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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

4 June 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allen Evans, State (INR)
 Colonel J. W. Strain, USA (ACSI)
 Captain A. D. Kilmartin, USN (ONI)
 Colonel R. M. Lawson, USAF (AFCIN 2B2)
 Colonel Hugh D. Wallace, USAF (J-2, The Joint Staff)
 [Redacted] Director of Operational Services, NSA
 Mr. Randolph V. Zander, Defense (OSO)

STAT

SUBJECT : NIE 53-59: THE OUTLOOK FOR AFGHANISTAN

1. The attached terms of reference were agreed on at the meeting of the USIB representatives on Thursday, 4 June.
2. All agencies are invited to contribute to any section within their competence to do so.
3. It is requested that contributions be received in this office by the close of business on Monday, 27 July.

Chester L. Cooper
 CHESTER L. COOPER
 Deputy Assistant Director
 National Estimates

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

4 June 1959

SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: NIE 53-59: THE OUTLOOK FOR
AFGHANISTAN

THE PROBLEM

To estimate probable developments in Afghanistan's internal affairs and international position over the next few years.

THE SCOPE

The purpose of this paper will be primarily to update NIE 53-54, 19 October 1954, "The Outlook for Afghanistan"; and NIE 53-56, 10 January 1956, "Probable Developments in Afghanistan's International Position." We have in mind a relatively short paper which will examine Afghanistan's basic political and economic structure and international position.

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QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Have there been any significant changes in the internal power structure in Afghanistan since the earlier NIE's? In Afghanistan's position vis-a-vis the Bloc or the West?

II. INTERNAL

A. Political

1. How stable is the present regime? What are its main components? What are their relations with each other? Is Daud likely to continue as prime minister? What are the most likely alternatives to him?

2. What are the present ruling group's long-term objectives for Afghanistan? Is it likely that the present leaders will attempt to introduce gradual political or social reforms? What is the likely impact of such reforms -- both in the tribal and settled areas?

3. What are the attitudes of the major elements within Afghanistan toward the present regime and what are their capabilities to influence it? Comment specifically on the

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tribes, the younger, educated middle class, the government
bureaucracy, business elements [redacted]

50X1

[redacted], religious leaders, and the military and security

50X1

forces. Which of these elements are most likely to cooperate
with each other? On what issues?

4. Is there any significant indigenous Communist strength?
If so, through which groups and by what means is it exercised?
Which elements within the government and which other groups are
likely to be most susceptible to Communist influence?

5. What have been the past and probably future effects of
external events on internal developments?

6. What developments (internal or external) might lead to
fragmentation of the country and what is the likelihood of such
developments?

B. The Role of the Military and Security Forces

1. What are the present and probable future capabilities
of the armed forces vis-a-vis the tribes? For other internal
security duties? Against Pakistan and Iran? How much Soviet
military aid has been obtained and to what degree has it been

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absorbed? How dependent are the Afghan armed forces on such aid? Are the Afghans likely to seek additional military aid? Under what circumstances? How much and what kind? What role is the armed forces likely to play in determining future developments in the country?

2. What is the attitude of various elements in the military toward the present regime? Comment specifically on the senior officers, the junior officers, the enlisted men, the gendarmerie, and the security police. What impact has Soviet training and equipment had on the attitudes of the armed forces? How much influence does the traditional military connection with Turkey have? On what issues might various elements in the military and security forces unite? Under what circumstances might they act independently of the regime?

3. What is the attitude of tribal and other elements in the country toward the military?

C. Economic

1. Has the Afghan economic situation changed significantly in the last few years? Are major changes likely in the future? Comment specifically on transportation, agricultural production, industrial development, foreign trade (including transit routes),

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foreign exchange holdings, capability for servicing foreign debts, defense spending, and domestic inflation.

2. What is the present regime's attitude toward economic development? What are its objectives? How practical is the present economic development program? To what degree is it likely to be implemented?

3. How much foreign aid has Afghanistan received from Western sources and what has been the impact on the economy? What types of aid have been sought? What types most readily accepted? Most effective? What are the most likely sources of aid in the future?

4. How much aid has Afghanistan received from the Sino-Soviet Bloc? What has been the impact of such aid? To what extent and in what fields are the Soviets likely to be able to exert economic pressure on Afghanistan in the future?

III. EXTERNAL RELATIONS

A. Foreign Policy Aims

1. What are the main foreign policy objectives of the Afghan Government and how does it hope to achieve them? What are its

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chances for success? What differences of view are there within the government and among other groups?

B. Relations with the Sino-Soviet Bloc

1. What are probable Soviet objectives vis-a-vis Afghanistan? What tactics are the Soviets likely to use to achieve these objectives. How might these compare with Soviet tactics and objectives toward other states in the area?

2. What is the present regime's attitude toward the USSR and Communist China? What is its reaction to Chinese Communist action in Tibet, the spread of Communist influence in Iraq, and Communist attacks on the present Governments of Pakistan and Iran? How has Sino-Soviet aid affected Afghan foreign policy? What are present or possible future areas of friction in Afghan relations with the Bloc?

C. Relations with the West

1. What is the regime's attitude toward the West, especially the US? What are the most likely sources of friction? Of cooperation? What is the outlook for Afghan relations with the UK, West Germany, and the smaller Western European nations?

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D. Relations with Neighboring States

1. What is the regime's attitude toward the Ayub government in Pakistan? The Ayub government's attitude toward it? What are the intentions of both Afghan and Pakistani Governments in the Pushtunistan dispute? What are the prospects for solution? What would be the effect of a solution on Pakistani-Afghan relations? On Afghanistan's attitude toward the West and the Bloc? Are Afghan economic relations with Pakistan likely to expand significantly? What would be the effect on Afghan relations with Pakistan of a major improvement in Pakistani-Indian relations? What would be the effect of a major deterioration of internal stability in Pakistan?

2. What are the prospects for Afghan relations with Iran? with India? with Turkey? with other Afro-Asian nations?

E. Popular Reaction to Foreign Policy

1. Is there any significant public support for or opposition to the present regime's foreign policy? Among which elements? On what issues? What would be the most likely cause of a major change in Afghan foreign policy? What direction would such a change take?