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PRIORITY

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

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FROM DAR ES SALAAM

106
DESP. NO.

TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

March 3, 1956
DATE

1679

REF Department's Circular Telegram 498 of January 27, 1956

For Dept. Use Only	ACTION <i>oli</i>	DEPT. I N F O	<i>Rmk NEA E Rep</i>	<i>Addis Ababa,</i>
	REC'D <i>3/19</i>	OTHER	<i>London, Pretoria, Salisbury, Lusaka, Maseru,</i>	

SUBJECT: Revised National Intelligence Estimate for Tropical Africa: Tanganyika

Although the Consulate has received a copy of Intelligence Report No. 7103 entitled Africa: A Special Assessment, neither the 1953 National Intelligence Estimate for Tropical Africa nor Intelligence Report 6390 of August 24, 1953 is available here. Consequently, the Consulate has had to draft this despatch largely on the basis of the topic headings suggested by the Department's Circular under reference. In this despatch particular reference will be made to information furnished to the Department by this office and by the Consulate General in Nairobi during the past several months.

A. Growth and Consequences of African Nationalism

Consulate General Nairobi's Despatch No. 246 of December 30, 1955 incorporated, on pages 4 and 5, certain comments relating to the strength of African nationalism in Tanganyika which had been furnished to that office by this Consulate. These estimates are still pertinent.

In addition to the Dar es Salaam headquarters, a total of 22 Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) branches have now been permitted registration in Tanganyika; branches exist in every Province except Tanga where TANU has been able to make little headway among the sisal workers. Many other branches have applied for registration and their applications are still pending. Six branches have either been dissolved or their registrations have been refused on the ground that their activities have been incompatible with the maintenance of good order.

The course of the Tanganyika Government is to grant registration where the TANU (or any nationalist organization) branches are not unreasonably immoderate in their attitudes and actions, refuse registration where this is not so, but generally to move cautiously in making any decision with regard to TANU so as to avoid building up its strength too quickly or making martyrs out of its local leaders.

It is highly probable that, as the election processes are introduced in the towns, municipalities and provinces of this territory, the "TANU candidate" will be elected in any electoral district where a large group of detribalized Africans live and where a registered (or sub-form) branch of TANU is in existence. It is also apparent that the winning Asian and European candidates for election from any such area will be those having the largest measure of TANU support.

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To some extent this accretion of support to TANU from all the so-called "emergent elements" is misleading. There are fierce rivalries between various local TANU leaders; there are fairly frequent reports of provocations by treasurers of TANU local branches; there are stupid actions by various TANU groups that infuriate government administrative officers, repel thinking members of all races, and cause concern to TANU's President and National Executive. The immense body of roughly 8,000,000 Africans in the territory is only starting to stir from its centuries-old slumber; to most Tanganyika Africans the word of TANU has yet no significance when placed beside that of the local "jumbo" or village chief.

As the reporting officer stated in the pertinent section of Nairobi Despatch No. 246: "It is when viewed against this general dearth of African political activity and interest... that TANU acquires significance... It is within the realm of conjecture that one day TANU may become the controlling party of the self-governing Dominion of Tanganyika."

One factor could overthrow TANU's present control of the emergent elements. J.K. Nyerere, President of TANU, recently told the reporting officer that, in the event of the creation of a rival political party preaching "Tanganyika for the Africans" rather than the multi-racialism to which Nyerere has subscribed, the overwhelming majority of African support could quickly shift from TANU to the new party. What is more likely, however, is that Nyerere would sharply revise his policies to meet the attack from the new quarter, even though he is personally willing to see a multi-racial state develop as long as African majorities are created in all councils and legislative bodies. (Condes 104)

Recent despatches from this office (79, 95, 100 and 106) dwelt at length on the creation in Tanganyika of the new multi-racial United Tanganyika Party (UTP), as well as the change of the Capricorn Africa movement into the Tanganyika National Society (TNS). It is not considered that the UTP and the TNS will gain sufficient strength to prevent the eventual acquisition of preponderant political power by TANU or some similar "African" organization. Nevertheless, they will provide a mitigating influence in the years of increasing turbulence which lie ahead. Many moderately minded local leaders, with considerable influence and support, will subscribe to a multi-racialism which seems to afford the most reasonable approach to the problems of Tanganyika's political, economic and social development. TANU will have to take cognizance of the searching questions which are raised by these more sophisticated and knowledgeable groups. In this context, therefore, they will render invaluable service to the future of the territory.

Against the growth of nationalistic ideas in Tanganyika must be realistically set the capacity of the African here for governing himself. The supply of educated, honest and capable Africans is certainly infinitely smaller in this territory than is the case in Uganda and Kenya. Even the TANU President admits this fact. In a conversation with the reporting officer last December 14 Nyerere stated that he was in full agreement with Tanganyika's present stage of constitutional development: "the equality of races in law is a good thing at this time". He intimated, of course, that certain changes might reasonably

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be adopted when the present Regime has served its stated term of three years. But Nyerere said that it would be "a disaster" if self-government were granted too soon. If, for instance, he said, the United Kingdom were to indicate that it was withdrawing from the territory within two or three years, the situation would be truly appalling. However, when asked if the Africans here could be educated and trained to run their country in twenty years time, Nyerere replied that he thought so.

Even in his own organization, Nyerere agreed that responsible leadership is sadly lacking. A few up-country leaders have some local influence, but at the national level Nyerere is almost completely without qualified assistance. Dennis Plunkett, the Nyantakyi who was one of Nyerere's chief assistants, has now left Tanganyika; he went to Yugoslavia on a scholarship but has now gone to England. George S. Mathew, the Organizing Secretary-General of TANU, has left to study law in the United Kingdom. Others, like the Nyron brothers, Abdul and Ali, are engaged in business and cannot apply themselves properly to political work. Nyerere says there is now no one in Bar or Salama on whom he can rely for mature judgment, although, of course, he is surrounded by hot-headed erstwhile TANU leaders.

There are two sources of potential African leadership outside the nationalistic movement: the native authorities (chiefs), and the Makerere and Makerere university graduates.

The Africans now on the Tanganyika Legislative Council include: chiefs, sub-chiefs, the wife of a chief, an ex-chief, local African magistrates, and some few African businessmen mostly connected with the co-operative movement. All were nominated by the Governor and most are fairly useful and knowledgeable members. Yet, without exception, they have naught but the most rudimentary appreciation of the interrelation of economic, political and social factors that must be considered in effectively governing a country.

Most of the Africans who progress beyond secondary school are quickly absorbed into the territorial administration. As such they do receive training and promotions leading toward the day when they may exert more control over the country's policies. But the number of Tanganyika Africans at Makerere University College in Uganda is still less than 200; only ten Tanganyika Africans have thus far been awarded baccalaureate degrees by that institution. The United Kingdom and India each award university scholarships to about five Tanganyika African students each year. Five Tanganyikas - four Africans and one Asian - were sent by our educational exchange program to the United States last year; because of a lack of suitable candidates, probably only one or two will go this year. The supply of educated Africans is simply not increasing quickly enough to fill the need for trained leaders in accordance with the ever-increasing nationalistic demand.

D. Outlook for Increased Racial Tension

As matters now stand, there is no fear of any outbreak of racial violence in the immediate future. The Chief of State to the Tanganyika Government,

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Robert de S. Stapledon, said in a recent conversation with the reporting officer and Colonel John Townsend, U.S. Army Attache, Addis Ababa, that he did not foresee any greatly augmented racial tension here in the near future. He granted that this situation can change very quickly but he contended that the Tanganyika Africans were not apt to resort to direct action for a variety of reasons: (a) They have seen the fate of Mau Mau in Kenya and the majority of them have resolved to have nothing to do with rebellions which only result in grief for all parties concerned; (b) In looking at other countries around them - the Congo, the Central African Federation, and Mozambique - most Africans here have concluded that theirs is a relatively happy lot, even if they are somewhat dissatisfied with the slow progress which Tanganyika is making toward self-government; (c) Again the relative political backwardness of this territory must be stressed: even though politically advanced ideas are rapidly impinging themselves upon the consciousness of some few local leaders, the great amorphous mass represented by the Tanganyika African is still not yet aware of or anxious for the political changes which will give him a greater degree of control over his own affairs.

The Asian communities have never been as much the object of overt hatred in Tanganyika as in the East African countries to the north. Nevertheless, it is true that the Tanganyika African dislikes the Asian shopkeeper/landlord/moneylender far more than he does the European. To this extent the presence of the Asian here has served and is serving as an effective buffer for the absorption of much of the resentment that would otherwise be directed against the European.

The normal distinctions among the Asian groups may be observed in Tanganyika: the Muslims in general and the Ismailis in particular participate best in community development; the Hindus add the least. However, these differences are not readily apparent to the African. Except in the very large cities and towns, the African is unable to distinguish between the varieties of Muslim, Sikh, Parsee and Hindu insofar as their relative worth to East Africa is concerned, and such distinctions are apt to be even less considered if "black nationalism" eventually dominates Tanganyika's political picture.

The position of the European in Tanganyika has never been as compromised as that of his contemporaries in Kenya. This is principally due to: a very much smaller settler group; absence of organized European supremacists; government resistance to land alienation; relative absence of land and population pressures.

There is no need to do other than delineate these factors briefly. In Tanganyika there are now an estimated 18,000 Europeans. A large proportion of these work for, or are dependent on, the administration for their livelihood and, in any event, have no intention of remaining in the territory when the wage earner's employment is terminated.

Up to 1950 there was a strong "white supremacy" centre of gravity in Northern Province. This has now ceased to exist. Further, the Tanganyika European Council is completely dormant. The obvious failure of the white

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settler policy in Kenya served to speed the collapse of white supremacists in this territory. In general, the Europeans in Tanganyika may be said to be meekly following Governor Twining's lead toward a multi-racial form of government.

With the sole major exception of the Sanya Corridor incident involving the Meru tribe, alienation of land to Europeans has not given rise to dissension or political controversy in Tanganyika. The Consulate's Despatch No. 58 of December 7, 1955 revealed that even this problem has now virtually been settled.

Racial segregation is not a factor in Tanganyika - not legally at least. The Government is sincerely making an effort to bring along the African to positions of influence as fast as possible. Government facilities - such as schools, hospitals, etc. - are supposed to be open to all races on the basis of economic considerations; i.e., if the higher non-native taxes are paid by an African or he pays the much higher fees for better hospital care, he is entitled to use the better facilities. As with the Royal Technical College in Nairobi, the Dar es Salaam Technical Institute will be fully interracial in character from its inception. The same is true of the Trade School at Ifunda in Southern Highlands Province and the new Trade School to be opened near Moshi in 1956.

On the side of private enterprise, of course, the situation is somewhat different. No one can thus far force the European commercial employer to replace his European, Goan, Asian or Seychellois clerks with Africans; and the African has thus far lamentably failed to demonstrate that he is better equipped for the job.

Some of the second-class hotels are willing to permit Africans to stay in them, but the better hotels and restaurants still make every effort to freeze out the African - unless, of course, he is a guest at a mixed racial social function for which the establishment has been specifically hired. The breakdown of social barriers among all races may be expected to accelerate. The diffidence and awkwardness between races at mixed social gatherings will be, of course, much more difficult to efface.

C. Local Communist Strength, Influence, Prospects and Soviet Intentions

As far as is known by this office and the Tanganyika Government, communist influence in Tanganyika is non-existent. The sources available to the Tanganyika Government indicate that no communist cell has been established here. Further, although the economic penetration activities emanating from the Soviet, Czech and Yugoslav embassies in Addis Ababa may be of concern to the British colonies and protectorates to the north, no blandishments of this kind have yet been levelled at Tanganyika. The territory may well have its place in the Soviet timetable for the future but at this stage such activities do not directly concern Tanganyika.

This does not mean, of course, that the communist doctrines are not coming to the attention of local African and Asian leaders. This is particularly so when these Tanganyikans travel to India, to Europe, to the United Kingdom, or to the United States, for education, trade, or other purposes. However, no local leader has overtly subscribed to the party line or is believed to do so.

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influenced to any appreciable degree by communist policies and precepts.

D. Nature and Speed of Social and Economic Changes

A number of the Consulate's Despatches (79, 98, 101 and 106) have expressed concern over the lack of imagination and foresight being displayed by the Tanganyika Government in developing the territory at a pace commensurate with its economic, political and social requirements. A too-conservative policy of development, based primarily on income, has been adopted and no coherent plan for capital investment has been created. The demands of this territory on the social and economic side are expected to far out-strip the availability of funds and opportunities which are afforded by this overly modest program. As this situation evolves, the political demands of the nationalist leaders may be expected to become even more vocal than would be the case if the economic and social wants of their supporters were being satisfactorily met.

E. Problems of Unity

Although tribalism is still the rule rather than the exception in Tanganyika, there is not such likelihood here of "balkanization" being a factor as self-government approaches or is achieved. The largest tribe, the Sukuma, has a total population of roughly one million in a country containing about 8,000,000 Africans. And this particular tribe is not likely to achieve sufficient coherence to cause it to seek an independent destiny. Some few smaller tribes, such as the Nya and Chagga, are more culturally and economically advanced and many demand certain privileges and safeguards as Tanganyika approaches nationhood. Nonetheless, they are not expected to make any effective attempt to acquire independent rights in the degree now being demanded by the Baganda in Uganda.

In Tanganyika, unlike Kenya and Uganda, the Swahili language may serve as a unifying factor. Through the years the Administering Authority has consistently encouraged the use of Swahili both by requiring that it be spoken by its administrative officers and by including it in the African school curriculum from the lowest grade. (All teaching is in Swahili up to the seventh grade; after that teaching is in English with Swahili continued as a separate subject).

The Consulate's Despatch No. 51 of November 23, 1955, reported the formation of a "National Study Circle" by TANU having as one of its avowed purposes the study and development of Swahili "as Tanganyika's national language." Nyerere recently confirmed to the reporting officer that he was using this as an additional method of breaking down tribalism and creating a national consciousness.

On the other hand, the African in Tanganyika, while not as vociferous as the more advanced Uganda African, has absolutely no desire for a Federation of East Africa. The ill-advised original statements by the Capricorn Africa Society regarding "federation" in East and Central Africa have also left a mark that no amount of disavowal will erase. The thinking Tanganyika African of today looks forward to a self-governing country within a very few decades that is completely without ties except for those consonant with membership in the British Commonwealth.

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CONCLUSIONS

Thus far Tanganyika is one of the most contented and least disturbed entities on the Continent of Africa. This is largely due to the backwardness of the territory, the lack of outside influences, and the reasonably intelligent and selfless control which has been exerted in this Trust Territory by the Administering Authority.

This situation can not, of course, remain constant. Outside influences will become more important, local nationalist leaders will become more vociferous in their demands, and the natural march of events in the world will necessarily bring more internal stresses here.

Nevertheless, there is considerable reason to expect that Tanganyika, as it evolves towards self-government, may be retained safely on the side of the free world. The nationalist movements may, with a moderate amount of intelligence, energy and luck on the part of the Administering Authority, be restrained from too radical and immature attitudes.

The role of the United States in this future can and should be extremely important. The shortcomings of the economic policies of the Administering Authority are already apparent. Some way must be found to encourage a more far-sighted program of economic development here and the entrance of American public and private capital could be an influence which is extremely beneficial both to this territory and the best interests of the United States.

America's relations with the territory's political and economic leaders are thus the crucial. We must be assiduous in insuring that this situation remains constant. No effort should be spared in impressing the future leaders of Tanganyika with America's sympathetic and careful consideration of all of the territory's problems as self-government is approached.

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