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8 APR 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT : Recommended Publication of Selected Portions
of the Material Contained in the so-called
McNamara Report, "The Roles of Airstrikes in
Attaining U.S. Objectives in North Vietnam"

1. As you know, by order of the Director of Central Intel-
ligence, the referenced report has been made available only to
Secretary McNamara and to selected recipients within this Agency.
We do not question Director Raborn's judgment on the sensitivity
of the report and are not seeking to give it broad distribution
in its present form.

2. However, the report embodies many man-hours of careful
research which we believe can be completely divorced from the
sensitive portions (primary recommendations), and made available
throughout the intelligence community. I am therefore submitting
for your consideration a series of steps whereby the research data
in the report could be published independently of the sensitive
material.

3. The summary of the report would not be disseminated but
material in the appendixes would either be published as separate
reports or incorporated with other material in the following
sequence:

      a. The immediate publication in a single report, after
making the necessary modifications to delete any references
to recommendations, of the present Appendix B, "The Rolling
Thunder Attack," and Appendix C, "An Appraisal of the Effects
of the Bombing of North Vietnam." This report would put
under one cover an operations analysis of the actual air
operations carried out in the Rolling Thunder program through
1965 and our estimates of the economic and military damage
resulting from these attacks. We believe such a report could
be a basic reference work for analysts in the intelligence
community dealing with the problem of air strikes against
North Vietnam.

25X1

b. The immediate publication of Appendix E, "The Effective-
ness of Air Attacks in Other Wars." This report is essentially
an abbreviated historical analysis focusing on the interdiction
efforts against Germany and Japan in World War II and more parti-
cularly on similar operations during the Korean War. We believe
this summary volume would be a valuable reference work for the
intelligence community.

c. We propose to incorporate a good deal of the material
now in Appendix A, "The Logistic Supply of Viet Cong and North
Vietnamese Forces in South Vietnam" in a somewhat broader
publication that would be issued late in May. The new logistic
and requirements study would include the results of the research
we now have under way as our contribution to the forthcoming
NIE 14.3-66, "North Vietnamese Military Potential for Fighting
in South Vietnam." The title of this NIE is somewhat mis-
leading since its primary focus is on supply and logistic
problems. While we have published many abbreviated papers on
these subjects, we believe there is a need for a thoroughgoing
analysis which would also provide an independent estimate of re-
quirements necessary to support the insurgency in the South.

d. Finally, in late June we have scheduled a publication
on North Vietnam which will cover its current functioning as
a war supporting mechanism and its potential for so doing. One
part of this report would be an analysis of individual industries
in North Vietnam, including their dependence on outside supply
and their contribution to the insurgency in the South and to the
military defense of North Vietnam. We would propose to in-
corporate pertinent material now in Appendix D of the McNamara
report entitled "Potential of Air Attacks as a Weapon to Achieve
Rolling Thunder Objectives." The target system references would,
of course, be deleted.

4. We request your approval of the course of action proposed
in paragraph 3, above, because we believe that it would make a posi-
tive contribution both to the intelligence community and to the policy-
making level of the Government. It would also provide a more complete
return on the very large investment needed to produce the basic report.

WILLIAM W. MORELL, JR.
Director
Research and Reports

Attachments:
As Stated

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