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SUMMARY OF CONTENTS

THE SOVIET WORLD Page 2

COMMUNIST INTENTIONS IN KOREA Page 4

There are no firm indications of ultimate Communist intentions regarding conclusion of a Korean cease-fire. In contrast with their assertions of a year ago which claimed that UN forces would be driven from the peninsula, the Communist conduct of negotiations and their propaganda in the past few days have struck a balance between conciliation and belligerency, suggesting an expectation of some form of cease-fire agreement. Meanwhile, there has been a continuing improvement in the enemy's military position, particularly in the development of his air potential.

BURMESE GOVERNMENT WEAKENING UNDER COMMUNIST PRESSURE Page 7

Recent events in Burma reveal that the stability of the Burmese Government continues to deteriorate as a result of military weakness and increasing political subversion. This progressive disintegration of the Rangoon regime's position is leading to Communist control of Burma. The Government's hypersensitivity to leftist criticism forestalls any effort to obtain aid and advice from the Western democracies.

WESTERN EUROPEAN REACTION TO CHURCHILL'S VICTORY Page 9

The importance of the Conservative Party victory in the British elections and of Churchill's return to power lies for western Europe in the impetus given to the rightist trend on the Continent. On balance, the effects of Churchill's victory will probably be more psychological than tangible. The initial enthusiastic reaction in Western Europe will undoubtedly be dulled as the Conservatives' policies are handicapped by their narrow majority and tempered by their growing economic and financial problems.

SPECIAL ARTICLE. WORLD COMMUNISM: THE SOVIET HOLD ON COMMUNIST CHINA Page 11

The Soviet hold on Communist China may already be, or may soon become, so strong as to preclude a successful assertion of independence by the Peiping regime. The USSR has been steadily developing a system of controls in Communist China to reduce Peiping's capabilities for independent action. Even if Peiping chooses to reject the Soviet demand for subordination of national interests to Moscow's global objectives, it is questionable whether the Chinese could retain control of their entire territory, expel Soviet personnel and eradicate Soviet influence.

THE SOVIET WORLD

In the course of functions commemorating the 34th Anniversary of the October Revolution, Moscow's spokesmen placed unusually strong emphasis on Soviet strength and warned the West against an attack on the USSR. Although claims of Communist strength are customary in comment on this anniversary, the tone of this year's output was more militant and the emphasis on capitalist encirclement was more pronounced.

Politburo member L. P. Beriya, in his keynote address at the Bolshoi Theater, cautioned Western leaders not to construe the USSR's desire for peace as a sign of weakness and repeatedly recalled the Nazi invaders' defeat by the Soviet Union at a time when it was much less prepared than at present. Another world war, he said, would result in the destruction of capitalism. Marshal Malinovsky echoed Beriya's remarks the next day at the parade in Red Square when he declared that Soviet forces were prepared to meet "any attack fully armed."

The sole hint in Beriya's speech that the Soviet Government might be prepared for negotiations with the West came in an assertion that a "basis for agreement" with the West continues to exist. Beriya cited the mutual benefits to be obtained from unrestricted East-West trade, non-aggression pacts and a disarmament treaty.

Probably because of the Kremlin's increasing concern over Western rearmament, the USSR, through various channels, has revealed an ostensible interest in great power negotiations. However, feelers from certain quarters in the West have so far elicited no favorable response from Moscow.

French President Auriol's suggestion for a big four conference is the only one of such feelers to receive any attention in the Soviet press and this in the form of criticism that it was not "specific" enough. The Kremlin's propaganda organs charged that Auriol had by-passed such vital questions as the North Atlantic Treaty, American bases encircling the Soviet Union, US rearmament and the remilitarization of Germany and Japan. Implicit in these Soviet press comments was a lack of interest in big-power talks that do not provide for outright negotiations on the rearmament issue and all related questions.

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In contrast to all other Eastern European Satellites, the Rumanian Government has announced that its over-all industrial production goals

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for the third quarter of 1951 have been fulfilled. According to the Rumanian announcement all major production categories, except building construction and food and timber products, exceeded their goals. Coal and petroleum goals were fulfilled by 102.9 percent, electric power by 105.1 percent and transport by 118.7 percent. The announced Rumanian industrial successes are in line with Voroshilov's Liberation Day speech in August which lauded Rumanian advancements under the guidance of the Soviet Union.

According to a Bulgarian press announcement, Politburo member Titko Chernokolev, who was dismissed from his post as Minister of Agriculture in June, has been expelled from the party. It was also made known that Chernokolev, as well as three deputies of the Bulgarian National Assembly, had been removed from their parliamentary posts. Since these officials have lost their legislative immunity by this action, it is possible that they may soon be involved in a political trial in Sofia. Bulgaria thus becomes the third European Satellite where current evidence suggests that important trials may soon be held -- Poland and Czechoslovakia being the other two.

The Czechoslovak Government has enacted a Defense Training bill which will require that premilitary and civil defense training be introduced into mass organizations. A Union for Cooperation with the Army, corresponding in name and functions to the USSR's DOSAAF, has been established to implement the mass defense training program through affiliated organizations, such as the Red Cross, the Peoples Militia, amateur flying groups, and SOKOL (the national sports organization). The army is to furnish the Union and its affiliates with instructors, training cadres, and materials.

There is evidence that the Rumanian port of Constanta is being developed as an alternate to the Polish port of Gdynia for Satellite shipments to China. Exports from Eastern Europe to China, which have increased sharply in the past year, have apparently overtaxed Polish shipping and port facilities.

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COMMUNIST INTENTIONS IN KOREA

Current intelligence offers no firm indications of ultimate Communist intentions regarding a cease-fire in Korea. Although the enemy's conduct of cease-fire negotiations and his propaganda have recently suggested an expectation that an agreement on the cessation of hostilities will eventually be reached, his pronouncements continue to strike a balance between conciliatory and belligerent themes. Meanwhile, a continuing improvement of the enemy's military position in Korea and contiguous areas has been observed.

From the date of Chinese Communist intervention in Korea until the spring of 1951 the stated objective of Communist forces was the forcible expulsion of UN troops from all of Korea. This position had ceased to be made explicit some weeks prior to Malik's cease-fire proposal of late June 1951, and has not been stated categorically since, although it presumably remains the Communist long-range objective.

The most nearly reliable gauge of Communist intentions in Korea has been the prevailing tenor of their propaganda which has attempted alternately to prepare for either successful negotiations and a cessation of military operations or failure of negotiations and a prolonged conflict. For most of the past month, enemy propaganda has emphasized the first possibility, attempting to prove that Communist forces have attained their objectives in Korea, that the US has suffered an unprecedented defeat, that the battle-lines are in the vicinity of the 38th Parallel, and that there are no insuperable obstacles to successful negotiations.

At the same time, Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai have asserted that Peiping's offer to settle the Korean question by peaceful means "still holds good," but have cautioned that support for the "long-term struggle" is still the "central task." Thus, even if the complex problem of a cease-fire is resolved, subsequent negotiations may see the reaffirmation of the enemy's original objectives.

Ranking Chinese Communist leaders have recently stated that Chinese "volunteers" would not have been dispatched to Korea if the US had not "occupied" Formosa, "invaded" Korea, and pushed toward Manchuria, and that Peiping's objective in Korea remains that of defending the territorial integrity of China. More ominously, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyshinsky at the Paris UN meeting has again put forth unacceptable proposals regarding the 38th Parallel and withdrawal of foreign troops as part of a Korean peace plan. These statements clearly permit renewal of the earlier explicit demand for abandonment by the US of its policy of "neutralization" of Formosa and for withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea.




Ambiguous political indications of a desire for an armistice have not been reflected in Communist military activity, with their air and ground forces continuing to improve their capabilities.

The major--and possibly the most decisive--improvement in the Communist strength has been in their air potential. Enemy air activity over North Korea expanded during 1951 and has now reached a point where effective UN superiority over northwestern Korea has been denied. There has also been a decided improvement in pilot ability. Chinese pilots have been noticed supplementing Soviet personnel who previously carried the main burden of enemy air combat. An effective air defense system now exists in northwestern Korea including daylight jet interceptors, night interceptors, probably utilizing radar, radar directed antiaircraft artillery, and an integrated early warning ground-controlled intercept radar net. Communist air strength in Manchuria is at an all-time high with about 500 MIG-15 jet aircraft, and enemy jets have recently begun operations from a Korean border airfield. Active preparations to base aircraft at other operational Korean airfields continue.

Communist troop strength has been maintained at about the maximum which can be logistically supported, and new units have appeared since the cease-fire talks began. The enemy has attempted to overcome his decided inferiority in weapons and firepower by introducing heavier equipment. At the time of the Chinese intervention, he had no effective armored force, but three armored divisions--partially equipped with tanks heavier than the familiar T-34--are now accepted in Korea. Firepower has also been increased by the addition of a Chinese Communist anti-tank division, and by a considerable increase in organic North Korean divisional artillery. Four, or possible five, Chinese Communist artillery divisions, possessing some conventional rocket weapons, are presently in support of front line troops. Antiaircraft strength, estimated to exceed six Soviet-style antiaircraft divisions, is disposed at strategic points throughout Communist held territory.

All evidence points to a continuing adequate supply situation to support current military operations. Morale among the enemy forces varies from good to excellent, with certain exceptions among units that have been heavily engaged during the past month.

While the problem of logistical support probably prevents the introduction of additional Chinese Communist elements, individual replacements continue to maintain existing units at or near strength. Major units that have lost their combat effectiveness have been replaced by fresh units from China and Manchuria. Chinese Communist strength in Manchuria has been maintained at a fairly constant level and presumably is available for commitment in Korea in the event of need.



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Although the Soviet Union has avoided publicly associating itself with the Communist cause in the Korean war--other than by giving limited diplomatic and propaganda support--Soviet covert participation has increased considerably during the summer and fall of 1951. It has included the continuous supplying of war material and of large numbers of Soviet military personnel, tentatively estimated by FECOM at 20,000, serving in both technical and combat capacities in rear areas. The effect has been to bolster Communist technical capabilities.

There continues to be no evidence, however, that the Soviet Union plans to employ its considerable Far Eastern military forces openly in Korea. In the event of such intervention, the Russians could commit up to 15 infantry divisions and sufficient air power to ensure Communist air supremacy. The USSR is increasing its offensive capability in the Far East by the conversion of conventional fighter air regiments to high performance jet fighters.

All current indications point to a continued strong enemy defense in depth. The Communists are believed to be preparing a series of defensive positions extending as far north as the Wonsan-Pyongyang line. In western Korea, they retain a considerable offensive potential, supported by armor and artillery; however, recent UN interdiction of supply lines has resulted in some deterioration of this potential. There are no indications, however, that offensive action, other than limited defensive counter and spoiling attacks, will be launched in the near future.

BURMESE GOVERNMENT WEAKENING UNDER COMMUNIST PRESSURE

Recent events in Burma reveal that the stability of the Burmese Government continues to deteriorate as a result of military weakness and increasing political subversion. This progressive disintegration of the Rangoon regime's position is leading to Communist control of Burma.

The Burma Communist Party has progressed substantially toward its immediate objectives. Communist military forces have successfully eluded the Burmese Army in moving toward the Chinese frontier, and have been able to accelerate their operations. In addition, Communist efforts to reach an understanding with other insurgents are apparently beginning to bear fruit; most significant in this respect is a reported agreement with the Karens in southern Burma to cooperate in military campaigns.

The Government seems helpless to prevent the Communists from consolidating control over large areas of northern Burma, from which a southward drive may be launched with materiel support from the Chinese Communists.

An equally serious danger to the Government is the increasing strength and activity of overt left-wing political elements. The Burma Workers and Peasants Party, which actually represents the Communist Party aboveground, is constantly and effectively attacking the Government's domestic and foreign policies. Not only is this group steadily gaining adherents, but it has lately formed a "triple alliance" with two other influential leftist political parties. Because of its superior organization, popular program and support from the Chinese and Soviet Embassies, this party will, in all likelihood, dominate the coalition and seek to transform it into an overt counterpart of the underground "Peoples Democratic Front," into which the Burma Communist Party is attempting to attract the several insurgent factions.

Another political threat lies in the activities of U Ba Swe, Secretary General of the Burma Socialist Party and leader of that party's large pro-Communist element. He is said to be dissatisfied with the moderate Socialist leadership in the Government and is maneuvering for the Premiership. In order to achieve his ambition it is entirely possible that he will effect a rapprochement between his left-wing Socialist followers and the Burma Workers and Peasants Party.

Should Ba Swe become Premier, the Burmese Government's drift to the right would be abruptly reversed, British and American influence would be reduced to a minimum, closer relations with Communist China would be developed -- as has been repeatedly recommended by the Burmese Ambassador to Peiping -- and the prospects of early Communist domination of Burma would be greatly improved.

Burmese leaders, despite the clearly apparent deterioration of their regime, continue to maintain a complacent attitude toward the Communist threat and to concentrate their energies on personal rivalries or the attainment of wealth and prestige. Burmese intolerance and racial prejudices prevent a settlement with the Karens and cooperation with other ethnic groups against the Communists. Finally, the Government's hypersensitivity to leftist criticism forestalls any effort to obtain aid and advice from the Western democracies.

WESTERN EUROPEAN REACTION TO CHURCHILL'S VICTORY

The Conservative victory in the United Kingdom is generally accepted on the Continent as another step in the general Western European trend to the right. Most non-Communists, with the exception of the Socialists, hailed Churchill's return. Although no great change in British policy is envisaged, the general expectation is that closer ties with the other Western European countries and a firmer stand on foreign policy matters will result.

While most Continental commentators agree that Churchill's domestic policy will follow that of the Atlee Government fairly closely, Socialist spokesmen have expressed considerable dismay over the effects of the Labor Party's defeat on the international Socialist movement. Even if the Labor program is not radically altered, Socialism's prestige is considered to be endangered by this setback to its outstanding experiment.

The relatively close vote has led some commentators to question the real force of the Conservative victory, and Socialist regret has been somewhat tempered by the thought that British Labor's policy has not been defeated. This attitude may help to prevent the adoption by the Socialists of more extreme measures which might widen the breach between them and their more moderate partners in the Continental governments. There is no immediate prospect of an increased strain on governmental stability in any Western European country because of this factor.

Continental observers are again enthusiastic over the possibility of British support of, or even participation in, such plans as the coal-steel pool and the European Defense Forces. Nevertheless, despite Churchill's record in favor of closer European cooperation, there is scepticism over the extent to which the Prime Minister will attempt to follow the views he expressed as leader of the opposition.

Most Europeans will be satisfied to see Great Britain more closely aligned with the Continent, even if political and economic ties are not formalized in a more rigid framework. On the other hand, the most commonly expressed fear in regard to British foreign policy is that closer Anglo-American solidarity will develop. Such a trend is viewed as a danger to British ties with the Continent and hence to the European unity goal.

The most optimistic European supporters of Churchill look to him for immediate efforts to ease East-West tension. Some expect four-power talks, or even an American-British-Soviet conference, although it has also been pointed out that past meetings involving Churchill and Stalin gained little for the West in comparison with what was given.

Nevertheless, any British attempt which might lessen the defense burden will be regarded hopefully on the Continent.

Particular national problems are reflected in the varying facets of European opinion on Churchill's return to power. The probability that the Conservatives will follow a stiffer policy toward the Moslem states appeals to the French, who have recently sought closer collaboration with Great Britain on Near East and African matters. Churchill's pro-French sympathies have also colored French estimates of his potentialities for advancing their foreign policy objectives.

Much speculation in West Germany revolves around the possibility of a change in British policy, particularly towards Germany. Underlying this speculation is the old German fear that an East-West rapprochement might be accomplished at the expense of German unity and independence.

The Austrian Foreign Office is optimistic over the possibility of renewed four-power negotiations which it associates with Churchill's policies. The Austrian Foreign Minister believes that the Austrian question can be resolved only through such a meeting.

Portugal finds specific grounds for welcoming a Conservative victory in the expectation that a stiffer British colonial policy will weaken the rising tide of nationalism in Africa. The Portuguese also look to a softer British attitude toward Spain. This hope is also found in the controlled Spanish press. The Spanish Government presumably looks for a less hostile attitude among its European neighbors if Great Britain develops a policy favorable to Spain.

Only in Scandinavia has non-Communist comment been apprehensive of the international effects of Churchill's return. Both Sweden and Norway foresee a possible loosening of the close relations they had maintained with the British Labor Government. The Norwegians particularly fear increased British activity in Asia and the Near East. In Denmark, on the other hand, greater governmental stability can be expected since the Social Democrats will now be disinclined to challenge the incumbent conservative Moderate-Liberal government.

On balance, the effects of Churchill's victory will probably be more psychological than tangible. The initial enthusiastic reaction in Western Europe will undoubtedly be dulled as the Conservatives' policies are handicapped by their narrow majority and tempered by their growing economic and financial problems.

SPECIAL ARTICLE

WORLD COMMUNISM: THE SOVIET HOLD ON COMMUNIST CHINA

The Soviet hold on Communist China may already be, or may soon become, so strong as to preclude a successful assertion of independence by the Peiping regime if the desire to do so should ever arise. The Chinese Communist leadership may eventually reject, as did the Yugoslav, the Soviet demand for subordination of national interests to the objective of world domination by Moscow. If current trends continue, however, it is doubtful that the Chinese could ever, like the Yugoslavs, retain control of their entire territory, expel Soviet personnel, and eradicate Soviet influence.

To date, far from showing any inclination to break or even to loosen its ties with the USSR, the Peiping regime has consistently followed policies which have the effect of binding China ever more tightly to the Soviet bloc. Even before the regime's founding in October 1949, the Chinese Communist movement was deeply penetrated by the USSR, and in the past two years Peiping has sought and obtained extensive Soviet assistance--political, economic and military--in consolidating its position and developing its capabilities. The USSR has thus been able to develop a system of controls in Communist China which steadily reduces Peiping's capabilities for independent action.

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Although the CCP owes its attainment of national power primarily to its own efforts and is bound by a strong sense of nationalism, it has been aggressively pro-Soviet and consistently Stalinist in behavior. Because the dis-

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inction between a Soviet order and an adopted Soviet suggestion is not readily apparent to the outer world, it is not known to what degree the USSR may compel Peiping to adopt policies which the Party regards as disadvantageous to its national interests. Thus it is not known whether Mao Tse-tung and his lieutenants, like Tito and his, envisage or will discover a point beyond which they cannot or will not go in sacrificing national interests to the cause of "proletarian internationalism."

Even if the CCP Politburo were to split en bloc from that of the USSR, it is questionable whether the entire party would follow. The USSR may already have a sufficiently strong hold over the political, economic and military apparatus of the border regions--Manchuria, Inner Mongolia and Sinkiang--to secure control of those areas in the event of a Sino-Soviet split without having to take direct military action.

Soviet economic interests are particularly strong in the border regions. Manchuria and Sinkiang are traditional spheres of Russian influence, and the USSR on several occasions, as when it invaded Manchuria in 1929 to protect Soviet interests in the Chinese Eastern Railway, has asserted its position in these regions by force. The USSR dominates civil air and land transport in these areas, has a controlling position in the exploitation of oil and certain mineral resources, and commands physical access to the border regions equal or superior to that from China proper. This dominance continues despite signs of a strengthened Chinese administrative position in these areas.

In China proper, Soviet economic penetration does not generally extend to the point of control. The railroads, the important textile industry, and other segments of the economy are typically Chinese-operated and Chinese-owned. Nevertheless, Sino-Soviet agreements concluded since 1950 in the field of communications, transportation and trade reflect considerable progress in aligning China with the Soviet economy. Traditionally unimportant in China's foreign commerce, the Soviet bloc accounted for one fourth of China's trade in 1950, and, according to Peiping, fully three fourths in 1951. Peiping's frequent commentaries on the activities of Soviet advisers also reveal the influence they have on many sectors of the Chinese economy.

The structure of Russian economic interests in China indicates that China could not be withdrawn intact--that is, China proper plus the border areas--from the Soviet bloc. China proper might be withdrawn without critical economic dislocation; the principal disruption would be caused by the necessity of once again reorienting China's foreign commerce, but the experience of the past two years shows that the redirection of China's trade-flow could be effected in short order if Peiping and the West were willing.

A Sino-Soviet split would threaten Peiping with loss of all effective authority in the border regions. The loss of Manchuria's industries and

resources in particular would be a crippling blow to Peiping's industrialization plans. This consideration alone would strongly discourage possible Chinese separatist tendencies.

On the military side, the Sino-Soviet treaty of February 1950 formally commits the Peiping regime to the Soviet bloc in the event of war, and permits the USSR to retain control of the Port Arthur naval base area until the end of 1952. Unpublished agreements are believed to provide for the assignment of Soviet advisory-technical personnel to every part of the Chinese military organization, for the supply of Soviet materiel, and possibly for the joint development and operation of Chinese naval and air bases.

An estimated 10,000 Soviet military advisers, instructors and technicians are attached to the Chinese Communist ground forces at every level from the Revolutionary Military Council in Peiping to the regiment in the field. While these Soviet officers do not have command of Chinese forces, their power is reported to be as great as that of the Chinese commanders. The USSR is reported to be training and equipping elite formations of the CCF in Manchuria and to be operating specialist schools of various types. The supply of Soviet materiel to Chinese armored and artillery forces, and possibly to the infantry as well, has been substantial. Although the CCP could dispense with Soviet aid without jeopardizing Peiping's control of China, the regime's capabilities for either offensive or defensive operations, and for achieving status as a world power, would be greatly reduced.

The Soviet position is especially strong in the Chinese Communist Air Force--with an available strength of 1220 combat planes--which is almost entirely a Soviet creation; the USSR has provided planes, equipment, training and combat pilots. Since maintenance and supply of the air force will continue to depend on the Soviet Union, a Sino-Soviet split would probably mean deterioration, or possibly even defection of the air force to the USSR.

The Soviet Union is undertaking development of the small--12,000 men--Chinese Communist Navy, and Soviet penetration, particularly in the more technical fields, extends to the lowest levels of the Chinese naval training organization. Realization of the Navy's missions of invading Formosa and defending the coast clearly depends upon continued Soviet assistance.

Many of the Peiping regime's military leaders have studied in the USSR, thousands of Chinese officers have been Soviet trained, all of the top commanders have indicated a Stalinist orientation, and indoctrination on Stalinist lines is pervasive throughout the armed forces. Moreover, the political apparatus in the military establishment is Stalinist in character and has presumably been penetrated by Soviet agents. In the event of a Sino-Soviet split at the Politburo level, it is likely that the Chinese Communist armed forces would also be split seriously enough to prevent the anti-Stalinist forces from achieving control over all of China.