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ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT

FORCED LABOR IN THE USSR  
1953-57



CIA/RR 148

12 September 1958

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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
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(ORR Project 41.1764A)

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FORCED LABOR IN THE USSR\*  
1953-57

Summary and Conclusions

Since the beginning of the Communist regime the USSR has used forced labor as an instrument of political and social control. Its use has been given legal sanction in Soviet penal codes and ideological sanction in the tenets of Communist doctrine. It has been employed in varying degrees at different periods in Soviet history to further changing policy objectives, both political and economic.

At the beginning of 1953, forced labor occupied an important place in the Soviet system, a place far different from that of prison labor in Western countries. Several million prisoners were confined in camps scattered throughout the USSR, with large camp clusters located in Central Siberia, the Far North, and the Far East. The prisoners were employed in a variety of enterprises, but mainly in construction and extractive activities, and their labor contributed significantly to the economy. The forced labor system was administered in a highly centralized manner by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), which not only controlled the prison labor force but also managed the most important economic enterprises employing such workers.

The death of Stalin in March 1953 inaugurated a series of events which have profoundly affected all aspects of the system of forced labor in the USSR. Important changes have been made in legal procedures, which, if enforced, will make it considerably more difficult to send people to forced labor camps than was possible with the arbitrary methods permissible in the past. The most important of these changes was the abolition of the MVD's Special Conference, an extrajudicial body authorized to impose sentences by administrative action, and the subsequent review of all such sentences. In addition, special courts which tried certain kinds of cases investigated by the MVD were abolished, as were courts that had jurisdiction over cases involving employees of the transport system. The right to try civilians (except for espionage) was taken away from the military courts. Nearly all cases involving civilians are now under the jurisdiction of the regular kray, oblast, and republic courts, whose powers have been strengthened by the transfer of some functions formerly given to the Ministry of Justice. In addition, the

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\* The estimates and conclusions contained in this report represent the best judgment of ORR as of 1 July 1958.

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Procurator General, USSR, and his counterparts on the regional and local levels have been vested with increased powers to enforce judicial adherence to established law and legal procedures. In addition to these reforms in judicial procedure, a number of changes have been made in the content of Soviet criminal law which reduce the number of offenses punishable by imprisonment and which lessen the severity of the penal sentences prescribed for other offenses. The basic penal codes also are currently being revised.

The administration of the camp system has undergone a radical transformation since 1953, and the treatment of the prisoners has improved substantially. Within a few months after Stalin's death, the MVD was divested of all of its extensive entrepreneurial activities based on the use of forced labor and of all responsibility for administering the far-flung system of corrective labor camps. The economic functions were assumed by the appropriate economic ministries, and the camps were taken over by the Ministry of Justice. In 1954 the camps were returned to the control of the MVD and its Main Administration of Camps (GULAG), along with some lumbering and agricultural enterprises. Beginning in April 1956, however, MVD control over the camp system was weakened through a series of reorganizations which resulted in a broad administrative decentralization of the police and the prison system. With respect to forced labor, it was decided to place all of the camps -- including even the large camp complexes formerly administered directly from Moscow -- under the direct control of newly created Administrations of Internal Affairs subordinate to oblast and kray Executive Committees. The Administrations themselves were made dually subordinate -- to these committees and to the Ministries of Internal Affairs in the republics.

[redacted] it was decided some time in 1956 to 50X1  
convert all corrective labor camps to corrective labor "colonies," where the principal emphasis would be on rehabilitating the prisoners and returning them speedily to civilian life rather than on exploiting prison labor for economic purposes. Under the new system, prison labor allegedly will no longer be hired out to civilian enterprises; rather, the prisoners will be employed in prison workshops. The extent to which the planned conversion is being carried out is not known. Prisoners were still being employed by civilian enterprises in Magadanskaya Oblast in early 1957. 50X1

The number of persons in corrective labor camps has declined sharply since 1953, perhaps by as much as two-thirds [redacted] 50X1  
[redacted] Several million prisoners were freed as a result of six separate amnesties issued during 1953-57, through the repatriation of foreign prisoners and through a systematic review of individual cases. Although definitive estimates are not possible, the available evidence suggests that the prison population probably was less than 5 million at the

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beginning of 1953 and that by the end of 1957 it had dropped to less than 2 million and may even have been as low as 1 million. This evidence also indicates that most previous estimates of the size of the prison population were too high.

Along with the freeing of prisoners, large numbers of camps have been closed or converted to civilian use, including the large camp complex at Noril'sk. Forced labor still existed in 1956 in the places that have long been forced labor centers -- Vorkuta, Karaganda, Irkutsk, Magadan, and Khabarovsk -- but both the number of individual camp sites and the number of inmates had declined greatly. These former centers are currently being "rehabilitated" through the large-scale influx of free workers, and major housing construction programs are being undertaken.

Prison labor has virtually disappeared from the gold-mining industry in the Far East, where it had long been almost the only source of manpower. A substantial decline in the use of forced labor for mining nickel, coal, tin, tungsten, and copper also has taken place, as evidenced by camp liquidations, arrival of recruited free workers at enterprises formerly employing forced labor, and changes in camp administration. The last vestige of MVD activity in the timber industry was removed in 1956, indicating that little or no prison labor is employed there. The amount of prison labor now employed in railroad construction appears to be negligible. Free labor is now being used on the kind of large-scale development projects, such as the hydroelectric power project at Bratsk, that would have employed prison labor in the past.

The change in Soviet policies with respect to forced labor results from a number of factors, both economic and political. About 1952-53, Soviet administrators evidently became convinced that economic progress in a modern industrial state must depend on the provision of incentives rather than on the use of coercion and that therefore the huge prison labor force was a serious drag on over-all productivity. The administrative costs of the camp system were high, and the net output per prisoner must have been very low. Moreover, by 1953, after about 25 years of the use of forced labor on a massive scale, a large part of the task of developing the habitable frontier had been accomplished, and most of the catastrophic destruction resulting from World War II had been repaired. The demographic consequences of the forced labor system also were becoming apparent. The disability and mortality rates in the camps were extremely high, and the isolation of large numbers of males necessarily had an adverse effect on the birthrate. Finally, the strikes and general unrest that spread through the prison camps during 1953 added to the administrative difficulties and economic costs of the system.

Whatever the economic imperatives against the use of forced labor, the transformation of the camp system could not have been accomplished

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without the relative political stability which has characterized the post-Stalin period. There has been no serious threat to the status of the collective leadership or to the Soviet economic and political system. By the end of 1957 the Soviet prison system was approaching the status of such systems in Western countries -- that is, imprisonment was being used as a method of punishment for criminal acts rather than primarily as an instrument for political repression and economic exploitation. As long as there is continued political stability, the gradual conversion of the infamous forced labor system to a normal penal system may be expected to continue.

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## I. Introduction.

Since the beginning of the Communist regime the USSR has used forced labor as an instrument of political and social control. Its use is given legal sanction in Soviet penal codes and philosophical sanction in the tenets of Communism. Although it can be argued that all labor in a Communist society is forced labor, the term as used in this report may be considered synonymous with prison labor; it refers generally to all prisoners, regardless of nationality and regardless of the type of prison -- whether camp or colony -- in which they are confined.

Forced labor has been employed in varying degrees at different periods in Soviet history to further changing policy objectives, both economic and political. At the beginning of 1953 the institution of forced labor occupied an important place in the Soviet system, a place far different from that of prison labor in Western countries. Several million prisoners were confined in camps scattered throughout the USSR, with large camp clusters located in Central Siberia, the Far North, and the Far East. The prisoners were employed in a variety of enterprises, and their labor made a significant contribution to the economy. The forced labor system was administered in a highly centralized manner by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), which not only controlled the prison labor force but also managed the most important economic enterprises employing such workers. During 1953-57 the system underwent a radical transformation. The present report was undertaken to assess the nature of this transformation, to explore its rationale, and to determine its current status and probable future course. The report is based on an exhaustive analysis of several thousand pertinent documents. Although specific source citations have been made in many instances, most of the conclusions concerning the various changes in the system represent composite judgments based on an analysis of the material as a whole.

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## II. Legal Developments Affecting Forced Labor.

The use of forced ("corrective") labor as a means of punishment has long been an inherent part of the Soviet legal system. The criminal and penal codes of the various union republics provide for three types of punishments involving forced labor -- corrective labor without deprivation of liberty, exile with corrective labor, and deprivation of liberty with corrective labor. The latter form, entailing confinement and work under guard in camps and colonies scattered throughout the USSR, undoubtedly has been the most significant, with respect both to numbers involved and to economic consequences and is the form with which this report is concerned. Under the various penal codes, persons may be sentenced to corrective labor for ordinary criminal offenses, such as murder, robbery, rape, and embezzlement, and for so-called "political" offenses, such as "counterrevolutionary crimes" and "crimes against the established order which are especially dangerous to the Soviet Union" (for example, sections 58 and 59 of the criminal code of the RSFSR). Sentences to corrective labor may range from a few months to as long as 25 years.

The death of Stalin in March 1953 inaugurated a series of events in the field of law and legal procedure which have had profound effects on the use of forced labor as a punitive device. As part of a concerted campaign to "improve socialist legality," important changes have been made in legal procedures, which, if enforced, will make it considerably more difficult to send large numbers of persons to forced labor camps than was possible with the arbitrary methods permissible in the past. Legislative changes have reduced the number and kinds of offenses punishable by sentence to corrective labor institutions. Finally, a series of amnesties has greatly reduced the population of the labor camps.

### A. Changes in Legal Procedures.

As of March 1953, persons could be sentenced to corrective labor either through regular judicial procedures or through administrative action of the state police. 1/\* Under the usual judicial procedure the accused was charged with violation of a specific statute, was given a court trial with the right to legal counsel, and was sentenced by a judge or panel of judges. Cases involving ordinary criminal offenses against persons or property were handled by the local peoples courts, and cases involving certain kinds of counterrevolutionary crimes and crimes against the state were tried by territorial and regional courts. The military courts were assigned original jurisdiction in cases of espionage, treason, terrorism, diversionary activities, and similar crimes. Finally, certain crimes against the state for which the MVD

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was the investigative agency were tried by special tribunals organized within the system of territorial courts.

Sentences to corrective labor could also be imposed by administrative action of the state police through the Special Conference of the MVD. This body, usually called OSSO (Osoboye Soveshchaniye), was created in 1934 and vested with authority to sentence to corrective labor camps for periods of 5 years or less any person "recognized as constituting a danger to society." Such action was taken by secret administrative procedure, the accused having no right of counsel or of appeal. This body was the chief legal instrument for carrying out the political purges of the Stalin era and apparently was also used extensively during the postwar period to sentence prisoners of war to terms of corrective labor by charging them with violation of some Soviet law. Almost never were the prisoners of war present at the proceedings, which seem usually to have taken place in Moscow. Judging from statements made by these ex-prisoners of war, the Conference imposed sentences of 10 years or more, despite the statutory restriction limiting its authority to sentences of 5 years or less.

A number of changes have taken place since 1953 in the methods used to convict and sentence persons in the USSR. Probably the most significant of these changes is the abolition of the Special Conference of the MVD in September 1953 and the subsequent review of the cases of all prisoners who had been sentenced by the tribunal. <sup>2/</sup> Although the demise of the Conference seems to have been generally known among prison camp inmates, it was not officially announced until 1956. Other extra-judicial organs and procedures have also been abolished. In a decree of 19 April 1956 the Supreme Soviet stripped the MVD of its authority to investigate and present certain kinds of cases involving terroristic acts and abolished the special courts which formerly had tried such cases. <sup>3/</sup> A subsequent decree issued in July 1956 removed the right of military courts to try cases involving civilians, except cases of espionage. <sup>4/</sup> The special courts which tried cases involving employees of the rail and water transport system also have been abolished. <sup>5/</sup> The effect of these actions is to place all criminal cases involving civilians (except espionage cases) under the jurisdiction of the regular kray, oblast, and republic courts, whose powers have been strengthened by these actions and by the assumption of some of the functions of the recently dissolved Ministry of Justice in the USSR and of the Ministries of Justice in the various republics.

To insure that the courts and the militia adhere to the principles of the new "socialist legality," the Procurator General, USSR, and his counterparts on the regional and local levels have been vested with wider authority to see to it that the legal acts of judicial and administrative organs are in accord with law and established legal

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procedure. 6/ Soviet legal experts are currently drafting the "Principles of Criminal Trial Procedure in the USSR and the Union Republics," to be embodied in a law and submitted to the Supreme Soviet for action. 7/ Among these principles are the following: citizens may be convicted and sentenced only by the courts, all citizens are equal before the law, peoples assessors (jurymen) must participate in the hearing of cases in all courts of original jurisdiction, judges must be independent and subordinate only to law, trials must be public, and defendants must be allowed legal counsel. If principles such as these are adhered to in practice, the character of Soviet justice will be quite different from what it has been in recent decades, when persons could be sent to prison without trial or the right to counsel and to appeal.

B. Changes in Criminal Laws.

In addition to reforms in judicial procedure, a number of changes also have been made in the content of Soviet criminal law during the past several years. The effect of these changes is to reduce the number of offenses subject to criminal punishment and to lessen the severity of penal sentences prescribed for other offenses. Thus, in a series of decrees issued by the Supreme Soviet in 1955-56, criminal penalties were eliminated for failure of kolkhoz members to work the required number of workdays 8/; for absenteeism, tardiness, and unauthorized quitting by workers 9/; for the illegal sale, exchange, or release of surplus equipment by enterprise managers 10/; for unauthorized travel on freight trains 11/; and for avoiding mobilization for seasonal agricultural work. 12/ The severity of punishment for various "economic" crimes, such as petty theft, has also been lessened, along with the abolition of criminal arrest for violation of work discipline by employees of the transport systems. 13/ Likewise, the enactment of new measures providing relatively light punishments for breach of the peace ("petty hooliganism") makes it easier for the courts to avoid sentencing such persons under other statutes to corrective labor camps for protracted periods, as had been done in the past, when there were no specific laws dealing with petty offenses. Finally, there seems to be general agreement that the new criminal codes of the various republics, now in process of preparation, will remove some of the more onerous provisions of the laws governing political crimes, specifically those provisions relating to the guilt assigned to relatives of persons convicted of political crimes and military desertion. 14/ Likewise, it appears that the sentencing tribunals no longer will be permitted to apply the so-called doctrine of analogy, which had been used in the past to sentence persons for acts not specifically prohibited by law by means of a finding that such acts were analogous to others that were explicitly proscribed.

Although the trend toward liberalization of criminal legislation and legal procedure seems, at the moment, to be firmly established, two

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republics have recently passed "antiparasite" laws which are counter to this trend. These laws, similar to those also being discussed in the other republics, provide for 2 to 5 years' exile with compulsory labor for any able-bodied person who is not gainfully employed in approved state enterprises or cooperatives. 15/ Sentences to exile may be imposed by the majority vote of citizens present at "general meetings" in villages or other appropriate units, subject to confirmation by the executive committee of the rayon or city soviet concerned. Thus not only do these new laws prescribe harsh penalties for what would seem to be an innocuous offense but also they permit the use of extralegal procedures to impose such penalties. A decree of the Supreme Soviet dated 5 October 1956 imposes similar penalties on gypsies who refuse to work, 16/ but this decree, in contrast to the "antiparasite" laws of the republics, provides that sentences to exile may be imposed only by court action. In view of the continuance of work on revision of the penal codes and of the liberal tone of recent discussions of legal matters, however, it seems probable that the actions taken against gypsies and parasites represent efforts to deal with a specific social problem rather than a reversal of policy.

C. Amnesties.

Along with the various actions taken since 1953 to liberalize criminal legislation and improve legal procedures, the USSR has issued a number of amnesties under which large numbers of persons have been freed from labor camps.\* Six of these amnesties have been published officially, as follows:

1. An edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet dated 27 March 1953 provided for a sweeping amnesty of all prisoners sentenced to terms of 5 years or less. 17/ In addition, the decree freed all pregnant women, women with children under 10 years of age, youths under 18, all men over 55 and women over 50, and the incurably ill.

2. An edict of 14 July 1954 provided for the release of prisoners who had completed two-thirds of their sentences if they had good conduct and work records, 18/ and individual camp commanders were authorized to ease the sentences of others with similar records.

3. A decree of 17 September 1955 permitted the immediate release of persons sentenced up to 10 years for collaborating with the Germans during World War II, and sentences of 10 years or more for such crimes were halved. 19/ The decree also released, regardless of length of sentence, those persons who were imprisoned for serving in the German army and police or in "special German units."

\* See pp. 24-25, below.

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4. In an edict of 25 September 1956 the provisions of the amnesty of 17 September 1955 were extended to members of the Soviet armed forces who had been imprisoned for having surrendered to the German army during World War II. 20/

5. An edict of 13 December 1956 freed all Japanese citizens held in Soviet prisons. 21/

6. Under a decree of 1 November 1957, amnesty was granted to prisoners serving terms of 3 years or less, to juvenile offenders aged 16 or under, to men over 60 and women over 55, and to women who were pregnant or had children under 8 years of age. 22/ The sentences of other prisoners were cut in half. Political prisoners; those convicted of serious crimes such as murder or banditry, repeat offenders, and various other categories of prisoners were excepted from the amnesty.

According to statements of persons freed from Soviet prison camps, several unpublished amnesties were issued in 1954 and 1955 in addition to the published amnesties already noted. These edicts allegedly freed persons who had been sentenced for crimes committed before their 18th birthday, prisoners considered physically unable to work, and individuals imprisoned on religious grounds. 23/ Ex-prisoners  report the issuance in 1956 of decrees which provided for the establishment of special commissions with authority to review the cases of all political prisoners and to grant pardons or commute sentences. 24/ In this connection a "Rehabilitation Commission of the Supreme Soviet" was reviewing the cases of prisoners in 1956.

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### III. Changes in the Administration of Forced Labor.

#### A. Situation at the Beginning of 1953.

At the time of Stalin's death in March 1953, all forced labor in the USSR was administered and controlled by the MVD. This Ministry employed its large prison labor force in a variety of economic undertakings which were carried out by subordinate main administrations (glavki) organized along industrial lines. Among these main administrations were the following: Main Administration for Construction of the Far North (Dal'stroy), Main Administration of Mining and Metallurgical Enterprises, Main Administration of Special Nonferrous Metallurgy, Main Administration of the Mica Industry, Main Administration of the Asbestos Industry, Main Administration of Industrial Construction, Main Administration of Highways, Main Administration of Road Construction, Main Administration of Railroad Construction, and Main Administration of the Timber Industry. The labor for most of these economic activities was supplied by GULAG, which administered directly or indirectly all of the forced labor camps. Several other main administrations existed within the MVD for the purpose of supplying the camps and projects with material and equipment.

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GULAG, with headquarters in Moscow, administered a number of large camp complexes (such as the Karlag camps in Karagandinskaya Oblast), which were subordinated directly to GULAG because of their size or the importance of their activities. 25/ Other large complexes, such as the Vorkuta camps, were subordinated directly to one of the MVD economic main administrations, although administered through GULAG. In addition, GULAG was responsible for the camps and colonies directly subordinate to GULAG counterparts in the republics, oblasts, and krays. The accompanying chart, Figure 1,\* shows the probable administrative setup of the forced labor system in March 1953.

Most of the centrally administered camp complexes, termed "administrations," were divided into "sections," each having charge of a number of individual camps (lagpunkty) within its territorial jurisdiction. The administrations, sections, and individual camps had a common organizational pattern, each having departments for production, accounting, finance, supplies, prisoner registration and distribution, guard and regime, and medical-sanitation. Each also had a so-called "third section," which was responsible for the security investigation of all prisoners and camp personnel and was directly subordinate to the Ministry of State Security (MGB). The camps and colonies administered by the GULAG counterparts in the republics, oblasts, and krays followed the organizational pattern of the federal camps, although these camps and colonies usually were not grouped into administrations and sections.

B. 1953-55.

Within a few months after Stalin's death in March 1953 the MVD was divested of all its extensive entrepreneurial activities based on the use of forced labor and of all responsibility for administering the far-flung system of camps and colonies. The Main Administration of Camps, its local counterparts, and all its camps and colonies were transferred to the Ministry of Justice. The various industrial administrations and their subordinate units were transferred to appropriate economic ministries (principally the Ministry of the Coal Industry, the Ministry of the Metallurgical Industry, the Ministry of the Construction Materials Industry, the Ministry of Land Transportation, and the Ministry of the Timber and Paper Industry). The transfer of GULAG to the Ministry of Justice proved to be unsatisfactory,\*\* and it was returned to the MVD early in 1954.

\* Following p. 10.

\*\* The transfer of GULAG to the Ministry of Justice reportedly resulted in great administrative confusion. The Ministry, only about one-fifth the size of GULAG, did not have the personnel resources to manage the camps, with the result that only 28 percent of GULAG's plan for 1953 was fulfilled. The transfer is alleged to have cost the USSR 25 million to 30 million rubles. 26/

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




Figure 1

# Administrative Structure for Forced Labor in the USSR

March 1953



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C. 1956-57.

Beginning in April 1956, the power of the MVD was further curtailed by a series of reorganizations which resulted in a broad decentralization of control over the police and the forced labor system. The first of these reorganizations was the merger of the oblast and kray administrations of police with the oblast and kray administrations of the MVD. The next step was to transform the merged administrations into Administrations of Internal Affairs (UVD) and to subordinate them directly to the Executive Committees of the oblast and kray soviets of workers' deputies. 27/ The effect of these moves was to make the local units of internal affairs dually responsible to the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the republics and in Moscow and to the Executive Committees of the local governments. Also, it seems likely that the guarding of camps and the conveying of prisoners, formerly functions of the MVD, are performed now by the regular police.

As a result of these reorganizations, the Administrations of Corrective Labor Camps and Colonies at the oblast and the kray level, formerly subordinate directly to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the appropriate republic and indirectly to the MVD in Moscow, were placed as departments under the control of the newly created Administrations of Internal Affairs of the Executive Committees at the oblast and the kray level. At about the same time, it was decided to transfer control of all camps and colonies to these local administrations, including even the large camp complexes formerly administered directly by GULAG in Moscow. The rationale for this decision stems in part from a desire to decentralize the prison system in line with a general move to increase the powers of local government units in legal and economic affairs and in part also from the need for adjusting the administrative structure for forced labor to conform to the drastic decline in the number of camp inmates.\* The accompanying chart, Figure 2,\*\* shows the presumed administrative setup for forced labor as of the end of 1957.

In May 1956 an MVD official in Moscow reported to a visiting delegation of French Socialists that the Soviet government had decided to abolish all forced labor camps within 18 months. 28/ [redacted] 50X1  
[redacted] it had been decided to convert all 50X1  
corrective labor camps to corrective labor "colonies," 29/ where the principal emphasis would be on rehabilitating the prisoners and returning them speedily to civilian life rather than on exploiting prisoner labor for economic purposes. Apparently this program is being implemented slowly, for as late as 10 December 1957 the press reported a sentence to a corrective labor "camp." 30/

\* See pp. 21-22, below.

\*\* Following p. 12.

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In another action the MVD of the USSR and the Councils of Ministers of the republics were assigned responsibility for maintaining "strict order" in corrective labor establishments, and special control commissions of the oblast and kray soviets were formed with broad responsibilities for exercising "public control" over the administration of prisons and colonies. 31/ The regulations establishing these commissions specify that they are to insure the observance of "socialist legality" and "proper maintenance" in prisons and see to it that the prisoners are given "re-education" while in prison and that they get jobs when they are released. Prison officials must submit all documents demanded by these commissions and must follow their recommendations; disputed questions are to be considered by the Executive Committee of the local soviet. 32/ These commissions presumably are to supplement the supervision exercised by the Department for Supervision over Places of Deprivation of Freedom of the Office of the Procurator, USSR. 33/

In addition to the concrete steps taken to reorganize the MVD and the forced labor system, there was considerable discussion in the press and in the legal journals in 1956-57 on a variety of legal, administrative, and philosophical problems concerning the use of "corrective labor" as a form of punishment. 34/ These subjects had not been discussed in the press since at least the early 1930's. The articles severely criticize the past legal and administrative practices with respect to forced labor, a frequent charge being that those responsible for prisoners emphasized the "economic" aspects of the system of corrective labor to the almost total neglect of the "re-educational" aspects. One author notes that no books on corrective labor law have been published, nor had any scholarly work been done in this field since the 1930's, despite the fact that corrective labor was the most common form of punishment in the USSR. 35/ Another article reports the proceedings of the first conference on corrective labor law in 25 years. 36/

#### IV. Changes in the Treatment of Prisoners.\*

Although some amelioration in the lot of the inmates of forced labor camps became noticeable as early as 1950-51, the changes that have taken place since the death of Stalin have been spectacular. Encompassing almost every aspect of prison life, these changes clearly have been directed toward the gradual conversion of the Soviet forced labor system into a prison system aimed at incarceration and rehabilitation of ordinary criminals rather than a system geared to the silencing of political opposition and to the development of remote geographic areas with prison labor.

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
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Figure 2

# Administrative Structure for Forced Labor in the USSR

December 1957



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A. Living Conditions.

Although living conditions varied widely, depending largely on the camp location and the nature of its activities, the typical inmate of a forced labor camp in the pre-Stalin period was housed in an overcrowded wooden barracks accommodating from 60 to 200 persons. Prisoners slept on wooden shelves or in bunks and were supplied with blankets. Although prisoners report improvements in the supply of bedding and in the fuel allocated for heating the barracks, the principal improvement in housing conditions for the prisoners was the great reduction in the number of persons per building resulting from the decline in the number of prisoners. With respect to housing for prisoners, the conversion of corrective labor camps to "colonies" announced in 1956 apparently was a change in name only, as no new prisons are to be constructed, according to a Soviet spokesman. 37/

Male and female prisoners were consistently housed in separate camps throughout the period under consideration. Policies with respect to the segregation of other prisoner groups varied widely from camp to camp, even in the same year, and no clear pattern of changes emerges for the post-Stalin period. In general, separate camps were maintained for German prisoners of war and for Germans who were sentenced under Soviet criminal laws, but this practice was not carried out in areas of the Far North (for example, Vorkuta) or in Central and Eastern Siberia. Other nationalities usually were not segregated in any way, except that beginning in 1954 an effort was made to assemble various nationality groups in separate camps in order to facilitate their repatriation. In general, both political and criminal prisoners were put in the same camp, although some attempt apparently was made after 1953 to place these categories in separate camps.

The amount of food allotted to camp inmates supposedly was prescribed by MVD regulations, but in practice the size of the food ration appears to have been one of the greatest variables in the life of the prisoner, and wide differences in policy seem to have existed between one camp and another even in the same year. An examination of several thousand reports from ex-prisoners indicates that by the end of 1955 the average prisoner was getting considerably more food than he got in 1950-51, perhaps as much as a third more. A gradual improvement in food rations became apparent in 1951-52, and by the end of 1953 the self-defeating practice of relating the size of the food ration to the percentage of fulfillment of work norms had been abandoned. Beginning in 1953, food stocks available in prison canteens became plentiful, and prisoners were able to augment their food rations by purchasing food with their wages. In Vorkuta, for example, two basic rations were established in 1953, one for underground miners and another for all other prisoners, and [redacted] in September 1955 the basic army food ration was adopted for all prisoners. 38/ In general, prisoners

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who were in forced labor camps in 1955-56 state that the food allotment was adequate, although of poor quality and of limited variety.

B. Working Conditions.

Under the Soviet prison system, all able-bodied prisoners have always been required to work in productive undertakings. Mining, lumbering, and construction have been the major economic activities using prison labor. Before 1953, large numbers of the prisoners were employed in MVD-controlled enterprises, but many prisoners also were contracted out to work in enterprises controlled by other economic ministries. With the transfer of MVD economic activities to other ministries during 1953-55, the contracting out of prisoner labor became almost universal. It is claimed, however, that when the conversion of corrective labor camps to the new "colonies" (started in 1956) has been completed, prisoners will work on projects run by the colony itself and the contracting of prison labor to other enterprises will be banned. 39/ It will take some time to implement this policy, and it seems highly probable that ordinary enterprises will continue to rent prisoner labor for some time, at least in labor-short areas long accustomed to the use of prison labor, such as Magadanskaya Oblast and Vorkuta.

The lot of the prisoner-worker improved considerably during 1953-57. Although the nature, the date, and the pace of the reforms varied greatly among the camps, the most substantial changes occurred during 1953-54. Before 1953 it was common for prisoners to work as many as 12 hours per day and 7 days per week. 40/ Ex-prisoners report that, beginning in 1953, the prisoners were generally given 1 day off each week and that in most camps the workday was reduced to 10 hours in 1953, to 9 hours in 1954, and to 8 hours in 1955. 41/ [redacted] under the new system of corrective labor colonies the prisoners will work the same number of hours as free workers (46 hours per week at present). 42/

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Beginning in 1950-51, prisoners in some camps began to receive wages for their work, and by the end of 1953 this practice had been extended to all camps.\* Prisoners were paid for their work on the basis of wage rates and norms applicable to free workers, except that forced laborers were not paid the special bonuses for work in remote areas and for length of service. Prisoners report gross monthly earnings ranging up to 1,800 rubles. Only a small part of these earnings was paid to

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the prisoner, the rest being kept by the state. The maximum amount which a prisoner was allowed to be paid in cash was fixed at 150 or 200 rubles in 1953, depending on the kind of work, and this ceiling was raised to 300 rubles in 1955.

The camp administration made regular monthly deductions from the prisoners' wages for subsistence and other purposes. During 1953-55, this deduction was fixed at 260 rubles for native Russian prisoners and at 456 rubles for foreign prisoners of war, who were told that, of this amount, 200 rubles were deducted for "reparations." <sup>43/</sup> Deductions were also made for income taxes and even for state loan subscriptions, according to some reports. All sums earned by the prisoner in excess of these deductions and the allowable cash payment to him were supposed to be placed in a special "release fund" to be paid to him upon completion of his term of imprisonment. It appears, however, that few released prisoners received more than a few hundred rubles.

In 1950-51 the system of zachet, under which the prisoner was able to reduce his term of imprisonment by overfulfilling his work norm, was introduced in a few camps and was liberalized and extended throughout the camp system during 1953-54. A typical schedule, one in effect in a camp in Magadanskaya Oblast in 1955, provided that the term of imprisonment would be reduced by 2 days for each month in which the prisoner overfulfilled his work norm by 25 percent or more and by 1 day for each month in which the norm was overfulfilled by 10 to 25 percent. <sup>44/</sup>

under the new system started in 1956, a prisoner confined in a corrective labor colony will not be compelled to work. The working prisoner, however, will receive occupational training and will be paid the same wages as free workers doing comparable jobs, less 30 percent for his subsistence and medical care, and, in addition, 1 day of work will equal 3 days' detention. <sup>45/</sup> These incentives undoubtedly will be sufficient to induce the prisoners to work rather than to remain idle.

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### C. Other Conditions.

In addition to matters relating to food, housing, and working conditions, a number of reforms were made during 1953-55 in the general policies with respect to the treatment of prisoners. Among these reforms were the following: doors to the prisoners' barracks were no longer locked at night, and bars were removed from the windows; prisoners with good work and conduct records were permitted to write letters and receive mail at frequent intervals, to receive visitors, and to be given leave and overnight passes to visit nearby towns; prisoners with good records were allowed to go to and from work without a guard (bezkonvoy);

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and prisoners were given the right to appeal for the review of their sentences and to file formal complaints of ill treatment with camp authorities. Ex-prisoners also report that the prisoners were accorded much more humane treatment by camp guards and administrative officials, particularly after the downfall of Beriya in June 1953. Not all of these improvements were introduced at the same time, nor were they applied uniformly in all camps. By the end of 1955, however, these reforms, along with improved living and working conditions, the payment of wages, and the system of zacet, seem to have been effected in all of the important camp complexes, such as those near Vorkuta, Inta, Karaganda, Noril'sk, and Magadan. These relatively enlightened methods of handling prisoners are in effect in the new "colonies" which replaced the old forced labor camps starting in 1956. [redacted]

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[redacted] prisoners may receive unlimited amounts of mail and packages, their relatives may visit them for 30 minutes each day, married prisoners are allowed periodically to spend several days with their wives in special lodgings provided within the prison compound, and working prisoners are covered by provisions of the Soviet labor code in the same way as free workers. <sup>46/</sup> When the conversion from camps to colonies is completed, most prisoners supposedly will be incarcerated in institutions of this kind, but some prisons with a more severe regime are to be provided for repeat offenders, persons convicted of political and other major crimes, and incorrigible prisoners transferred from the work colonies for disciplinary offenses.

#### V. Changes in the Number of Camps and Prisoners.

An overwhelming body of evidence points to a fundamental and drastic change in the number of forced labor camps and in the prison population in the USSR since 1953. Large numbers of camps have been closed; whole camp complexes have been abandoned; and several million prisoners have been freed through amnesties, repatriations, individual pardons, and a change in policy toward some categories of prisoners. Although an attempt will be made to quantify the decrease in the numbers of camps and prisoners, these numerical estimates cannot be considered definitive, because of the nature of the data on which they necessarily must be based. Nevertheless, these estimates, together with the large amount of nonquantitative information, not only provide convincing evidence of the probable size of the forced labor contingent at present and the magnitude of the change that has occurred since 1953 but also indicate that most past estimates of the forced labor population have been much too high.

##### A. Camps.

The number of forced labor camps in existence at the beginning of 1953 is not known. [redacted]


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
Because [redacted] information necessarily is based on reports from ex-prisoners who have been repatriated to their native countries or who have defected, the data were limited to those places in which such persons were confined or about which they were told by fellow prisoners. For the most part, such persons tended to be imprisoned in one or another of the large camp complexes that were centrally administered by GULAG in Moscow. Hence the list of place names would not include many of the camps and colonies directly under the control of the MVD organizations in the republics, oblasts, and krays.

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In order to obtain some idea of the geography and size of the camp system in the years since 1952, an exhaustive survey was made of all available material, including several thousand reports from former prisoners and others who had personal knowledge of the camps during 1953-57. This survey is believed to be a complete examination of such available materials. In all, 321 places were identified as having been the location of one or more forced labor camps at some time during the period surveyed. Tables 1 and 2\*\* show the distribution of these places by economic region\*\*\* and by year of latest identification; the places are listed in Appendix A and located on the map; Figure 3.\*\*\*\*

Although it cannot be contended that this list is complete, it probably covers all of the camp centers that were centrally administered and most of those directly subordinate to the republic, oblast, and kray

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\*\* Tables 1 and 2 follow on p. 18.

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\*\*\*\* Following p. 18.

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Table 1

Distribution of Places Associated with Forced Labor Camps  
in the USSR, by Economic Region a/  
1953-57

<u>Economic Region</u>	<u>Number of Places</u>
I	17
II	5
III	18
IV	9
V	5
VI	7
VII	29
VIII	35
IX	10
X	29
XI	59
XII	98
Total	<u>321</u>

a. These places are listed in Appendix A

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Table 2

Distribution of Places Associated with Forced Labor Camps  
in the USSR, by Year of Latest Identification a/  
1953-57


<u>Year</u>	<u>Number of Places</u>
1953	71
1954	80
1955	105
1956	56
1957	9
Total	<u>321</u>

a. These places are listed in Appendix A

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MVD organizations. It does not include the locations of the numerous smaller camps and colonies administered by about 150 local MVD units in Central Siberia and Western USSR. A few of the places listed and identified in 1953 and 1954 (particularly in Western USSR) may have been the locations of prisoner-of-war camps only rather than of forced labor camps housing both native and foreign prisoners, although forced labor camps and prisoner-of-war camps were commonly located side by side.

Available information indicates that in 1956 forced labor camps still existed in the places that have long been forced labor centers -- Vorkuta, Karaganda, Irkutsk, Noril'sk, Magadan, and Khabarovsk -- but both the number of camps and the number of prisoners were greatly reduced. The scanty information available for 1957 pertains to transit or repatriation camps, such as Bikovo in Moskovskaya Oblast, and to a few camps in the Far East.

Ex-prisoners and other observers have reported the dissolution of a considerable number of individual camps. Of a total of 125 individual camps in which a selected group of German returnees were interned at some time during 1953-56, almost one-third -- 41 -- were reported to have been closed during the period.\* In addition, reports made by 20 returnees of various nationalities indicate the closing of 40 individual camps. [redacted] information concerning the closing of camps: all camps in Vorkuta except two were closed or converted to free settlements by the end of 1955 49/; 80 to 85 percent of the camps in the Kolyma area had been closed by the end of 1955 50/; most camp billets in Noril'sk and Khabarovsk were being converted to civilian use in 1956 51/; a number of camps in the Zayarsk area were disbanded during 1954-55 52/; most camps in the Abez area were handed over to the Red Army during 1955 53/; numerous abandoned camps were observed in the area between Vorkuta and Potma 54/; and a large number of abandoned camps were observed by a Western visitor in Sverdlovsk in the summer of 1956. Finally, [redacted] the camp complex at Noril'sk was dissolved by the end of 1956 and [redacted] a number of individual camps in Magadanskaya Oblast and Yakutskaya ASSR were closed during 1956-57.

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B. Prisoners.

Estimates of the number of forced laborers in the USSR in various past years have ranged from a conservative 2 million to 3 million to such extreme figures as 25 million to 40 million. Great differences exist even in estimates made for approximately the same time period. [redacted]

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[redacted] estimated the prisoner population at 13.5 million and 3.5 million for 1940 and 1941, respectively. 55/ The plethora and extreme range of such estimates and the lack of adequate data on which to determine their reliability led the UN Ad Hoc Committee on Forced Labor in 1953 to decline to assess "however roughly, the number of persons sentenced to corrective labor in camps, in colonies, or in exile." 56/

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The most recent major attempt to determine the forced labor population in the USSR [redacted]

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[redacted] estimated the number of prisoners in the prewar period (about 1941) at 10 million, plus or minus 20 percent, and at 12 million, plus or minus 10 percent, in the postwar period (about 1950). 57/ These magnitudes were obtained for each period by assembling all available reports from ex-prisoners who had given the number of prisoners at various forced labor sites, computing an estimate of the average number of prisoners per place and multiplying this average by the estimated total number of places associated with forced labor camps. Because of the nature of the data (observation reports from ex-prisoners) and the methodology used, and in light of [redacted] information received since 1953, the estimate of 12 million prisoners as of about 1950 appears much too high. As at least 4 out of every 5 prisoners were males in the productive age group (15 to 59), moreover, a prisoner population of such a magnitude would mean that nearly one-fifth of all adult males were imprisoned. So disastrous would be the demographic and economic consequences of such a situation that its existence seems highly implausible. [redacted]

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[redacted] the number of prisoners released under the terms of the 1953 amnesty "must have run into millions." 58/

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During the past several years the USSR has released more statistics concerning the distribution of its labor force by work categories, and, in addition, Soviet officials have made various statements which afford some clues as to size and trends in prisoner population. On the basis of these clues and an analysis of Soviet population and labor statistics, it has been possible to develop an estimate of the total number of forced laborers (including prisoners of foreign nationality) for 1952-56, with a breakdown of these totals into the number employed on MVD-administered projects or not working and the number contracted out to various economic ministries. These estimates are shown in Table 3.\*

According to the estimates shown in Table 3, the forced labor total dropped from 4.8 million in 1952 to 2.2 million in 1956. These

\* Table 3 follows on p. 21.

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Table 3

Estimates of the Prison Population in the USSR  
by Category  
1952-56

Millions

Year	Number of Prisoners		
	Number Working on MVD Projects or Not Working <u>a/</u>	Number Contracted Out to Economic Ministries <u>b/</u>	Total <u>c/</u>
1952	1.8	3.0	4.8
1953	1.6	3.0	4.6
1954	1.0	2.5	3.5
1955	0.8	2.2	3.0
1956	0.5	1.7	2.2

a. These estimates were derived as residuals and are consistent with official Soviet statistics and with other estimates which are believed to have high reliability.

b. These estimates represent the difference between total prison population and the number of prisoners employed on MVD projects or not working.

c. These estimates were developed for use in estimating gross national product (GNP) in the USSR. The figures (annual averages) represent ORR's best judgment of the probable maximum size of the prison population for the indicated years. They are the quantitative expression of a mass of both quantitative and qualitative information concerning the size of the trends in camp population during the period.

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figures are to be regarded as maximums, representing the largest totals that would seem to be consistent with Soviet statistics and with other evidence concerning the forced labor situation during the period. In view of the continuing release and repatriation of prisoners and the new amnesty, the total for 1957 undoubtedly declined further. In the absence of major purges or amnesties, the total will probably become stabilized at about the 1957 level, which would represent about 0.5 percent of the total population.\*

Besides these estimates of prison population "maximums," it is possible to set some figures which should probably be regarded as prison

\* In 1955, only about 0.1 percent of the population of the US was in prisons. 59/

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population "minimums." The Soviet Deputy Procurator General, P.I. Kudriatsev, intimated [redacted] that about 3 million persons had been under detention in the USSR in March 1953, almost half of whom were political prisoners, but that at that time (May 1957) only about 800,000 or 900,000 persons were imprisoned, of whom about 18,000 were political prisoners. 60/ Kudriatsev also stated that the number of prisoners had been reduced by 70 percent since the death of Stalin, that 52 percent of those detained at that time were released as a result of the amnesty of 27 March 1953, that more than half of those then (presumably in May 1957) serving sentences had been sentenced after March 1953, and that the number of prisoners then was less than in the 1920's and less than one-third of the number in prerevolutionary Russia. 61/ These are the first figures ever released by Soviet officials concerning the prison population and, in light of current agitation among Soviet jurists for the release of crime statistics, suggest that the USSR may be preparing to issue official statistics concerning crime rates and the criminal population.

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According to the estimates in Table 3, the number of prisoners employed directly on MVD projects or not working decreased sharply between 1953 and 1956, a reflection of the fact that the MVD was gradually shorn of all of its economic functions during the period. By the end of 1956 the MVD no longer had direct production responsibilities, and most of the working prisoners were contracted out to other ministries, principally the metallurgical, construction, and timber industries. When the announced conversion of camps to colonies is completed, however, prisoners will no longer be contracted out to civilian enterprises, according to Soviet statements. 62/

## VI. Other Evidence of a Major Change in Forced Labor Policy.

A large body of evidence concerning labor developments in the USSR since 1953 can be marshaled to support the reasonableness of the numerical estimates of prison population and trends previously presented. This body of evidence concerns (1) the release and repatriation of foreign prisoners and the effects of amnesties; (2) evidence of the drastically decreased use of forced labor in specific industries; and (3) the use of free labor on large-scale developmental projects and the "rehabilitation" of such notorious forced labor centers as Magadan, Noril'sk, and Karaganda. Although no one part of this body of evidence is definitive, taken as a whole it makes possible a confident judgment that the USSR has decided to disband the notorious camp system, at least for the present, and that this decision is being implemented as rapidly as possible.

### A. Release of Foreign Prisoners.

Following World War II a large but unknown number of foreign nationals became prisoners of war in the USSR. These prisoners came

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from virtually every country of Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East, and estimates of their total have ranged from a few hundred thousand to several million. 63/ It has also been estimated that "anything up to 10 percent" of all prisoners in about 1950 were foreign nationals. 64/ As noted previously, beginning about 1950, large numbers of these prisoners of war (particularly Germans) were tried under Soviet criminal laws and sentenced to terms of corrective labor, usually of 5 to 10 years, for various crimes against the state. Although substantial numbers of prisoners of war had been released before the death of Stalin, the USSR has been pursuing since 1953 a systematic policy of freeing foreign nationals from the prison camps. Numerous returned prisoners report evidence of this policy; some state that the policy was decided upon in 1952, and others give the year as 1954. According to these returnees, a concerted effort was made beginning in 1953-54 to collect prisoners of a given nationality in special camps preparatory to repatriation, a process which took many months in most cases and even several years in some instances.

Prisoners of foreign nationality were freed as a result of the general amnesties declared during 1953-55 and certain special amnesties. The total number released is unknown. In 1953, all Japanese "war criminals" and, allegedly, 9,000 Germans were released. 65/ In late 1955 and early 1956, 9,652 German prisoners were repatriated as a result of an agreement reached between West Germany and the USSR in October 1955. 66/ The Soviet Red Cross denied that any German prisoners of war remained in the USSR in 1957. 67/ All remaining Japanese prisoners allegedly have been freed as a result of the special amnesty for such persons issued in December 1956. 68/ During 1953-56 the USSR released numerous Hungarians, Rumanians, Poles, Spaniards, Iranians, and other foreign prisoners of many nationalities. With respect to Poland in particular, a large-scale repatriation campaign was conducted during 1955-57, and as of February 1957 about 55,800 Polish nationals were returned to Poland, all but a few thousand of whom came from the USSR. 69/ How many of these were former prisoners is not known, but the Polish press reported that the majority of the 3,468 repatriates who returned in October 1956 had been in Soviet prisons. 70/

With the exception of the Hungarians deported to the USSR following the Hungarian rebellion in October 1956, all pertinent reports received in the past several years indicate a rapid decline in the numbers of foreign nationals held in Soviet prisons. The reasons why the USSR should wish to get rid of these foreign prisoners are eminently clear from a review of the several thousand reports available from returnees. The foreigners created serious disciplinary problems. They were the nucleus of dissidence when thrown with native prisoners; they frequently refused to work. Moreover, by 1953 the task of rebuilding war-damaged areas had been largely completed, as had several large

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construction projects which used prison labor. Many ex-prisoners report very high disability rates and long sojourns in camps where the prisoners did not work. The mass of reports from repatriated prisoners shows clearly that, by and large, the foreign nationals detained in the camps during 1953-56 must have been an economic liability.

B. Effects of the Amnesties.

The major amnesties affording release to prisoners were those of March 1953 and September 1955, although the two amnesties issued in 1954 also had significant effects. Both the 1953 and the 1955 amnesties were hailed in the press as having resulted in the release of "millions" of prisoners. The evidence indicates that such estimates were grossly exaggerated, stemming as they did from excessively high estimates of total prisoner strength. This body of evidence shows also that the implementation of each of the amnesties was spread over a number of months. With respect to each amnesty, the practice seems to have been to release quickly those prisoners whose cases clearly fell within the scope of the amnesty and then to review all questionable cases over a period of many months. Beginning in late 1953 and extending into 1956, special commissions from the Ministry of Justice visited individual camps and reviewed dossiers. The use of this procedure for implementing the amnesties makes it impossible to delineate their separate effects with any degree of assurance.

In 1957 the Soviet Deputy Procurator stated that the 1953 amnesty, which affected criminal and not political prisoners, resulted in the release of 52 percent of all those detained at the time. 71/ This statement may refer only to the relative proportion of criminal prisoners released and to the total ultimately released under this amnesty; if so, the statement may well be correct. [redacted]

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[redacted] large numbers of the criminals released in 1953 shortly committed new crimes and were re-imprisoned. [redacted]

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[redacted] 9,000 prisoners were released from the camps at Noril'sk and Dudinka. 72/ [redacted] half of the 60,000 to 80,000 prisoners in the Kraslag camp complex were freed. 73/

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[redacted] substantial declines in individual camp populations resulting from the amnesty, [redacted]

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[redacted] such as many of those in Vorkuta, report few releases.

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The sums spent to carry out provisions of the 1953 amnesty must have run into hundreds of millions of rubles, judging from the available fragmentary information. In addition, production undoubtedly was adversely affected in many instances. Strenuous efforts were made to induce amnestied workers to take jobs in the areas of their release. A decree of the Soviet Council of Ministers authorized lump-sum grants

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ranging from 150 to 1,000 rubles, depending on the area and activity, to persons who signed work contracts of 1 to 3 years; in addition, they could be granted loans of 1,000 to 2,000, or 3,000 rubles, depending on the length of the contract, to be repaid within 1 year; workers who signed 2-year contracts received money to bring their families to the area; and, finally those signing 3-year contracts for work in the Far North became entitled to the special financial privileges accorded free workers in these areas. These inducements were only partly successful, and [redacted] persons whose release under the amnesty was delayed until the second half of 1953 were forcibly settled in the camp areas. 74/

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Those released in the amnesties of 1954 were mainly invalids and juveniles. These amnesties reportedly resulted in closing of all of the invalid camps in many areas, and the virtual removal of juveniles and the aged from the camps. Releases under the 1953 amnesty apparently also were still taking place in 1954. Also in 1954, large numbers of those who had served two-thirds of their sentences were permitted a semifree status by being allowed to live in barracks outside the camp and to go to work without convoy. 75/

The amnesty of September 1955, which affected those arrested for collaboration with the enemy during World War II, allegedly freed half of all prisoners. 76/

Finally, there is evidence that the reductions in forced labor population continued in 1956 on a considerable scale. For example, [redacted] 50X1  
[redacted] in Yerevan, Armenia, [redacted] in the summer of 1956 50X1  
4,000 prisoners freed from Siberia returned to the city. 77/ [redacted] 50X1  
[redacted] most political prisoners had been released by the 50X1  
end of 1956. Finally, some time in 1956 a special commission was set up by the Supreme Soviet to examine the cases of individuals sentenced to corrective labor camps. This so-called Rehabilitation Commission appears to have been quite active during 1956.

C. Decline in the Utilization of Forced Labor in Individual Industries.

In the past, prison labor in the USSR has been employed primarily in the mining and timber industries and on large-scale construction projects, such as railroads, canals, and industrial installations. Before 1953, when the MVD had maximum control over the use of prison labor, its contribution to total output in these economic activities was important, especially in certain geographic areas. Thus data in the captured 1941 state plan show that the MVD was to produce 2.8 percent of total coal tonnage, but the proportions were to be 82.5 in Khabarovskiy Kray, 100 percent in Komi ASSR, and 35.6 percent in Chitinskaya Oblast. 78/

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The MVD was to be responsible for 13.7 percent of industrial timber output; corresponding percentages were 34.0 for Khabarovskiy Kray, 51.7 for Komi ASSR, and 41.5 for Murmanskaya Oblast. The share of the MVD in total capital construction was planned at 18.2 percent, or 6,850 million rubles. Although comparable data are not available for subsequent years, the entrepreneurial role of the MVD probably was not much different at the beginning of 1953 from what it was in 1941. The amnesties and the changes in forced labor administration, which began almost immediately after Stalin's death, have radically altered the role of the MVD in economic affairs and have resulted in the disappearance of forced labor as a major source of manpower, even in those areas of the Far North that had been built up by prisoners.

According to available evidence, forced labor has virtually disappeared from the gold-mining industry in the Soviet Far East. Beginning in 1954, various gold-mining trusts began to experience difficulty in obtaining forced labor from the MVD and by the end of 1956 these trusts apparently no longer were using prison labor. Throughout 1956 the gold trusts conducted extensive recruiting campaigns in order to replace released forced laborers. A number of camps located near gold mines were closed in 1956, including some which supplied labor for the Kolyma gold fields under the jurisdiction of Dal'stroy. Finally, the activities of various gold-mining enterprises recently have been described in the press in much the same way as are the activities of other Soviet enterprises. 79/ This fact is significant in view of the long silence in the Soviet press on all matters pertaining to the gold industry, whose exploitation of forced labor has long been known.

A substantial decline in the use of forced labor for mining nickel, cobalt, coal, tin, tungsten, and copper also has taken place. Evidence of this decline is shown by liquidations of forced labor camps, arrival of recruited free workers at enterprises formerly employing forced labor, and changes in camp administration. One of the most complete pieces of substantiating evidence concerns the liquidation of the camp complex at Noril'sk. This complex, supplying labor for the mining of nickel, cobalt, copper, and coal in the Noril'sk area, was one of the large camp systems directly subordinated to GULAG in Moscow. Reports indicate that during 1956 prisoners were shipped out of the area, barracks were converted to civilian use, and the entire complex was scheduled for liquidation by the end of the year. Extensive efforts were made to obtain free workers through organized recruitment and a special "public appeal"; a Komsomol official at Noril'sk stated that 20,000 workers arrived there during 1956, and at least 11,900 persons recruited from among demobilized soldiers and through the "public appeal" arrived during the first half of 1956. 80/

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A similar fate has befallen the Main Administration of North-eastern Correctional Labor Camps (USVITL), the large camp complex that formerly supplied labor to Dal'stroy mining and construction enterprises. The total number of prisoners in Magadanskaya Oblast and in Yakutskaya ASSR in 1957 is estimated at about 20,000 to 30,000.\* During 1957, as part of the over-all reorganization of economic management in the USSR, Dal'stroy was liquidated and its subordinate mining administrations were transferred to the Sovnarkhozy of Magadanskaya Oblast and Yakutskaya ASSR, and USVITL was broken up and subordinated to the Internal Affairs Administrations of these same political subdivisions. Also, as noted previously, Dal'stroy lost large numbers of workers because of the amnesties and engaged in extensive recruiting activities during 1955-56 to replace the lost prison labor.

In 1956 the last vestige of MVD activity in the timber industry apparently was removed. Evidence taken from the trade journal of the Ministry of the Timber Industry indicates that the Chief Directorate for Special Timber became subordinate to the Ministry in 1956. 81/ This Administration formerly had been subordinate to the MVD and had controlled a number of camps engaged in logging and timber processing. The trade journal also listed 13 of these camps as trusts subordinate to the Ministry. These facts suggest that forced labor is no longer being used in these timber enterprises.

During World War II and throughout the Fourth Five Year Plan (1946-50), large numbers of forced laborers (including army troops) were employed in railroad construction. During the Fifth Five Year Plan (1951-55) the use of forced labor gradually decreased, and its composition changed, so that by the end of the period most nonfree labor used in railroad construction consisted of troops. It is estimated that nonfree labor laid 49 percent of total railroad track during 1946-50 and 29 percent during 1951-55, and the proportion is expected to be negligible during 1956-60. 82/

D. Recruitment of Free Workers and Rehabilitation of Former Forced Labor Centers.

Beginning in 1955 and proceeding with mounting intensity during 1956 and 1957, the USSR conducted extensive recruiting campaigns to obtain free workers for mines, factories, and construction in the Far North and the Far East and in other areas such as the Donbas, where large-scale construction and developmental projects were being carried on. An important part of this recruitment was undertaken directly to replace forced laborers freed under the various amnesties. The reports

\* During the period 1948-50, there probably were between 75,000 and 100,000 prisoners in Yakutskaya ASSR and the territory that is now Magadanskaya Oblast.

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submitted by ex-prisoners frequently refer to the arrival of large numbers of free workers during 1955 and 1956 in Vorkuta, Magadan, Noril'sk, Karaganda, and other forced labor centers. The press and radio refer to the presence of young recruits at mining and construction sites that used prison labor in the past -- for example, the Komsolsets, Udarnik, and Timoshenko placer mines in Magadanskaya Oblast. 83/ There has also been extensive advertising for workers to go to construction projects formerly using prison labor -- for example, the Noril'sk Combine, the Krasnoyarsk Construction Trust, the Kansk Construction Trust, the Yenisey and Lena Gold Trusts, and the Pechorles Combine. 84/ The radio refers to the arrival of 20,000 "young patriots" in Noril'sk during 1955-56, 85/ 6,500 "new workers" in Magadan during 1956, 86/ and 13,000 "young construction workers" in Irkutskaya Oblast during 1956. 87/

In addition to the drives to recruit free workers for economic activities formerly carried on with prison labor, extensive efforts were also made to keep the ex-prisoners from leaving the labor-short areas of the Far North and Far East. The financial inducements offered to persons signing long-term work contracts have been noted previously.\* In some forced labor centers such as Vorkuta, prisoners who were released after the expiration of two-thirds of their sentences were required to remain in the area until the end of their original term. With respect to the status of other released prisoners, the evidence is conflicting. On balance, however, the facts seem to be that different policies were pursued in various places and at different times. Criminal prisoners released in the 1953 amnesty apparently were permitted to return home at first, but freed persons later were required to remain in the area for a fixed period. Political prisoners, for the most part, apparently either were forcibly resettled in the camp areas or were allowed to choose among several areas. There are also reports that freed prisoners who returned to their homes were unable to find work and had to return to the camp area.

There is also extensive evidence that free labor is now being used for the kind of large-scale construction and resource development projects that in the past would have used prisoners. Thus the huge hydroelectric power project at Bratsk is being built with free labor. 88/ Many thousands of young people have been recruited for the enormous task of developing new coal mines in the Donbas 89/ and in Karaganda. 90/ Free labor is being used to build or expand the Omsk oil refinery, the Dzhezkazgan copper smelting plant, the Pavlodar aluminum plant, the Karaganda metallurgical plant, and numerous others. 91/ Finally, the diamond fields in Yakutskaya ASSR are being exploited with free labor. 92/

\* See pp. 24-25, above.

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Further evidence suggesting that the USSR is gradually dismantling its erstwhile huge prison camp system is afforded by the numerous references in the central and local press to conditions in areas once the centers of large forced labor populations. The attempt evidently is being made to remove the stigma attached to these areas by virtue of their long association with forced labor. This policy is in striking contrast to the situation which prevailed until recently, when the remote areas and the economic activities associated with them were almost never mentioned. Some of the places that have been the subjects of discussion recently in the press are Vorkuta, Noril'sk, Magadan, Tayshet, and Karaganda. 93/ A recent article discusses the developments in the northern areas of the USSR in general, including all of the former major centers of forced labor. 94/ Another article gives a glowing description of conditions in the gold fields of Yakutskaya ASSR. 95/ Other evidence of the rehabilitation of the notorious "lands of the prisoners" is afforded by the numerous references to the influx of population into these cities during 1954-57 and to the existence of large-scale housing construction programs there. For example, returned prisoners report that a large housing construction program was being carried on in Karaganda in 1954-55, that civilian cities began to spring up in the Tayshet area during 1954-56, and that the populations of Rudnik and Pervomaiskiy rose sharply during the same period. 96/ The press reports that 160,000 square meters of housing were constructed during 1956 in Vorkuta 97/ and refers to major housing projects in such former prison centers as Noril'sk, Magadan, Sverdlovsk, and Dzhezkazgan. 98/ In August 1956 the Chairman of the Novosibirsk City Soviet told US reporters that the prison camp system was being abandoned in that area, 99/ the site of a huge new water development project.

## VII. Major Factors Contributing to the Change in Forced Labor Policy.

The radical change since 1952 in Soviet policies with respect to forced labor must be explained in terms of a number of factors, both economic and political. No single factor would have been sufficient to bring about the changes. They are in essence the result of the combination of pressing economic and demographic considerations militating against the efficiency of a mass forced labor system and of a political climate which, in the minds of the Soviet leaders, would permit the conversion to a more normal prison system without the loss of political control over the people.

### A. Economic Considerations.

Although the net value of a system of mass forced labor to the USSR cannot be appraised solely in economic terms, the evidence strongly suggests that about 1952-53 it became evident to Soviet administrators that a modern industrial economy can best be operated with incentives

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rather than coercion and that the huge prison labor force was a drag on over-all productivity. Also, strategic considerations made this an opportune time to appraise the efficacy of the forced labor system purely in economic terms. By 1953, after about 25 years of the use of forced labor on a massive scale, a large part of the task of developing the frontier had been accomplished. Prison labor, for example, had built the White Sea - Baltic Canal and the Volga-Don Canal and the North Pechora and the Baykal-Amur Magistral' (BAM) railroads; forced labor had opened and developed such remote areas as Magadan, Noril'sk, Ukhta, Vorkuta, the Kola Peninsula, Karagandinskaya Oblast, the northern part of Sverdlovskaya Oblast, and the northern Urals. In addition, most of the catastrophic destruction resulting from World War II had been repaired, mainly by prisoners of war. Whether or not these developmental projects could have been completed, or accomplished more cheaply, with free labor is an unanswerable -- and irrelevant -- question.

In any event, it is evident that the Soviet leaders have come to regard the forced labor system as an economic liability, and there is ample evidence to support such a position. In the first place, the administrative costs of the system were high. The prisoners lived and worked under guard. Although the ratio of guards to prisoners varied with circumstances, the preponderance of information indicates that the ratios usually fell within the range of 1 to 6 and 1 to 12. An MVD official stated in 1957, however, that the ratio was 1 to 20. 100/ When the latter ratio (which should be regarded as a minimum) is applied to the estimated total of 4.8 million prisoners in 1952,\* an estimate of 240,000 persons employed to guard the prisoners is obtained. A comparable estimate of 85,000 may be made for 1956. Almost all of these persons were males in the prime productive age groups and thus represent the diversion of a significant segment of manpower from civilian employment.

In addition to these direct manpower costs of policing the prison labor force, there were other costs peculiar to the use of prison labor. Prison laborers worked under guard, even when hired out to civilian enterprises, and construction projects employing such labor had to be surrounded by high wooden fences and equipped with guard towers. Ex-prisoners report that there was an "appalling" indifference among the prisoners toward the materials and equipment with which they worked and that sabotage of machinery, notably in mines, was an almost daily occurrence. 101/ Others report that the prisoners deliberately pursued "go slow" policies, had a highly negative attitude toward doing what was forced on them, and showed no initiative whatever. 102/ Moreover, there was little or no on-the-job training, and

\* See Table 3, p. 21, above.

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the skills that a prisoner may have acquired before his arrest were seldom used.\* Prisoners hired out to civilian enterprises devised a variety of ingenious methods for obtaining high earnings with as little effort as possible, to the serious detriment of the quality of the work. 104/

Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that the USSR should wish to weigh the relative productivity of forced and free labor. An MVD official stated in May 1957, "It has been proved that the camps were not profitable from an economic point of view. The ministries did not like to make contracts with the camps because the costs were too high." 105/ There is also evidence that the existence of large pools of prison labor encouraged administrators to undertake developmental projects that were economically unsound some of which were dropped before completion, with attendant waste of materials and investment funds. 106/ The availability of large numbers of unskilled workers in the northern and eastern regions also undoubtedly deterred the mechanization of mines and construction projects in these areas. The press [redacted] recently have reported many instances of the progress of mechanization and increased labor productivity in mines and other enterprises known to have used prison labor in the past. 107/ [redacted] [redacted] the 1957 gold-extraction plan for Magadanskaya Oblast had been completed 3 months ahead of schedule with a 4-percent increase in output and a substantial reduction in production costs. 108/ The manager of the gold trust at Yakutsk stated that labor productivity in the trust increased 17 percent in 1955 and that, in 1956, gold mines in the Aldan Rayon as a whole reduced production costs by 16 percent. 109/ Similar claims of success have been made for the timber industry in the Far East. 110/

50X1

50X1

50X1

Another important factor in an assessment of the over-all value of mass forced labor is the sociological and demographic consequence of the system. The disability and mortality rates in the camps were very high. According to numerous ex-prisoners reports, the percentage of prisoners unable to work because of illness or injury ranged from 10 to 40 percent in the various camps. In addition, there were special camps for invalids in each of the large camp complexes and administrations, some of them having as many as 1,200 inmates. These sick and disabled prisoners made no economic contribution and had to be maintained at state expense. Although medical facilities were generally available, they were grossly inadequate. The mortality rates in the camps consequently were higher than the death rate for the population as a

\* The USSR made good use, however, of the skills of prisoners who were scientists. They were allowed to work freely in certain laboratories and were even permitted to travel and to have their sentences reduced for good conduct. 103/

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whole during the same period, which was probably slightly more than 1 percent. 111/ Although the extremely high mortality rates in the camps probably declined considerably after 1950 as a result of improved living and working conditions, the abnormal death rates and high incidence of disability among the prisoners continued to represent a significant economic and demographic loss, which must have been apparent to Soviet administrators. In 1954 a directive reportedly was issued to all camp commanders requiring them to take steps to reduce prisoner mortality rates. 112/

The high death rates among camp inmates, most of whom were males, and the removal of millions of males from normal civilian and family life during a part of their prime years undoubtedly had critical effects on the birthrate in the USSR. Faced with a sharply declining birthrate and imminent decreases in the annual increments to the labor force, Soviet leaders apparently concluded that the situation could be corrected only through large-scale release of prisoners, which has occurred, and through abandonment of the mass isolation of men, except hardened criminals and persons clearly dangerous to the preservation of the Soviet state. As already shown, serious attempts are being made to transform the former prison areas -- Vorkuta, Noril'sk, and Magadan -- into ordinary cities, so that even though the released prisoners may be forced to remain in these areas, they will have the opportunity to live and work as civilians and to rear families.

Other factors which undoubtedly contributed to the transformation of the forced labor system are the rash of large-scale strikes and the general unrest which seems to have permeated the prison camps since 1953. Although scattered instances of rebellion during the years before 1953 have been reported, a veritable rash of strikes and other disturbances occurred during 1953-55. The most famous of these was the strike at Vorkuta in July 1953, which lasted more than a month and resulted in an investigation from Moscow.\* These incidents of serious unrest in the prison camps must have had significant adverse effects on productivity and must have caused serious concern to MVD officials. [redacted]

[redacted] following the strikes, measures were taken to reduce the possibility of large-scale revolts. [redacted] a special edict issued in 1953 or 1954 limited the number of prisoners in each camp to 800 and provided for a greater physical separation of camps, and political prisoners were not to remain in one camp for more than 6 months and other prisoners for more than 1 year. 113/ If this directive was carried out, it must have increased greatly the economic loss involved in the constant transfer of prisoners from camp to camp, a persistent feature of the forced labor system.

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\* The locations, dates, and the nature of the disturbances in the labor camps, as reported by ex-prisoners, are shown in Appendix B.

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B. Political Considerations.

Although there are indications that, even before 1953, Soviet policymakers were becoming aware of the economic liabilities inherent in the forced labor system, the dominant political event which triggered the transformation of the system was the death of Stalin in March 1953. This event, along with the subsequent removal of Beriya, provided an opportunity for the more liberal elements in the Communist Party leadership to initiate and implement a series of measures in the domestic field which have radically altered the life of the ordinary Soviet citizen. At least for the moment, the use of terror as an instrument of control has been virtually abandoned, and throughout the Soviet system incentives have replaced coercion as the means of securing adherence of the people to the goals of the state. Such a shift in methods of control made imperative the disbanding of the system of mass forced labor which had been inherited from the old regime. The collective leadership has recognized this imperative, and the events of the past 5 years -- the amnesties, the release of prisoners, the lightening of criminal penalties, the closing of camps, the changes in camp administration, and the dissolution of the MVD's economic empire -- bear witness to this recognition. By the end of 1957 the Soviet prison system was approaching the status of such systems in Western countries -- that is, imprisonment was being used as a method of punishment for criminal acts rather than as an instrument for political repression, the objectives of imprisonment being to administer punishment and rehabilitate the prisoner. The economic exploitation of prison labor is no longer a dominant factor influencing penal policy. Although persons are still being sentenced to "corrective labor," the logic of a centrally managed economy -- and good penal practice -- requires that able-bodied prisoners should be employed productively.

Finally, whatever the economic imperatives against the use of mass forced labor, the transformation of the camp system in the USSR could not have been accomplished without a high degree of political stability. Such stability has characterized the post-Stalin period. There has been no serious threat to the status of the collective leadership, no attempt to change the planned character of the economic system, and, in short, no serious threat to the existence of the Soviet state. Consequently, the Soviet leadership has been sufficiently secure to permit the carrying out of the sweeping transformation of the prison system which has taken place in the past 5 years. As long as there is such political stability, the policy of a gradual conversion of the infamous forced labor system to a normal penal system may be expected to continue.

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APPENDIX A

LOCATION OF FORCED LABOR CAMPS IN THE USSR\*  
1953-57

<u>Location</u>	<u>Map Key Number</u>	<u>Coordinates**</u>	<u>Date of Latest Identification</u>
Abez	1	66°30' N - 61°40' E	1955
Akmolinsk	2	51°10' N - 71°30' E	1953
Aktas	3	48°02' N - 66°21' E	1954
Aldan	4	58°37' N - 125°24' E	1954
Aleksandrovsik	5	50°54' N - 142°10' E	1956
Aleksandrovsikoye	6	51°45' N - 113°45' E	1956
Aleskito Perevoz	7	68°33' N - 146°12' E	1955
Ambarchik	8	69°45' N - 162°00' E	1955
Anadyr'	9	64°45' N - 177°00' E	1955
Andzebinskaya	10	56°11' N - 101°21' E	1956
Anga	11	53°58' N - 106°12' E	1955
Angarsk	12	58°05' N - 93°10' E	1954
Arkagala	13	63°07' N - 146°49' E	1955
Arkhangel'sk	14	64°30' N - 41°00' E	1953
Asbest	15	57°05' N - 61°25' E	1955
Astrakhan	16	46°14' N - 48°30' E	1955
Ayuta	17	47°43' N - 40°04' E	1954
Baku	18	40°20' N - 50°00' E	1953
Balkhash	19	46°49' N - 75°00' E	1954
Balykley	20	52°22' N - 42°36' E	1956
Barashevo	21	54°31' N - 42°52' E	1955
Batygay	22	67°11' N - 133°12' E	1955
Belniki	23	53°55' N - 73°22' E	1955
Belov	24	44°41' N - 40°08' E	1955
Beregovaya	25	42°46' N - 133°05' E	1954
Berelyakh	26	62°47' N - 148°07' E	1956
Bezmyanka	27	49°55' N - 43°14' E	1953
Bira	28	49°03' N - 132°28' E	1955
Birobidzhan	29	48°50' N - 133°00' E	1953

\*\* Alternate coordinates are given when nearby localities have identical place names and it is impossible to determine which locality has the camp. No coordinates are given if the place name can not be identified in a standard gazetteer.

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Map Key Number</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>	<u>Date of Latest Identification</u>
Blagoveschenskoye	30	46°45' N - 142°31' E	1955
Bodaybo	31	57°51' N - 114°12' E	1954
Bol'she-Bykovo	32	50°51' N - 38°23' E	1957
Bondyug	33	60°30' N - 55°55' E	1955
Borovichi	34	58°15' N - 34°02' E	1954
Bratsk	35	56°05' N - 101°48' E	1957
Bryanka	36		1954
Bryansk	37	53°15' N - 34°20' E	1953
Budukan	38	49°01' N - 132°13' E	1955
Burgalchan	39	61°06' N - 142°36' E	1954
Burma	40	48°55' N - 72°50' E	1954
Burustakh	41	64°27' N - 144°44' E	1953
Busochan	42		1953
Butygychag	43	61°30' N - 149°11' E	1956
Caneyon (Phonetic)	44	62°40' N - 151°43' E	1954
Chita	45	52°03' N - 113°30' E	1953
Chkalov Ostrov	46	53°24' N - 141°12' E	1955
Chu	47	43°36' N - 73°42' E	1954
Chuguyevo	48	44°15' N - 133°50' E	1953
Chuna	49	57°47' N - 94°37' E	1953
Churba Nura	50	49°36' N - 72°50' E	1956
Chulym	51	55°08' N - 80°57' E	
		54°34' N - 78°20' E	1953
Chuyevo	52	48°02' N - 39°57' E	1953
Darnitsa	53	50°26' N - 30°39' E	1954
Debin	54	62°21' N - 150°46' E	1953
Degtyarsk	55	56°43' N - 60°05' E	1955
Dekastri	56	51°30' N - 140°47' E	1953
Delyankyr	57	63°50' N - 145°33' E	1953
Derzhinskiy	58	55°40' N - 37°45' E	1956
Dnepropetrovsk	59	48°27' N - 34°59' E	1953
Dolino	60	51°28' N - 80°50' E	1955
Dolinsk	61	47°25' N - 142°50' E	1956
Dolinskoye	62	49°42' N - 72°50' E	1954
Dorozhnya	63		1954
Dubinsk	64		1953
Dubrovka	65	48°57' N - 29°45' E	1955
Dudinka	66	69°25' N - 86°10' E	1954
Dzemgi	67	51°20' N - 137°00' E	1954
Dzhegala	68		1955
Dzhezkazgan Kingi	69	47°51' N - 67°14' E	1954
Dzhugdzhur	70	47°40' N - 58°45' E	1956

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Map Key Number</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>	<u>Date of Latest Identification</u>
Ege Khaya	71	67°24' N - 134°15' E	1956
Egvekinot	72	65°10' N - 179°15' W	1956
Ekibastuz	73	51°40' N - 75°22' E	1955
Elgen	74	62°48' N - 150°44' E	1953
Elgen-Ugol'	75	62°54' N - 151°46' E	1953
Forchaysk	76		1956
Golenki	77	44°03' N - 131°46' E	1953
Gori	78	41°58' N - 44°07' E	1953
Gubakha	79	58°52' N - 57°36' E	1955
Gukovo	80	48°03' N - 39°56' E	1954
Gundorovskaya	81	48°21' N - 40°01' E	1954
Gvardeysk	82	54°39' N - 21°05' E	1954
Igarka	83	67°30' N - 86°35' E	1953
Il'inskiy	84	48°00' N - 142°15' E	1956
Ilintag	85		1954
Indigirskiy	86	64°37' N - 144°26' E	1953
Inta	87	66°00' N - 60°55' E	1955
Irkutsk	88	52°10' N - 104°10' E	1956
Iul'tin	89	67°50' N - 178°45' W	1957
Ivanovka	90	44°00' N - 132°30' E	
		50°30' N - 128°28' E	1953
Ivanovo	91	57°03' N - 40°50' E	1955
Ivdel'	92	60°45' N - 60°30' E	1954
Izvarino	93	48°19' N - 39°52' E	1954
Izvestkovaya	94	49°00' N - 131°30' E	1953
Kadakchan	95		1955
Kadiyevka	96	48°30' N - 38°45' E	1954
Kadzhar	97	40°36' N - 48°28' E	
		39°12' N - 46°26' E	1954
Kaiki	98		1955
Kalinina	99		1954
Kamensk	100	52°59' N - 32°28' E	1955
Kamenskoye	101	62°40' N - 165°10' E	1953
Kansk	102	56°13' N - 95°40' E	1954
Karabas Gora	103	44°30' N - 72°20' E	1955
Karabash	104	54°42' N - 52°34' E	1954
Karafuto (So. Sakhalin)	105	51°00' N - 143°00' E	1955
Karaganda	106	49°50' N - 73°10' E	1957
Kayskoye	107	57°21' N - 44°41' E	1955
Kemerovo	108	55°20' N - 86°05' E	1955

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Map Key Number</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>	<u>Date of Latest Identification</u>
Khabarovsk	109	48°20' N - 135°10' E	1956
Khandyga	110	62°32' N - 135°35' E	1955
Khenikenzhinskiy	111		1956
Kholodnyy	112		1953
Khorol'	113	44°25' N - 132°04' E	1953
Khrompik	114	56°54' N - 59°55' E	1955
Kiev	115	50°10' N - 30°45' E	1954
Kingar	116	47°47' N - 67°46' E	1954
Kitoy	117	52°33' N - 103°49' E	1955
Kizel	118	59°00' N - 57°40' E	1955
Klyuchi	119	58°03' N - 52°27' E	1955
Knyazhpogost	120	62°38' N - 50°50' E	1957
Kokuzek	121	49°40' N - 73°10' E	1954
Komsomol'sk	122	50°33' N - 136°59' E	1955
Kopeysk	123	55°00' N - 61°35' E	1953
Korsakov	124	46°40' N - 143°45' E	1955
Kospash	125	59°30' N - 57°00' E	1955
Koton	126	49°45' N - 142°45' E	1955
Krasnaya Rechka	127	46°42' N - 134°00' E	
		48°23' N - 135°04' E	1954
Krasnodon	128	48°17' N - 39°48' E	
		48°19' N - 39°34' E	1954
Krasnomayskiy	129	57°37' N - 34°27' E	1955
Krasnopolye	130	50°47' N - 35°15' E	1954
Krasnoturinsk	131	59°50' N - 60°15' E	1955
Krasnoyarsk	132	56°02' N - 92°48' E	1955
Kryazh	133	57°33' N - 58°09' E	1955
Kuchino	134	54°28' N - 40°46' E	1955
		55°59' N - 35°09' E	
Kuogastakh	135	70°55' N - 135°40' E	1954
Kurgannaya	136	44°54' N - 40°35' E	1953
Kushunmai	137	48°00' N - 142°15' E	1956
Kyzyl-Kiya	138	41°39' N - 69°22' E	1953
Lachanka	139	59°50' N - 150°10' E	1955
Lazo	140	45°22' N - 133°39' E	1954
Lebedinyy	141	56°02' N - 125°27' E	1953
		58°29' N - 125°31' E	
Lydiyevka	142	47°58' N - 37°41' E	1953
Magadan	143	59°34' N - 150°48' E	1956
Makar'ovo	144	52°16' N - 43°20' E	1954
		52°30' N - 43°30' E	
Maksimovka	145	49°32' N - 25°45' E	1954
Mariinsk	146	56°15' N - 87°50' E	1955

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Map Key Number</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>	<u>Date of Latest Identification</u>
Marshalskiy	147	64°28' N - 142°03' E	1955
Matrosovo	148	61°39' N - 147°51' E	1954
Mikhalevo	149	52°07' N - 104°28' E	1954
Mikhaylovka	150	48°02' N - 135°29' E	1954
Mikheroska	151	47°14' N - 39°53' E	1954
Minsk	152	53°45' N - 26°25' E	1953
Miyuki	153	47°11' N - 142°45' E	1956
Molotov	154	58°00' N - 56°15' E	1954
Molotovsk	155	64°34' N - 39°50' E	1954
Mordovo	156	52°05' N - 40°46' E	
		55°42' N - 45°06' E	1956
Moscow	157	55°56' N - 37°58' E	1955
Mozhaysh	158	55°30' N - 36°00' E	1955
Muvika	159		1956
Mylki	160		1955
Nadezhdinskoye	161	48°16' N - 133°14' E	1953
Naibuchi	162	47°20' N - 142°34' E	1956
Nakhodka	163	42°50' N - 132°50' E	1954
Nera	164	64°14' N - 130°16' E	1955
Nerchinsk	165	51°58' N - 116°35' E	1953
Nerenzha	166	58°12' N - 125°17' E	1953
Nikolayevsk-Na-Amure	167	53°15' N - 140°45' E	1955
Nizhnaya Poyma	168	56°11' N - 96°39' E	1955
Nizhne Isetskiy	169	56°46' N - 60°42' E	1955
Nizhniy Kuranakh	170	58°46' N - 125°32' E	1953
Nizhniy Tagil	171	57°54' N - 60°00' E	1955
Noril'sk	172	69°20' N - 88°06' E	1956
Novaya Zemlya (Island)	173	72°00' N - 54°00' E	1955
Novocherkassk	174	47°24' N - 39°42' E	1955
Novosibirsk	175	55°02' N - 82°53' E	1955
Novo Troitsk	176	51°10' N - 58°15' E	1953
Novy Voroshilov	177		1955
Novyy Port	178	67°42' N - 72°55' E	1953
Nyrob	179	60°43' N - 56°44' E	1953
Okha	180	53°34' N - 142°56' E	1955
Olonki	181	52°54' N - 103°45' E	1955
Omsk	182	55°00' N - 73°24' E	1954
Orotukan	183	62°16' N - 151°42' E	1955
Orsk	184	51°10' N - 58°30' E	1954
Ossora	185	59°15' N - 163°00' E	1953
Oymyakon	186	63°28' N - 142°49' E	1955

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Map Key Number</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>	<u>Date of Latest Identification</u>
Parichi	187	52°48' N - 29°26' E	1953
Pechora	188	65°25' N - 57°02' E	1953
Pernaty	189		1955
Pervomaysk	190	48°04' N - 30°52' E	1953
Pervomayskiy	191	51°30' N - 55°10' E	1955
Pervoural'sk	192	56°45' N - 60°00' E	1956
Petropavlovsk	193	54°52' N - 69°06' E	1954
Petropavlovsk Kamchatskiy	194	53°01' N - 158°39' E	1955
Pevek	195	69°42' N - 170°17' E	1957
Pokateyevka	196		1955
Polovinka	197	58°50' N - 57°50' E	1955
Poronaysk	198	49°15' N - 143°00' E	1956
Postal'	199	46°05' N - 30°05' E	1955
Potma	200	53°32' N - 44°05' E	1956
Pretschachtnaya	201	67°30' N - 64°45' E	1954
Prokhladnyy	202	48°30' N - 82°46' E	1955
Provodanka	203	47°59' N - 37°57' E	1954
Pyatiletka	204	62°18' N - 151°27' E	1953
Razvedchik	205	62°21' N - 151°14' E	1957
Razvet'ye	206	52°19' N - 35°20' E	1956
Reshety	207	54°13' N - 80°14' E	1956
Revda	208	56°45' N - 60°00' E	1956
Rostov	209	57°12' N - 39°25' E	1953
Rostov-Na-Donu	210	47°14' N - 39°42' E	1954
Rudnik	211	53°32' N - 119°18' E	1954
Rutchenkovo	212	47°57' N - 37°44' E	1953
Sakaehama	213	47°30' N - 142°50' E	1956
Samarkand	214	39°40' N - 67°00' E	1953
Saran	215	49°30' N - 73°30' E	1954
Selyamka	216	59°35' N - 56°55' E	1953
Sesvetsky	217	57°50' N - 56°30' E	1956
Severnoye	218	55°21' N - 165°57' E	1956
Seymchan	219	62°53' N - 152°26' E	1954
Shakhty	220	47°46' N - 40°12' E	1955
Shcherbakov	221	58°03' N - 38°50' E	1955
Shestakova	222	62°40' N - 164°32' E	1955
Shikuka	223	49°15' N - 143°10' E	1954
Shirokiy	224	50°55' N - 129°00' E	1955
Sim	225	55°00' N - 57°45' E	1955
Slyudyanka	226	51°38' N - 103°40' E	1955
Solikamsk	227	59°40' N - 56°45' E	1955

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Map Key Number</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>	<u>Date of Latest Identification</u>
Sosnovka	228	54°15' N - 109°30' E 55°00' N - 117°30' E	1953
Sos'va	229	59°15' N - 61°50' E	1953
Sovetskaya Gavan	230	48°58' N - 140°18' E	1954
Spassk-Dal'niy	231	44°37' N - 132°48' E	1953
Spasskiy	232	48°28' N - 85°18' E 54°04' N - 77°02' E	1954
Spasskiy Zavod	233	49°32' N - 73°17' E	1955
Spornyy	234	62°21' N - 151°06' E	1955
Sredne Beloye	235	50°41' N - 128°02' E	1955
Stalinabad	236	38°30' N - 68°55' E	1955
Stalingrad	237	48°30' N - 44°45' E	1956
Stalino	238	48°00' N - 37°55' E	1955
Stalinsk	239	53°44' N - 87°10' E	1955
Stan Utiny	240	59°50' N - 151°00' E	1954
Staro Mikhaylovka	241	47°58' N - 37°35' E	1954
Sukhobezvodnoye	242	57°03' N - 44°55' E	1956
Susman	243	62°47' N - 148°10' E	1956
Suzdal	244	56°25' N - 40°26' E	1954
Sverdlovsk	245	56°45' N - 60°20' E	1955
Svodbodnyy	246	48°14' N - 134°42' E 51°24' N - 128°08' E	1955
Takhia Tash	247	42°17' N - 59°45' E	1953
Talagi	248	64°34' N - 40°32' E	1956
Talitsa	249	57°00' N - 63°45' E	1956
Tambov	250	52°43' N - 41°27' E	1953
Tashkent	251	41°10' N - 69°00' E	1953
Taskan	252	62°59' N - 150°20' E	1953
Tavda	253	58°00' N - 64°25' E	1953
Tayshet	254	55°57' N - 98°02' E	1957
Temir-Tau	255	50°05' N - 72°56' E	1954
Temnikov	256	54°38' N - 43°12' E	1955
Tiflis	257	41°45' N - 45°00' E	1953
Timoshenko	258	61°33' N - 147°55' E	1954
Tomari	259	47°45' N - 142°00' E	1954
Tomarikishi	260	49°00' N - 142°58' E	1956
Toro	261	49°15' N - 142°10' E	1956
Toyohara	262	47°00' N - 142°45' E	1956
Truskovets-Zdroy	263	49°16' N - 23°30' E	1955
Tsimmermanovka	264	51°21' N - 139°16' E	1953
Tula	265	54°12' N - 37°36' E	1956
Tumnin	266	49°18' N - 140°23' E	1954



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<u>Location</u>	<u>Map Key Number</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>	<u>Date of Latest Identification</u>
Turinsk	267	58°00' N - 63°45' E	1956
Tymovskoye	268	50°45' N - 142°40' E	1953
Tyrkhanda	269	57°48' N - 127°54' E	1953
Uglegorsk	270	49°00' N - 142°00' E	1956
Ugol'nyy	271	63°00' N - 179°24' E	1954
Ukhta	272	63°34' N - 53°42' E	1955
Ukta	273	70°55' N - 145°35' E	1953
Ulan Ude	274	51°50' N - 107°37' E	1954
Umet	275	52°34' N - 42°58' E	1954
Unzha	276	58°01' N - 44°01' E	1953
Uralo Klyuchi	277	56°04' N - 97°25' E	1955
Usa	278	65°25' N - 51°11' E	1955
Usha	279	54°25' N - 26°36' E	1955
Usol'ye-Sibirskoye	280	52°45' N - 103°38' E	1954
Ust'drinka	281	47°20' N - 142°34' E	1956
Ust' Kamenogorsk	282	49°58' N - 82°40' E	1955
Ust' Kut	283	56°46' N - 105°40' E	1954
Ust' Nera	284	64°40' N - 143°05' E	1953
Ust' Omchuk	285	61°09' N - 149°38' E	1956
Ust' Utinaya	286	62°34' N - 151°28' E	1954
Ust' Vikhorevka	287	56°48' N - 101°26' E	1956
Ust' Vym	288	62°15' N - 50°25' E	1954
Utinaya	289	62°31' N - 151°28' E	1954
Vakeushev	290		1956
Vakhrushev	291	49°00' N - 142°58' E	1956
Vanino	292	49°02' N - 140°16' E	1955
Vasilyevskiy	293	50°30' N - 117°50' E	1953
Verkhniy Kuranakh	294	58°30' N - 125°00' E	1953
Verkhniy Stvor	295	58°00' N - 56°50' E	1956
Verkhotur'ye	296	58°45' N - 61°00' E	1953
Verkhoyansk	297	67°35' N - 133°30' E	1955
Veslyana	298	63°01' N - 50°51' E	1954
Vikhorevka	299	56°08' N - 101°20' E	1956
Vladimir	300	56°10' N - 40°25' E	1955
Vladivostok	301	43°08' N - 131°54' E	1955
Volkovo	302	57°48' N - 63°02' E	1955
Vorkuta	303	67°30' N - 64°00' E	1956
Voroshilov	304	43°47' N - 131°54' E	1955
Voroshilovgrad	305	48°34' N - 39°20' E	1954
Yagodnyy	306	62°33' N - 149°40' E	1956
Yakutsk	307	62°05' N - 129°50' E	1957

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Map Key Number</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>	<u>Date of Latest Identification</u>
Yavas	308	54°25' N - 42°51' E	1956
Yaya	309	56°12' N - 86°24' E	1953
Yekaterinoslavskoye	310	53°13' N - 77°49' E	1954
Yerevan	311	40°11' N - 44°30' E	1954
Yoshkar Ola	312	56°40' N - 47°55' E	1955
Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk	313	47°00' N - 142°45' E	1956
Zaliv Kresta	314	66°00' N - 179°15' W	1955
Zaporozh'ye	315	47°49' N - 35°11' E	1953
Zayarsk	316	55°45' N - 102°30' E	1955
Zheleznodorozhny	317	62°35' N - 50°52' E	1954
Zhigalovo	318	54°48' N - 105°08' E	1954
Zhigulevsk	319	53°25' N - 49°29' E	1955
Zubova Polyana	320	54°05' N - 42°50' E	1955
Zyryznka	321	65°50' N - 150°50' E	1956

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APPENDIX B

STRIKES AND OTHER DISTURBANCES IN FORCED LABOR CAMPS  
IN THE USSR  
1953-55

<u>Year</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Type of Disturbance</u>	<u>Cause of Disturbance</u>
1953	Kingir	Riot	Bad working and living conditions. <u>114/</u>
1953	Kraslag Complex	Riot	General dissatisfaction. <u>115/</u>
1953	Lazo	Riot	Aftermath of a prisoner's unsuccessful plot to escape. <u>116/</u>
1953	Noril'sk	Hunger strike	Dissatisfaction with food rations. <u>117/</u>
1953	Omsk	Hunger strike	Demand for release from penal barracks. <u>118/</u>
1953	Tayshet	Hunger strike	Promises of better food and working conditions not fulfilled. <u>119/</u>
1953	Vorkuta	Strike	Prisoners who were transferred from Karaganda to Vorkuta found conditions much worse. <u>120/</u>
1954	Bratsk	Strike	Nonfulfillment of promises for preterm release of prisoners. <u>121/</u>
1954	Dzhezkazgan	Sympathy strike	Response to the strike at Kingir. <u>122/</u>
1954	Inta	Strike	Strike allegedly instigated by MVD to determine which potential German repatriates were strongly anti-Communist. <u>123/</u>
1954	Karaganda	Strike	Unrest over application of Amnesty Decree of 1953. Bad working and living conditions. <u>124/</u>

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<u>Year</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Type of Disturbance</u>	<u>Cause of Disturbance</u>
1954	Karaganda	Riot	Young Communists transferred from towns to the new lands program area were dissatisfied with conditions, complained, and were interned in forced labor camps. Youths then organized strike. <u>125/</u>
1954	Kingir	Strike	Bad treatment by guards. <u>126/</u>
1954	Kingir	Riot	Discontent resulting from the mixing of political and criminal prisoners. Promises not fulfilled. <u>127/</u>
1954	Revda	Strike	Nonfulfillment of promises to free prisoners. <u>128/</u>
1954	Rudnik	Sympathy strike	Response to strike at Kingir. <u>129/</u>
1954	Tayshet	Strike	Insufficient clothing for low temperatures. <u>130/</u>
1954	Bratsk	Strike	High work norms. <u>131/</u>
1954	Tayshet	Riot	Refusal of German prisoners to work on German holiday. <u>132/</u>
1954	Tayshet	Strike	Refusal of nuns to work. <u>133/</u>
1954	Vorkuta	Riot	Bad working and living conditions. <u>134/</u>
1955	Khabarovsk	Strike	Dissatisfaction. <u>135/</u>
1955	Komsomol'sk	Strike	Refusal of new medical officers to supply narcotics to prisoners who were drug addicts. <u>136/</u>
1955	Muyka	Riot	Bad treatment by guards. <u>137/</u>
1955	Kingir	Riot	Unfair work norms. <u>138/</u>

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<u>Year</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Type of Disturbance</u>	<u>Cause of Disturbance</u>
1955	Mirnoye	Riot	General dissatisfaction. <u>139/</u>
1955	Vorkuta	Riot	Demand of political prisoners for removal of criminal prisoners. <u>140/</u>
1955	Timsher	Strike	Bad working and living con- ditions. <u>141/</u>

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
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