

Prospectus for Paper on Spanish Politics

The forty year old Portuguese dictatorship recently fell quickly, easily and unexpectedly. Political institutions disappeared almost overnight. Rightist groups associated with the old Salazar-Caetano regime proved unable to govern. The population, no longer dormant, kept escalating its political demands, and failed to form political groups which could work toward consensus and a new order. The only disciplined force to emerge was the Communist party, whose leaders were therefore in a position to cultivate and influence the military officers who now rule in Lisbon.

The question is, will there be a similar scenario in Spain, as Franco's health fails and antagonistic groups compete for political power? The key to the answer lies in the actions and strategies of Spain's major political groupings. The groups are, roughly: the official bureaucracy, military and political associations, the clergy, business and laboring classes. By examining each group for its relative strengths and weaknesses, personalities, internal differences and viewpoints, one can derive a picture of potential political alliances along the conventional spectrum of right-center-left. A study would be organized along the following lines:

-- Background: a very brief analysis of the collapse of the Caetano regime for comparison and contrast with current conditions in Spain.

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-- Institutions: a short description of the constitutional structure created by Franco, and a judgment about its viability during a period of transition.

-- Political Groups: the heart of the analysis, along the lines suggested above;

-- The Right: the Falange, and all other conservative elements from varying groups, treated in terms of their ability to cooperate.

-- The Center: the important sectors from all groups likely to hold a moderate position, and an assessment of their ability to organize together.

-- The Left: the Communist Party of Spain along with the radical portions of the working classes, clergy and intellectuals considered in terms of a possibly viable alliance.

The study would conclude by trying to predict which groups will come out on top in the context of Spanish economic and social change, and the implications for US policy.

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SECRET

4 December 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, OPR

SUBJECT : The Spanish Succession Question

Sew -

1. Attached are the Director's comments about [redacted] recent study. Like others, he found it interesting and informative but was rather more startled than most would be over the possibility of real troubles of the post-Franco era. The way Portugal surprised us all no doubt is a factor. In any case, he wants some form of interagency consideration of this question as you will note.

25X1

2. I don't have any firm ideas about how to proceed. I know that neither INR nor OCI has anybody capable of writing an estimate on this subject, and it looks like Dave would be the logical choice. An NIE or interagency memorandum could be fairly readily adapted from this text, possibly deleting some of the detail, accelerating the pace of some of the prose so it reads faster, and expanding key judgments with a few more specifics on likely scenarios in the short, medium, and longer terms.

3. In any case would you, [redacted] give this some thought and let's then consult on procedures.

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[redacted]

[redacted]

25X1

National Intelligence Officer
for Western Europe

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20 September 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED] OPR

SUBJECT : The Spanish Succession: Strains
in the Post-Franco EraThanks for sending me the draft of [REDACTED] piece on
Spain. 25X1

I think it is a thoughtful and interesting treatment and will be glad to see it published. The subject is of considerable interest in town now and will presumably get more interesting. A few comments -- all of them quite minor:

-- I would suggest some other phrase than "as presently constituted" in making the estimate that Franco's designed system cannot endure. For one thing the phrase is ambiguous as to whether it means what's in existence now or what his blueprint calls for; and for another thing, no new system, following three decades of what Spain has had, can help but show some significant changes. Hence this judgment is hardly news (the phrase occurs on page 1 and again later in the text).

-- On page 5, I myself would qualify the proposition that the "economic miracle" has dampened discontent or wedded people to the system; I am sure this proposition has truth in it, yet the notion that prosperity allays discontent instead of creating more appetite has been proven wrong so many times that I think it should be approached with caution. I think what more often happens is that people do get a stake in the system, then develop appetite for more, and then if in any way that stake is threatened they tend to think of drastic solutions. But this, of course, differs case by case.

-- On page 10, I am not sure that "praetorian" is precisely the right term here. It means different things to different people; my dictionary suggests corruption as part of the meaning, which I don't think is intended here. In any case, if used, it should be defined. On the same page, I think the system is "finely" rather than "finally" tuned. (Franco may have tried the latter!)

NIO/WE ✓
NIO(R)

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-- On page 23, I have the impression that there is more opposition to US bases and close US defense ties than is suggested in this section. It seems to me I have seen reference to a number of moderates and some conservatives (possibly including Juan Carlos) who oppose or have misgivings about these facilities. [redacted] in OCI will know more about this.

25X1

-- I would suggest some consideration be given to Europe -- especially the magnetic attraction of European social democracy to many Spaniards, Spain's desire to get into Europe, and general European attitudes as a factor in Spanish attitudes.

[redacted]

25X1


Again, a very nice job. I presume you and Dave will be showing this to the OCI people; [redacted] has been at work on a piece the DCI asked for about groups likely to figure in the Spanish succession.

25X1

[redacted]

25X1

National Intelligence Officer
for Western Europe



*THE SPANISH SUCCESSION:
Strains in the Post-Franco Authoritarian System*

OPR-402
November 1974

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
OFFICE OF POLITICAL RESEARCH

November 1974

THE SPANISH SUCCESSION: STRAINS IN THE
POST-FRANCO AUTHORITARIAN SYSTEM

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FOREWORD

This paper was prepared as part of an OPR research project, "Authoritarianism and Militarism in Southern Europe," scheduled for publication early in 1975. The aim of the project is to develop a better understanding of the separate but often overlapping phenomena of authoritarian rule and direct military involvement in political affairs and to probe the implications of both in a region of considerable strategic importance to the United States. This paper is being published separately at this time because of the growing interest in prospects for Spain after Franco. The appraisal of Franco's blueprint for succession, and what its defects may portend for Madrid and Washington, reflects the author's preliminary observations and conclusions about authoritarianism and militarism, some of which are set forth in the Annex.

The subject matter of this study was discussed with representatives of other offices in both CIA and Department of State, but no attempt at formal coordination was made. Comments and queries are welcome. Please call [redacted]

[redacted]

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THE SPANISH SUCCESSION: STRAINS IN THE
POST-FRANCO AUTHORITARIAN SYSTEM

KEY JUDGMENTS

- Spanish experience demonstrates that authoritarianism can be a relatively stable and effective system of government. Nevertheless, Franco has failed to establish the tried and trusted political institutions needed to perpetuate his system after his departure.
- Pressures for liberalization in Spain are certain to escalate once Franco leaves the scene. Neither the governmental structure that he has designed for his heirs nor the current balance of forces in Spanish society favor an orderly evolution toward effective democratic rule. But the issue of whether or not to liberalize the country's authoritarian system is an open one.
- In any event, the outlook is for a lengthy period of instability caused by contention not only between the forces for and against liberalizing change, but among the different power elements in Franco's complex succession scheme as well.
- Though divided over the issues of further societal reforms and direct involvement in political affairs, the Spanish military establishment will almost certainly intervene in the event of a serious and prolonged breakdown of domestic order.
- While Franco's successors will want to maintain the benefits of reasonably cordial relations with the US, they will be tempted to employ zealous appeals to nationalism (at the expense of US interests) in order to strengthen their position at home.

THE DISCUSSION

After 35 years of personal dictatorship under Generalissimo Francisco Franco, Spain is on the verge of transition to a far more complex form of authoritarian rule. Despite the likely imminence of this change, the current system of getting things done cannot simply be dismissed as no longer relevant. Indeed, some understanding of current practices and problems is essential to gauging the implications of the redistribution of power and corresponding, institutional role changes which will follow Franco's departure.

Spanish experience underscores the linkages between modernizing change, political decay, military intervention, and authoritarian rule. It also demonstrates that authoritarianism can be a relatively stable and effective system of government -- even in a country which has passed well beyond the initial stages of political, social, and economic development.*

* *Despite its many variants, modern-day authoritarianism can be categorized as a distinctive system of rule -- one in essence neither totalitarian nor democratic, and one in which the military establishment generally plays a significant political role. For a further discussion of authoritarianism and militarism, see the Annex.*

Some formal components of Franco's highly personalized variant of authoritarian rule are flawed. Others are rusty from disuse. But, until recently at least, his overall system has worked remarkably well.

I. The Franco Era

The Franco regime has been supported from its inception by a conservative coalition composed of the military establishment; business, financial, and land-owning interests; the National Movement (a pseudo-party which some years ago superseded the *Falange Espanola Tradicionalista* as Spain's sole legal political organization); a varied array of monarchists; and, until recently, most of the Spanish hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church. The privileged political position of these groups has long been institutionalized in the carefully balanced corporatist structure of Spain's principal governmental organs and councils. But although these elites are united in support of the overall political system, they frequently differ among themselves over specific policy issues. Thus, when necessary, Franco has been able to play one group off against another

and thereby insure that none become strong enough to challenge his position as supreme arbiter.

During the early days of Franco's rule coercive force was widely and ruthlessly applied. And although the systemic role of repression has since declined, Madrid's efficient internal security forces have continued to make anti-regime activity a high risk occupation. Many, if not most, of Franco's active opponents have been jailed or forced to flee the country.

But the weak and fragmented state of oppositionist forces within Spain is only partially attributable to police action. Franco has not simply cowed the population. On the contrary, the remarkable balance of his system has long depended upon the positive -- if passive -- acceptance of the majority of his countrymen. This critical element of consent can be traced to the following factors:

--The weight of Spain's hierarchical, elitist, and corporatist traditions.

--The legendary aura surrounding Franco himself.

--A two-fold legacy of the 1936-1939 civil war and its chaotic prelude: (1) the desire of all but a radical fringe to avoid triggering another bloody fratricidal conflict, and (2) a general hostility toward Franco's most militant opponents, the Communists.

--The "economic miracle" of the 1960's and early 1970's which, by sharply raising living standards, has dampened discontent and given more and more people a genuine if fragile stake in the system.

--A modest and gradual political liberalization (*apertura*) highlighted by the 1967 law granting heads of household the right to elect about one-fifth of the members of Spain's unicameral parliament (*Cortes Espanolas*) and by current reforms providing for (1) the indirect election of most of Spain's urban mayors and (2) the

formation of distinctive political "associations" *within* the National Movement.

Unfortunately for Franco's successors, some of these factors (e.g., morbid concern about renewed civil war) have declined in force over time, and one -- Franco's personal stature -- is non-transferable. Moreover, economic contentment is a notoriously unstable political currency. Even under the best of conditions, Madrid might find it difficult to satisfy popular appetites whetted by a decade of increasing living standards. As it is, Spain's economic prospects have recently been clouded by mounting inflationary pressures, the increased cost of petroleum, and the general deterioration of the economic picture in Western Europe.*

In addition, Franco has failed to establish the effective and respected political institutions

* *Europe's economic woes have already found reflection in shrinking earnings from Spain's important tourist industry and in a decline in job opportunities for -- and hard currency remittances from -- nearly one million Spanish emigrant workers.*

needed to perpetuate *his* system once he has left the scene. Of all the institutions he has created, only the cabinet (which has benefited from Franco's willingness to delegate authority over significant areas of administration to hand-picked subordinates) has developed any vitality. The rest have simply lain dormant pending the succession or have been discredited as compliant appendages of dictatorial rule. Indeed, Franco's continued reluctance to grant these institutions any sort of independent life lies at the heart of the most pressing problems he will bequeath to his successors -- mounting labor unrest, a polarization of the political scene along liberal and conservative lines,* continued agitation for Basque and Catalanian autonomy, and overall, a distinct potential for a return to chronic instability.

* *The terms conservative and liberal take on distinctive meanings when applied to Spanish politics. Far from simply evincing a cautious attitude toward change, Spanish conservatives feel uncomfortable with Franco's modest apertura and would resist, by force if necessary, any significant shift in the balance of political power toward populism. Thus, the whole political spectrum is skewed to the right, and many Spaniards who might be classified as liberals by outside observers would be considered centrists in a more democratic society.*

Labor unrest -- aggravated by inflation and the prospect of increasing unemployment -- quite possibly poses the most immediate threat to the stability of post-Franco Spain. The inadequacy of the official Syndical Organization in dealing with workers' problems gave rise to a parallel clandestine labor movement, the Workers' Commissions, in the early 1960's. Initiated largely by young Catholic activists, but now in many cases dominated by Communists, these commissions have survived both internal infighting and repeated government crackdowns to achieve nationwide compass and international support. And although the movement has so far fallen short of its goal of effecting a general strike, it has become increasingly successful in fomenting and organizing labor disputes at the local plant level.

The liberal-conservative split over how to respond to the pressures of modernizing change has to some degree affected all the groups which have traditionally supported the Franco regime, including the military establishment, the business-technocratic

elite, and the National Movement. On balance, most of them have so far remained conservative in outlook. But mounting dismay over the inability or unwillingness of official organs to alleviate what it perceives as social injustice recently drove Spain's Roman Catholic establishment from the ranks of solidly pro-regime forces. Moderate and liberal bishops gained control of the hierarchy in 1972, and since then, the Church has taken a prominent role in the campaign for social and political reforms. This, in turn, has strengthened the convictions of those forces which believe that political liberalization has already gone too far, and thus made it more difficult than ever to strike a happy balance.

Similarly, the failure of Franco's political institutions to accommodate or ameliorate pressures for regional autonomy led to a split in the illegal but moderate Basque Nationalist Party and to the birth in 1960 of a small terrorist group dedicated to the complete independence of the four Basque provinces. This is the group that is believed to have been responsible for the assassination of Prime Minister

Carrero Blanco in December 1973. Further actions of this type might not only seriously disrupt the post-Franco political environment, but could inspire emulation among Catalonian nationalists as well.

In short, despite the beneficial effects of Franco's *apertura*, Spanish political development has not kept pace with the changes of social structure and outlook generated by the vigorous economic growth of the 1960's and increasing exposure to foreign influences. As the result, Franco's once finely tuned system has been thrown out of kilter. By and large, his personal authority and prestige have offset this growing imbalance. But now, in a climate further unsettled by recent events in Portugal, Spanish politics are threatening to reacquire a *praetorian* character.*

* As used here, the adjective *praetorian* denotes a condition characterized by the politicization of all significant social groupings and the lack of political institutions strong enough to mediate, refine, and moderate their interaction. Under these circumstances, contending groups increasingly resort to direct political action (e.g., bribery, coercion, terrorism, work stoppages, and demonstrations), and the military establishment is inexorably drawn toward the center of the political stage. For a pioneering and comprehensive discussion of praetorianism see Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 79-82 and 192-263.


And while Franco's system is not yet beyond salvation, the ability of his successors to halt its erosion will be severely impaired by the complexity of the largely untested governmental structure they will inherit (see chart).

II. The Post-Franco Scene

Franco's passing will mark the end of one-man rule* and the restoration in fact (rather than just in principle) of Spanish monarchy. Theoretically, the Caudillo's designee for future King, 36 year-old Prince Juan Carlos de Borbon, will occupy the key positions -- Chief of State, Generalissimo of the Armed Forces, and Chief of the National Movement. But, according to Franco's plan, the Prime Minister will control the government machinery and act for the King in exercising leadership of the National Movement. In addition, either the Prime Minister or the minister concerned will have to approve every decision taken by the King as Chief of State.

** Although Franco chose to implement constitutional arrangements for dual succession in mid-1973 by giving up the post of Prime Minister, this action in no way diluted his personal power.*

Organization of the Spanish Government



* From three names presented by Council of the REALM

The incumbent Prime Minister, Carlos Arias -- who is expected to retain his present position at least initially when Juan Carlos takes office -- seems to share the young Prince's views on the need for further political and social reforms. Even so, the checks and balances that Franco has built into his succession arrangements provide ample ammunition for a multi-faceted power struggle once he is gone.

Significantly, the title of Caudillo and the extraordinary constitutional powers which rendered Franco "responsible only to God and history" will die with him. Juan Carlos will be legally empowered to resolve disputes between the Cabinet, the *Cortes*, and the judiciary, but Franco's role of supreme arbiter will have passed elsewhere -- to the previously somnolent Council of the Realm. In effect, there will have been a *triple*, rather than a dual, succession.*

* *The Council of the Realm has 17 members: 7 ex officio (the President of the Cortes, the senior prelate among the members of the Cortes, the senior military officer on active duty, the Chief of the High General Staff, and the Presidents of the Supreme Court, Council of State, and Institute of Spain) and 10 elected from among the groups represented in the Cortes.*

The law limits the individuals whom Juan Carlos may appoint as Prime Minister, President of the *Cortes*, or President of the Supreme Court to nominees (in each case, three) proposed by the Council of the Realm. Similarly, he may not dismiss these officials before the end of their appointed terms without the Council's approval. He must also secure the Council's agreement whenever he wishes to veto a law passed by the *Cortes*, hold an extraordinary referendum, adopt measures allowing for decree rule, extend a session of the *Cortes*, or ask the *Cortes* to perform some particularly sensitive act -- such as declaring war or ratifying a treaty that may affect Spanish sovereignty. In addition, the Council of the Realm is charged with ruling on claims referred from the *Cortes* or the National Council alleging that a given law or government action is contrary to either constitutional law or the Fundamental Principles of the National Movement.

These are grave responsibilities to place on a collegiate body composed of representatives of disparate groups. In fact, given the growing rift

between liberal and conservative forces in Spain, Franco's whole succession scheme seems close to unworkable. Effective power is spread too widely among contending elites. Neither Juan Carlos nor Carlos Arias possesses the enormous personal prestige which helped Franco to command the unswerving loyalty of the military establishment, hold his checkered governing coalition together, and mute popular discontent.

Indeed, despite constitutional sanction and personal anointment by Franco, Juan Carlos is likely to encounter widespread skepticism about the legitimacy of his position. There are not too many ardent monarchists left in Spain. Of these, more than a few would prefer to see someone other than Juan Carlos on the throne. Others feel that the oath of fealty to Franco's system which Juan Carlos was required to take in 1969 has demeaned the restoration. Finally, for many Spanish citizens who would otherwise greet the resurrection of Kingly office with resounding indifference, the thought that the considerable powers

accorded to Spain's Chief of State will henceforth be passed on through primogeniture is appalling.

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There will be other constraints on Juan Carlos' effectiveness as well. He will, for example, be restrained by both constitutional law and the aforementioned personal oath from taking any action contrary to the "permanent and unalterable" Principles of the National Movement -- principles which, while subject to differing interpretation, establish Spain as a Catholic, corporatist, syndical, and one-party state. Moreover, major changes in the laws which currently comprise Spain's "open constitution" require approval by both the *Cortes* and popular referendum and thus are likely to be difficult to engineer in the post-Franco environment.

In short, even if Juan Carlos and Carlos Arias could reach full agreement on some innovative course of action, they might well lack the clout to implement

controversial change. What's more, should the two for any reason come to a parting of the ways, Juan Carlos could easily end up with a Prime Minister less amenable to political reform. Of the half dozen men currently considered to be leading contenders for the job, only one, Manuel Fraga Iribarne, seems to be as interested as the present Prime Minister in liberalizing the system.

Bold departures are, therefore, unlikely in the immediate post-Franco period. But, unless a dramatic failure of Portugal's newly-launched experiment with liberalization greatly discourages Spain's evermore numerous proponents of change, cautious adherence to past policies will only exacerbate the polarization of Spanish society and thus lead to greater instability.

In the absence of healthy political institutions, Franco's successors will be hard pressed to contain either inter-elite disputes over the issue of reform or growing popular discontent. Most importantly, perhaps, they will lack a strong and broadly based

political party capable of co-opting moderate opposition leaders and of giving their views some representation in the *Cortes* and top advisory councils. (Despite recent efforts at reform, the introverted and elitist National Movement still falls far short of this mark.) Currently threatening economic problems could easily compound these woes. And if domestic turbulence reaches serious proportions, Spain's military establishment can be expected to emerge from the political wings and attempt to impose its own solution.

III. The Ultimate Arbiter

Not only is the military still the most powerful institution in Spain, but it could claim full constitutional authority for such intervention. The 1967 Organic Law of the State specifically charges the armed forces with the duty of guaranteeing the defense of the institutional system. Moreover, an organizational vehicle for the exercise of this political mandate already exists in the National Defense Board (*Junta de Defensa Nacional*), a council

which normally advises the Prime Minister on security and national defense policy.*

Nevertheless, a decision as to when and how to intervene is unlikely to be easily reached. Like other Spanish institutions, the military establishment is divided over how much political reform is desirable in the post-Franco era. It is also divided over the question of what political role the armed forces should play.

A small but growing liberal minority, incorporating officers of all ages and ranks, favors faster and more meaningful political and social reform. Exhibiting both a professional and political distaste for internal policing functions, these officers are convinced that widespread domestic disorder would oblige the military to take at least some direct responsibility for policy making in order to curb the causes for unrest. Although their mentor, Lieutenant General Manuel Diez-Alegria, was unceremoniously removed

** Appropriately enough, this board bears the same name as the first governing body established by the Nationalists during the Spanish Civil War.*

from his post as Chief of the High General Staff in June 1974, he is still looked to by some as a potential Spanish Spinola.*

At the other end of the spectrum, a somewhat more outspoken group opposes any relaxation of authoritarian rule and vigorously maintains that the military should and must assume active responsibility for Spain's political future. Most senior officers, however, would seem to prefer to avoid a more active political role. Although conservatively inclined, they would probably support any regime -- including a mildly liberal one -- so long as it seemed reasonably capable of maintaining order, preserved the essential features of Franco's system, and did not threaten military prerogatives.

As a group, the junior officers appear to be less tolerant than most of their superiors with respect

* For a brief but thoughtful analysis of Lt. Gen. Diez-Alegria's published views, see K. Medhurst, "The Politics of the Spanish Army," Government and Opposition, Volume 9, Number 2, Spring 1974, pp. 227-235.

to the maneuvers and foibles of civilian politicians. For one thing, they have more cause for grievance over current pay and promotion policies. For another, they have a better feel for the impact of tight budgetary restrictions and societal pressures for change on the morale and efficiency of the troops they command. But they too entertain a variety of conflicting views on Spain's political future. Although some junior officers clearly sympathize with the goals and behavior of the Armed Forces Movement in Portugal, many more appear far less concerned over civil liberties than with the need to maintain domestic order and to enhance the prestige and capabilities of the military establishment. Some may even be inclined to favor intervention in behalf of a radical authoritarianism of the right.

The absence of more widespread disenchantment with the basic features of Franco's system stems in part from the fact that, unlike their Portuguese counterparts, Spain's young officers have not suffered the frustrations of seemingly pointless and endless

colonial wars. Perhaps equally important, however, has been the gradual broadening of the social base of the Spanish Army's officer corps.* It was once drawn largely from the sons of officers, but in recent years, these stalwarts increasingly have either joined other services or followed their middle class contemporaries into regular universities in pursuit of non-military careers. Their place in the Army's commissioned ranks has been taken by representatives of lower social strata, primarily by the sons of NCOs. Such ambitious but economically insecure officers tend to be especially zealous guardians of military privilege and prestige.

Whatever their other differences, it is clear from the above that most Spanish officers agree that the military has the right and duty to intervene in the event of a serious and prolonged breakdown of domestic order. Thus, a relatively small shift in the current balance of forces within the military

* *K. Medhurst, op. cit., p. 231.*

establishment could significantly affect the political outlook for Spain in the years just ahead.

No duplication of recent events in Portugal is likely. If Spain's military liberals and moderates gain ascendancy, they are more apt to attempt to work through and to improve the existing system than to promote rapid democratization. But in the event that such men felt obliged to intervene directly, some readjustment of the power structure would almost certainly ensue -- perhaps a constitutional upgrading of the Prime Minister and the National Defense Board at the expense of the King and the Council of the Realm. And if accompanied by efforts to revitalize other key institutions -- particularly the *Cortes*, the Syndical Organization, and the National Movement -- such changes might restore Spain's authoritarian system to something near its early equilibrium.

Should hardline military elements prevail, however, Spain's prospects would be gloomy. Men of that stripe might either seek to install a military

dictatorship or simply to veto all further liberalizing change. In either case, dissent would be forcefully repressed. The overall climate would probably foster additional economic difficulties. Latent instability would constantly threaten to erupt into open crisis.

IV. The Outlook

Fanned in part by the magnetic attraction of European social democracy and a growing desire to strengthen Madrid's economic and political links with Western Europe, pressures for internal liberalization in Spain are certain to escalate once Franco leaves the scene. But neither the governmental structure that the Caudillo has designed for his heirs nor the current balance of forces in Spanish society favor an orderly evolution toward a significantly more liberal form of rule. Indeed, whatever the intentions of Juan Carlos and his designated Prime Minister, conflict and crisis will probably govern the actual course of political developments in Madrid in the immediate post-Franco era.

Just when and how Franco's political legacy is altered will depend on too many internal and external variables to permit confident prediction. Change may be precipitated early, or Spain's contending elites and restless population may give the new regime a fairly long grace period. Either way, the outlook is for a fairly lengthy period of instability -- one which could be considerably prolonged if hardline conservative forces win the upper hand.

V. Implications for the United States

It is this potential for long-term instability, not the likelihood of hostility on the part of any of Spain's principal contending factions, that poses the greatest threat to US interests. Indeed, if left to its own devices, almost any post-Franco governing coalition would probably try to maintain reasonably warm ties with Washington out of sheer self-interest. But if, as seems likely, it is under challenge in an unstable political environment, that same self-interest may dictate adoption of an assertive nationalism -- a

development which, together with the increased threat to life and property arising from sporadic outbreaks of domestic violence, could cause headaches both in Washington and in several other NATO capitals.

The US interests which might be affected are considerable. In large part, of course, they derive from Spain's strategic location. Under a series of three executive agreements concluded since 1953 (the latest of which is due to expire in September 1975), Madrid has granted the US a military presence at one naval base, three airfields, and a number of smaller support facilities. Presumably, America's defense strategists would like to retain relatively unrestricted access to, and use of, most of these installations for at least a few more years. For its part, the Spanish Government has already introduced the spectre of growing popular misgivings over the extent and nature of these defense arrangements as a bargaining counter in negotiations with the US.

But base rights are not Washington's only concern. Spain's burgeoning economy has attracted over

900 million dollars in private American investment. Despite the distorting effects of Madrid's trade preference agreement with the European Economic Community, the Spanish market currently absorbs over two billion dollars worth of American exports annually. On the international plane, any exacerbation of Madrid's long-standing dispute with London over Gibraltar or hardening of Spain's already outspoken opposition to the right of "free transit" through the Gibraltar Strait would be unwelcome.

All told, some relatively enlightened form of authoritarian rule would seem to offer the greatest hope for Spanish stability (and therefore the fewest problems for the US) in the decade ahead. Given Spain's current stage of social and economic development, a rigid right-wing dictatorship -- particularly a military one -- would quite likely lead to a situation similar to that which prevailed in Greece earlier this year. On the other hand, the Spanish political scene would still seem to be too vulnerable to the disruptive impact of modernizing change to give root to stable democracy any time soon.

ANNEX

SOME PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
ABOUT AUTHORITARIANISM AND MILITARISM

In an authoritarian regime, predominant power is exercised by a single leader or narrow autocratic elite neither responsible to the general public nor fully subject to legal restraints. At the same time, however, a limited number of relatively autonomous special interest groups can and do influence the political process. Indeed, despite the fact that the leadership of an authoritarian regime effectively stands above the law, its freedom of action is restricted in often predictable ways by the constant need to manage and manipulate interest group pressures and conflict.*

The factors favoring authoritarianism and military intervention in politics are similar, and

* *The author owes the concept of a distinctive authoritarian system of rule and his understanding of many of authoritarianism's characteristic features to Professor Juan J. Linz. Linz's earliest and most complete statement of his model is presented in his "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain," in Cleavages, Ideologies, and Party Systems, ed. Erik Allardt and Yrjo Littunen (Helsinki: Westermark Society, 1964), pp. 291-342.*

these factors tend to be especially prevalent and potent in developing countries. In fact, most of them arise from -- or impact on -- the process of modernization. Not only does the modernization process itself favor efforts to centralize and expand political authority, but its attendant strains can overtax and erode weakly-rooted or obsolescent political institutions. Political anemia or decay, in turn, breeds domestic disorder and thus invites imposition (or reimposition) of authoritarian rule.

Authoritarianism places far less arduous demands on a society than either totalitarianism or representative democracy. In addition, it is adaptable to a wide range of local conditions. For many nations it is, in effect, the only feasible system of rule. For many more -- particularly for those with long-standing authoritarian traditions -- it offers an easy way out when the going gets rough.

Thus, for much of the world today, authoritarian rule and military intervention in politics should be considered as norms rather than aberrations. Moreover,

the increasing problems and tensions generated by the processes of development and modernization in this era of technological revolution and world wide economic strains will by themselves operate to perpetuate these two phenomena -- and perhaps to spread them still further.

The record shows that under certain circumstances, at least, authoritarianism can be a relatively effective form of rule. Nevertheless, the key internal balances and trade-offs upon which the successful operation and stability of authoritarian rule depend are easily upset. Hence, authoritarianism is prone to repeated crisis and resort to political violence (both government-sponsored and oppositionist). Sometimes such turbulence serves as a catalyst for evolutionary change. More often it results in paralysis and the emergence of still another ineffective authoritarian regime.

In aggregate, military regimes tend to fare no better and no worse than their authoritarian civilian counterparts. Indeed, militarism is a

highly variable phenomenon. Although the process of modernization has increasingly affected both military motives and capabilities with respect to direct involvement in political affairs, no national military establishment -- no matter what its size or degree of professionalization -- is a monolithic institution. On the contrary, each tends to reflect the currents and divisions affecting the country at large. Thus, while it is possible to catalog the conditions which invite military intervention, the form and direction that such intervention takes, in any given case, will in large part depend on which military faction seizes the initiative and which domestic allies it chooses to court or support.

Finally, whether military or civilian, authoritarian regimes in countries approaching a middle stage of social and economic development are subject to a particularly broad range of destabilizing pressures. And while such regimes tend to be in the best position to create the preconditions for possible transition to a more democratic form of rule, their errors and failures also carry the greatest risk of spawning a radical dictatorship of either the left or right.

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