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14 JUL 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director, Current Intelligence

THRU : Chief Sino-Soviet Staff

FROM : Chief EE Branch

SUBJECT : Recommendation for a special national estimate on Poland

1. We in Eastern European Branch are becoming increasingly concerned over the Polish situation and believe that a National Intelligence Estimate on Poland should be undertaken immediately.

2. There are numerous signs that Soviet-Polish relations are deteriorating at a more rapid pace than we anticipated a few weeks ago and may reach a critical stage in the next few months. While this may not result in direct Soviet military intervention in Poland, it is likely to precipitate a situation requiring major US policy decisions regarding Poland and the Gomulka regime.

3. Subsequent to the Kremlin's abortive attempt to prevent the establishment of the Gomulka regime last October, the USSR appeared to be reconciled to its existence at least temporarily. It probably counted on certain assets (i.e. the Stalinist and opportunist Polish Communists whose positions were jeopardized, Polish dependence on Soviet economic aid, Soviet support for Poland's Oder-Neisse frontier, etc) either to keep Poland within acceptable orthodox limits or eventually to subvert the Gomulka regime. It also may have believed that its capabilities for restoring a Stalinist regime in Poland would more probably increase than decrease with the passage of time.

4. Gomulka policies to date, however, may well have forced Soviet leaders to revise this estimate. The USSR is undoubtedly alarmed by many of Gomulka's actions such as the curtailment of the collectivization program, the dissolution of the Communist youth organization, the agreement with the Catholic church--all measures which will reduce orthodox Communist strength in the country. Furthermore, Gomulka's efforts to establish contacts with Western socialist parties and to obtain Western aid are evidences of his intent to broaden his international contacts and support.

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5. There are signs that Soviet leaders may well be convinced that these moves are only the initial steps toward the restoration of capitalism in Poland and that they must move rapidly to undermine or destroy the present Polish regime. The campaign to subvert Gomulka party supporters has moved more and more into the open with the Soviet Embassy in Warsaw playing a prominent role. There are also unconfirmed reports that the USSR has threatened to withhold promised economic credits. Finally the Soviet bloc has stepped up its ideological criticism of Poland to the point that the Polish leadership, through its official government and party press, has broken its silence and sharply rebuked its Communist bloc critics. The issue has thus been joined and no compromise is in sight.

6. We still believe that the USSR will probably avoid any drastic military action in the next several months. The rift between the two countries, however, is almost certain to widen and Moscow may feel compelled to resort to increasingly harsh measures. These could culminate in an attempted internal Stalinist coup, or a sharpening of the ideological dispute which would result in Poland's secession or expulsion from the 'socialist camp.'

7. In any event the situation will not stand still and we believe it is almost certain to deteriorate more rapidly than previously anticipated. We therefore believe a special national estimate on Poland is required which will weigh the various possible courses of action available to the USSR and Poland and serve as a basis for the formulation of American policy decisions.



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