950, they began to be separated from their fellow farmers by the leadership demands of the Communist regime. First, their hands were covered with the blood of the "landlords" and "rich peasants," and "counterrevolutionaries" in the violent land reform movement of 1950-51, and the "three and five antis" campaigns of 1951-52. Then, the basic level cadres became caught between their fellow peasants and the middle level cadres and party members in the tortuous advances and retreats of the collectivization movement from 1955 to 1957. The "leap forward" of 1958-60 required the peasant cadres to implement numerous innovations and exploitations against the will of their fellow workers. The disastrous results of these attempts to change man and nature were then blamed in part on these cadres not only by the farmers but also by the regime in Peking. In self-defense and in fear of being required once again to implement ruinous agricultural programs some cadres have become hyper-bureaucratic while others at this basic level have been compromising their activist positions. For their fellow farmers this has, on the whole, been a golden opportunity to entrench and fortify themselves against the renewal of collectivist demands, which the Communist regime has repeatedly forecast.

It is down to the ranks of these compromised basic level cadres that Peking has since 1962 been sending cadres of all other levels to investigate or be reformed through "participation in labor." The results have been largely negative. The arrival of higher ranking cadres from other rural areas and basic level cadres from urban areas has almost always caused friction with the local peasant cadres, according to the many reports on this problem which have been received. The results of such "infusion of new blood" at the basic level have been to cause

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many local cadres to move closer to their fellow peasants. Many urban and middle level cadres have reacted to the cold reception given them on the farms, the difficulty of ferretting out information, and to the hard work by showing their disdain for manual labor upon arrival in the countryside and by making every effort to get out of such duty. From mid-1962 through mid-1964 one clear result was an on-again-off-again pattern of labor participation drives for cadres.

The regime has recognized since 1962 that the basic level peasant cadres were the source of much of its frustration in trying to increase collective farm productivity and in the remolding of other cadres and party members through labor, and it has tried to do something to correct this fundamental source of difficulty. In certain key areas, such as Fukien Province, the regime zeroed in on the peasant cadre as early as the winter of 1962-63, and [redacted]

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[redacted] the intensity of the regime's effort to root out the corruption and connections that had already so compromised the control position of the basic level cadres in that province. [redacted]

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The great change of pace in the socialist education campaign that began in mid-1964, and the many forms that it has taken, have tended to hide the unchanging focus of the regime's concern and effort upon the peasant cadres. The chronology of the campaign and its terminology have been blurred not only by the natural fluctuation associated with crop cycles and the availability of farmers' and workers' time for attending indoctrination meetings but also by the flexibility which has been allowed local officials in applying the campaign to local problems. In general, it can be said that the following things have been under intense investigation for the past twelve months:

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1. non-Communist, or anti-Communist words, thoughts, and inclinations
2. malperformance of work, including foot-dragging as well as over-zealousness and bureaucratism
3. misdeeds, such as blackmarketing, graft, embezzlement, waste, and immorality
4. class status - for the purpose of reclassification where desired for control purposes.

In the course of these investigations officials in various localities have alternately emphasized the similarity of current charges to the previous "three antis" and "five antis" (which were severely punished in 1951-52) or they have used the terminology of "four clearances." Most such officials involved in the campaign have introduced special charges with local significance, as in Kwangtung, where "anti-escape to Hong Kong" has been stressed. Throughout the many reports from China on socialist education, however, there runs the main theme of concentrated attack on the basic-level cadre.

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[REDACTED] The evolution of these peasant associations has been extremely important; not because they have so strengthened the control apparatus, but also because of the control problems at the basic level that have been revealed in the process.

It appears to have taken more than a year, beginning early in 1963, to get these associations really off the ground. This was probably due in part to the stigma, which they acquired in 1950-51, when they were the instrument used for bullying the victims of the Land Reform Movement. A more important hindrance was probably the regime's obvious intent of using these PLMP's initially for uncovering and prosecuting cadre shortcomings.

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The regime has had to select carefully in order to get peasants into the associations who would really serve this objective. Fear of cadre retribution has almost certainly been one reason for such reluctance to take an active part in investigation and prosecution. A more important reason for the difficulty in finding reliable new peasant activists may be the wide involvement of peasants in the corruption that has taken place.

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#### IV. IMPLICATIONS

There have been three cases of group resistance on a significant scale in Communist China, excluding resistance by ethnic minority groups in Tibet, Sinkiang, and some of the provinces of China. Three groups have been involved--intellectuals, youth, and peasants. Each case has been different, but they have common themes. (1) In May 1957 many intellectuals and students throughout China seized an opportunity to abuse the regime's invitation to "bloom and contend" and caused Peking to undertake a far harsher indoctrination effort than it had intended. (2) In the summer and fall of 1960 peasants in many parts of Honan Province thwarted the efforts of local authorities to control the storage and distribution of food for several months before order was restored by the use of regular troops. (3) In May 1962 peasants and urban workers, particularly youth, in southern Kwangtung Province overwhelmed local authorities in the Canton area for a short while in their unexpected rush for the Hong Kong border.

In each of these cases real resistance was involved in that dissident feelings of a particular segment of the Chinese population found expression in the same way at the same time. The resistance was passive in the sense that it began or took place in the course of some regular program laid on by the Communist regime. It was active in the sense that the people involved undertook their action in the expectation of a resulting group effort thwarting or upsetting authority for at least awhile. That such coordination took place without any organization for resistance is significant. More significant is that in each case the group was sensitive to conditions of weakness in the control apparatus that provided the opportunity for the resistance to take place. This weakness consistently occurred among the cadres at the basic level of control.

Since 1962 Peking has shown its recognition of potential resistance among the above three groups particularly, and it has concentrated its

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attention on strengthening cadre ranks at the basic level in these groups. Among the peasant cadres this has been a particularly frustrating effort and the lack of success in rural areas has had an adverse effect upon the regime's other programs for remolding rural and urban cadres of all levels through participation in farm labor.

Continuing weakness at the basic cadre level in the youth-oriented elements of the control apparatus may mean that there will be further opportunities for resistance that the youth of China will be inclined to seize. In the case of the youth group, dissidence may be much more volatile than it appears from outside China. Students all over the world have surprised observers time and again with their open opposition to totalitarian regimes. Upon many occasions students have revealed a deep sense of mission in openly resisting where they knew others would not or could not act in such a way. The present regime in Peking has consistently stressed the youth of China in its propaganda, and its programs at one time gave false educational and employment hopes to all the youth of China. In the past two years, Peking's leaders have been trying again to throw up at least a facade of educational opportunity, and to keep most of China's youth busy, if not gainfully employed. The focus of attention on the individual leadership of Mao Tse-tung may be fulfilling a particular need among China's youth, but if it is, his passing may usher in a period of greatly increased uncertainty among the youth. During such a period any foreseeable successor to Mao would have to rely in part for stability upon the same youth-oriented elements in the control apparatus, which showed their weakness in 1957, 1962, and 1963 and which appear to be the cause of much concern in Peking today.

At some time in the future, basic control weakness may again combine with discontent to cause one or more of the above groups in China to resist openly on a large scale. When this occurs, though, it is probable that lack of organization for resistance, and the innate self-limitation of Chinese acting in groups will prevent a Hungarian-style revolt, so long as overwhelming force is still available to the Communist regime.

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