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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
2050/61R
6 April 1961

MAINTENANCE OF BASIC PAPER

The basic paper, "The Arab-Israeli Situation," is under continuous review to insure currency. Changes or additions of importance are issued as soon as practicable. The entire paper will be revised as developments require.

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SECRET

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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
prepared by an
AD HOC WORKING GROUP
of the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

I. Political

A. Introduction

The problem of Arab-Israeli relations has two main aspects: a) the unresolved conflict between the Arabs and Israel, and b) the struggle for hegemony and the question of power balance among the various rival Arab leaders. The key to both of these is the policies followed by the UAR under Nasir's guidance. Israel's arming is predicated primarily on a felt need for defense against Nasir. Nasir's arming, on the other hand, is motivated not only by a felt need for present defense and an ultimate showdown with Israel, but importantly also by a desire to win for the UAR a dominant position in the Arab area and make the UAR a "power to be reckoned with" in Afro-Asian and world affairs. Arming by other Arab states is undertaken at least as much for reasons of national prestige and against the aspirations of Nasir as against any anticipated danger from Israel. Qasim, King Husayn, and the Lebanese Christians, for example, are well aware that UAR forces in Syria could be employed against them as well as against the Israelis.

It is unlikely, therefore, that any solution to the problem of UAR-Israeli arms competition could be arrived at through the avenue of disarmament or security guarantees. While these probably would be acceptable to Israel under the proper conditions, they would be unacceptable to Nasir since they would hamper the attainment of his goals other than those that are concerned with Israel.

SECRET

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2050/61R
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B. Arab Intentions Regarding Israel

Arab opinion in general agrees that Israel should ultimately be destroyed. This, however, is an ideal that does not necessarily reflect the actual intentions of any given Arab government at any specific time. The burden of any Arab attack on Israel would be borne initially and chiefly by the UAR, and this is generally accepted by the other Arab peoples and governments.

The UAR regards itself as being in a broad, uncompromising struggle with Israel which will continue until UAR supremacy is clearly established. There is no inclination to accept Israel as an equal. The UAR sees the Israeli threat as a total one that challenges the UAR politically, economically, and militarily. The UAR feels itself militarily inferior to Israel and hence accords top priority to its aim of achieving at least parity with Israel. The UAR urgently seeks to augment its armed strength not only for the purpose of being able to make a creditable showing in the event of an ultimate showdown with the Israelis, but also to prevent Israel from gaining such a preponderant lead in military potential that it could proceed with impunity to implement major economic and political plans aimed at promoting Israel's growth and international prestige. UAR arming also has the effect of obliging Israel to divert to military uses financial and other resources that it could use to strengthen its economic and political position.

President Nasir and the UAR leadership are particularly concerned over Israel's development of a nuclear capability. They may believe there is a real danger that Israel, with French assistance, will in a few years be able to produce nuclear weapons, thus reaching a stage at which it could virtually dictate terms to the UAR. In the immediate future the UAR probably expects Israel to continue to strengthen itself with US and West German aid and with improved conventional weapons supplied by Western countries, particularly France. Behind an increasingly effective military shield Israel will be expected by the UAR to press forward on such projects as diverting water from the Jordan River to the Negev, absorbing a large number of new immigrants, and expanding trade and political relations with the new countries of Africa. The prospect of an increased number of military settlements in the Negev is regarded by the UAR as a particular threat to its security.

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SECRET

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To counter the many aspects of the Israeli threat which it perceives, the UAR depends heavily on the outside political support it can solicit. It has recently sought to mend its fences with the other Arab states and to secure their cooperation through the Arab League in developing means to counter the threat from Israel. However, there still exists among the Arabs considerable suspicion and distrust as to each other's true objectives.

The UAR relies to a great extent on the USSR as a source of political support and on the Soviet bloc as the major source of military equipment. While the USSR has made impressive contributions to the UAR in both respects, the Nasir regime now recognizes that Soviet backing is not without limits or strings. The USSR has never indicated that it would back an Arab attempt to destroy Israel and it is doubtful that it intends to do so.

The UAR also counts on building up political support among the neutralist nations, particularly those in Africa. Finally, despite its belief that the US is Israel's main support, the UAR leadership probably looks to the US as well as the USSR to help prevent Israel from successfully carrying out a major military offensive.

The UAR's preliminary reaction to Israel's progress in the nuclear field has been to threaten to obtain nuclear weapons "at all costs" if the Israeli program appears to be directed toward this end. Other than this threat, implying willingness to become fully aligned with the USSR in extreme circumstances, the UAR has increased its propaganda concerning its own nuclear program, which is still a modest one without a military potential. The UAR will probably continue to press the USSR for improved conventional weapons such as the recent shipment of MIG-19's with which it hopes to overcome its present disadvantage in fighter aircraft. It is unlikely, however, that the USSR would supply nuclear weapons to the UAR.

Neither the UAR nor any other Arab government is likely to initiate a military attack against Israel in present circumstances, and the general Arab military posture continues to be essentially defensive. However, because of their fears of Israel's nuclear program, and of Israel's intention to divert

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SECRET

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2050/61R
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Jordan water, the Arabs probably regard the next two years or so as especially critical for them. Minor incidents during this time may consequently develop more serious proportions than they have in the recent past.

C. Israel vis-a-vis the Arabs

1. General

The only Arab state that Israel considers important militarily is the UAR. For this reason Israel is sensitive to any development suggestive of greater Arab unity under the aegis of Nasir. Israel has done what it could to support those Arab forces hostile to him. These measures have included a conciliatory policy toward Lebanon and Jordan and encouragement of anti-Nasir forces in the Arab states generally.

2. The Rationale of Israel's Security Position vis-a-vis the UAR

There is no evidence that Israel is currently planning to annex Arab territory or contemplates an unprovoked attack on the UAR or any other Arab state. However, Israel probably would exploit certain provocations by attempting to occupy a strategic area or areas. While Israel is aware of generalized UAR threats against its existence, there is no evidence that the Israelis believe that the UAR has any specific plan or timetable for launching a general attack.

In the Israeli view, there are three solutions to the problem of Israel's security vis-a-vis the UAR: 1) regional disarmament, 2) a security guarantee from the US, and 3) military superiority. The main advantage of the first two to Israel would be to relieve Israel of the increasingly serious financial burden of its military establishment. However, the first two would not necessarily free Israel from UAR harassing action and they might well limit Israel's ability to counter it. It is doubtful that Israel expects to obtain either regional disarmament or a security guarantee, and it is likely that they have been put forth chiefly as bargaining counters. The problem is thus reduced essentially to one of military superiority

SECRET

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2050/61R
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and some form of relief from the financial burden of military costs, which in 1960-61 are estimated to be at least 26 per cent (\$236,000,000) of total Israeli government expenditures.

25X6 The Israelis are accustomed to present their case in the context of a need to preserve an adequate deterrent and defensive posture in the face of a generalized threat of large-scale attack by the UAR. They do not, however, [REDACTED] indicate the full extent of the measures they have taken to counter such a threat, [REDACTED]

25X6 Furthermore, there is a considerable range of other and more immediate considerations that the Israelis do not stress but which they must have in mind. Among these are:

a. Jordan -- Jordan is a prime concern of Israel in the context of the extension of Nasir's influence, since it is along the armistice line with Jordan that Israel is most vulnerable. Thus while Israel exhibited concern at the time of Syria-Egyptian union, it exhibited more concern at Jordan-Iraqi union in February 1958 and threatened to take military action against Jordan if Iraqi troops entered the country, particularly the West Bank. It is probable that Israel would move against the West Bank militarily if there were danger of its being occupied by UAR forces.

b. Other Potential Ground Targets -- There are other moves that, if taken by the UAR, might well bring Israeli military counteraction. These include an attempt once again to close the Strait of Tiran and a resumption of serious fedayeen attacks. Israel probably would regard these as provocations to which it would be justified in replying militarily. There is no reason to believe, however, that the Israelis feel that the UAR has any definite plans to carry out such provocative acts. The Israelis are aware, on the other hand, that the UAR has taken the lead in organizing an Arab project to divert the waters of the tributaries of the Jordan River in Syrian and Lebanese territory in order to sabotage the success of Israel's plan to bring water from the upper Jordan basin to the Negev by 1963. Should this Arab plan be carried out, it

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SECRET

SECRET

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2050/61R
6 April 1961

is possible that Israel might move to occupy at least the area of the source of the Banyas River, which lies a short distance over the armistice line in Syrian territory.

c. Air -- Among the various methods employed by Israel to check on Arab intentions is that of conducting reconnaissance flights over neighboring Arab, particularly Egyptian territory. UAR air parity or superiority could seriously hinder these operations and would enhance UAR capabilities to carry out similar flights over Israel.

D. Points of Recurrent Disputes

1. The Demilitarized or Neutral Zones. The General Armistice Agreements (GAA) signed in 1949 between Israel and the Arab states of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria each established a demilitarized zone, neutral zone or a no-man's-land along or near the frontier. These areas were created as a temporary solution designed to facilitate acceptance of the armistice agreements which were themselves regarded by the UN as a forerunner of an early permanent peace settlement.

a. Israeli-Syrian Border. The Demilitarized Zone (DZ) along the Israeli-Syrian border is divided into three sectors: one southeast of Lake Tiberias, the second stretching between the northern end of Lake Tiberias to and around the southern tip of the former Lake Hula (drained by Israel in 1958), and the third a small area at the northernmost border point. This DZ has been the scene of periodic violence since 1951, when Israel began work on the Hula reclamation project. The conflict revolves around Israel's attempts to develop and extend its sovereignty in the DZ and Syria's resistance to these moves. Contrary to the provisions of the GAA, Israel claims sovereignty over all land in the DZ. In 1951 the Security Council authorized Israel to resume the drainage work on non-Arab-owned land in the zone; moreover, the GAA did provide for the restoration of civilian life therein. In compliance with this resolution Israel has confined most of its activities in connection with the Hula drainage to lands that are not Arab-owned. As the drainage project has progressed Israel has established in the reclaimed area close to the border, but outside the DZ, several settlements

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SECRET

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2050/61R
6 April 1961

that have since become involved in incidents. The Hula area is still a point of friction, but its importance as a trouble spot has been reduced by the fact that major work has been completed and the de-silting of the canals, the most likely present cause of incidents, need be done only periodically. The areas more prone to become the scene of friction between Israel and Syria recently have been the areas of the DZ farther to the south.

The DZ area to the southeast of Lake Tiberias has been the scene of most of the recent flareups. Basically the question is Israel's extension of sovereignty over the entire DZ. The immediate problem is "the progressive extension of Israeli cultivation towards the east" (Annex 2 to General Von Horn's report of February 25, 1960) in the area between the Israeli settlement of Beit Qatsir and the Arab village of Tawafiq. Land ownership in the DZ is shared by Arabs and Jews, with the land parcels running east and west between Beit Qatsir and Tawafiq. Following the completion of a north-south drainage ditch in 1958, the Israelis have opposed cultivation by the Arabs of land west of the ditch. Violence continues to flare periodically and is apt to become acute during planting and harvesting seasons.

b. Jerusalem. The demilitarized areas of dispute between Israel and Jordan are Mount Scopus and the Area between the Lines (ABL) at Government House, both in Jerusalem. The Mount Scopus neutral zone was established by an Arab-Jewish Military Commander's Agreement of July 7, 1948, and includes the inactive Jewish institutions of Hadassah Hospital and Hebrew University patrolled by Israeli police, the Arab village of Al-Isawiyah, and a Jordanian-occupied area around Augusta Victoria Hospital. One problem is the delineation of the zone, since the Agreement did not describe the zone but referred to an attached map for boundaries (see Map VIII). Another problem arises from the fact that the Israeli police control the major access road to the Arab village and periodically force the villagers to detour off the road and down the hillside. The population limits of Al-Isawiyah are also a source of dispute, since the agreement limits the number of inhabitants to those living in the village when the agreement was signed and it is not clear as to what their number was. Israeli patrolling in the Ra's as Sullam or Gan Shlomit area has also been a source

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SECRET

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2050/61R
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of controversy and has resulted in exchanges of fire between the patrols and the Jordanians. From time to time the fortnightly convoy that rotates the Israeli police complement and brings supplies has been the cause of friction.

The situation in the Government House Zone is less complex than that of Mount Scopus. The Government House is the headquarters of the UNTSO and there are no problems connected with it. The surrounding area, however, is occupied by Jordanian Arabs and Israeli Jewish civilians. The chief problem concerns Israeli attempts to convert a de facto separation of Arabs and Jews into a boundary between the two. In July 1957 the Israelis began preparations to plant trees along the de facto line thus partitioning the zone. Tension mounted between Israel and Jordan over Israel's unilateral demarcation efforts and the case was referred to the Security Council. In January 1958 the Council adopted a resolution calling on Israel to halt its tree-planting activities. The tension abated following the Security Council's action, and while Jordan complained of continued Israeli aggressions in the area in September 1958 there have been no major incidents in the Government House DZ recently.

In recent years Israel has alternated its Independence Day military parade between Tel Aviv, Haifa and Jerusalem, holding it on the Jewish calendar date which corresponds to 14 May 1948, when Israel attained its independence. A dispute arises whenever Jerusalem is the scene because the presence of tanks and other heavy equipment in the procession violates restrictions in the armistice agreement. This was the issue again this year in connection with Israel's 13th anniversary parade in Jerusalem on 20 April. The Israelis were adamant about including their heavy equipment despite a warning from the UN Security Council.

c. Al Awja. The Al Awja DZ established by the Israel-Egypt GAA lies to the east of the international boundary that was drawn between Palestine and Egypt in 1906. The zone is important for its strategic location at the only inland route crossing between Egypt and Palestine and for its water sources in a desert region. The first armistice violation in the Al Awja DZ to come to the attention of the UN was the Egyptian

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SECRET

SECRET

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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
2050/61R
6 April 1961

complaint in 1950 that the Israelis had expelled the Bedouin living in the zone into Egyptian territory. By 1951 the MAC had restored order at least temporarily in the situation. Serious disturbances again took place in the DZ between 1953 and 1956, beginning with the harassment of Bedouin in the zone about the end of June 1953. The following September the Israelis established in the zone the first of a few kibbutzim which the Egyptians alleged and the UN later agreed were inhabited by military personnel. By 1955 Israel was in full military occupation of the DZ. Countering the Egyptian complaints that the Israeli settlements were military camps were Israeli protests that Egyptians had crossed into the zone and mined the roads, thereby causing Israeli casualties. Incidents continued to occur in the zone until the Sinai invasion at the end of October 1956; there have been no flareups in the zone since that time.

2. Suez Canal Transit. On March 13, 1948 Egypt declared a state of siege to be effective with the termination of the Palestine Mandate on May 15 and the procedures for visit and search of vessels dealing with Israel began to develop. Instructions were issued to provide for the inspection of ships destined directly or indirectly for Palestine and their cargoes made subject to confiscation. A Prize Court was established in Alexandria on July 8, 1948. A royal decree of 1950 consolidated Egyptian regulations on searches and seizure of contraband in connection with the Palestine hostilities. In 1953 the list of contraband goods was revised to include "foodstuffs and all other commodities" likely to strengthen the Israeli "war potential." Moreover, Egypt contends that there is a state of belligerency between it and Israel which was not terminated by the signing of the General Armistice Agreement.

The denial of Suez Canal transit to Israeli ships and cargoes has been debated in the Security Council on four occasions. One resolution, that of September 1, 1951, has been adopted calling on Egypt to cease its blockade practices in the Canal. Later Israeli complaints did not result in the adoption of any resolutions because of a Soviet veto or threat of veto.

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SECRET

SECRET

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2050/61R

6 April 1961

The only Israel-flag vessel ever to attempt transiting the Canal was the Bat Galim seized at Suez on September 28, 1954. While the ship's crew was returned to Israel on January 1, 1955 under the auspices of the MAC, the ship remains in Egyptian possession.

Egyptian practice with respect to vessels of neutral flags has varied somewhat, but generally cargo ships chartered by Israel or by firms in which Israelis have part ownership are not allowed to transit the Canal; moreover, cargoes of Israeli origin or known Israeli destination are liable to be confiscated. Such cargoes are sold at public auction "for the benefit of the Palestine Arabs," according to Egyptian sources. Moreover, foreign vessels which have called at Israeli ports are blacklisted, which means in general that they are refused services and supplies during their transit of the canal. Several cases have been given considerable publicity, including the following:

The Capetan Manolis, Liberian flag, arrived at Port Said from Haifa February 26, 1959 carrying potash and cement bound for the Far East. The UAR suspected that the ship was under Israel charter and the cargo Israel-owned. The cargo was confiscated and the ship allowed to proceed.

The Inge Toft, Danish flag, arrived at Port Said from Haifa May 21, 1959 carrying potash and cement bound for the Far East. It was not until February 1960, however, that the ship's owners allowed its cargo to be unloaded. The cargo was sold at public auction June 18, 1960.

The Astypalea, Greek flag, arrived at Port Said December 17, 1959 carrying cement bound for the Far East. The ship's detention by the UAR coincided with World Bank consideration of a \$56,000,000 loan to the UAR but did not prevent the loan from being granted. In April 1960 the ship's owners authorized its cargo to be discharged and the ship returned to Greece.

In the spring of 1960 attention in the Suez issue focussed briefly on the Cleopatra incident. On April 13 the UAR-flag vessel Cleopatra arrived in New York and the local Seaman's International Union prevented the discharge of its cargo in protest against UAR blacklisting of US-flag vessels.

SECRET

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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
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The International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions responded with a boycott of US shipping in Arab ports. US-Arab relations were further aggravated at the time by the passage of the Hayes-Douglas Amendment, which directs the President in administering foreign aid to take into consideration US support for freedom of usage of international waterways. The incident closed when the unions withdrew their pickets and allowed the Cleopatra to begin discharging cargo on May 9.

3. Jordan River Development. Israel's water development schemes, while a matter of concern to all the neighboring Arab states, are a source of potential trouble particularly between Israel and the Syrian region of the UAR. Arab apprehension that Israel will attempt to divert the waters of the Jordan at Jisr Banat Yaqub has caused recurrent tension since 1953, when the Israelis began work on such a project. Current information indicates that Israel's water plan will be developed in three stages ending respectively in 1963, 1966, and 1969. When the last stage is completed water will be carried from the Jordan River near Jisr Banat Yaqub to the Negev. In stage I, water will be drawn from Lake Tiberias through an underground pumping plant at Eshed Kinnerot (See Map VII), thereby circumventing the UN Security Council prohibition against drawing water from the Jordan at Jisr Banat Yaqub. However, the Arabs are opposed to all Israeli schemes to improve and develop the country and are likely to become alarmed at any news or rumor of progress in Israel's water development plans.

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
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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
2050/61R
6 April 1961

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B. UAR

The urge behind the Egyptian program of atomic research appears to spring from a desire for prestige within the Arab world. The 2 megawatt Soviet-supplied research reactor now being completed poses no military threat. Since the disclosure of [redacted] Egyptian press statements have implied that future development might be also of a military nature. However, it does not at this time seem probably that Egypt will be in a position to build or to operate a large reactor, either for power or for weapons production, without substantial assistance from non-Egyptian experts for some time to come.

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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
2050/61R
6 April 1961

III. Military Situation (See Maps)

A. Israel

1. Ground: The average strength of the Israeli Army is estimated at 29,500 but varies widely due to callups of reserve units, economic considerations and border tensions. The 5,000 man quasi-military NAHAL, which forms the first line of defense on the frontier, is continuing its normal activities.

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Current military activities in Israel are directed toward training with increased emphasis on armor, modernization and standardization of weapons. There has been no discernible reduction in the level of French support.* Israel will continue to press for additional arms aid from the Western World in a effort to offset UAR gains resulting from Soviet aid.

The Israeli ground forces can maintain internal security and have the capability of defeating those of any or all of Israel's Arab neighbors. Against a major power, they could offer effective delaying action.

*The following table of the percentages of certain Israeli ground equipment which are of French origin illustrates the degree of French assistance:

<u>Item</u>	<u>Percentage of French Origin</u>
Small arms and mortars	Some
Recoilless weapons	22%
Guided missiles (antitank)	100%
Light artillery	48%
Medium artillery	52%
Special purpose artillery	32%
Light tanks	85%

SECRET

SECRET

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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
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6 April 1961

2. Air: The Israel Defense Force Air Force (IDFAF) is an effective and capable air force in spite of limited resources and air facilities. The present vigor of the IDFAF stems from several factors: aggressive and dedicated personnel, good leadership, good organization, an effective reserve system, excellent training and high morale. In its combat aircraft inventory Israel is presently estimated to have 162 jet fighters--24 Vautours, 38 Super-Mysteres, 55 Mysteres, 19 Meteors, 26 Ouragans--30 F-51 piston fighters, and 10 Vautour jet light bombers. Included in the combat jet fighter inventory are 10 Vautour and 5 Meteor all-weather models. It is believed that approximately 80% of these aircraft are combat ready. Israel is estimated to have at least a 90-day level of POL stockpiled for emergency use. The IDFAF is scheduled to receive up to 40 Mirage III supersonic jet fighters from France, beginning in late 1961. The Mirage III should have a distinct edge in performance characteristics over the FARMER (MIG-19), particularly in speed and combat ceiling.

Israel, when compared to the UAR, continues to be at a disadvantage so far as numbers of aircraft and air facilities are concerned; however, the deficiency in numbers is counter-balanced by the superior quality of the Israeli air staff, pilots and technicians. It is estimated that the IDFAF could defeat the UAR Air Force, if an effective defense of Israel's air facilities could be maintained. Any failure in the normally efficient EW/GCI radar network would be disastrous for the IDFAF because the proximity of the UAR air bases severely limits scramble time even under favorable conditions. The IDFAF is especially concerned at the present about the vulnerability of its air defense system to jamming tactics. Efforts are being made to acquire improved electronics gear which is less susceptible to electronic countermeasures than the present equipment. In order to prevent total destruction on the ground in case of a large-scale UARAF attack which the fighters and antiaircraft defenses are unable to stop, semi-underground revetments have been constructed at the 3 principal Israeli military airfields to provide some protection against bombing and strafing attacks. Israeli air defense doctrine also places major emphasis on using offensive air operations to ease defensive problems.

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SECRET

SECRET

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3. Navy: The Israeli Navy consists of two ex-British destroyers (DD), two ex-British submarines (SS), one patrol escort (PF), two submarine chasers (one PC and one SC), 11 motor torpedo boats (PT), one auxiliary (AG), and about 17 amphibious and service craft. Most of the combatant ships are in excellent material condition and are normally maintained in active operational status. All ships are based at Haifa except 3 PT and 7 service craft which are based at Eilat (at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba). The Sea Commando unit of the Navy is a specialized force of about 300 men trained in underwater demolition, raiding, and commando-assault type operations. Most of these personnel are also qualified parachutists. Inflatable rubber boats, face masks, underwater breathing devices and possibly underwater propulsion units have been acquired, principally from Italy, and during the past 12 months emphasis has been placed on unconventional forms of naval warfare training. On numerous occasions PT have been observed with assault-type rubber boats on their after decks and up to 40 Commando troops embarked. It is believed that submarines have also been utilized during training exercises for transporting and debarking rubber boats and troops.

The Israeli Navy is a highly trained force whose combat effectiveness and capabilities are superior to those of neighboring Arab states' navies. The Israeli Navy is capable of defending the coasts against an Arab naval or amphibious attack and, with air support, is capable of neutralizing an Arab blockade of Israeli ports. Leadership is competent and forceful, morale and self-confidence are high, and seamanship and shiphandling are excellent.

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Anti-submarine (ASW) capabilities are currently limited due to the lack of modern ASW equipment, but this type of training is being emphasized, particularly since the acquisition of submarines. The Israeli Navy places considerable reliance on motor torpedo boats, not only as a defensive weapon, but also as an offensive force to be utilized in conjunction with underwater demolition and landing operations.

SECRET

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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
2050/61R
6 April 1961

B. Arab States

1. United Arab Republic (UAR)

a. General: The United Arab Republic armed forces are dominated by Egyptians. They hold the key posts in the high command and have permeated the Syrian forces to the point where it is believed that Egyptians have been assigned as deputies to the Syrian commanders in practically all units and installations. This influx, intended to extend Egyptian control over the Syrian forces and remove them from politics, particularly the Army, has stimulated Syrian discontent, but the presence of the better trained and more experienced Egyptian officers should significantly improve the quality of the forces. Further improvement in the standards of the forces of both regions can also be expected to result from continuing Soviet Bloc assistance in the supply of arms and equipment, in training, both at home and abroad, and assistance in reorganization.

The troops in both armies are highly motivated against Israel. Their discipline is good and there are reports indicating that rigorous training during the past year and a half has made them hard and confident.

The operational combining of the air forces of both regions into a United Arab Republic Air Force (UARAF) provides a basis for the establishment of several important advantages, although some jealousy, suspicion and lack of strong leadership are factors militating against the success of coordinated operations. First, Egypt can utilize Syrian air bases, from which at least a portion of her fighters are capable of mounting direct air strikes on Israel much easier than if they had to operate from airfields in the Cairo area. Secondly, BEAGLE (IL-28) jet light bombers are now capable of flying turnabout one-way bombing missions over Israel, shuttling back and forth between remote bases in both countries, taking advantage of the wider dispersal opportunity. A third item of primary importance is the UAR capability for mounting a surprise air attack on Israel. The UAR's ability to obtain both personnel and training combat aircraft from the USSR may result in its reaching a point where the present qualitative superiority of the Israeli Air Force would be offset by the rapidly expanding and improving UAR air forces.

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SECRET

SECRET

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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
2050/61R
6 April 1961

b. Egyptian Region

(1) Ground: The total strength of all components of the UAR ground forces in the Egyptian Region is estimated at 100,000. Present dispositions are as follows: Northern Zone, 14,000; Central Zone, 42,000; Southern Zone, 5,000; Canal Zone, 26,500; and Sinai, 12,500. The Egyptians continue to improve their defenses of the Sinai Peninsula. Total uniformed or active duty forces in Gaza are currently estimated at 1,000 men and comprise two battalions of the 107th Palestine Brigade, 225 Fedayeen, 125 Military Police and 150 civilian police. There are no indications of any offensive action being initiated from the Sinai.

The army in the Egyptian Region is loyal to the regime and is capable of maintaining it in power against internal opposition. While not yet able to challenge the Israeli forces in the field, it has surpassed the level of efficiency prevailing before the 1956 hostilities and is now believed capable of limited operations on a divisional level. With adequate leadership the Army could offer stubborn resistance in a static defense against an Israeli attack. The leadership is believed to be adequate at the small unit level, but the quality of the senior commanders is questionable. This weakness results in generally poor command and staff work and combined with the low level of education and initiative of the average soldier is believed to render the forces unable to cope with a mobile and rapidly changing situation.

(2) Air: The Egyptian Region combat aircraft inventory is estimated at about 146 jet fighters--20 FARMER/MIG-19's, 96 FRESCO/MIG-17's, 30 FAGOT/MIG-15's--and 50 BEAGLE/IL-28 jet light bombers. Sixteen of the FRESCO aircraft are equipped for all-weather operations. The UAR received an estimated 20 FARMER/MIG-19's from the Soviet Union in early 1961; an additional 20 are expected before the end of the year. The FARMER is estimated to be slightly superior in speed to the Israeli Super Mystere; the climb rate and combat ceiling are about equal. Israeli pilot proficiency may be able largely to offset any performance advantages that the FARMER holds over the Super Mystere. Egypt has one of the most modern airfield complexes in the Middle East. The Egyptian air facilities can easily support the combat aircraft which are presently in the UAR inventory. It is estimated that Egypt has at least a 90-day supply of POL stockpiled for emergencies.

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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
2050/61R
6 April 1961

The combat capability of the Egyptian air element has improved considerably since the 1956 Suez campaign, particularly the air defense system. Soviet radar has gradually replaced the French radars which have been in use since the early 1950's. Most Israeli overflights are now detected quickly and aircraft are scrambled and vectored on an intercept course. With the addition of the FARMERS to the UARAF inventory, Israeli reconnaissance intruders will encounter increased opposition in the near future. Despite the improvements, however, the system is not deemed capable of coping with a determined large-scale attack because of the low standards of its operating personnel, and the lack of a defense against jamming. Offensive capabilities against fixed targets such as airfields, military installations, and transportation facilities are fair. With the offensive resources the UARAF has at its command, there is little doubt that a devastating surprise attack could be carried out against Israel if the UARAF staff could plan and initiate such a move without Israeli detection.

(3) Navy: The Egyptian Navy is composed of 45 combatant ships, as follows: four destroyers (DD) (two ex-Soviet, two ex-British), nine ex-Soviet submarines (SS) (eight long range, one coastal type), six ex-British patrol escorts (PF), 18 ex-Soviet motor torpedo boats (PT), four ex-Soviet fleet minesweepers (MSF), and four US-built coastal minesweepers (old) MSC (O). There are in addition three auxiliaries (two former yachts, one former transport) and several minor service craft. All are based at Alexandria except three PT based at Port Said which operate in the Port Said--Suez Canal--Red Sea area. The ex-Soviet ships are in fair material condition. The submarines now spend increasing periods in maintenance or overhaul. Of the ex-British ships, the DD are in fair material condition, but as far as is known they still lack main battery ammunition and torpedoes. Two patrol escorts are in poor condition and are in reserve. The MSC (O), also in reserve, are in poor material condition and are of little value. The Navy possesses a stockpile of about 2,000 contact type mines and unknown quantities of depth charges and torpedoes, nearly all of Soviet origin. A number of underwater propulsion units, plus a quantity of limpet mines, has been purchased from Italy for use in underwater assault and demolition.

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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
2050/61R
6 April 1961

Despite the increase in ship strength as a result of Soviet aid during the past several years, combat effectiveness remains low and, because of poor maintenance, the over-all effectiveness of the ex-Soviet ships has declined since they were acquired. Only with immediate outside assistance could the Egyptian Navy hope to survive a concerted air and naval attack by Israel. Although fairly well equipped to conduct small scale defensive and offensive operations, Egyptian naval capabilities are restricted by lack of adequately trained personnel, lack of logistic support, and a decisive lack of initiative and coordinated teamwork. Capabilities are limited, at the present time, to surface ship and submarine patrols of short duration, motor torpedo boat operations against enemy surface craft in Egyptian waters, and minelaying and minesweeping operations of questionable effectiveness. The submarine force represents a potential offensive strength, but the future effectiveness of the submarines will depend to a great extent on improved maintenance as well as on the aptitude of personnel to advance with continued training. The emphasis now being given to afloat training, particularly daily exercises conducted by small task force groups, provides the Egyptians with much needed operational experience.

c. Syrian Region

(1) Ground: The present strength of all components of the Syrian Region ground forces is estimated at 62,900. The largest component is the First UAR Army with a strength of 52,500. Present ground forces dispositions are as follows: Southwestern Area (Israeli border), 17,200; Central Area, 4,900; Northern Area 3,500; Coastal Area, 5,400; Eastern Area, 2,900; Southern Area, 5,400; and Damascus Area, 23,600. The Syrian ground forces, during an emergency, are believed capable of mobilizing from four to five reserve infantry brigades upon short notice. The ground forces of the Syrian Region are capable of maintaining internal security. They are also capable of successfully defending the vital areas of the country against attack by any one of their Arab neighbors. They could, however, be defeated by Israel or Turkey. The Syrian Region ground forces are incapable of effective sustained offensive operations against any of its neighbors except Lebanon.

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Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79S00427A000400060001-9

THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION

2050/61R

6 April 1961

(2) Air: There are an estimated 50 FRESCO/MIG-17 jet fighters, including 6 equipped for all-weather operations, based in the Syrian Region of the UAR. Air capabilities, both defensive and offensive, are poor. Although an EW/GCI network equipped with Soviet and Polish radar exists, the level of proficiency is low. Major stress in the Syrian region is believed to be on development of an offensive capability, for strikes against fixed targets, such as airfields, military installations, and transportation facilities. Israel's principal port and its main petroleum refinery and storage area are located within 100 nautical miles of two major Syrian airfields. Syria's complex of jet airfields provide the UAR bomber force with a capability of launching a two pronged attack on Israel. It is estimated that Syria has enough POL to conduct air operations for 30 to 40 days.

(3) Navy: The Syrian Navy consists of three ex-French submarine chasers (SC), 15 ex-Soviet motor torpedo boats (PT), two ex-Soviet fleet minesweepers (MSF), and several minor amphibious vessels and service craft. Until recently all were based at Latakia but at the present time some are based at Al Mina al Bayda. Integration of the Syrian and Egyptian navies into a single UAR Navy has not yet been fully implemented. Some limited joint exercises, however, have taken place.

The Syrian Navy is capable of conducting effective coastal patrol operations. It has also recently developed limited minesweeping, anti-submarine and torpedo boat capabilities. In the event of hostilities, the Syrian PT would probably be used to augment the "strike" capability of the Egyptian Navy.

2. Jordan

a. Ground: The Jordan Arab Army is currently engaged in strengthening and modernizing its armed forces with the help of US-supplied equipment. The total strength of the regular Army is 36,400; currently 17,300 thereof, supported by about 9,000 lightly armed and poorly trained National Guardsmen stationed in border villages, guard Jordan's frontier with Israel. The remainder of the Army is deployed in East Jordan, with the largest concentration being near the capital, Amman.

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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
2050/61R
6 April 1961

As long as the Bedouin remain cohesive and loyal to King Husayn, the Jordan Arab Army is capable of maintaining internal security. It is incapable of sustained offensive combat. Defensively, it could probably contain attacks by any one neighboring Arab Army but could not defend West Jordan against an Israeli attack for longer than six days. Because of the concern over possible Israeli attack and internal security, Jordan cannot provide significant forces for employment elsewhere.

b. Air: Jordan has 11 Hawker Hunter and 11 Vampire jet fighters. This air force has virtually no combat capability with respect to Israel. Jordanian pilots are well-trained for tactical-type missions and could effectively support ground forces in suppressing an internal rebellion.

c. Navy: The Flotilla Force, a component of the Army, operates 10 small naval craft (including two ex-British assault landing craft (LCA)) on the Dead Sea and two small aluminum-hulled patrol launches at Aqaba. Combat capabilities are nonexistent.

3. Iraq

a. Ground: The strength of the Iraqi Army (excluding the organic air forces) is about 68,000 organized into four infantry divisions, and one armored division. Soviet equipment has been largely absorbed, resulting in some improvement in effectiveness.

Logistical limitations and internal security considerations preclude the commitment of more than 12,000-15,000 troops to the west for possible action in the Jordan-Israel-Syria area.

The Army could probably resist invasion by Iran or any one of Iraq's Arab neighbors; but against invasion by large forces of a major power, the Army could offer only minor harassing action. The Army is capable of maintaining internal security.

b. Air: The Iraqi Air Force (IAF) combat aircraft inventory is estimated to consist of 87 jet fighters--16 FARMER/MIG-19's, 40 FRESCO/MIG-17's, 12 Hawker Hunters, 11 Venoms, 8 Vampires--13 piston fighter-bombers, and 16 BEAGLE/IL-28 jet light bombers. The 16 FARMERS were added to the inventory in early 1961. Fourteen of the FRESCOs are equipped for all-weather

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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
2050/61R
6 April 1961

operations. All programmed equipment is believed to have arrived from the Soviet Union except 3 CAT/AN-10 transports. Soviet instructors and advisors continue to participate in the domestic training program and a small number of Iraqi pilots are training in the Soviet Union.

The IAF is currently capable of attacking fixed targets such as airfields, military installations, and transportation facilities. Air defense capabilities are restricted to the Baghdad, Habbaniya, and Kirkuk areas. Radar stations are presently operating at Baghdad and Kirkuk. A school for operators and technicians is being conducted in Iraq and reportedly has graduated about 50 GCI controllers. No effective defense could be organized against an attack by a major air force. Close support could not be provided for ground forces because of the lack of joint training. The IAF could furnish effective support during any internal disturbance short of civil war, in which event political factionalism could render the air force ineffective.

c. Navy: The Iraqi River Force is composed of 10 ex-Soviet motor torpedo boats (PT), 4 river gunboats (PR), 1 yacht (PY), 2 ex-Soviet patrol vessels (YP), and 2 ex-Soviet torpedo retrievers (YTR). Four of the PT arrived in January 1961 and are still being fitted out; the 2 YP and 2 YTR arrived in November 1960. All craft are based at Basra except for 2 PT and 1 PR, which are at Fao. The River Force is at present a specialized component of the Army, but may soon become at least a semi-autonomous naval force.

The river gunboats (PR) have no combat capability; they are utilized only to assist in maintaining internal security in southern Iraq. However, the recently acquired motor torpedo boats (PT) represent a potential, but limited, offensive and defensive capability against the Iranian Navy. The PT, stationed on a rotating basis at Fao, exercise regularly in the northern Persian Gulf. A small number of Iraqi personnel are receiving naval training in the USSR, and Soviet technicians at Basra are assisting the Iraqis in the maintenance and operation of the PT.

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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION

2050/61R

6 April 1961

4. Lebanon

a. Ground: The strength of the Lebanese ground forces is 10,500; there is a gendarmerie force of 2,800. Given a political decision and orders to do so, the Army is considered capable of maintaining internal security and of providing limited defense of land approaches to Beirut.

b. Air: Lebanon has 6 Hawker Hunters and 8 Vampire jet fighters. The air force has no capability to engage effectively a foreign aggressor, but does possess a good capability to assist in quelling internal disturbances.

c. Navy: The small Lebanese Navy, a specialized component of the Lebanese Army, has no combat capabilities. It is capable of conducting fairly effective coastal patrol operations.

5. Saudi Arabia

a. Ground: The total strength of the regular Saudi Army is 13,600. In addition, there is a "White Army" of subsidized tribesmen which has an estimated strength of 16,000 loosely organized into at least three brigades. The Saudi Arabian armed forces would be incapable of organized resistance against a modern army, except for desert harassing operations.

b. Air: The Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) has 18 Vampire jet fighters, but all are unserviceable. In addition, there are 11 F-86's, 9 T-33's and 4 T-34's in Saudi Arabia used for RSAF training, but under the control of the USAF training mission. The task of advising and training this air force rests solely with the U.S. [REDACTED]

25X6

25X6

[REDACTED] The RSAF has no tactical air capability at this time.

25X6

c. Navy: A Saudi Arabian naval force is in the process of being established and one craft, a US Coast Guard "95-foot" Class motor gunboat (PGM) purchased in the US, was delivered in May 1960. A US Navy Training Mission operates a seaman school at Dammam where about 50 enlisted personnel are being given language training and classroom instruction in naval subjects. On board training of the crew of the PGM began recently using as a nucleus a group of Saudi personnel, who received their naval training in Egypt.

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24
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Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79S00427A000400060001-9

THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
2050/61R
6 April 1961

C. UN Forces: United Nations Emergency Forces on the Israel-Sinai border continue to act as a buffer between Israel and the UAR, and have been successful in maintaining a relatively quiet border.

UNEF strength stands at about 5,325. (See chart for details). Although border crossings and minor incidents continue to be reported, the situation along the Gaza and Sinai frontiers remains relatively quiet. Contributing nations continue periodic rotation of their troops. The Swedish battalion which was withdrawn for a special mission in the Congo has been replaced by another Swedish battalion.

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THE ARAB ISRAELI SITUATION
2050/61R
6 APRIL 1961

THE ARAB ISRAELI SITUATION

SUPPLEMENT

SOVIET BLOC ARMS HOLDINGS IN EGYPTIAN REGION (UAR)
SYRIAN REGION (UAR), IRAQ, AND YEMEN

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Egyptian leaders have assumed since 1958 overall coordination of military purchases from the Soviet Bloc by both regions of the UAR. The total value of Bloc military aid to the UAR is estimated to be more than 700 million dollars.* In most instances the Arab States are believed to have received discounts on their arms purchases from the Bloc.

An estimated 225 Soviet Bloc military technicians and advisors are in Egypt, where they are assisting the UAR in reorganizing the Second Army (Egyptian). Egyptian air, army, and navy personnel have been and are being trained in both the use and maintenance of the equipment in Soviet Bloc countries. The number is unknown.

The number of Soviet Bloc military technicians and advisors working with the First Army (Syrian) probably has been reduced to about 150 since the formation of the United Arab Republic. Many of the duties performed by the Soviets have been taken over by Egyptian advisory personnel.

* This figure, in addition to arms, includes the estimated cost--prior to discount--of all military-related items supplied by the Bloc.

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THE ARAB ISRAELI SITUATION
2050/61R
6 APRIL 1961

TO EGYPTIAN REGION (UAR)

<u>Item</u>	<u>Estimated Minimum Holdings</u>
<u>AIR</u>	
MIG 19 jet fighter	20
MIG 15/17 jet fighter	126
IL-28 light jet bomber	50
IL-14 twin engine transport	40
Trainer aircraft: Yak-11, Yak-18, U MIG-15 U IL-28	60
Helicopter	10
Radar EW/GCI	30
<u>GROUND</u>	
T-34 medium tank	275
JS-3 heavy tank	60
100mm SP assault gun SU-100	70
BTR-152 APC	350
85mm field gun D-44	50
100mm field gun M 1944	7
122mm gun M 1931/37	50
122mm howitzer M 1938	100
152mm gun-howitzer M 1937	32
130mm rocket launcher RM-130 (32 round)	30
57mm AT gun M 1943	200
82mm recoilless gun B-10	200
14.5mm AA HMG (ZPU-2)	48
14.5mm AA HMG (ZPU-4)	48
37mm AA gun M 1939	112
85mm AA gun	72
100mm AA gun	12
82mm mortar	140
120mm mortar M 1943	36

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THE ARAB ISRAELI SITUATION
2050/61R
6 APRIL 1961

NAVAL

Destroyer	2	
Submarine	9	(8 W-class and 1 M- class)
Motor Torpedo boat	18	
190 ft. T-43 class fleet minesweeper	4	
Naval mines	2,000	
Depth charges	large quantity	
Torpedoes	large quantity	

TO SYRIAN REGION (UAR)

<u>Item</u>	<u>Estimated Minimum Holdings</u>
-------------	---------------------------------------

AIR

MIG-17 jet fighter	50
IL-14	6
Helicopter	4

GROUND

T-34 medium tank	200
T-54 medium tank	85
100mm SP assault gun SU-100	54
BTR 152 APC	246
85mm field gun D44	40
122mm gun M 1931/37	32
122mm howitzer M 1938	100
152mm gun-howitzer M 1937	24
130mm rocket launcher RM-130 (32 round)	32
57mm AT gun M 1943	100
82mm recoilless gun B-10	100
82mm recoilless gun T-21	some
14.5mm AA HMG (ZPU-2)	12
14.5mm AA HMG (ZPU-4)	12
37mm AA gun M 1939	104
85mm AA gun	50
100mm AA gun KS 19	12
82mm mortar	100
120mm mortar M 1943	100
Small arms	some
Radar	15
Trucks	2,600

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THE ARAB ISRAELI SITUATION
2050/61R
6 APRIL 1961

NAVAL


Motor Torpedo boat	15
190 ft. T-43 class fleet minesweeper	2
Naval mines, torpedoes, depth charges	unknown quantity

IRAQ

25X1B

In November 1958 Iraq concluded an arms agreement with the Soviet Union in which the Soviets agreed to provide Iraq with certain military equipment, including jet aircraft and medium tanks.

25X1B



There are now in Iraq about 220 Soviet military advisors and technicians.

Item

Estimated Minimum Quantities Delivered

AIR

MIG-19 jet fighter	16
MIG-15/17 jet fighter and trainer	48
IL-28 jet light bomber	16
Helicopter	12
Radar EW/GCI	10-12

GROUND

T-34 medium tank	80
T-54 medium tank	160
100mm SP assault gun SU-100	52
BTR-152 APC	60
BTR-40 APC	40
57mm AT gun M 1943	23
85mm field gun D-44	100
100mm field gun M 1944	60
122mm howitzer M 1938	50
152mm gun-howitzer M 1937	24

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THE ARAB ISRAELI SITUATION
2050/61R
6 APRIL 1961

GROUND

132mm rocket launcher BM-13	24
37mm AA gun M 1939	268
100mm AA gun KS 19	27
82mm mortar	54
120mm mortar M 1943	76
Trucks and other vehicles	4-5000

NAVAL

Motor torpedo boat	10
Patrol vessels	2
Torpedo recovery craft	2
Torpedoes	some

YEMEN

25X1B

Yemen concluded an arms deal with the Soviet Bloc in 1956 [REDACTED]. At least twelve shipments of Soviet Bloc arms arrived in Yemen by sea beginning in October 1956, and it is believed that all arms purchased by Yemen from the Bloc have been delivered. The total value of Soviet Bloc arms thus far received by Yemen may amount to as much as 30 million dollars. The Yemenis have no technical competence to operate and maintain the equipment received and require extensive Soviet Bloc or other foreign assistance to use it effectively. It is estimated that not more than 25 Bloc military technicians remain in Yemen.

<u>Item</u>	<u>Estimated Quantities</u> <u>Delivered</u>
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AIR

IL-10 Piston ground attack aircraft	26
Piston trainer aircraft	5
Helicopter, MI-4	3

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Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79S00427A000400060001-9

THE ARAB ISRAELI SITUATION
2050/61R
6 APRIL 1961

GROUND

T-34 medium tank	30
100mm SP assault gun SU-100	61
BTR-40 APC	74
57mm AT gun M 1943	62
76mm field/AT gun M 1942	73
122mm gun M 1931/37	31
152mm gun-howitzer M 1937	3
37mm AA gun M 1939	106
85mm AA gun	26
AT rocket launcher	10
Small arms	some
Trucks (including 24 gasoline trucks)	223

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SELECTIVE ARMAMENTS INVENTORY¹

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	ARMOR						ARTILLERY					OTHER		
	TANKS			ARTILLERY		MISC ² ARMORED VEHICLES	ANTI- TANK	FIELD			ANTI-AIRCRAFT		RECOILLESS WEAPONS	MORTARS 81-120 MM
	LIGHT	MEDIUM	HEAVY	ANTI- TANK & ASSAULT GUNS	FIELD			57-76 MM	75-105 MM	106-155 MM	20-40 MM	75-130 MM		
UAR EGYPT	40	363	60	142	8	804	333	161	246	465	126	1400	434	
UAR SYRIA		300		114	9	551	177	121	200	433	62	143	477	
TOTAL UAR	40	663	60	256	17	1355	510	282	446	898	188	1543	911	
IRAQ	36	394		52		338	105	479	154	363	51	203	310	
JORDAN		154		27		453	95	156	18	120		459	154	
LEBANON	40	20				118		18	18	69	12	97		
SAUDI ARABIA	36	18				114	15	67	6	114	32	1784	438	
YEMEN		30		61		74	135		34	106	26	10		
TOTAL ARAB	152	1279	60	396	17	2452	860	1002	676 ³	1670	309	4096	1813	
ISRAELI	175	383		124	199	1413	385	584	92	914	92	5699 ⁴	1534	

¹ Certain obsolete items have been omitted

² Includes armored cars, personnel and weapons carriers

³ Includes 62 130mm rocket launchers (32 tube) in UAR and 24 132mm rocket launchers (16 tube) in Iraq

⁴ Includes 850 ss 10 anti tank guided missiles

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**STRENGTH OF FORCES*
DEPLOYED IN VICINITY OF ISRAELI BORDERS**

	CURRENT	M+48 HRS
UAR EGYPT	16,000	35,000
UAR SYRIA	19,000	32,000
JORDAN	26,300	45,000
LEBANON	2,500	7,500
TOTAL ARAB	63,800	119,500

* Includes irregulars.

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TOTAL STRENGTH OF ARAB ARMIES

UAR EGYPT	100,000*
UAR SYRIA	62,900*
IRAQ	72,000*
JORDAN	48,100*
SAUDI ARABIA	13,600
LEBANON	10,500
TOTAL	307,100

* This figure includes quasi-military personnel on active duty.

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**UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE, EGYPT
(AS OF 1 MARCH 1961)**

BRAZIL	636
CANADA	919
DENMARK	558
INDIA	1,246
NORWAY	609
SWEDEN	648
YUGOSLAVIA	708
TOTAL	5,324

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CHART I

THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION

2050 / 61 R
6 APRIL 1961

AIR FORCES

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	FIGHTERS		BOMBERS		TRANSPORTS		OTHER		TOTAL	TOTAL AF PERSONNEL
	Jet	Piston	Jet	Piston	Jet	Piston	Jet	Piston		
UAR EGYPT	146		50			46	30	130	402	4500
UAR SYRIA	50					7	6	21	84	3000
TOTAL UAR	196		50			53	36	151	486	7500
JORDAN	22					4	4	18	48	1242
SAUDI ARABIA	18					10		25	53	285
LEBANON	14						4	6	24	593
YEMEN		26						8	34	UNK
IRAQ	87	13	16			5	9	82	212	3807
TOTAL ARAB	337	39	66			72	53	290	857	13427
ISRAEL	162	30	10			24	11	119	356	4028

CHART II

NAVAL FORCES

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	DESTROYERS (DD)	PATROL VESSELS (PF PR PC PY PGM SC)	MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS (PT)	MINE CRAFT (MSC) (MSF)	SUBS (SS)	AMPHIB. CRAFT	OTHER	TOTAL NAVAL PERSONNEL
UAR EGYPT	4	4(2)	18	4(4)	6(3)		9	7500
UAR SYRIA		3	6(9)	2		(3)	5	1000
TOTAL UAR	4	7(2)	24(9)	6(4)	6(3)	(3)	14	8500
IRAQ		5	6(4)				4	250
LEBANON						2	4	190
JORDAN							12	300
SAUDI ARABIA		1						80
TOTAL ARAB	4	13(2)	30(13)	6(4)	6(3)	2(3)	34	9320
ISRAEL	2	3	11*		2	7	11	3319

Figures in parentheses indicate inactive ships (both nonoperational and those undergoing repairs).


*In addition there are 6-10 PT under construction in France and Italy, and three are being purchased from the UK.

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CHART III

THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION


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6 APRIL 1961



MAP I

THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION


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MAP II

THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION


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6 APRIL 1961



MAP III

THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION


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
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MAP IV


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MAP V




MAP VI



MAP VII

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