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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
2050/61S
6 December 1961

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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION

prepared by an

AD HOC WORKING GROUP

of the

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

I. Political

A. The Arab States

Since June 1961 the chief factors affecting the Arab-Israeli confrontation have been a) the intensified contest for influence and the question of the power balance among the various rival Arab leaders, and b) internal disruptive forces in Iraq and the UAR. The drop in outside pressures--both Israeli and great-power--on the community of Arab states has permitted inherent Arab internal divisive forces again to come to the fore and add to the lack of effective unity against Israel. This development has both revived old frictions and created new ones between Egypt, the kingpin of Arab military and political solidarity against Israel, and the other Arab states.

Prime Minister Qasim's abrupt assertion of Iraq's claim to Kuwait in June, together with further Iraqi intimations of claims affecting Saudi Arabia's interests, drove a new wedge between Iraq and the other Arab states, most of which supported the independence of Kuwait. As a result of the Arab League's acceptance of Kuwait as a member in July 1961 and the dispatch of an Arab League military force to Kuwait in September, Arab forces find themselves facing each other instead of the Israelis.

Centrifugal forces within two important Arab states--Iraq and the UAR--also have tended to weaken Arab capabilities against Israel. Beginning in September, important units of the Iraqi army were occupied in putting

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down a serious uprising in Iraqi Kurdistan that has been accompanied by demands for Kurdish autonomy. Although the backbone of the uprising apparently has been broken, it is anticipated that guerrilla action against government forces will continue throughout the winter. More important has been the weakening of the Arab military front against Israel brought about by the secession of Syria from the UAR at the end of September. Although the new Syrian regime has verbally reiterated its intransigent hostility toward Israel, it has made no move to translate this into concrete action. This development underscores again the fact that the geographical interposition of Israel between Egypt and the neighboring Arab states constitutes one of the most effective guarantees not only of Israel's security, but also of the independence of those states.

The Arabs are aware that the Syrian developments constitute a setback to their strategic position vis-à-vis Israel, but nevertheless they have exacerbated this dis-unity by radio campaigns of mutual recrimination in which the opposing factions accuse their opponents of "softness" toward or clandestine collaboration with Israel. At present, Nasir's radio is attacking the Syrian, Saudi and Jordanian governments, and their radios are replying in kind. The Israeli and clandestine French radios meanwhile continue their anti-Nasir broadcasts. At present most Arab states feel themselves threatened in the short run more by each other than by Israel.

B. Israel

The withdrawal of Syria from the UAR has been welcomed by Israel as a blow to Arab unity, a setback for Nasser's prestige, and a reduction of his strength. The military units in Syria and Egypt no longer constitute a combined force at Nasser's disposal against Israel. In Israel's view, however, the benefits thus accruing to Israel's security situation are accompanied by certain disadvantages. The campaign of accusation of softness toward Israel entered into by Syria and Jordan on the one hand and Egypt on the other since the Syrian revolt could provoke more overt demonstrations of defiance toward Israel on the part of the Arab states concerned and thus could revive

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recently-quiet problems between Israel and the Arabs. Israel is concerned also lest it result in a revival of pro-Nasser subversion in Jordan. Since UAR agents destined for Jordan are likely to cross from Gaza to the West Bank through Israel, an increase in infiltration from the Gaza Strip would be likely to bring strong Israeli countermeasures to curb such traffic.

Israeli diplomatic maneuvers for a solution to its problem of security *vis à vis* the Arabs have been reflected in Israel's reiteration of its endorsement of a regional disarmament proposal. Foreign Minister Golda Meir in an address to the UN General Assembly in October 1961, suggested that the way to general and complete disarmament might begin with a pilot project for Middle East disarmament. In so doing, Mrs. Meir reiterated earlier statements of Israeli government officials calling for Middle East disarmament and a nonaggression pact between Israel and the Arabs. Israel is endeavoring to introduce into the UN a resolution calling for direct negotiations with the Arabs. These proposals have been put forth mainly for bargaining purposes, however. Israel's immediate aim of maintaining military superiority over the Arabs, while a serious financial burden, continues to be given priority in planning. The imminent arrival of Mirage III aircraft from France is evidence of Israel's continuing attempts to outmatch materiel acquired by the UAR from the Soviets.

C. Points of Recurrent Dispute

1. Arab Refugees

The Palestine refugee problem is a subject of debate at the current 16th General Assembly which opened in September 1961. In addition to consideration of the question of the extension of the mandate of UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency) beyond June 30, 1963, related questions such as proposals for a custodian of former Arab properties in Israel, the enlargement of the Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC), and the Palestine entity concept may be raised. In anticipation of this, a special representative of the PCC, Dr. Joseph E. Johnson, has met with officials of the governments that are host to refugees and with Israel to survey the situation, but has reported that prospects for a solution are not bright.

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The PCC was established by General Assembly resolution 194(III) of December 11, 1948 and was charged with responsibility for facilitating the repatriation, resettlement, and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation. The same resolution formulated the principle of the right of the refugees to choose between repatriation and compensation. The latter position has been reiterated by succeeding sessions of the General Assembly and has been supported by the Arabs. UNRWA was established in accordance with a General Assembly resolution of December 8, 1949. Its initial purpose was to transform the program of direct relief into a program of works projects. This objective has not been realized and UNRWA continues to provide direct relief--food, shelter, health care, education and clothing. As of June 1961 the number of registered refugees living in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and the Gaza Strip had reached 1,151,024.

Israel, which at one time was willing to accept token repatriation, now opposes the repatriation of the Arab refugees, a position that on November 6, 1961 was endorsed by a Knesset vote including opposition parties as well as those in the government. In Israel's view the only solution lies in resettlement of the Palestine refugees in Arab territory. Israel has professed a readiness to compensate the refugees for their lost properties in Israel. A willingness to discuss the refugee problem in advance of a general peace settlement has also been expressed by Israeli officials.

The Arabs view the solution of the refugee question primarily in terms of the refugees' return to their homes in what is now Israeli territory. Negotiation of the issue is hindered by Arab insistence on Israel's prior agreement to repatriation and by Arab refusal to recognize or negotiate directly with Israel. The Arab states as well as individual Arab Palestinians, however, have played an active role in debating the refugee problem before the UN. The Palestinian Arab Delegation that has requested recognition and a hearing before the commissions of the 16th General Assembly discussing refugees originally consisted of 6 members and is led by Emile al-Ghuri, chief lieutenant of Hajj Amin al-Hasayni, former Mufti of Jerusalem; it claims to be acknowledged by eleven Arab Governments as representing the Palestinians. The Egyptians subsequently sent to New York

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their own three-man delegation from Gaza, which joined the original six despite the apparent Egyptian intention that the Gaza delegation should work independently.

2. The Demilitarized or Neutral Zones

The General Armistice Agreements (GAA) signed in 1949 between Israel and the Arab states of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria each established a demilitarized zone, neutral zone or a no-man's-land along or near the frontier. These areas were created as a temporary solution designed to facilitate acceptance of the armistice agreements which were themselves regarded by the UN as a forerunner of an early permanent peace settlement.

a. Israeli-Syrian Border. The Demilitarized Zone (DZ) along the Israeli-Syrian border is divided into three sectors: one southeast of Lake Tiberias, the second stretching between the northern end of Lake Tiberias to and around the southern tip of the former Lake Hula (drained by Israel in 1958), and the third a small area at the northernmost border point (see Map VII). This DZ has been the scene of periodic violence since 1951, when Israel began work on the Hula reclamation project. The conflict revolves around Israel's attempts to develop and extend its sovereignty in the DZ and Syria's resistance to these moves. Contrary to the provisions of the GAA, Israel claims sovereignty over all land in the DZ. In 1951 the Security Council authorized Israel to resume the drainage work on non-Arab-owned land in the zone; moreover, the GAA did provide for the restoration of civilian life therein. In compliance with this resolution Israel has confined most of its activities in connection with the Hula drainage to lands that are not Arab-owned. As the drainage project has progressed Israel has established in the reclaimed area close to the border, but outside the DZ, several settlements that have since become involved in incidents. The Hula area is still a point of friction, but its importance as a trouble spot has been reduced by the fact that major work has been completed and the desilting of the canals, the most likely present cause of incidents, need be done only periodically.

The DZ area to the southeast of Lake Tiberias has been the scene of a number of flareups. Basically the question is Israel's extension of sovereignty over the entire DZ. Land ownership in the DZ is shared by Arabs and

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Jews, with the land parcels running east and west. Following the completion of a north-south drainage ditch in 1958, the Israelis have opposed cultivation by the Arabs of land west of the ditch. Violence is most apt to occur during planting and harvesting seasons.

b. Jerusalem. The demilitarized area of dispute between Israel and Jordan are Mount Scopus and the Area between the Lines (ABL) at Government House, both in Jerusalem. The Mount Scopus neutral zone was established by an Arab-Jewish Military Commander's Agreement of July 7, 1948, and includes the inactive Jewish institutions of Hadassah Hospital and Hebrew University patrolled by Israeli police, the Arab village of Al-Isawiyah, and a Jordanian-occupied area around Augusta Victoria Hospital. One problem is the delineation of the zone, since the Agreement did not describe the zone but referred to an attached map for boundaries (see Map VIII). Another problem arises from the fact that the Israeli police control the major access road to the Arab village and periodically force the villagers to detour off the road and down the hillside. The population limits of Al-Isawiyah are also a source of dispute, since the agreement limits the number of inhabitants to those living in the village when the agreement was signed and it is not clear as to what their number was. Israeli patrolling in the Ra's as Sullam or Gan Shlomit area has also been a source of controversy and has resulted in exchanges of fire between the patrols and the Jordanians. From time to time the fortnightly convoy that rotates the Israeli police complement and brings supplies has been the cause of friction.

The situation in the Government House Zone is less complex than that of Mount Scopus. The Government House is the headquarters of the UNTSO and there are no problems connected with it. The surrounding area, however, is occupied by Jordanian Arabs and Israeli Jewish civilians. The chief problem concerns Israeli attempts to convert a de facto separation of Arabs and Jews into a boundary between the two. In July 1957 the Israelis began preparations to plant trees along the de facto line thus partitioning the zone. Tension mounted between Israel and Jordan over Israel's unilateral demarcation efforts and the case was referred to the Security Council. In January 1958 the Council adopted

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a resolution calling on Israel to halt its tree-planting activities. The tension abated following the Security Council's action, and while Jordan complained of continued Israeli aggressions in the area in September 1958 there have been no major incidents in the Government House DZ recently.

In recent years Israel has alternated its Independence Day military parade between Tel Aviv, Haifa and Jerusalem, holding it on the Jewish calendar date which corresponds to 14 May 1948, when Israel attained its independence. A dispute arises whenever Jerusalem is the scene because the presence of tanks and other heavy equipment in the procession violates restrictions in the armistice agreement.

c. Al Awja. The Al Awja DZ established by the Israel-Egypt GAA lies to the east of the international boundary that was drawn between Palestine and Egypt in 1906. The zone is important for its strategic location at the only inland route crossing between Egypt and Palestine and for its water sources in a desert region. The first armistice violation in the Al Awja DZ to come to the attention of the UN was the Egyptian complaint in 1950 that the Israelis had expelled the Bedouin living in the zone into Egyptian territory. By 1951 the MAC had restored order at least temporarily in the situation. Serious disturbances again took place in the DZ between 1953 and 1956, beginning with the harassment of Bedouin in the zone about the end of June 1953. The following September the Israelis established in the zone the first of a few kibbutzim which the Egyptians alleged and the UN later agreed were inhabited by military personnel. By 1955 Israel was in full military occupation of the DZ. Countering the Egyptian complaints that the Israeli settlements were military camps were Israeli protests that Egyptians had crossed into the zone and mined the roads, thereby causing Israeli casualties. Incidents continued to occur in the zone until the Sinai invasion at the end of October 1956; there have been no flareups in the zone since that time.

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3. Suez Canal Transit

On March 13, 1948 Egypt declared a state of siege to be effective with the termination of the Palestine Mandate on May 15 and the procedures for visit and search of vessels dealing with Israel began to develop. Instructions were issued to provide for the inspection of ships destined directly or indirectly for Palestine and their cargoes made subject to confiscation. A Prize Court was established in Alexandria on July 8, 1948. A royal decree of 1950 consolidated Egyptian regulations on searches and seizure of contraband in connection with the Palestine hostilities. In 1953 the list of contraband goods was revised to include "foodstuffs and all other commodities" likely to strengthen the Israeli "war potential." Moreover, Egypt contends that there is a state of belligerency between it and Israel which was not terminated by the signing of the General Armistice Agreement.

The denial of Suez Canal transit to Israeli ships and cargoes has been debated in the Security Council on four occasions. One resolution, that of September 1, 1951, has been adopted calling on Egypt to cease its blockade practices in the Canal. Later Israeli complaints did not result in the adoption of any resolutions because of a Soviet veto or threat of veto.

The only Israel-flag vessel ever to attempt transiting the Canal was the Bat Galim seized at Suez on September 28, 1954. While the ship's crew was returned to Israel on January 1, 1955 under the auspices of the MAC, the ship remains in Egyptian possession.

Egyptian practice with respect to vessels of neutral flags has varied somewhat, but generally cargo ships chartered by Israel or by firms in which Israelis have part ownership are not allowed to transit the Canal; moreover, cargoes of Israeli origin or known Israeli destination are liable to be confiscated. Such cargoes are sold at public auction "for the benefit of the Palestine Arabs," according to Egyptian sources. Moreover, foreign vessels which have called at Israeli ports are blacklisted, which means in general that they are refused services and supplies during their transit of the canal.

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4. Jordan River Development

Israel's water development schemes, while a matter of concern to all the neighboring Arab states, are a source of potential trouble particularly between Israel and the Syrian region of the UAR. Arab apprehension that Israel will attempt to divert the waters of the Jordan at Jisr Banat Yaqub has caused recurrent tension since 1953, when the Israelis began work on such a project. Current information indicates that Israel's water plan will be developed in three stages ending respectively in 1963, 1966, and 1969. When the last stage is completed water will be carried from the Jordan River near Jisr Banat Yaqub to the Negev. In stage I, water will be drawn from Lake Tiberias through an underground pumping plant at Eshed Kinnerot (See Map VII), thereby circumventing the UN Security Council prohibition against drawing water from the Jordan at Jisr Banat Yaqub. The Arabs are opposed to all Israeli schemes to improve and develop the country and have become alarmed at any news or rumor of progress in Israel's water development plans. They have indicated they would regard actual diversion of Jordan River water by Israel as a casus belli, but their attempts to coordinate plans for such a contingency have not been successful. Future prospects for such coordination appear especially unfavorable in view of renewed antagonism among the Arab States since Syria's withdrawal from the UAR.

5. The Gulf of Aqaba

The Gulf of Aqaba is bordered by Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. The Arab littoral states all maintain that the Gulf is an Arab sea and that they have the right to deny Israel the use of it. In practice, however, the Arab littoral states have left to Egypt the initiative in enforcing Arab claims against Israel in this matter. Thus any conflict over Israeli use of the Gulf of Aqaba would be primarily between Israel and Egypt.

The Gulf of Aqaba is approximately 100 miles long and varies in width from 7 to 14 nautical miles (see Map IX). The western shoreline is that of the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula, while the eastern shore is Saudi Arabian territory. Israel and Jordan each border on the northern

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end for only about five miles, but each has a port on its short strip of coastline. Eilat is Israel's outlet to East Africa and Asia, while Aqaba is Jordan's only port. The main channel between the Red Sea and the Gulf is the Enterprise Passage close to the Egyptian coast. A second navigable channel is the Grafton Passage to the east of the Enterprise Passage; it also lies between the Sinai coast and the island of Tiran, which is 3 or 4 miles from the Sinai coast. Between Tiran and the Saudi coast the passage is not navigable for large vessels.

Until the 1956 Israeli invasion of Sinai and the subsequent posting of UNEF personnel in Sinai at Sharm al-Shaykh on the Red Sea approach to the Strait of Tiran, Egypt controlled the entry to the Gulf by means of shore batteries at Ras Nasrani and military occupation of Tiran Island, the latter at the behest of Saudi Arabia. Egypt based its control on two arguments: 1) that the Strait of Tiran was in Egyptian territorial waters, and 2) that the existence of a state of war with Israel justified Egypt in exercising belligerent rights with regard to shipping bound to or from Israel or flying the Israeli flag. During this period Egyptian policy toward shipping through the Strait was inconsistent. A few vessels were visited and searched and some were the object of warning shots, but no cargoes were confiscated. Meanwhile, Israel since 1950 had been developing port facilities at Eilat.

Since 1956, vessels bound for Eilat have had free access to the Gulf and Israel has rapidly expanded the port for trade with Africa and Asia. Israel regards use of the Gulf and access to it as one of the chief fruits of its Sinai campaign of 1956, particularly since the Gulf provides an alternate route to the Egyptian-controlled Suez Canal. This is especially important to Israel because the Gulf is the avenue through which Israel secures vital oil supplies from Iran. Israeli spokesmen have repeatedly stated that the reassertion of Egyptian control over the entrance to the Gulf would place Israeli access in jeopardy and that Israel would regard the closure of the Gulf as a casus belli.

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B. UAR (Egypt)

Egypt has initiated a very modest nuclear energy program--the principal facility is a 2 MW research reactor of the VVR-S type supplied and installed by the USSR under the terms of the agreement for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy concluded in July 1956. This reactor is located at the Atomic Energy Establishment at Inshass, northeast of Cairo, and went into operation on 27 July 1961. This reactor, however, will not contribute to a nuclear weapon capability. While consideration is being given to initiating a nuclear power program, Egypt will be dependent upon extensive assistance from other countries for its execution.

C. Iraq


On 17 August 1959, Iraq and the USSR concluded an agreement for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and on 17 May 1961, the contract implementing this agreement was signed. The terms of the contract call for the Soviet Union to supply a research reactor and a radiochemistry laboratory for the Tammuz Nuclear Project at Tuwaitha, near Baghdad. The reactor is to be an IRT-2000, a swimming pool type reactor having a maximum thermal power of 200 kilowatts (2 MW), and it is expected to be in operation by 1963.

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B. UAR (Egypt)

Egypt does not have a native capability to develop a guided missile delivery system for nuclear weapons despite its efforts to develop one through contracts with private West German individuals. Under the

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terms of a recently concluded agreement with the Soviet Union the UAR will receive the TU-16 (Badger) aircraft which can carry a 10,000 pound payload to a combat radius of 1650 nautical miles. The Egyptians have IL-28 (Beagle) subsonic aircraft which can carry a 6,600 pound payload to a combat radius of some 500 nautical miles.

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IV. Military Situation (See Maps)

A. General

Individually and collectively the armed forces of the Arab States are inferior in quality to those of Israel, though superior in total numbers and hardware. (See Chart II) They trail Israel in quality and experience of leadership, in the level of general educational and technical background among the enlisted ranks, in mobilization capability, and in incentive to fight.

There is no existing joint command and staff machinery in sufficient state of organization to coordinate effectively Arab military effort in the event of hostilities with Israel. Proposals for the creation of a Joint Command put forward at the Cairo meeting of the Arab League Defense Council in June 1961 were unproductive because of Lebanese and Jordanian opposition to points covering finance, leadership and the employment of other Arab forces in Lebanon and Jordan. Persistent local interests and frictions, particularly between Egypt on the one hand and Jordan and Syria on the other, preclude the likelihood of a workable joint command being established in the near future. What limited capability the Arabs enjoyed of coordinating operations on two fronts has been lost with the dissolution of the Egyptian-Syrian union.

B. Israel

1. Ground: The average strength of the Israeli Army is estimated at 29,500 but varies widely due to call-ups of reserve units, economic considerations and border tensions. The 5,000 man quasi-military NAHAL, which forms the first line of defense on the frontier, is continuing its normal activities.

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Current military activities in Israel are directed toward training with increased emphasis on armor, modernization and standardization of weapons. There has been no

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discernible reduction in the level of French support.* Israel will continue to press for additional arms aid from the Western World in an effort to offset UAR gains resulting from Soviet aid.

The Israeli ground forces can maintain internal security, can defend successfully against simultaneous Arab attacks on all fronts, can launch limited attacks simultaneously on all fronts, or can hold on any three fronts and mount successfully a major offensive on the fourth. Against a major power, they could offer effective delaying action.

2. Air; The Israel Defense Force Air Force (IDFAF) is an effective and capable air force in spite of limited resources and air facilities. In its combat aircraft inventory Israel is presently estimated to have 148 jet fighters--10 Vautours (all-weather), 38 Super Mysteres, 55 Mysteres, 19 Meteors (5 all-weather), 26 Ouragans--25 F-51 prop fighters, and 24 Vautour jet light bombers. It is believed that about 80% of these aircraft are combat ready. Delivery of the first Mirage III supersonic jet fighters from France, part of a total order of about 40, is slated to begin in December 1961. Israel is estimated to have at least a 90-day level of POL stockpiled for emergency use.

*The following table of the percentages of certain Israeli ground equipment of French origin illustrates the degree of French assistance:

<u>Item</u>	<u>Percentage of French Origin</u>
Small arms and mortars	Some
Recoilless weapons	22%
Guided missiles (antitank)	100%
Light artillery	48%
Medium artillery	52%
Special purpose artillery	32%
Light tanks	85%

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Israel, when compared to the UAR, continues to be at a disadvantage so far as numbers of aircraft and air facilities are concerned; however, the deficiency in numbers is counter-balanced by the superior quality of the Israeli air staff, pilots, and technicians. It is estimated that the IDFAF could defeat the Egyptian Air Force (EAF), if an effective defense of Israel's air facilities could be maintained. The Mirage III's should give the Israelis a distinct qualitative edge in fighter aircraft, although the appearance of the MIG-21 in EAF operational units would narrow the margin appreciably. Despite superiority in pilot and fighter quality, the Israeli air defense system has several major weaknesses. Capability to provide an effective defense against a night or bad-weather attack is poor because of a shortage of all-weather fighters. The radar network is vulnerable to jamming tactics and also has difficulty detecting low-level penetrations. In order to prevent total destruction on the ground in case of a large-scale EAF attack which the fighters and anti-aircraft units are unable to stop, semi-underground revetments have been constructed at the three principal Israeli military airfields to provide some protection against bombing and strafing attacks. Israeli air defense doctrine also places major emphasis on using offensive air operations to ease defensive problems. Offensive capabilities are good; IDFAF pilots are well-trained to carry out all types of offensive missions, including close support of ground forces. About 500 paratroopers could be dropped in a single operation.

3. Navy; The Israeli Navy consists of 2 ex-British destroyers (DD), 2 ex-British submarines (SS), 1 patrol escort (PF), 1 submarine chaser (PC), 11 motor torpedo boats (PT), one auxiliary (AG), 14 amphibious craft and 3 minor service craft. Most ships are in excellent material conditions and are normally maintained in active operational status. All are based at Haifa except 3 PT and 6 amphibious types which are based at Eilat (at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba). Personnel strength of the Navy is approximately 3,700.

The Israeli Navy is capable of defending the National coastline against an Arab attack by maintaining a continuous day and night surface patrol, of maintaining a submarine surveillance patrol, of providing gunfire support

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for the Israeli Army, of conducting day and night attacks on single lightly-protected merchant vessels, and of attacking single, conventional submarines. The Sea Commando Unit of the Navy is developing a minor amphibious raiding capability. Training of Commando personnel in unconventional forms of naval warfare includes sabotage, fast-striking demolition and assault raids, parachute drops of personnel and "frogman" equipment, and landing of raiding parties from rubber boats launched from surface ships and submarines. The Navy is capable of landing up to 200 naval commandoes as surprise raiding parties on the coasts of adjoining Arab states while providing protective gunfire support.

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The Israeli Navy is a well-trained and efficient fighting force; combat effectiveness is superior to that of any of the Arab States' navies. Israeli ships and personnel are maintained in a high state of readiness. Morale and self-confidence are high; leadership is competent and forceful.

Although the Navy lacks modern anti-submarine warfare (ASW) equipment, ASW training is being emphasized. Small groups of Israeli personnel receive submarine and anti-submarine training from the British Navy at Malta and Israeli ships have participated in anti-submarine and convoy escort exercises with the French Navy. In event of hostilities, the Israeli Navy would most likely place strong reliance on its motor torpedo boats, not only as a defensive force, but also as an offensive force to be utilized in conjunction with underwater demolition and landing operations.

One destroyer has recently been fitted with a helicopter platform and it is anticipated that the Israeli Navy will achieve a limited capability to operate helicopters from destroyers in order to increase its reconnaissance and patrol capabilities.

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C. Arab States1. United Arab Republic (Egypt)

a. Ground: The UAR army, a conscript force numbering approximately 5,000 officers and 79,000 enlisted men, is the largest Arab army. Mobilization to an estimated maximum strength of 133,000 would require six months. In addition to re-equipping with Bloc weapons, the Army has adopted modified Soviet tactical doctrine and has been partially reorganized along Soviet lines, significantly increasing organic firepower in the infantry formations. Bloc assistance in training and the supply of materiel continues. Training in Egypt is intensive and has reached division level. Several combined arms exercises have been conducted employing large forces of all services, but, in general, combat efficiency remains low primarily because of weak senior leadership. Reports of poor morale and antiregime sentiment in the army have become more numerous since the Syrian coup d'etat in September. The regime allegedly has arrested, retired or transferred significant numbers of officers and has rotated units as a security precaution, further reducing combat efficiency. The army is normally deployed in the Cairo area, the Canal Zone, and Sinai, leaving outlying desert areas bordering the Sudan and Libya largely undefended. Sinai forces number between 12,000 and 15,000 and are deployed defensively with the heaviest concentrations in the El Arish-Abu Aweigila area and the Gaza Strip. El Arish is also a National Guard training center and base where a National Guard unit, possibly as large as a brigade, has been formed during the past year and is being trained [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] However, no significant increase in fedayeen activity against Israel has been noted.

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The UAR army is not capable of sustained offensive ground operations but it could mount an attack of short duration by one to two divisions with the possibility of achieving limited, local, and only temporary success. In the event of a full-scale Israeli attack, it would lose Sinai, but could probably contain the attack at the Suez Canal.

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b. Air: The Egyptian combat aircraft inventory is estimated to contain 166 jet fighters--40 FARMER/MIG-19's, 96 FRESCO/MIG-17's, 30 FAGOT/MIG-15's--and 46 BEAGLE/IL-28 jet light bombers. Sixteen of the FRESCO aircraft are equipped for all-weather operations. It is believed that about 50-60% of these aircraft are combat ready. The Egyptian air facilities, the most extensive in the Middle East excluding Turkey, can easily support the combat aircraft. It is estimated that at least a 90-days supply of POL is stockpiled for emergencies.

The combat capability of the Egyptian Air Force (EAF) has improved considerably since the 1956 Suez campaign. Modernization of the radar network has resulted in Israeli overflights being detected quickly and aircraft scrambled and vectored on an intercept course. Higher-performance fighter aircraft have been added periodically to the air inventory; 40 FARMER's were acquired in 1961 and 20 to 40 MIG-21's may enter the inventory in 1962. Despite these improvements, the air defense system is not capable of coping with a determined large-scale assault because of the minimum scramble time available, the lack of a defense against radar jamming, and the inferior quality of the EAF personnel as compared with the Israelis. Offensive capabilities against fixed targets such as airfields, military and industrial installations, and transportation facilities are fair. The possible addition of at least 20 BADGER/TU-16 jet medium bombers in 1962 will bolster offensive striking power considerably. Even with its present offensive resources, the EAF has the capability to carry out a damaging surprise attack against Israel if the EAF staff could plan and initiate such a move without Israeli detection. About 600-1,000 troops could be airdropped in a single operation, if adequate fighter cover could be provided.

c. Navy: The Egyptian Navy consists of 2 ex-British and 2 ex-Soviet destroyers (DD), 9 ex-Soviet submarines (SS), 6 ex-British patrol escorts (PF), 18 ex-Soviet motor torpedo boats (PT), 4 ex-Soviet fleet minesweepers (MSF), 4 coastal minesweepers, old (MSCO), 3 miscellaneous auxiliaries (AG), and several minor service craft. All are active except 1 SS, 1 PF and 4 MSCO which are in reserve and 1 PF

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undergoing overhaul. All ships are normally based at Alexandria except 3 to 6 PT based at Port Said which operate in the Port Said-Suez Canal-Red Sea area. Personnel strength of the Navy is approximately 7,500.

Operational capabilities have decreased during the past year and are currently limited to surface ship and submarine patrols of short duration, motor torpedo boat operations against enemy surface craft in Egyptian waters, and small-scale minelaying and minesweeping operations. Only with immediate outside assistance could the Egyptian Navy hope to survive a concerted air and naval attack by Israel.

Egyptian ships have deteriorated and their material condition is, in general, poor. To some extent this may be due to unavailability of spare parts, especially for the ex-Soviet ships, but it is primarily due to lack of maintenance on the part of the Egyptians. Both the destroyers and the submarines suffer frequent engineering breakdowns and neither are capable of extended operations. Training has not progressed beyond the performance of basic exercises of a few hours' duration. The Navy is handicapped by a shortage of trained technical personnel, lack of operating experience, inefficient staff administration, lack of initiative and coordinated teamwork, haphazard logistic planning, and total dependence on foreign sources for extensive ship overhauls, ordnance, spare parts, and electronic, electrical and communications equipment. Another factor contributing to the low capability estimate of the Navy is the lack of inspiring leadership and enthusiasm on the part of senior officers and the resultant low morale and attitude of indifference among junior personnel.

Egypt has a sizeable stockpile of contact type mines, depth charges and torpedoes, nearly all of Soviet origin; some underwater propulsion units and possibly some limpet mines for use in underwater assault and demolition operations have been purchased from Italy.

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2. Syria

a. Ground: The Syrian Army numbers approximately 3,000 officers and 51,000 enlisted men. Mobilization to a top strength of 81,000 would require 6 months. Organized reserves consist of 8 partially equipped infantry brigades totalling about 26,000 men. The army is approximately 85-90% equipped with Soviet Bloc arms mostly of World War II design but including some more modern types. The infantry and armored brigades have been reorganized along Soviet lines during the past three years and Soviet tactical doctrine has been adopted and tailored to the army's needs and capabilities. Training of Syrian officers and technicians in Egypt and the USSR has been suspended following the September coup d'etat and the status of Soviet Bloc military advisors present in Syria since 1956 is now uncertain. Organization and doctrine emphasize firepower, mechanization, and mobility, but the army has no sustained offensive capability. Its deficiencies are derived from a weak, under-strength, inexperienced, and politically factioned officer corps; personnel shortages in the more sophisticated military skills; inadequate training; low maintenance standards; and inefficient logistical systems. It nurtures an almost fanatical hatred of Israel and has adopted a pugnacious attitude toward affairs in the sensitive Israeli border area. It could mount limited objective attacks employing two or three brigades and achieve some limited success. The strength and depth of its defenses on the Israeli border, coupled with favorable terrain, would provide formidable obstacles to an Israeli attack.

b. Air: Syria has an estimated 50 FRESCO/MIG-17 jet fighters, including 6 equipped for all-weather operations, and 4 BEAGLE/IL-28 jet light bombers. Air capabilities, both defensive and offensive, are poor. Although an EW/GCI network equipped with Polish and Soviet radars exists, defense of the Damascus area against a sizable Israeli air assault is believed impossible, largely because of the short reaction time available to scramble fighters and to intercept an enemy force whose point of takeoff is less than 100 miles away. As a consequence of insolvable defensive problems, major stress has

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been given to developing an offensive capability for strikes against fixed targets such as airfields, military and industrial installations, and transportation facilities. The threat of effective Syrian offensive air action against Israel is considerably negated, however, by the lack of a significant number of jet light bombers in the air inventory and by the inability of the Syrians to defend their airfields against Israeli attacks. The dissolution of the union with Egypt has also decreased Syrian air capabilities. It is estimated that Syria has enough POL to conduct air operations for 30 to 40 days.

c. Navy: The small Syrian Navy is composed of 3 submarine chasers (SC), 15 motor torpedo boats (PT), 2 fleet minesweepers (MSF), and several minor amphibious and service craft. Current information is lacking on actual location and operational status; however, ships are normally based at Latakia or at Al Mina al Bayda and, with the possible exception of several PT which may still be in reserve, are assumed to be active. Personnel strength is approximately 1,000.

The Navy is not capable of defending the national coastline. It is capable of conducting moderately effective coastal patrol operations to prevent illegal entry and smuggling and of very limited minesweeping and motor torpedo boat operations against surface craft in local waters. Lack of trained personnel and operating experience reduces the actual effectiveness of equipment on hand.

3. Jordan

a. Ground: The Jordan Arab Army is currently engaged in strengthening and modernizing its armed forces with the help of US-supplied equipment. The total strength of the regular Army is 36,500; currently 14,000 thereof, supported by about 9,000 lightly armed National Guardsmen mostly stationed within border villages, guard Jordan's frontier with Israel. The remainder of the Army is deployed in East Jordan, with the largest concentration being near the capital, Amman.

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As long as the Bedouin remain cohesive and loyal to King Husayn, the Jordan Arab Army is capable of maintaining internal security. It is incapable of sustained offensive combat. Defensively, it could probably contain attacks by any one neighboring Arab Army but could not defend West Jordan against an Israeli attack for longer than six to ten days. Because of the concern over possible Israeli attack and internal security, Jordan cannot provide significant forces for employment elsewhere.

b. Air: Jordan has 12 Hawker Hunter and 9 Vampire jet fighters. This air force has virtually no combat capability with respect to Israel. Jordanian pilots are well-trained for tactical-type missions and could effectively support ground forces in suppressing an internal rebellion.

c. Navy: The Flotilla Force, a component of the Army, operates 10 small naval craft (including two ex-British assault landing craft (LCA)) on the Dead Sea and two small aluminum-hulled patrol launches at Aqaba. Combat capabilities are nonexistent.

4. Iraq

a. Ground: The strength of the Iraqi Army (excluding the organic air forces) is about 70,000 organized into four infantry divisions, and one armored division. Soviet equipment has been largely absorbed, resulting in some improvement in effectiveness.

Logistical limitations and internal security considerations preclude the commitment of more than 12,000-15,000 troops to the west for possible action in the Jordan-Israel-Syria area.

The Army could probably resist invasion by Iran or any one of Iraq's Arab neighbors; but against invasion by large forces of a major power, the Army could offer only minor harassing action. The Army is capable of maintaining internal security.

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b. Air: The Iraqi Air Force (IAF) combat aircraft inventory is estimated to consist of 84 jet fighters--16 FARMER/MIG-19's, 38 FRESCO/MIG-17's, 7 Hawker Hunters, 10 Venoms, and 8 Vampires--, 14 piston fighter-bombers, and 16 BEAGLE/IL-28 jet light bombers. Fourteen of the FRESCO's are equipped for all-weather operations. The 16 FARMER's were added to the inventory in early 1961. Three CUB/AN-12 transports and 4 additional HOUND/MI-4 helicopters were delivered to Iraq during June 1961.

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The IAF is also contemplating the purchase of an undisclosed number of MIDGET/UMIG-15 and MAX/YAK-18 trainers. Soviet instructors and advisers continue to participate in the domestic training program, and a number of Iraqi pilots are undergoing flight training in the Soviet Union.

The IAF is currently capable of attacking fixed targets such as airfields, military installations, and transportation facilities. Air defense capabilities are restricted to the Baghdad, Habbaniya, and Kirkuk areas. Radar stations are presently operating at Baghdad and Kirkuk. A school for operators and technicians is being conducted in Iraq and reportedly has graduated about 50 GCI controllers. No effective defense could be organized against an attack by a major air force. Close support could not be provided for ground forces because of the lack of joint training. The IAF could furnish effective support during any internal disturbance short of civil war, in which event political factionalism could render the air force ineffective. The 3 CUB/AN-12's in the IAF inventory are capable of transporting an estimated 240-255 troops.

c. Navy: The Iraqi River Force, under army control, is composed of 12 ex-Soviet motor torpedo boats (PT), four obsolete river gunboats (PR), 1 yacht (PY), 2 ex-Soviet patrol vessels (YP), and 2 ex-Soviet torpedo retrievers (YPT). All are based at Basra where the PT are employed in tactical training exercises. Personnel strength is approximately 250.

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Combat capabilities are currently negligible, but the PT do represent a potential, but limited, defensive capability. However, continued foreign assistance is required to maintain and operate the PT effectively. The PR could be utilized to assist in maintaining internal security in southern Iraq, but they have no combat capability.

A number of Iraqi personnel have received naval training in the USSR and a small number of Soviet technicians are assisting in the training of Iraqi personnel at Basra. Despite the Iraqis' dissatisfaction with the quality of Soviet naval equipment acquired, Iraq will probably continue to rely on the USSR for training assistance and will of necessity continue to rely on the USSR for spare parts, ammunition, torpedoes, and naval electronic equipment.

5. Lebanon

a. Ground: The strength of the Lebanese ground forces is 10,500; there is a gendarmerie force of 2,800. Given a political decision and orders to do so, the Army is considered capable of maintaining internal security and of providing limited defense of land approaches to Beirut.

b. Air: Lebanon has 6 Hawker Hunters and 8 Vampire jet fighters. The air force has no capability to engage effectively a foreign aggressor, but does possess a good capability to assist in quelling internal disturbances.

c. Navy: The small Lebanese Navy, a specialized component of the Lebanese Army, has no combat capabilities. It is capable of conducting fairly effective coastal patrol operations and naval personnel are adequately trained to maintain and operate small patrol craft. Personnel strength is 200.

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6. Saudi Arabia

a. Ground: The total strength of the regular Saudi Army is 14,600. In addition, there is a "White Army" of subsidized tribesmen which has an estimated strength of 16,000 loosely organized into at least twenty battalion-sized units. The Saudi Arabian armed forces would be incapable of organized resistance against a modern army, except for desert harassing operations.

b. Air: The Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) has 18 Vampire jet fighters, but probably none are flyable. In addition, there are 11 F-86's, 9 T-33's and 4 T-34's in Saudi Arabia used for RSAF training, but under the control of the USAF training mission. The task of advising and training this air force rests with the U.S. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The RSAF has no tactical air capability at this time.

c. Navy: The Royal Saudi Navy, consisting of 1 motor gunboat (PGM) and about 80 men, is totally ineffective. There is no command structure or staff organization. A naval base is planned at Dammam but no funds have been allocated for its construction. Training is conducted by a US Naval Training Mission at Dammam but facilities are inadequate and the training program is hampered by the language problem and the low educational level of the Saudi trainees. The crew of the PGM, composed principally of Saudi personnel who have received some basic naval training in Egypt, is receiving some on-board training.

d. UN Forces: United Nations Emergency Forces on the Israel-Sinai border continue to act as a buffer between Israel and the UAR, and have been successful in maintaining a relatively quiet border.

UNEF strength stands at about 5,159. (See chart for details). Although border crossings and minor incidents continue to be reported, the situation along the Gaza and Sinai frontiers remains relatively quiet. Contributing nations continue periodic rotation of their troops. The Swedish battalion which was withdrawn for a special mission in the Congo has been replaced by other Swedish troops.

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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION

SUPPLEMENT

MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM THE SOVIET BLOC

GENERAL

The Soviet Bloc since 1955, has extended to UAR (Egypt), Syria, Iraq and Yemen military assistance totalling well over \$1,000,000,000.* In negotiating its arms deals with these Arab countries, the Bloc has granted large discounts and has allowed extremely favorable repayment terms.

Under the arms deals, the Bloc has supplied Egypt, Syria and Iraq--in addition to arms and ammunition--with substantial quantities of communications and electronics equipment, transport vehicles and other military-related end items. The Bloc also provides technical assistance to the countries receiving arms and has made available to their personnel training facilities within the Bloc.

This year the Bloc has concluded a new arms agreement with Iraq which calls for the delivery of such items as short-range, tactical guided missiles, jet medium bombers and super-sonic jet fighters. A similar agreement apparently has also been concluded with Egypt.

UAR (EGYPT)

Egyptian air, army and navy personnel have been and are being trained in both the use and maintenance of the new equipment in Soviet Bloc countries. Since 1955, well over 1,500 Egyptian military personnel have received such training in the Bloc. An estimated 150-200 Soviet Bloc military technicians and advisors still are active in Egypt, where they are assisting the Egyptians in assimilating the Bloc equipment and in reorganizing the Egyptian Army.

* This figure, in addition to arms, includes the estimated cost--prior to discounts--of all military related items supplied by the Bloc.

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The Egyptian orders over the past six years--which now amount to more than \$500 million--have included the following major items as well as other equipment. Complete and precise information on deliveries is not available; the following minimum estimates are, however, considered reasonably accurate.

<u>Item</u>	<u>Holdings</u>
<u>AIR</u>	
TU-16 jet bomber	-- (On order)
MIG-21 jet fighter	-- (On order)
MIG-19 jet fighter	40
MIG-15/17 jet fighter	126
IL-28 light jet bomber	46
IL-14 twin engine transport	40
Trainer aircraft: Yak-11, Yak-18, U MIG-15, U IL-28	79
Helicopter	16
Radar EW/GCI	30
Guided Missiles	-- (On order)
<u>GROUND</u>	
T-34 medium tank	275
JS-3 heavy tank	60
100mm SP assault gun SU-100	100
BTR-152 APC	350
85mm field gun D-44	75
122mm gun M 1931/37	50
122mm howitzer M 1938	100
152mm gun-howitzer M 1937	32
130mm rocket launcher RM-130 (32 round)	30
57mm AT gun M 1943	200
82mm recoilless gun B-10	200
82mm recoilless gun T-21 "Tarasnice"	200-500
12.7mm AA HMG quad-mounted	60
37mm AA gun M 1939	125-200
85mm AA gun	75-100
100mm AA gun	12
82mm mortar	500
120mm mortar M 1943	100
Small arms	large quantities

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NAVAL

Destroyer	2
Submarine	9 (8 W-class and 1 M- class)
Motor torpedo boat	18
190 ft. T-43 class fleet minesweeper	4
Naval mines, depth charges and torpedoes	large quantities

SYRIA

Since 1955, Syria has received \$200-250 million in Bloc military assistance--most of which was arranged for prior to the formation of the UAR in 1958. The large-scale arms deliveries to Syria in the late summer and early fall of 1958 apparently were under contracts Damascus had concluded with the Bloc before the union with Egypt. Thereafter, Syria's arms aid negotiations with the Bloc were conducted by Cairo, and relatively little additional Bloc equipment was provided. Thus far, there has been no Bloc arms aid to the new Syrian government, although negotiations for such assistance may be underway.

About 700 Syrian military personnel have received training in the Bloc since 1955, but few--if any--are believed to be undergoing training there at present. As many as 100 Soviet Bloc arms experts are still believed to be in Syria.

The following chart provides the available information and estimates on arms purchases from the Bloc:

<u>Item</u>	<u>Holdings</u>
<u>AIR</u>	
MIG-17 jet fighter	50
IL-14	6
Helicopter	6

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GROUND

T-34 medium tank	200
T-54 medium tank	85
100mm SP assault gun SU-100	75
BTR 152 APC	300
85mm field gun D-44	40
122mm gun M 1931/37	32
122mm howitzer M 1938	100
152mm gun-howitzer M 1937	24-36
130mm rocket launcher RM-130 (32 round)	32
57mm AT gun M 1943	100
82mm recoilless gun B-10	200-300
82mm recoilless gun T-21 "Tarasnice"	300
14.5mm AA HMG ZPU 2 and ZPU 4	120
37mm AA gun M 1939	110-150
57mm AA gun S60	40
85mm AA gun	50
100mm AA gun KS 19	17
82mm mortar	100-150
120mm mortar M 1943	100
Small arms	large quantities
Trucks	2,800

NAVAL

Motor Torpedo Boat	15
190 ft. T-43 class fleet minesweeper	2
Naval mines, torpedoes, depth charges	some

IRAQ

In November 1958 Iraq concluded an arms agreement with the Soviet Union in which the Soviets agreed to provide Iraq with certain military equipment, including jet aircraft and medium tanks. 25X1C

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Total Bloc arms aid may now amount to about \$300 million.

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There are now in Iraq about 200-250 Soviet military experts, and additional numbers may arrive later this year. An estimated 400 Iraqi personnel have undergone training in the Bloc since 1958.

<u>Item</u>	<u>Holdings</u>
<u>AIR</u>	
TU-16 jet medium bomber	-- (On order)
MIG-21 jet fighter	-- (On order)
MIG-19 jet fighter	16
MIG-15/17 jet fighter and trainer	40
IL-28 jet light bomber	16
AN-12 heavy transport	3
AN-2 light transport	--
Helicopter	16
Radar EW/GCI	10-12
Surface-to-air guided missiles	-- (On order)
<u>GROUND</u>	
T-34 medium tank	80
T-54 medium tank	180
100mm SP assault gun SU-100	120
BTR-152 APC	200
BTR-40 APC	90
57mm AT gun M 1943	23
76mm mtn gun-howitzer M 1938	12
85mm field gun D-44	100
100mm field gun M 1944	60
122mm howitzer M 1938	69
152mm gun-howitzer M 1937	28
82mm rocket launcher SPG 82	104
132mm rocket launcher BM-13	24
37mm AA gun M 1939	268
100mm AA gun KS 19	38
82mm mortar	180
120mm mortar M 1943	76
Trucks and other vehicles	5,200

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NAVAL

Motor torpedo boat	12
Patrol vessels	2
Torpedo recovery craft	2
Torpedoes	some

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YEMEN

Yemen concluded an arms deal with the Soviet Bloc in 1956 [redacted] At least twelve shipments of Soviet Bloc arms arrived in Yemen by sea beginning in October 1956, and it is believed that all arms purchased by Yemen from the Bloc have been delivered. The total value of Soviet Bloc arms thus far received by Yemen may amount to as much as [redacted]. The Yemenis have no technical competence to operate and maintain the equipment received and require extensive Soviet Bloc or other foreign assistance to use it effectively. It is estimated that not more than 25 Bloc military technicians remain in Yemen.

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Item

Holdings

AIR

IL-10 Piston ground attack aircraft	28
Piston trainer aircraft	5
Helicopter MI-4	2
IL-14 transports	2

GROUND

T-34 medium tank	30
100mm SP assault gun SU-100	61
BTR-40 APC	74
57mm AT gun M 1943	62
76mm field/AT gun M 1942	73
122mm gun M 1931/37	31
152mm gun-howitzer M 1937	3
37mm AA gun M 1939	106
85mm AA gun	26
AT rocket launcher	10
Small arms	some
Trucks (including 24 gasoline trucks)	223

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SELECTIVE ARMAMENTS INVENTORY¹

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	ARMOR						ARTILLERY					OTHER	
	TANKS			ARTILLERY		MISC ² ARMORED VEHICLES	ANTI- TANK	FIELD		ANTI-AIRCRAFT		RECONLESS WEAPONS	MORTARS 81-120 MM
	LIGHT	MEDIUM	HEAVY	ANTI- TANK & ASSAULT GUNS	FIELD		57-76 MM	75-105 MM	106-155 MM	20-57 MM	75-130 MM		
UAR (EGYPT)	40	354	60	100		350	333	134+	238	478+	123+	1400+	454+
SYRIA		342		135		375	160	40+	200+	439+	67	1500+	477+
IRAQ	36	414		120		460	73	447	129	431	62	307	436
JORDAN		176		33	24	350	80	156	18	104		323	130
LEBANON	40	20				138		18	18	89	12	97	96
SAUDI ARABIA	36	18				114	15	67	6	114	32	1784	438
YEMEN		30		61		74	135		34	106	26	10	
TOTAL ARAB	152	1354	60	449	24	1861	796	862+	643+³	1761+	322+	5421+	2031+
ISRAELI	175	457		124	199	1413	385	584	92	914	92	5699⁴	1534

¹ Certain obsolete items have been omitted

² Includes armored cars, personnel and weapons carriers

³ Includes 30 130mm rocket launchers (32 tube) in UAR (Egypt), 32 in Syria, and 24 132mm rocket launchers (16 tube) in Iraq

⁴ Includes 850 ss 10 anti tank guided missiles

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**STRENGTH OF FORCES*
DEPLOYED IN VICINITY OF ISRAELI BORDERS**

	CURRENT	M+48 HRS
UAR (EGYPT)	16,000	35,000
SYRIA	16,500	31,000
JORDAN	23,000	45,000
LEBANON	2,700	7,500
TOTAL ARAB	58,200	118,500

* Includes irregulars.

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TOTAL STRENGTH OF ARAB ARMIES

UAR (EGYPT)	107,300*
SYRIA	64,200*
IRAQ	74,000*
JORDAN	46,000*
SAUDI ARABIA	14,600
LEBANON	10,500
TOTAL	316,600

*This figure includes quasi-military personnel on active duty.

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**UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE, EGYPT
(AS OF 31 JULY 1961)**

BRAZIL	625
CANADA	936
DENMARK	562
INDIA	1,251
NORWAY	614
SWEDEN	463
YUGOSLAVIA	708
TOTAL	5,159

CHART I

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AIR FORCES

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	FIGHTERS		BOMBERS		TRANSPORTS		OTHER		TOTAL	TOTAL AF PERSONNEL
	Jet	Piston	Jet	Piston	Jet	Piston	Jet	Piston		
UAR (Egypt)	166		46			46	34	136	428	4500
SYRIA	50		4			7	8	24	93	3000
JORDAN	21					4	3	16	44	1550
SAUDI ARABIA	18*					10		23	51	326
LEBANON	14						4	9	27	727
YEMEN		28*				2		7	37	UNK
IRAQ	79	14	16			8	8	78	203	3807
TOTAL ARAB	348	42	66			77	57	293	883	13910
ISRAEL	148	25	24			30	26	83	336	4088

*Probably non-flyable

CHART II

NAVAL FORCES

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	DESTROYERS (DD)	PATROL VESSELS (PF PR PC PY PGM SC)	MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS (PT)	MINE WARFARE SHIPS (MSF, MSCO)	SUBS (SS)	AMPHIB. CRAFT	OTHER	TOTAL NAVAL PERSONNEL
UAR (Egypt)	4	4(2)	18	4(4)	8(1)	-	9	7,500
SYRIA	-	3	15	2	-	(3)	5	1,000
IRAQ	-	5	12	-	-	-	4	250
LEBANON	-	-	-	-	-	2	4	200
JORDAN	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	300
SAUDI ARABIA	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	80
TOTAL ARAB	4	13(2)	45	6(4)	8(1)	2(3)	34	9,330
ISRAEL	2	2	11	-	2	14	4	3,700

Figures in parentheses indicate inactive ships (Both reserve and those in overhaul).

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CHART III


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
THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION

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MAP I




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MAP II

THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION

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6 DECEMBER 1961




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MAP III

THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION

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
MAP IV

THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION

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
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


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MAP V



MAP VI



MAP VII


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MAP VIII

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
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GULF OF AQABA

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MAP IX

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