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prevent the use of Hong Kong and Macao as transshipment points for trade with Communist China. (See Tab A for data on Chinese Communist trade during 1951.)

b. Such interdiction would create serious economic strains in Communist China, but would not in itself force the Chinese Communists to end the Korean war or threaten the internal control of the Chinese Communist regime.

c. The Chinese Communists would be unable to counter such a blockade effectively but would probably employ mine warfare against the blockading ships and might employ aircraft and submarines.

d. The USSR would probably do its utmost to offset the economic effects of the embargo and blockade by expanding overland shipments to Communist China. The USSR would probably refuse to recognize the legality of the blockade. It would probably undertake to escort Soviet shipping into Port Arthur and Dairen (if these ports were blockaded), and might escort Soviet shipping into other blockaded ports. Interception of such Soviet shipping might well create serious incidents, but we believe it unlikely that the USSR would make such incidents, in themselves, a casus belli.

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2. Intensification and Expansion of UN Military Operations in the Korean Area.

a. Large scale UN ground operations in Korea, combined with unrestricted UN air attack on Communist military targets in North Korea and Manchuria, would, if successful, seriously impair the Communist military capability to maintain their position in Korea.

b. Such a course of action might compel the Communists to conclude an early armistice. We believe it more likely, however, that the Chinese Communists would retaliate by offensive air action against UN forces and targets, conceivably including even those in Japan.

c. The USSR would probably react immediately by giving all possible support short of the commitment of their own ground forces, including the commitment of additional elements of their own air defense forces to the air defense of Manchuria and North Korea.

d. If these measures should prove insufficient to permit the Communists to maintain themselves militarily in Korea, the Communists might: (1) withdraw from Korea and continue by guerrilla attacks to harass the UN occupation; (2) conclude an

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armistice while still in control of some portion of North Korea; or (3) commit Soviet forces. On balance, we believe the chances are somewhat better than even that the Communists would conclude an armistice. We believe it unlikely that the USSR would commit Soviet air forces to combat over UN-held territory or Soviet ground forces to combat against UN forces.

3. Expansion of the Korean War by Bombardment of Strategic Targets throughout Communist China.

a. A bombardment of strategic targets in Communist China (including airfields, naval bases and shipyards, troop concentrations, transportation systems, industrial facilities and urban complexes) would probably, if successful, seriously reduce Chinese Communist military power, disrupt the Chinese Communist economy, and eventually jeopardize Communist control over at least some parts of south and southwest China. (See Tab B on Strategic Targets in Communist China.)

b. The Chinese Communist air defense capabilities are substantial in Manchuria and North China but are slight elsewhere. (See Tab C on Chinese Communist Air Defensive Capabilities.) The Chinese Communists would almost certainly seek to counter the US strategic bombardment by offensive air action against UN

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forces and targets, possibly including those in Japan and Okinawa.

c. The USSR would commit additional Soviet units for the air defense of Communist China.

d. If the Communists found that their air defense capabilities were insufficient to defeat the US strategic bombardment, and if they estimated that the consequences listed above were likely to ensue, they might commit Soviet air forces to offensive operations against US forces and bases, or they might seek an armistice on the best terms available. On balance, we believe that in these circumstances the Communists would conclude an armistice if part of North Korea were left under their control.

4. Expansion of the Korean War by Employment of Nationalist Military Forces.

The Chinese Nationalist forces could not be effectively used for offensive action against the Chinese Communist mainland unless the present US program for equipping and training these forces were greatly expanded, and unless the US were willing to provide not only logistic support for an invasion but substantial air and naval support as well. In any event, Nationalist forces could not be ready for an invasion operation

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before 1953. (See Tab D for detailed statement of Nationalist capabilities.)

5. Expansion of the Korean War by Utilization of Non-Communist Guerrilla Forces Already in China.

The Chinese Communists have succeeded in greatly reducing the strength of guerrilla forces throughout China and these forces do not now have a significant operational capability. (See Tab E for detailed statement of guerrilla capabilities.) Even if guerrilla capabilities were developed, the guerrillas could be employed effectively only in conjunction with other courses of action directed against Communist China.

6. Expansion of the Korean War by a Combination of Several or All Courses of Action Considered Above.

a. An intensification of UN operations in Korea and an expansion of the war to include successful tactical and strategic bombardment of Manchuria and China proper and a successful interdiction of Communist China's seaborne imports would have the following effects on Communist capabilities: (1) the Chinese Communists would be unable to continue large-scale operations in Korea; (2) lines of communication in Communist China would be disrupted; (3) Communist China would be forced into complete dependence on the USSR for military supplies and

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other critical imports; (4) Chinese Communist capabilities for large-scale military operations in Southeast Asia would be eliminated; (5) Communist China's ability to maintain effective control of the mainland would be progressively reduced.

b. In response to these US courses of action, the USSR would almost certainly expand its aid to Communist China. This aid would probably include increasing commitment of Soviet air defense forces in Communist China and North Korea but would probably stop short of commitment of Soviet air forces to combat over UN-held territory or Soviet ground forces to combat against UN forces. If such aid failed to counter the US effort, the Communists would probably seek an armistice which would leave some part of North Korea under Communist control. While at every point the USSR would probably seek to avoid the precipitation of general war, there would be grave danger that general war might result from action not intended to produce that result.

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