

JAN 1961

NIE 64.2-61<sup>352</sup>

24 January 1961

~~SECRET~~

*Matthias*

# NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER 64.2-61

## PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FEDERATION OF NIGERIA

Submitted by the  
**DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE**

*The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.*

Concurred in by the  
**UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD**

*on 24 January 1961. Concurring were The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB, and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.*

DOCUMENT NO. 1  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. I  
 DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: \_\_\_\_\_  
AUTH: HR 70-2  
DATE: 10-16-81 REVIEWER: 009256

RETURN TO ARCHIVES & RECORDS CENTER  
IMMEDIATELY AFTER USE  
198 79B101280X 190

~~SECRET~~

No 348

209703

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

### DISSEMINATION NOTICE

1. This estimate was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy is for the information and use of the recipient and of persons under his jurisdiction on a need to know basis. Additional essential dissemination may be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments.

- a. Director of Intelligence and Research, for the Department of State
- b. Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
- c. Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), for the Department of the Navy
- d. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force
- e. Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for The Joint Staff
- f. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission
- g. Assistant Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
- h. Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, for the Department of Defense
- i. Director of NSA for the National Security Agency
- j. Assistant Director for Central Reference, CIA, for any other Department or Agency

2. This copy may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by arrangement with the Office of Central Reference, CIA.

3. When an estimate is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain it for a period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the estimate should either be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be requested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-69/2, 22 June 1953.

4. The title of this estimate when used separately from the text, should be classified:  
**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

#### WARNING

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

#### DISTRIBUTION:

White House  
National Security Council  
Department of State  
Department of Defense  
Operations Coordinating Board  
Atomic Energy Commission  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

~~SECRET~~

## PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FEDERATION OF NIGERIA

### THE PROBLEM

To estimate probable developments in the Federation of Nigeria over the next two years or so.

### CONCLUSIONS

1. Nigeria, which achieved independence on 1 October 1960, promises to develop into a moderate and influential African state. Independence of this most populous African state came without bitterness toward the UK, its former colonial ruler. Nigeria has responsible leadership, a substantial civil service trained in internal administration, and security forces able to maintain domestic order. The general outlook for stability and internal cohesion appears favorable. (*Paras. 6, 16-18, 21, 23*)

2. However, Nigeria's population is made up of a wide diversity of ethnic groups, and each of its three regions is controlled by a major tribal group and its attendant political party. The Federal Government is now controlled by a coalition. There are wide social, cultural, economic and political divergencies between the regions and conflicting interests and as-

pirations contribute to tensions within the federation. As the excitement of independence recedes, and as pressures for economic and social progress and reform grow, strains will be put on the federal system. The two southern regions, in particular, will press for a stronger central government and more radical solutions of internal problems. (*Paras. 7-15, 19-20, 22*)

3. Nigeria's economy is predominantly agricultural, and its foreign exchange earnings come principally from the export of agricultural products whose prices are subject to fluctuations beyond Nigerian control. Before independence, Nigeria had achieved a fair degree of economic development, and there are prospects for further progress. Domestic capital is, however, scarce and Nigeria will look to the UK and the West for considerable assistance. Although the present leaders are not anxious to turn to the Bloc for aid, it will be difficult for them to reject attractive offers which compete with or supplement Western assistance. (*Paras. 26-21*)

NOTE: The following Annexes are attached:

- A. Military and Security Forces.
- B. The British Trust Territory of the Cameroons.
- C. Political, Social, and Economic Background Data.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

4. In foreign affairs Nigeria will seek a position of leadership in Africa. In doing so, it will attempt to play a moderating role between differing African factions but probably will find itself most frequently aligned with the conservative states and opposed to the radicalism of states like Ghana and Guinea. On issues believed to involve colonialism, however, Nigeria will almost always find itself in agreement with the majority of Afro-Asian states. As Nigeria manifests a growing sense of independence on international issues, British political influence will decline. While the US now enjoys some prestige among Nigerian leaders, US relations with Nigeria will be plagued by the former's close identification with

European colonial powers, by Nigerian suspicions that US attitudes toward Africa are too heavily influenced by cold war considerations, and by Nigerian sensitivity on racial issues. (*Paras. 32-36, 38*)

5. In accordance with its announced policy of nonalignment, Nigeria will probably establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and some European satellites during the next year or so. The diplomatic and economic presence of Bloc countries within Nigeria will give them opportunities for increasing their influence at the expense of the West. Nevertheless, Western influence will be more affected by Western policies and actions on specific African issues than by Bloc initiatives within Nigeria. (*Para. 39*)

## DISCUSSION

### I. INTRODUCTION

6. Nigeria, which achieved independence on 1 October 1960, is Africa's most populous state—with about 35 million people, or about one-seventh of the continental total—and is potentially one of its most important. Unlike many African states, Nigeria had a gradual and relatively thorough preparation for independence. Its leadership has received broad experience in internal self-government under successive constitutional reforms since World War II, there had been a fair amount of economic development, and the country has a federal constitution which represents a compromise between national requirements and the jealously guarded interests of Nigeria's regional administrations. The country also has been bequeathed the beginnings of a modern communications network and a relatively well trained administrative cadre. Finally, the absence of a British white-settler population has smoothed the transition to independence.

7. Nevertheless, more than fifty years of British colonial tutelage has not eliminated the many tribal, religious, and political divisions which impede the formation of a nation. Diversity is reflected at almost every level of national life, ranging from Nigeria's three separate regions to the many small tribal communities within each of the latter. All in all, Nigeria probably has between 200 and 250 different tribes or tribal groupings, speaking mutually unintelligible languages or dialects and varying in size from as few as 50 thousand to as many as five million. Approximately 40 percent of the population is Moslem, concentrated largely in the North and the West, and another 20 percent is Christian. There is also a myriad of animistic cults which are followed by virtually all others, and remain influential even among many Moslems and Christians. Even the economic configuration of Nigeria is regional. The principal cash crops are peanuts in the North, oil palm products in the East, and cocoa in the West.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3

8. The tribal background of most Nigerians and their natural inclination—at least in the two southern regions—towards flamboyance in political behavior, often tend to create an impression of volatility and instability. The exaggerated public postures and constant maneuvering of many Nigerian politicians add to this impression. At the core of Nigerian politics, however, is the rivalry among the leaders of Nigeria's three regions.

9. Each of Nigeria's three regions is dominated by a distinctive ethnic group, though in each there are substantial minorities.<sup>1</sup> In the Western Region, the more than five million Yoruba people have a long history of formally organized kingdoms and urban settlements. Under the continuing influence of their ruling chiefs they have developed a strong sense of ethnic solidarity. The five and a half million Ibos of the Eastern Region, in contrast, have historically lacked centralized leadership and major urban centers. However, because of the high density of population and the close proximity of their many villages the Ibos have developed a high degree of cultural homogeneity. Generally more individualistic and adaptable to Western ways than the other tribal groups, the Ibos are heavily represented in the Federal Government, and it was among them that Nigeria's first modern political movement arose.

10. An even more distinctive pattern exists in the Northern Region which, unlike the southern rain-forest belt, is for the most part arid and sparsely populated. However, with its large size—twice that of the two southern regions combined—the North accounts for slightly over half of Nigeria's total population. The area is dominated by the Moslem tribes of the Fulani and the Hausa who had, by the early 19th century, established a series of tightly controlled states (emirates) recognizing the spiritual leadership of the Sultan of Sokoto. After the British took over the North at the beginning of the 20th century, they administered the area by a system of indirect rule, using the existing pattern of government, and the region has remained under

<sup>1</sup> See Annex C.

the domination of an autocratic feudal aristocracy which has systematically discouraged modernizing influences. For this reason, and because of the North's isolation and relative poverty, it is economically and educationally the most backward of the three regions.

11. The antagonisms existing between the regions are deep-seated and numerous. The Ibo and Yoruba-dominated South, which has registered substantial educational and other gains under British tutelage, regards the North as backward and reactionary while at the same time remaining fearful of its warlike traditions. The Northerners in turn despise the Southerners as being essentially of slave stock and racially inferior. Political cooperation between Ibo and Yoruba is impeded by historical antagonism, aggravated by the aggressive individualism and competitive nature of the former and the cultural pride of the latter.

## II. POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

12. Nigeria's developing political system has reflected its ethnic and regional divisions. The regional bias of Nigerian politics was greatly encouraged by British colonial practice which, by first providing for Nigerian participation in government only at the local and regional levels, facilitated the development of strong regional political machines.

13. As a result, each of the parties draws upon a separate group for its basic strength. The National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), founded by Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe ("Zik"), is primarily the spokesman for the dominant Ibo group in the Eastern Region, although it has consistently sought to develop a following in the other regions. Similarly, the Action Group (AG) of Chief Obofemi Awolowo ("Awo") is associated with Western Region Yoruba leadership, although more recently it too has sought to extend its influence in the other regions. The Northern People's Congress (NPC), with a plurality in the national parliament, is essentially a group controlled by the Northern Region's autocratic rulers to preserve their power in the face of intruding and competitive political in-

~~SECRET~~

fluences. Its dominant figure is Sir Ahmadu Bello, Premier of the North.<sup>2</sup>

14. Various minor parties—mainly splinter groups or representatives of ethnic minorities—have come and gone from the Nigerian scene. Probably the most important at present are two rivals of the NPC: (a) the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), a party of Hausa petty traders, artisans, and students led by Aminu Kano, which entered the 1959 elections in the North with NCNC support, on a platform calling for more rapid political and social progress; and (b) the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC), led by J. S. Tarka, which with AG support campaigned for creation of a separate "Middle Belt" state in the southern portion of the Northern Region.

15. The federal constitution promulgated prior to independence represents a compromise between the conflicting political aspirations of the three regions and was agreed to only with difficulty. Largely to overcome Northern fears of a strong Southern-dominated central government, the present constitution allocates considerable powers to the regions. However, the Federal Government retains exclusive jurisdiction in such fields as foreign affairs, defense, and monetary control, and shares responsibility with the regions for public order and certain other functions.<sup>3</sup> As a result of the present arrangement, the NPC sees in the federal system the means to safeguard its regional interests, while the remaining two major participant groups retain the hope of eventually establishing Southern hegemony.

<sup>2</sup> He is also Sardauna of Sokoto, a traditional title not to be confused with that of Sultan of Sokoto, a position to which Sir Ahmadu Bello hopes to succeed on the death of the present Sultan.

<sup>3</sup> Federal power is ultimately vested in a directly elected Federal House of Representatives apportioned on the basis of population, with 167 of the 305 seats allotted to the North, as against 73 for the East, 62 for the West, and 3 for the Lagos Federal District. The fact that the Northern Region is allotted a majority of seats gives its leaders a check on the scope of federal activities, as long as they can control the Northern constituencies.

### III. POLITICAL PROSPECTS

16. Thus far the established federal system has worked out reasonably well, and prospects appear favorable for overcoming most threats to Nigeria's internal stability for at least the next year or two. The December 1959 elections evoked a high degree of popular interest and participation. Despite some isolated disturbances, notably over attempts by other parties to gain votes in NPC territory, the balloting went off smoothly, with the NPC winning 142 seats, the NCNC-NEPU alliance 89, and the AG and its allies 73. Although the two Southern parties might have formed a majority coalition, fear of Northern secession together with AG-NCNC antagonisms fostered cooperation between the NPC and the NCNC. A coalition was formed in which the NCNC accepted Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa of the NPC as federal Prime Minister with the understanding that Dr. Azikiwe would become Governor General after independence and that the NCNC would receive a generous number of federal cabinet portfolios.

17. Hence Nigeria has started off under a government possessing a large parliamentary majority; among the country's major party heads, only Chief Awolowo is relegated to the opposition. Although Balewa is a relatively little known figure who was thrust into the Premiership in 1957 only because the real leader of the NPC, the Sardauna of Sokoto, preferred to remain in the North, he is a responsible and skillful statesman who has already demonstrated real interest in making the federal scheme work smoothly. The flamboyant Dr. Azikiwe has long been Nigeria's best known nationalist figure, and as Governor General will probably be helpful in promoting the concept of national unity. At least within the cabinet, partisan differences between the NPC and NCNC appear to have been minimized, with both elements apparently convinced that the Federal Government must move cautiously and conservatively.

18. Another encouraging development since independence has been the growing recognition by numerous political spokesmen of the need for common agreement on domestic

~~SECRET~~

5

issues and for expanding national loyalties if Nigeria is to play an influential role in Africa. As a result, leaders in the Eastern and Western Regions have cooperated in efforts to enhance the public stature of Balewa as Federal Prime Minister, somewhat to the chagrin of the Sardauna of Sokoto. In addition, a greater willingness to compromise on major problems is becoming apparent among the capable and relatively conservative Premiers of the Western and Eastern Regions—Chief Samuel Akintola and Dr. Michael Okpara respectively—as well as recognition that Nigeria must rely upon the support of British and other foreign technicians and administrative personnel for some time to come.

19. Nevertheless, there remain under the surface a great number of conflicting interests and aspirations which, if pushed too far, could seriously disturb the present delicate balance of political forces and threaten Nigeria's stability and unity. Political skirmishing, often bitter, between the AG and the NCNC will probably continue in the more closely contested constituencies, and the NCNC as well as the AG will probably be involved in efforts to undermine the NPC's preponderant strength in the North. One method of doing this would be through the creation of new regions. There have been many suggestions by Southerners along this line—the most concrete involving the UMBC proposal to carve a separate state out of the Tiv tribal area, where its principal strength lies, and out of the neighboring "Middle Belt" areas of Northern Nigeria. Although the NPC has sufficient strength to block legislation to create additional states, the minorities in the border areas, with strong AG support, will probably continue to agitate the issue, sometimes violently.

20. The leaders of the NCNC and the AG are likely to come under increasing pressure from younger and more radical elements within their parties to push for more vigorous policies both at home and abroad—e.g., to adopt a more neutralist and actively nationalist foreign policy, to speed "Nigerianization" of the civil service (in which the better educated

Ibos and Yorubas would fare better than their Northern competitors), and to make maximum use of federal power in the field of economic and social reform. There might even be pressure from NCNC radicals to transform Nigeria into a republic under a presidential system headed by Dr. Azikiwe. Underlying most of these issues is the basic conflict posed by the glaring disparity in political, economic, and social development between the backward North and the two more advanced southern regions—the conflict between the desire of the Southerners to modernize the North and the desire of the Northern leaders to maintain their traditional institutions and ascendancy.

21. We consider it unlikely that any of these problems will get out of hand in the next year or so. Despite probable growing pressure from radical elements, Nigeria's governing institutions will probably remain in the hands of experienced and generally conservative leaders who appear convinced of the need to work together and who probably have, in the present parliamentary system, a reasonably effective means of working out their differences peacefully. Although political, labor, and tribal disputes are likely to produce sporadic local outbreaks, the military and other security forces appear capable of handling all but the most widespread disturbances.

22. The North may present a special problem. Regional elections are to be held in the North within the next few months and may be marked by police repression of NEPU and other rivals of the NPC. Should this occur, NEPU might adopt extremist tactics and is capable of fomenting some violence and disorder. However, we believe that such disorders, if they take place, could be contained by the Nigerian security forces. Although NEPU has received financial aid from Ghana's Convention People's Party and has recently allowed some of its members to go to Bloc countries for "training in political organization," the party has been subject to a number of internal dissensions and is not yet particularly strong.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

6

23. Nigeria's longer range prospects for remaining a unified nation are reasonably good, although there will be continuing threats to internal political stability. The obstacles to the continuance of the existing post-independence atmosphere of harmony and cooperation are formidable. The disparate aims of the two coalition partners will make it difficult for them to agree on positive programs. While the Northern leaders will probably attempt to stave off radical change in their region through piecemeal reforms, the pressures on the old order there—and the potential for conflict—will gradually increase. Throughout Nigeria, traditional institutions and relationships will be undermined by the process of economic and social change, and in time some realignment of political parties and leadership groups appears likely. Popular enthusiasm over independence will almost certainly decline, leaving an undercurrent of disillusionment over corruption and over the almost inevitable failure of the government to meet the extravagant hopes generated by independence. At least for the next few years, such disillusionment is more likely to be expressed in labor and political agitation than in open revolt.

24. In the event of major outbreaks, the role of the security forces would become more critical. These forces are British trained and equipped and still contain a large preponderance of British officers. They appear capable of dealing with any but large-scale political rebellion.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, the government is likely to go slow in "Nigerianization" of the security forces, in order to maintain their status as a reliable, nonpolitical arm of government. However, their reliability in the event of serious internal trouble is far from certain. The mixed ethnic composition of the security forces, with the Nigerian officers coming principally from the South and the enlisted men principally from the North, could create difficulties in the event of serious internal disturbances. And while the apolitical tradition inculcated by the British remains strong, some African officers could become

<sup>4</sup> See Annex A—Military and Security Forces.

sufficiently disillusioned with procrastination and corruption in the government to involve themselves in political matters.

25. There is no known Communist party in Nigeria, but a few Communists and pro-Communists are active, chiefly in the small, poorly organized labor movement. The most effective penetration has been among the leadership of the recently established Trades Union Congress (NTUC), which receives support from Ghana and the WFTU. The NTUC is strongly critical of what it considers the present government's overly conservative approach to social and economic problems and the NTUC endorses the efforts of Ghana and Guinea to form a "neutralist" all-African trade union movement. Many unions, however, have remained loyal to the Trades Union Congress of Nigeria (TUCN), which is affiliated with the anti-Communist ICFTU. While strikes could temporarily immobilize Nigeria's transport and communications facilities, the government retains a substantial capability for retaliating against the unions.

#### IV. ECONOMIC PROSPECTS

26. Despite substantial economic growth since World War II, Nigeria remains an underdeveloped country, and a large proportion of the population supports itself by subsistence farming. Even within the money economy, agriculture employs more than three-quarters of the labor force. Of the total estimated potential Nigerian labor force of nine million, only 40 thousand persons are employed in medium and large-scale industry. Three commodities—cocoa, peanuts, and palm oil products—account for two-thirds of Nigeria's exports, and 85 percent of Nigeria's export earnings come from agricultural products of all kinds, also including rubber, coffee, bananas, cotton, benniseed, hides and skins, and timber. Nevertheless, the expansion of Nigeria's light industry has been impressive, as has the development of oil resources in the Eastern Region by a Shell-British Petroleum consortium. The country's coal and iron resources and its hydroelectric potential could also provide the basis for further development.

SECRET



~~SECRET~~

7

27. Given the commitment of all Nigerian parties and leaders to economic expansion and modernization, the problem of continuing economic growth will remain a major concern of the new government. The gross national product (GNP) rose from \$2.4 billion in 1956 to \$2.8 billion in 1960 and real per capita income by about three percent annually. In view of the weak base of Nigerian manufacturing and mining,<sup>5</sup> capital formation is heavily dependent upon earnings from agricultural exports. In recent years bumper crops and a large volume of exports have buoyed hopes for economic growth. However, beginning in 1956, Nigeria has had a balance of payments deficit every year due to low export prices, heavy capital goods expenditures, and growing consumer imports.

28. Most business or industrial establishments of any major importance are controlled by foreigners. Modern commerce is dominated by non-Nigerian trading companies and Federal Government export and marketing agencies. Substantial British private investment has secured for the UK a particularly influential position in the Nigerian economy.

29. Current development programs are rapidly depleting the uncommitted portion of the Nigerian Government's foreign exchange holdings, largely derived from sales of agricultural products abroad. During 1960 the external debt of the Federal Government for the first time exceeded its total sterling reserves, changing the Federal Government's position to that of an international debtor. To finance development programs the Federal Government probably will pursue three approaches simultaneously over the next few years: (a) continue to run current deficits on Nigeria's balance of payments to the full extent of its ability; (b) reduce the sterling backing of Nigeria's currency; and (c) attract as much foreign capital (loans, investments, and grant aid) and technical assistance as

<sup>5</sup> Mineral production and manufacturing (including utilities) each accounts for less than five percent of GNP. However, Nigerian production of columbium, approximately one-half of the world supply, is of considerable strategic interest to the US.

possible. The UK has promised to make \$47 million available through 1962 for Nigeria's 1955-1962 development program, as well as extending assurances of future loans and technical assistance. However, these offerings have fallen far short of Nigerian expectations, and a financing gap of between \$25 million and \$50 million exists even after all presently anticipated foreign aid is taken into account.<sup>6</sup> Meanwhile planning is about to get under way for a new five-year plan. As a result the Federal Government can be expected to look for greatly expanded development aid from various international agencies such as the IBRD (which has already extended \$28 million and is being asked for an additional \$56 million in loans) and from individual foreign countries, including the US.

30. Given the wide range of Nigeria's desires, many of them economically justified, and the speed with which it, in common with other African countries, wants to develop and modernize, we believe it unlikely that the West will meet all the country's expectations. The Bloc will almost certainly make offers that it will be difficult for Nigeria to reject, even if it prefers to. These offers may cover such items as a steel mill, meat packing facilities, or various hydroelectric projects. Nigerian economic ties with the Bloc may also be established under bilateral trade agreements covering purchases of cocoa and other agricultural commodities.

31. With substantial foreign aid, Nigeria probably will be able to make considerable economic progress. But these gains will not be adequate to develop a broadly based and modern economy. The Nigerian economy will remain vulnerable to the uncertainties of agri-

<sup>6</sup> Cumulative US aid to Nigeria since 1955 up to 30 June 1960 amounted to \$5.6 million, of which \$4.6 million was technical cooperation, \$.8 million from the Development Loan Fund, and \$.2 million from P.L. 480. Of the technical cooperation funds, \$2.4 million were obligated in US FY 1960. A total of \$13.3 million in US aid to Nigeria has been authorized for US FY 1961; of this amount \$6.6 million is from the Special Program for Tropical Africa, \$2.4 million from technical cooperation funds, \$1.3 million from special assistance funds, and \$3 million from DLF.

~~SECRET~~

cultural production and to fluctuations in world market prices of its few export commodities. It also faces possible loss of some of its markets (e.g., for cocoa) to African states associated with the Common Market. Moreover, the Federal Government will be subject to pressures from each region to subordinate measures for national economic development to purely regional objectives and to popular demands to meet particular local needs. All these pressures may lead the Federal Government increasingly to adopt dramatic but economically unrealistic measures, including nationalization of certain enterprises and increased controls over foreign trading companies.

## V. FOREIGN POLICY

### General Orientation

32. Nigeria comes to the international scene with a strong sense of its importance, its dignity, and its potential for leadership in Africa. A relatively moderate body of men who achieved independence without a bitter struggle with the colonial authorities, Nigerian leaders tend to look down on the more extreme Pan-African aspirations and maneuvers of men like Nkrumah and Sekou Toure and to deplore nationalist excesses in the Congo and elsewhere. They see their country as one which can play an important moderating and stabilizing influence in the tangled affairs of Africa.

33. Thus far the Nigerians have been largely preoccupied with internal affairs and are only beginning to take part in the regional politics of African nationalism. In foreign affairs Nigeria appears likely to occupy a middle position among the African states. On the one hand, at least the present Nigerian leaders will wish to preserve the cordial and useful ties they have with the UK and other Western countries, and will tend to oppose extreme solutions to colonial problems elsewhere on the continent. On the other hand, they are very conscious of their status as Africans, and will be impelled both by inclination and by self-interest to identify themselves with African aspirations in the remaining areas of

colonial dominance and with the concept of African solidarity. They have already announced a position of nonalignment and will probably pursue the general Afro-Asian line in the UN on issues of little direct concern to them. Nigerian desires to accept economic and technical assistance proffered by Israel will be tempered by unwillingness to become involved in Arab-Israeli disputes, particularly as this would tend to excite Moslem sensitivities in the North. These divergent tendencies in Nigerian policy will probably cause some strains between the two major partners in Nigeria's ruling coalition, with the more conservative and internally oriented NPC favoring a cautious and pragmatic policy, and the NCNC, spurred by AG criticism, urging a more dynamic role and a greater identification with nationalist aspirations elsewhere. Though Nigerian foreign policy is likely to be in favor of moderate and negotiated solutions for the time being, pressures will grow for them to side with radical African nationalists should the major issues be further inflamed or their solution delayed.

### Relations with African States

34. While African solidarity will tend to become an increasingly important consideration of its foreign policy, Nigeria's relations with Ghana, Guinea, and Mali are not likely to prove cordial. Rejecting Ghanaian claims to leadership in the Pan-African movement and reacting coolly to the idea of early African political union, Nigeria will be more likely to emphasize economic, educational, and other forms of cooperation. While the UAR will seek to capitalize upon its religious ties in the Northern Region, the secular nature of Nasser's regime may eventually offend Northerners, and most Nigerians will react with suspicion to Nasser's alignment with Ghana and Guinea. Nigeria probably will find itself more frequently aligned with conservative states like Liberia and most of the former French African possessions. Even among the latter, however, Nigerian efforts to assert pre-eminence will not pass uncontested, since the former French territories retain closer ties with one another than with Nigeria.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

9

35. Nigeria will almost always find itself in agreement with the majority of other Afro-Asian states on major colonial issues. Its relations with the Union of South Africa and, possibly with the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, are likely to become increasingly strained. In general, however, we believe that Nigeria will be a leading advocate of nonintervention in the affairs of other states. In accordance with this principle, we believe that Nigeria will generally refrain from agitation in areas adjacent to its own borders, despite the close religious and ethnic affinities which exist with neighboring peoples. The occurrence of serious disorders or a political vacuum in the British Cameroons, however, might provoke Nigerian action (see Annex B).

#### Connections with the West

36. The UK, which retains a pre-eminent position in Nigeria after six decades of generally effective colonial rule, is likely to exert considerable influence, particularly in the military, economic, and cultural fields. For the next several years the UK will remain Nigeria's most important trading partner, will be a source for much of the external assistance which the latter requires, and will serve as the major source for needed technicians, military advisers, and other skilled personnel. Nevertheless, we anticipate that Nigeria will manifest a growing independence of judgment and action on major international issues, reflecting declining British political influence. Under a recently concluded defense agreement, the Nigerian Government would make certain military facilities available to the British in time of emergency. However, this agreement, which already has stimulated pro-

test, is likely to become increasingly controversial in Nigeria.

37. Nigerian relations with Western Europe will be greatly influenced by the attitude which individual European countries adopt toward African problems. Diplomatic relations with France have been severed in protest against French nuclear tests in the Sahara.

38. The US enjoys high prestige among Nigerian leaders, particularly those educated in American schools. Nigeria expects a growing measure of private, as well as official, US assistance. Nevertheless, we believe that US relations with Nigeria's leaders will be plagued by their close identification of the US with European colonial powers, and by suspicions that US attitudes toward Africa are too heavily influenced by cold war considerations, and by Nigerian sensitivity on racial issues.

#### Relations with the Bloc

39. In the light of Nigeria's policy of non-alignment, diplomatic relations probably will be established with the Soviet Union and some of its European satellites during the next year or so. Nigeria disapproves of the exclusion of Communist China from the UN. Nevertheless, we do not anticipate that Nigeria will recognize either Communist China or Nationalist China in the near future. The diplomatic and economic presence of Bloc countries in Nigeria will give them opportunities for increasing their influence at the expense of the West. However, Western influence will be more affected by Western policies and actions on specific African issues than by Bloc initiatives within Nigeria.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

## ANNEX A

## MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES

1. Nigeria's military and security forces consist of an army of approximately 8,000; a navy component of 492 men and six small vessels, charged with coastal patrol; and a federal police of approximately 12,000 men. In addition, local police or "militia" units are employed to maintain order. In the Northern Region, each local force is recruited and maintained under the personal authority of the local ruler.

2. Charged with maintenance of internal order as well as defense, the army comprises five infantry battalions—two of which are presently in the Congo—one engineer squadron, one signals squadron, and a combination reconnaissance and field artillery company size unit. It appears to be a relatively effective military establishment, largely because of the continued presence of about 300 British officers and some British NCO's on loan to the Nigerian Government. Sixty-six officers, most NCO's, and all other ranks are Nigerians.

3. While pressures for expansion and "Nigerianization" of the army are mounting, the government is proceeding cautiously because of the problems which such programs would engender. Only six Northern Nigerians hold

commissions and few Northerners qualified to be officers are attracted to military careers. Today, the overwhelming majority of Nigerian officers are Southern Ibos, while the nontechnical enlisted ranks are mostly tribesmen from the North. Considerable doubt exists concerning the willingness of the latter to execute the commands of their Ibo and Yoruba officers, should such commands involve retaliation against refractory Northern tribes. In addition, the Northern Region is likely to react jealously to any program of "Nigerianization" or expansion which increases the preponderance of the Southerners in the higher army echelons.

4. Some Nigerian Army officers may become critical of the present political leadership. Their experience in the Congo, knowledge of the influential role of the military in other underdeveloped countries, and awareness of corruption among high government officials are factors which may ultimately induce them to enter the political arena. For this added reason, Nigeria's ruling elite probably will wish to retain the services of its apolitical British military advisers for at least the next several years.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

## ANNEX B

## THE BRITISH TRUST TERRITORY OF THE CAMEROONS

1. After World War I, the Cameroons were divided between British and French rule, under supervision at first by the League of Nations and later by the UN. The French trust territory became independent on 1 January 1960, and is now known as the Republic of Cameroun. The British trust territory is divided into Northern and Southern Cameroons. Each of these latter areas is to decide, in separate plebiscites scheduled for February 1961, whether it wishes to join the Federation of Nigeria or the Republic of Cameroun.

2. Northern Cameroons was, prior to Nigerian independence, administered by the British as part of the Northern Region of Nigeria. The control by the Northern Region's rulers was widely resented by the people of Northern Cameroons, and in a November 1959 plebiscite they voted to postpone a decision on their future rather than retain ties with Nigeria after the latter's independence. This result shocked the NPC leaders, and various reforms designed to redress Cameroonian grievances have since been introduced. We believe that in the February 1961 plebiscite Northern Cameroons will probably vote to join Nigeria.

3. In Southern Cameroons the outcome of the plebiscite is more uncertain. The area has, since 1954, been treated as a potential fourth region of Nigeria, and has enjoyed a degree of local self-government. The predominant political group, the Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP), favors a federal tie with the Republic of Cameroun, but it commands only a slight popular majority. Major tribes are arrayed against each other, and the losers may resort to violence, especially if the margin of decision is close. Furthermore, tribal connections extend across the borders into both

Nigeria and the Republic of Cameroun, and tribal loyalties, coupled with considerations of national pride, could involve both the latter countries if the results of the plebiscite are contested.

4. Even if the plebiscite results in a clear-cut decision for union of Southern Cameroons with the Republic of Cameroun, the terms of federation would remain to be worked out, and negotiations would probably be prolonged. During any extended period of uncertainty, there would be an increased likelihood that incidents of violence and terrorism would spread into Southern Cameroons from disturbed tribal areas in the Republic of Cameroun. Such incidents would be stimulated by the activities of the One Kamerun Party (OKP), a radical Southern Cameroons group which maintains close connections across the border with remnants of the Communist-influenced *Union des Populations Camerounaises* (UPC) in the Republic of Cameroun. Serious disorders would pose problems not only for the UK, whose responsibilities in Southern Cameroons continue until that territory's status is finally determined, but also for Nigeria, which would be alarmed by unrest along its eastern boundaries. Moreover, the situation would almost certainly be brought into the UN, where it would be exploited by the Bloc and at least the more radical of the African states.

5. Some of these results would be likely to follow even were Southern Cameroons to elect to enter the Federation of Nigeria. Such a decision would run counter to both KNDP and OKP desires, and the latter especially might foment disorders, thus posing troublesome security problems for Nigeria.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

## ANNEX C

## POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND DATA

## 1. Political Background Data

PARTIES	LEADERS	RESULTS OF DECEMBER 1959 ELECTIONS					
		Regionally				Percent of total national vote	Parliament seats won
		North	East	West	Lagos		
Northern People's Congress (NPC). Action Group (AG).....	Sir Ahmadu Bello..... Chief Obafemi Awolowo.	1,900,000 votes	20,000 votes	3,000 votes	200 votes	27.01	142
National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC). Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU). United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC). Others.....	Dr. Michael Okpara <sup>a</sup> ... Aminu Kano..... J. S. Tarka.....	500,000 votes <sup>b</sup>	1,200,000 votes	700,000 votes	60,000 votes	36.00	81
		b	..	..	..	b	8
		2,000 votes	..	..	..	.03	0
		100,000	183,814	191,641	100	7.19	8

<sup>a</sup> Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe headed the NCNC until his recent appointment as Governor General.

<sup>b</sup> The NCNC-NEPU alliance resulted in their ballots being totaled together.

## 2. Social and Economic Background Data

AREA	POPULATION (MID-1959 EST.)	DENSITY (PER SQ. MILE)	SCHOOL ENROLLMENT <sup>a</sup> (1958)	PRINCIPAL AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES
North.....	18 million..... Hausa } Over 50% Fulani }	67	232,600	Peanuts Cotton
East.....	8 million..... Ibo—almost 70%	269	1,250,000	Oil Palm Products
West.....	6.9 million..... Yoruba—Over 70%	148	1,110,000	Cocoa, Some Oil Palm Products
Lagos.....	350,000..... Largely Yoruba	1,280	63,300	

<sup>a</sup> Of this enrollment, it is estimated that some 88,000 students were in secondary schools and 1,800 students were in Nigerian universities in 1959. Approximately 5,700 Nigerians were receiving higher level education in the UK.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~