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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: The 22nd Party Congress and Asian Communist Parties:

1. Since the 22nd CPSU Congress, Khrushchev has received little support from Asian Communist parties in his attacks on the Albanian leadership and on Stalin's methods of leadership. Of the 15 Asian parties in attendance at the congress, only two--from Mongolia and Ceylon--seconded Khrushchev's attack on Hoxha. Ten Asian parties--from Communist China, North Korea, North Vietnam, Indonesia, India, Japan, Burma, Malaya, Australia, and New Zealand--did not second Khrushchev, although the North Korean and Indian delegates did offer some implicit support for the Soviet leader's position on Albania.

2. Messages of greetings on the 20th anniversary of the Albanian Party on 8 November 1961 were sent by the Chinese, North Korean, North Vietnam, Indonesian, Australian, Burmese, New Zealand, Malayan, and Thai parties. This lineup of Asian parties corresponds closely with the list of those which had most clearly supported the Chinese refusal to surrender on the question of international discipline at the 1960 Moscow conference. CCP influence in each of these Asian parties is probably directly proportional to the fervency with which each now praised Hoxha.

3. The Burmese message was the most outspokenly pro-Albanian, even surpassing the one from Peiping. The Malayan and Thai parties sent messages which closely paralleled the one from the CCP in warmly praising the Albanian party and its leadership. North Korea and North Vietnam, trying to maintain a pose of neutralism, did not endorse the Albanian leadership, but restricted themselves to a more or less routine greeting. Greetings from Australia, New Zealand, and Indonesia not only failed to endorse the Albanian leadership but seemed to appeal to the Albanians not to exacerbate relations.

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4. Khrushchev's tactics have received little support and his apparent failure to consult or forewarn the leaders of these parties has stirred clear resentment because his actions have exacerbated existing factionalism within their own parties and caught them unprepared to deal with it. Khrushchev's surprise assaults on Stalin and Albania, dictated by Soviet national interests, have made increasingly difficult the role of the leaders of the non-bloc Asian Communist parties, and is forcing the leaders of the bloc parties to make an unwelcome choice.

Indonesian Communist Party

5. Recent statements issued by D. N. Aidit, chairman of the Indonesian Communist party (PKI), on the implications of the Soviet 22nd party congress clearly indicate his concern over the effect Khrushchev's power struggle with the Chinese will have on the party in Indonesia. Aidit, who has long been a loyal supporter of Moscow, is judged by Indonesian observers to be firmly secure in the leadership of the party. Although there has been no effective challenge to his control in the past ten years, a militant minority faction in the PKI, generally regarded as pro-Peiping, has vigorously criticized Aidit's support for President Sukarno and the party's adoption of a peaceful parliamentary course in order to achieve its final goal. This faction, closely oriented to Peiping, feels strongly that the party will gradually lose its identity by continued participation in a "united front" government and has pressed for more violent opposition to Sukarno.

6. Aidit was sorely embarrassed by Khrushchev's tactics at the congress. His apprehensions were realized by the publication of an editorial in the PKI's major propaganda organ, while the Indonesian party leader was still in Moscow, strongly emphasizing that any differences between Communist parties should be resolved through private consultations. Following his return to Djakarta, Aidit hurried to a party meeting which apparently had difficulty in arriving at an acceptable position on the results of the 22nd party congress. Reflecting his own desire to consolidate party unity, Aidit, in a 27 November statement, sought to dissociate himself from the Soviet action and stressed the necessity to settle Communist inter-party troubles privately. Although Aidit's statement appears on the surface to lean toward the Chinese position, it is more likely an attempt by him to pre-empt the ground on which his party's pro-Peiping faction bases its argument and the Indonesian party can be expected to chart a middle course in the dispute.

7. While the PKI chairman, like a good many other Communist party leaders, is obviously angered at Khrushchev's actions which have encouraged the pro-Chinese faction in the party, all the evidence seems to indicate that he can contain the opposition and the party will continue to pursue the pro-Sukarno, moderate, parliamentary tactics which have proved so successful in Indonesia. Indonesian elections are tentatively scheduled for 1962 and the PKI is presently engaged in an ambitious campaign to build up the peasantry as a broad base of support. Aidit's policy, strongly endorsed by Moscow, has seen the Indonesian Communist party well-placed throughout the government apparatus--a unique achievement for a Far Eastern communist party. Only army opposition has prevented Communist representation in the cabinet. Moscow probably hopes that its wholehearted endorsement of Sukarno's drive to recover West New Guinea, a demand vociferously advocated by the PKI, and the increased dependence of the Indonesian Army on the USSR for military assistance in order to achieve this goal, will upset the delicate balance Sukarno has tried to preserve between the Army and the Communists. This prospect gives Aidit a powerful bargaining position with which to counter those arguing for a radical change in the PKI's policies.

Indian Communist Party

8. Khrushchev's latest campaign against Albania and his denigration of Stalin apparently have shaken the CPI thoroughly, reopening the policy controversy which had been temporarily smoothed over to give the party a platform from which to campaign for India's national elections in February. The CPI has not expressed itself formally on the Sino-Soviet dispute, but individual party leaders and state units--mostly those under leftist influence--have sharply criticized Moscow's recent actions. Dissent by leftist elements has grown strong enough to lead moderate CPI General Secretary Ajoy Ghosh to avoid normal meetings of the party's National Council until the elections are over in order not to risk an open break.

9. While Moscow's moves have undermined the moderate CPI leadership which it has long supported and stimulated radical elements to oppose the present "peaceful" party policy more vigorously than ever, the moderates still appear to hold control. Peiping's continued intransigence in the Sino-Indian border dispute, which Ghosh has roundly condemned, probably will help those elements in the party who follow the Moscow line retain the upper hand over those who advocate

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open support for the Chinese Communist party. The strong leftist faction in the CPI has privately denounced Ghosh for his attack on Peiping, however, and the leftist-controlled and Peiping-oriented West Bengal provincial committee has refused to distribute the issue of the CPI organ containing Ghosh's statement. Both Peiping's actions and the continuing Sino-Soviet rift are likely to further damage the CPI's already poor election prospects.

10. The Communist parties in Nepal and Ceylon generally take their cue from the CPI. The Nepali party also suffers from deep ideological and personal rivalries, in which the larger bloc dispute reportedly has been reflected. Leaders of the party in Ceylon, overshadowed at home by a rival Trotskyite political party, have given Khrushchev strong support in public statements.

Japanese Communist Party

11. For the Japanese Communist party leadership, Khrushchev's renewed attack on Albania and implicitly the Chinese Communists came at a uniquely unfavorable time. Party chairman Sanzo Nosaka and secretary-general Kenji Miyamoto, who have personally always endorsed Moscow's line, have nevertheless attempted to steer a neutral course in the Sino-Soviet dispute, because the party has a strong militant faction oriented toward Peiping. Their problems have been increased, however, by a factional dispute quite outside the Sino-Soviet dispute, involving a right-wing element which advocates directing major party activity against Japanese "monopoly capitalists" rather than against American military influence and presence. This dispute culminated this past summer with the expulsion of the leader of the right wing dissident movement--up to that time one of the senior leaders of the party. A series of resignations and expulsions of others who agreed with him followed.

12. The JCP leadership, seriously concerned with the divisive effects of its internal dispute with the rightists, are undoubtedly deeply disturbed by Khrushchev's re-awakening of the Sino-Soviet dispute which will give the pro-Chinese faction in their party an opportunity to increase their influence and face them with two fronts upon which to fight. There are some indications that the pro-Chinese faction may be increasing its activities. While Nosaka and Miyamoto were still in Moscow, the JCP issued a statement that selected works of Mao-Tse tung would be published in Japanese--works which were described as "great documents of Marxism-Leninism." Nevertheless, the Japanese Communist party will undoubtedly attempt to steer the middle course it adopted in 1959 and 1960.

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Cambodia, Burma, Malaya and Thailand

13. The Communist party strength in these countries is small and largely unorganized. For the most part the Communists in this area are under tight security control by their respective governments and in urban areas conduct their activities largely through front organizations, which include trade unions and newspapers. In Burma and Malaya, the Communists operate clandestinely in the outlying sparsely populated area and concentrate on guerrilla tactics along the classic Chinese Communist lines. These Southeast Asian parties can probably be expected to continue their support for Peiping as they did in 1959 and 1960.