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REFLECTIONS ON THE "PSYCHOLOGICAL PEARL HARBOR"

At a moment when the eyes of the world are focused on a point of the fourth magnitude in the firmament, it would seem advisable to survey more searchingly the earthly horizon. Such a scrutiny would almost certainly indicate that the dynamics of the Soviet power potential as the base of world Communism have generally been underestimated. A number of reflections are suggested by this sobering conclusion which are here presented under two rubrics: (A) the world outlook of the Kremlin, and (B) suggested world outlook of the United States.

A. The world outlook of the Kremlin.

1. Virtually dictatorial power is now firmly in the hands of Nikita Khrushchev. That Khrushchev has successfully concluded a drive to power comparable to that of Stalin prior to 1930 now appears to be an established fact. [redacted]

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Khrushchev has no visible personal challenger and the principal elements of the Soviet state and society - the Party, technological, military and intellectual elites - appear to be either firmly behind him or unable to constitute an effective threat to his power. It may be added that the secret police which was a principal element of Stalin's dictatorship remains fully in readiness and would be subject to exploitation by Khrushchev should circumstances require.

2. The basic instrument of Khrushchev's dictatorship is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, specifically its hierarchy of functionaries generally known as the apparat. Khrushchev has taken a number of powerful steps to strengthen the apparat and its hold on every aspect of Soviet life. [redacted]

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3. Although firmly in the saddle, Khrushchev faces many difficult problems. Considerable attention has been devoted in the press and in intelligence research to such factors as economic difficulties, unrest among students and intellectuals, desire of the Soviet

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people for more consumer goods and greater contact with the outside world, and others. We know from past statements and actions of Khrushchev that he is aware of these problems.

4. What we have seen of Khrushchev, especially in recent months, suggests that he will make every effort to remove or bring under control the elements of discontent in the Soviet Union. It is apparent that Khrushchev is a combination of a brilliant politician, a natural demagogue, a resourceful and tough negotiator, a pragmatist and a convinced Communist. His grasp and understanding of internal and external political forces are increasingly revealed as of a higher order than those exhibited in London and India. He is particularly strong in sensing the vulnerability of an adversary and attacking it by a variety of means, including intimidation, blandishment, provocation and envelopment.

5. In the military field we must assume that the USSR has established a permanent basis of nuclear deterrence. This proposition scarcely needs discussion and it may be assumed to underly all Soviet strategic thinking. This doctrine presumably posits not only that the Soviet Union now has the capability to destroy any area of resistance, including the continental United States, but also that the United States possesses the same capability vis-a-vis the Sino-Soviet Bloc. In other words, no "breakthrough" of military technology can be envisaged which would prevent either side from being able to wipe out the entire base of the other, even in the event of an overwhelming surprise attack.

6. Under these circumstances, "peaceful coexistence" is the only thinkable status for the contending power blocs. Thus what was once a slogan and a "cold-war device" has become, at least for the predictable future, an iron reality. This does not exclude the possibility of limited conventional warfare in the future. Moreover, it is probable that the emergence of other major power groupings, such as a United Western Europe, will alter the present polarization of world power with unforeseeable consequences.

7. The Soviet Union, under "peaceful coexistence," will wage an implacable struggle to achieve world hegemony. There is no reason to believe that any diminution of ideological fervor will weaken this

unprecedented imperialistic drive. In the eyes of Khrushchev, victory may well be something which can be assured, if not actually achieved, in his own lifetime, and in the event that he dies or is removed, he may well believe that the regime which he now controls will be able to continue the battle with undiminished vigor. This is indeed a debatable point for, in the event of his removal from power a struggle for succession would probably ensue which could paralyze the Soviet system and bring about a "time of trouble" for the Soviet Union in which its drive toward the Communist millennium would be halted. Nevertheless, it would not be prudent to base our own strategic calculations upon such an eventuality.

8. Having established nuclear stalemate and "peaceful coexistence", the primary strategy of the Kremlin for world conquest will necessarily be political and economic. The double-track Soviet approach through diplomacy and Communist Party subversion is now well established and is recognized as such by the Free World. The battle is thus joined on a shifting front in which basic engagements will henceforth be tactical and will be characterized by maximum flexibility on the part of Khrushchev. There is ample evidence that he now has at his disposition adequate material resources to heighten the intensity of the engagement and a powerful, highly disciplined personnel to execute it.

9. The domestic base from which Khrushchev will conduct his campaign is inherently strong. On the political side, the supremacy of the Party is sufficiently well established to cope with any potential or actual dissidence or threats to the regime. On the economic side, there appears to be in process a major shift of gear which is accompanied by a certain loss of momentum but which has the promise of accelerated speed in the future. It is unnecessary here to elaborate the steps which are being taken to increase labor productivity, worker discipline and morale, and to achieve a smoother and more efficient adjustment of production and distribution. We believe that Khrushchev's agricultural program, though undoubtedly a gamble, holds the possibility of quickly realizing a substantial part of the claims he has made for it. In the industrial field the USSR may not be able to maintain the rate of expansion which his plans call for, but it may register within

five years sufficient progress toward its goal of catching up with the West, specifically the United States economy, to satisfy the aspirations of the Russian people and to convince key underdeveloped and neutralist countries that the Communist model is the one to follow. At this point, a chain reaction of "capitalist" decline and "socialist" advance might well ensue.

10. Taking into consideration the above propositions, it would appear that the threat presented by Soviet-dominated world Communism has increased rather than diminished.

B. Suggested world outlook of the United States.

1. The U. S. Government and the American people should accept and fully understand the implications of the era of permanent nuclear stalemate. It would appear that to a large extent the realization of this situation exists not only in the United States but throughout the politically conscious world.

2. U. S. policy and opinion must face the challenge presented by Khrushchev with dignity and courage. Khrushchev has offered to accept world control of satellites and guided missiles. While it is obvious that current Soviet exploitation of their ICBM and satellite triumphs is conducted primarily on the propaganda level, the hard reality of inevitable decision lies before us. It is clear that Khrushchev will not present us with an easy field of negotiation, since he - at least in his own view - is bargaining from that "position of strength" which he has bitterly accused us of defending. The eyes of the world will watch us with increasing concern and critical detachment. We have neither forfeited nor fully shown our capacity for the position of leadership which the Free World would be disposed to accord us.

3. Since further military progress - even if it produced major "breakthroughs" - can no longer eliminate the prospect of total mutual destruction, it would appear that we should concentrate on disarmament negotiations and on the requirements which peaceful coexistence imposes upon us. It is suggested that we might cease to resist the use of that term, and take a leaf from the Communist book, turning the adversary's own slogans and catchwords to our ends. For the

present, we must, of course, maintain our defense effort, including conventional armament, at the present or higher levels and be prepared to face the necessary economic consequences. But our prime interest lies in the cultivation of peace, in which we probably still have the advantage over our adversary.

4. Victory for the Free World can be achieved only in terms of our contribution to its welfare. This is not to suggest that our ideals of freedom and justice are not powerful weapons, but they are standards and banners rather than instruments of actual conflict. What is required of us is not morality of which we have no monopoly, but practical deeds. Specifically, we must be prepared to act on the scale of generosity and enlightened self-interest implied in the Millikan-Rostow proposal for an international development fund or, in the vision of an again Fertile Crescent. We must increase our commitment to international programs. The test of our disposition in this field is most sharply presented by India's request for a loan. Renewal of the Aswan Dam project might follow.

5. It is apparent that this program can only be achieved by a sharp change in the attitude of the American people. We must be prepared to accept the notion of sacrifice and at least limited austerity, and to defer the unrestrained pursuit of material goods and services which has dominated our national life during the past decade. The American people would probably accept such a regimen of self-denial, but they certainly would not do so without enlightened leadership.

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Chief, SRS/DDI

9 October 1957

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| REMARKS: Mr. Amory thought you might be interested in the attached. <i>10/22/59</i> | | |
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| ROOM NO. | BUILDING | EXTENSION |

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