

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

19 November 1951

25X5

MEMORANDUM FOR:

[REDACTED]
Colonel B. B. Talley, G-2
Captain Ray Malpass, ONI
Colonel Edward H. Porter, AFOIN
Colonel S. M. Lansing, JIG

SUBJECT : SE-20: The Effect on the Communists of Certain US Courses of Action.

1. The enclosed terms of reference were agreed on by the IAC representatives meeting on 19 November.

2. All agencies are requested to contribute to the second part of the problem, i.e., "the Communist reaction to these courses of action"; part VII; and to every other section on which they have pertinent information. Specific responsibilities have been assigned as follows:

OIR: I B, II D, III B, IV B, V B, VI B, VII B, Annex A.

G-2: I A, V A, VI, Annex C.

ONI: II A, B, C; III A, Annex A.

AFOIN: I A, III A, VI.

O/RR: I A; II A, B, C; III A.

O/PC: IV A, Annex B.

3. It is requested that contributions be received in this office by the close of business Tuesday, 27 November 1951.

DOCUMENT NO. _____
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S 1991
NEXT REVIEW DATE: _____
AUTH: HR 7J-2
DATE: 10 FEB 81 REVIEWER: 018557

[REDACTED]

Executive Secretary

25X1A9a

NOV 20 1951
NE-D

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

19 November 1951

SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: SE-20: THE EFFECT ON THE
COMMUNISTS OF CERTAIN US COURSES OF ACTION

THE PROBLEM

To estimate (1) the vulnerability of the Chinese Communists to certain US courses of action, and (2) the Communist reaction to these courses of action in the Far East.*

QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

I. MAJOR OFFENSIVE USING ALL AVAILABLE WEAPONS

- A. If the US should press the war more vigorously in Korea using all available weapons and, in conjunction with this offensive, carry out bombing attacks on

* The question, except in the case of the shipping embargo and naval blockade, of whether the UN would support US policy in this regard is beyond the scope of this paper.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

military installations and lines of communications in Manchuria, what would be the vulnerability of the Chinese Communists to this course of action?

B. What reaction from the Communists could be expected?

II. SHIPPING EMBARGO AND NAVAL BLOCKADE*

A. Full Embargo on Exports to Communist China. If the US, supported by its major allies, imposed a full embargo on exports to Communist China, what would be the vulnerability of the Communists to this course of action?

B. Control of Shipping. If the US, supported by its major allies, should institute a shipping embargo of Communist China, what would be the vulnerability of the Communists to this course of action? (See Annex "A")

C. Naval Blockade. If the US, supported by its major allies, should institute a naval blockade of Communist China, what would be the vulnerability of the Communists to this course of action? Include the following consideration:

* Consider in these measures the exclusion and inclusion of (1) Port Arthur and Dairen, and (2) Macao and Hong Kong.

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

1. Enforcement of present trade restrictions;
2. A pacific blockade;
3. A complete blockade, including mining operations.

D. What would be the Communist reaction to these courses of action?

III. BOMBING ATTACKS THROUGHOUT CHINA

A. If the US should launch a systematic air and naval bombardment of Communist China, what would be the vulnerability of the Chinese Communists of this course of action?

B.- What would be the reaction of the Communists to these courses of action?

IV. SUPPORT OF GUERRILLA OPERATIONS

A. What is the extent of the vulnerability of Communist China to US supported guerrilla activity? (See Annex "B")

1. Under present circumstances?
2. In conjunction with the other courses of action discussed in this estimate?

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S01011A000600010047-2

- B. What would be the reaction of the Communists to this course of action?

V. CHINESE NATIONALIST ATTACK WITH US LOGISTIC SUPPORT

- A. What is the vulnerability of Communist China to attacks by the Chinese Nationalists supported logistically by the US?

1. Under conditions of presently contemplated US aid with removal of restrictions on Nationalist operations against the mainland?
2. Under conditions of greatly expanded US logistic support, but not operational support, of the Nationalists?

- B. What would be the Communist reaction to this course of action?

VI. CHINESE NATIONALIST INVASION WITH US LOGISTIC, NAVAL AND AIR SUPPORT

- A. If the US provided full logistic support, plus naval and air support for the Chinese Nationalists, what would be the Chinese Communist vulnerability to Chinese Nationalist invasion?

Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S01011A000600010047-2

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Approved For Release 2000/08/25 : CIA-RDP79S01011A000600010047-2

~~SECRET~~

- B. What would be the Communist reaction to this course of action?

VII. THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF SEVERAL OR ALL OF THESE COURSES OF ACTION

- A. What would be the cumulative vulnerability of Communist China if the US undertook several or all of the courses of action discussed above?
- B. What would be the Communist reaction to several or all of these courses of action?

ANNEXA

- A. Foreign trade data for Communist China by month during 1951.
- B. The guerrilla situation in Communist China.
- C. Chinese Nationalist Capabilities.

- 5 -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Approved For Release 2000/08/25 : CIA-RDP79S01011A000600010047-2