


~~SECRET~~

SNIE 42-2-62 ADVCON  
7 September 1962

*SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE*

# SHORT-TERM OUTLOOK FOR SOUTH KOREA

NOTE: This is an advance copy of the conclusions of this estimate as approved by the United States Intelligence Board. The complete text will be circulated within five days of this issuance.



- Position of the Regime
- Public Attitudes
- ROK-US Relations
- The Communist Threat

Central Intelligence Agency

~~SECRET~~

*Submitted by the*  
**DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE**

*The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force.*

*Concurred in by the*  
**UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD**

*on 7 September 1962. Concurring were the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.*

**CLASSIFICATION OF TITLE IS OFFICIAL USE ONLY  
WHEN USED SEPARATELY**

**GROUP 1  
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING  
AND DECLASSIFICATION**

**WARNING**

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.

S-E-C-R-E-T

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

7 September 1962

SUBJECT: SNIE 42-2-62: SHORT-TERM OUTLOOK FOR SOUTH KOREA

## THE PROBLEM

To assess the political situation in South Korea and to estimate probable developments over the next few months.

## CONCLUSIONS

A. The recent outbreak of factional strife within the military junta which rules South Korea has been caused largely by controversy over the expanding role of Colonel Kim Chong-p'il and the ROK Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Quarreling between the senior officers and the Eighth Class group of field grade officers led by Kim will continue, but it now seems likely that the two factions will seek to avoid a showdown. We believe that the junta, with General Pak Chong-hui as the key figure, will remain in power until the elections scheduled for 1963, and will exercise a large degree of control over the new civilian government. (Paras. 1-5, 9-12).

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T

B. The junta currently has little popular support. Blatantly rigged elections or further economic deterioration could cause riots and demonstrations. While the regime can suppress local outbursts, massive public demonstrations could trigger coup attempts by disgruntled military leaders, perhaps acting in concert with presently disbarred political elements. The outcome of such attempts cannot be estimated, but the government which emerged from such a situation would almost certainly require a large degree of backing from the ROK military. (Paras. 6-8, 11)

C. ROK-US relations will continue to be difficult over the next few months. There will probably be some attempts to improve liaison with US officials in economic matters, although the CIA will continue its largely uncontrolled economic activities. In political matters, it is doubtful that either Pak or Kim will accept US suggestions which might impose limitations on their actions. Despite strong US pressures, it is doubtful that the issue of ROK-Japanese relations will soon be resolved. Only on the military plane will ROK-US relations remain reasonably open and friendly. (Paras. 13-17)

D. Factional strife within the junta, increased public apathy and even hostility toward the regime, and strained relations with the US have increased the danger of Communist subversive activities. Appeals to Korean nationalism and for peaceful unification may prove more effective than in

- 2 -

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

the past. During the next few months, a real Communist threat to the regime is unlikely to develop, but if the political erosion, which has already commenced, is not halted and if economic stagnation persists, the problem of countering Communist subversion will become far more serious. (Paras. 18-20)

- 3 -

S-E-C-R-E-T