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## THE OUTLOOK FOR FRANCE

*Submitted by the*

**DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE**

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*The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.*

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**INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE**

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
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**CHART** \_\_\_\_\_  
**Distribution of seats in the  
French national assembly**  
\_\_\_\_\_ **1956**

# DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS IN THE FRENCH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 1956



\* The remaining thirty seats (4.8%) not depicted on the chart represent the unfilled Algerian seats.

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## THE OUTLOOK FOR FRANCE

### THE PROBLEM

To assess the situation in France with particular reference to prospects for short and long term internal political stability; and to estimate the effect of probable developments upon France's policy on major international issues.

### CONCLUSIONS

1. Successive setbacks in the French international position, the Algerian problem, and the 1956 elections have produced a situation containing new elements of danger to the Fourth Republic. Nevertheless, we believe that such developments as an authoritarian rightist regime or a popular front are improbable during the life of this parliament, which will probably run to 1960. Instead, the outlook is for continued minority governments drawn for the most part from the center and moderate left. These governments will probably depend from time to time upon Communist votes (presently 25 percent of the Assembly), but they are unlikely to drift into continuing dependence upon the Communists.

2. Operations against the Algerian rebels may meet with considerable success, and the French may maintain their position for some time. In the long run, however, we believe that a more basic solution involving the grant of substantial independence to Algeria will be virtually in-

evitable. Such a grant, or any settlement which aroused substantial rightist opposition, might endanger parliamentary government. We believe, however, that a crisis over Algeria — short of a military disaster, which we now believe unlikely — or over any other foreseeable issue would not terminate the Fourth Republic, but would be resolved within the parliamentary context.

3. The economy is currently prosperous, but serious inflationary pressures are developing. A general, though limited, price rise is probable in the next several years but — barring economically-unsound political decisions such as an indiscriminate granting of price and wage increases — rapid price inflation and general financial instability are unlikely.

4. Any likely French government will regard the Atlantic alliance as fundamental to French security, but will probably exhibit a more independent line in foreign policy and press for East-West agreements on outstanding issues.

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## DISCUSSION

## I. THE FRENCH PROBLEM

5. For decades France has been characterized by political factionalism, parliamentary confusion, and short-lived, often impotent governments. Parliament reflects the cleavages and class conflicts in French society. There are strong forces for and against a fundamental change in social and political institutions, strong clerical and anticlerical factions, intense provincialism together with devotion to supranational institutions. This very multiplicity of conflicting interests, with their permutations and interactions, is an obstacle to quick or radical change. Any group which threatens to get disproportionate strength tends to unite other groups against it. However, because governments in these circumstances are weak, it is always difficult and often impossible to make critical policy decisions. Governmental crises frequently occur when decisions are needed or strong action required to deal with changing conditions at home or abroad, and such frequent crises have lost France much of its international prestige.

6. Dissatisfaction and disillusionment with the government and its institutions are widespread among the French people. They exist among those who support the moderate as well as the extremist parties. Many vote in protest instead of from positive conviction. Many vote as far to the left as possible without appreciating the consequences for state and society which would ensue if a majority of their fellow citizens did likewise. Substantial numbers of Frenchmen are occasionally caught up in an enthusiasm for a political movement or a political leader, but before long enthusiasm wanes as obstacles mount and results are few. If there is any political attitude common to a majority of Frenchmen, it is cynicism.

7. This mood, together with the weariness and frightful experiences of the last two major wars, the series of postwar setbacks, and the decline of France as a world power, has contributed to make neutralism stronger in

France than elsewhere in Western Europe. While very small numbers of Frenchmen (less than five percent) sympathize with the USSR in the East-West struggle, about half have expressed a preference to stay aloof from that contest, according to public opinion polls. Ignorance of NATO is greater in France than elsewhere in Western Europe, and support for it less. Belief in Western European unity is still strong, but France's neighbors apparently believe in it more strongly.

8. An atmosphere of major political crisis periodically recurs in France. Whenever governmental instability becomes particularly acute, or when external problems — such as the current struggle in Algeria — bear down upon the public consciousness, there is talk of a "*crise de regime*," of constitutional reform, of a strong leader to relieve France of its political indecision. Since the birth of the Third Republic, these crises — except for that brought on by the German victory of June 1940 — have always dissipated. Despite the vicissitudes of politics, the bureaucracy has gone on conducting the business of the state, and the economy has shown a remarkable resiliency. Nevertheless, the persistence of this underlying malaise and its present re-emergence, together with the cumulative effects of the recent setbacks in the French international position, have produced a situation containing elements of danger to the Fourth Republic.

## II. THE FRENCH ECONOMY

9. France has a balanced economy rich in resources and manpower skills, but realization of its potential is retarded by the persistence of structural weaknesses, such as poor labor mobility and a lack of competitive spirit. Strong protectionist attitudes continue to prevail in France, although a more enterprising state of mind seems to be emerging among some entrepreneurs. The French economy as a whole has shown steady growth since 1953. In 1955, Gross National Product increased by 6.3 percent, about the same as the Western

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European average, with industrial production increasing by 10 percent. The increase in GNP resulted both in higher gross investment and in higher personal consumption levels, while public consumption and the import surplus declined slightly. Prices, although currently under inflationary pressure, have remained relatively stable over the past four years, real wages have moved steadily up, and there is little unemployment. French saving habits are returning, the capital market is reviving, and treasury operations are easier, for the time being at least.

10. Internal expansion has been accompanied since 1954 by substantial improvement in France's balance of trade and payments. However, late in 1955 imports began to rise faster than exports, and France once again began to run monthly deficits in the EPU (European Payments Union). Receipts from US dollar expenditures and military assistance have not only helped to balance current accounts but during 1955 served to raise gold and dollar reserves from about \$1 billion to \$2 billion. However, reserves are likely to decline in 1956 and 1957. Despite some talk of devaluation when the Mollet government was inaugurated, France's stronger reserve position and the obvious political and economic risks involved make any official devaluation of the franc unlikely in the near future.

11. *The Danger of Inflation.* Despite these favorable developments in the economy and the relative stability of prices over the past four years, serious inflationary pressures are developing. Although this is partly a consequence of the increased costs of Algeria, other factors play a more important part. Increased consumer demand is anticipated. The total wage bill in 1956 will probably rise by about 8.5 percent over 1955. It is unlikely that industrial production can maintain the 10 percent rate of growth in 1956 that it achieved in 1955; key industries, particularly steel, are already operating near capacity levels, an energy shortage is developing, and labor shortages have been aggravated by the recall of reservists and the increased unreliability of Algerian labor in France. The severe winter of 1955-1956 will reduce agricultural produc-

tion, particularly wheat, and this will have adverse effects on the balance of payments and will tend to raise the price of farm products.

12. Budgetary problems in France usually present political dangers even when the economy itself is relatively sound. It now appears that there will be a cash deficit of about 1,000 billion francs this year. This would represent a 35 percent increase over 1955, and a larger deficit could develop if warfare in Algeria continues. It will be difficult if not impossible to cover the increase in the deficit through administrative economies or new taxes, and recourse to the Bank of France, which also is politically difficult, may be necessary. While the French Treasury position is easy at present, borrowing 35 percent more this year than last will inevitably create strains on the money market.

13. Considering: (a) the basic structural strength and weaknesses of the French economy; (b) its present prosperous condition; and (c) developing storm warnings, we conclude, on balance, that a fairly general, but limited, price rise is likely in the next several years. This situation will be exploited by the parliamentary opposition, but the present government at least, appears determined to limit inflationary pressures by increasing taxes and slowly reducing import restrictions. Indeed, unless economically-unsound political decisions are taken, such as an indiscriminate granting of price and wage increases, renewal of rapid price inflation and a relapse into general financial instability are unlikely. In and by themselves economic prospects need not significantly increase political instability; however, the danger of renewed inflation is sufficiently great that political ineptness could set off a cumulative process of adverse political and financial interactions.

14. *Economic Implications of North African Developments.* The lasting economic impact on France of developments in North Africa will be determined largely by the political solution that finally evolves. Although the total French private and public investment in Algeria cannot be estimated with any accuracy, it probably runs to several billions of dol-

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lars and is greater than in Morocco, Tunisia, or Indochina. In 1955 France exported about \$570 million worth of goods to Algeria. This represented 11.8 percent of total French exports, compared to 4.7 percent sent to Morocco and 2.8 percent sent to Tunisia. In 1955 France imported about \$339 million worth of goods from Algeria. This constituted only 7.2 percent of total French imports, but was 74 percent of Algeria's exports. By way of comparison, 3 percent of French imports were from Morocco (45.3 percent of Morocco's exports) while 1.2 percent of French imports were from Tunisia (55.2 percent of Tunisia's exports).

15. To protect this substantial investment and trade, as well as French prestige and the lives of Frenchmen in Algeria, the French are involved in a costly effort. According to recent French budget documents, extraordinary military appropriations for Algeria will be at least \$613 million in 1956 as compared with \$176 million in 1955. In addition, regular appropriations for national defense, with the exception of monies for Indochina, show slight increases, and an unknown but considerable and growing proportion of these funds is for Algerian expenditures. Finally, the call-up of the 200,000 reservists to cope with Algeria, and the increased costs involved in more active operations may well increase present estimates. In addition, the French government has increased its contribution to civil expenditures in Algeria from about \$135 million in 1955 to about \$185 million in 1956. Thus, the gross public cost of Algeria to France in 1956 may be over \$1 billion, of which the extraordinary cost, due to the particular circumstances of the emergency, is about \$650 million. This sum is of considerable magnitude, and exerts an inflationary influence on the French economy. It is not yet great enough, however, to be by itself a major influence on French policy decisions in Algeria.

16. The costs of military operations and of reform in Algeria, even under the best of circumstances, would remain high for at least several years under present French policy. If the current policy of pacification of Algeria is

maintained, and even if it is successful, the need for substantial garrisons will continue. Moreover, the French government will almost certainly feel obliged to increase its investment and reform program further, without any assurance that this will significantly alleviate the area's basic economic problems or eliminate economic grievances and unrest.

17. If the French should retreat from their present Algerian policy to something resembling the Moroccan and Tunisian arrangements, the public cost to France might be substantially reduced, since garrisons could be reduced as order was restored and the native government took over. On the other hand, new charges on the treasury would arise — for example, to finance the indemnification of French property owners and the re-establishment outside of Algeria of those large numbers of Europeans who would wish to emigrate to France or elsewhere. A moderate native regime would seek to retain a French public investment program in some form, but would probably also seek aid elsewhere. There would be, moreover, a strong interest on both sides in continuing their substantial trade and reciprocal preferences.

18. If such trade is continued to mutual advantage, independence for Algeria as well as Morocco and Tunisia need not have a major adverse impact on the over-all French economy, although it would hurt individuals. Indeed, France could benefit from the reduction of French military and investment expenditures there. In the short run, however, if independence for Algeria were followed by rash anti-French economic policies on the part of the native regime, the consequences could be very serious for: (a) the million-plus French colonists; (b) other holders of large investments; (c) certain French industries and their workers dependent upon Algerian labor and Algerian markets; and (d) the nationalist leaders and natives themselves, as a consequence of the chaotic conditions that would ensue. To the extent that similar policies might develop in Morocco and Tunisia if the present moderate regimes are replaced, these difficulties would be compounded.

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### III. THE FRENCH POLITICAL SCENE

#### The New Parliament

19. French parliamentary democracy has demonstrated remarkable staying power, despite chronic governmental instability and antiparlamentarianism on both left and right. Moreover, while the composition of parliaments and cabinets has shifted, the basic political attitudes of the electorate have shown considerable stability. Since the end of World War II, about 25 percent of the electorate has consistently voted for the Communist party and about 15 percent for the Socialist party. Votes for the various center and rightist parties have been far less constant during the postwar period, partly owing to a search by the antiparlamentary right for a political home. This extreme rightist element appears to have voted for the Catholic MRP in 1946, De Gaulle in 1951, and Poujade in 1956. In addition, however, many voters of the center and moderate right as well as of the left, shaken by the general social and economic instability of 1947 and 1948, appear to have rallied to the Gaullist banner in 1951, but to have gone to traditional parties in 1956. The gain in votes registered by the Socialists and Radical Socialists in 1956 suggests that political opinion has moved slightly to the left as compared with 1951, and restored the moderate left to virtually the same strength it demonstrated in 1946.<sup>1</sup>

20. While popular political opinion in France thus has remained fairly stable, the size of the party representations in the new parliament has substantially changed. The Communists, with virtually the same popular vote as in 1951, have 50 percent more seats and control about 25 percent of the Assembly. This resulted largely from the split of the moderate parties into center-left and center-right lists in 1956, whereas in 1951 they had all joined together in affiliated lists to fight the Communists and Gaullists.<sup>2</sup> The Poujadist right is smaller than the initial Gaullist right of the 1951 Assembly, but as a party the Poujadists

<sup>1</sup> For a detailed statement of the political strengths of the various parties in the national elections of 1946, 1951, and 1956, see the Appendix.

appear more violent and irresponsible. The increased number of seats for the Communists and the proportionately smaller number for the parties to the right of the Radical Socialists make the parliamentary center of gravity in the new Assembly somewhat to the left of that in the previous Assembly. The distribution of seats in the two Assemblies is shown in tabular form below:

Distribution of Seats in the Assembly

	Previous Assembly 1955	1956 <sup>a</sup>
Communists and Allies	98	150
Socialists (SFIO)	104	101
Democratic Socialist Resistance Union (UDSR)	24	19
Radical Socialists	75	61
Left Republican Rally (RGR)		14
Overseas Independents	16	10
Popular Republicans (MRP)	88	75
Independents and Peasants ( <i>Modérés</i> )	103	95
Gaullists (ARS)	32	
Gaullist Social Republicans	69	22
Poujadists (UFF)	--	42
Miscellaneous	15	8
Vacancies	3	30 <sup>b</sup>
<b>Total</b>	<b>627</b>	<b>627</b>

<sup>a</sup> For a graphic presentation of the distribution of seats in the present Assembly, see Chart.

<sup>b</sup> These vacancies are the seats allocated to Algeria, where elections have not been held because of the absence of public order.

#### The Major Political Parties

21. *Communists.* The French Communist Party (PCF) is still the largest and strongest political organization in France, despite a decrease in membership and a notable weakening of the position of the party press since 1948. The strength of the Communist-dominated trade unions (CGT) has also declined considerably, but the Communists remain the strongest force in organized labor. The hard core of the party has remained virtually unchanged, and party membership over the past two years has remained between 350,000-400,000 — about half that of 1948. The number of

<sup>2</sup> By the election law of 1951 and 1956, any affiliated list receiving over 50 percent of the vote in most election areas received all seats; obviously the more parties joined in such lists, the greater the chance of gaining over 50 percent of the vote and all the seats.

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Communists (and allies) in the Assembly has increased from 98 to 150 after the 1956 elections, because of the working of the electoral law. Nevertheless, the party's over-all electoral support has remained almost constant at about one-fourth of the total vote since the end of World War II. This attests to the strength and flexibility of the Communist organization and its ability to exploit varying national issues and local grievances. It also suggests that Communist strength in France to a large degree reflects fundamental class hostilities and traditional leftist allegiances which the PCF has systematically exploited. In the postwar period neither general economic conditions nor East-West developments appear to have had much effect upon the number of votes cast for the Communist party. We are presently unable to estimate what effect the changes within the USSR and particularly the denigration of Stalin is likely to have either upon the nature of the PCF or upon the popular support afforded the Communists.

22. For several years the PCF has been attempting with some success to escape from the political isolation imposed on it in 1947. Aided by its 1956 gain in seats and by the more peaceful posture of Moscow, it has been sedulously cultivating a popular front atmosphere. Thus, though bluntly repulsed by the Socialist leadership in its efforts to form common electoral lists for the parliamentary elections, the PCF nevertheless voted to invest the Mollet government. It supported the Mollet government on subsequent parliamentary votes, including the grant of "special powers" on Algeria. However, the PCF found itself in a dilemma. While its campaign for a popular front dictated that it cooperate with the Socialists, its support of Mollet's repressive policies in Algeria conflicted with the strong Communist line of anticolonialism, and caused dissidence among Communist rank-and-file. Hence the PCF commenced to attack the government on the call-up of reservists for Algeria, and abstained on the general confidence vote in early June. The Communists also stimulated riots against the sending of reservists to Algeria.

23. In the near future, relations of Communists and Socialists will probably depend to a large degree upon how the Mollet policy on Algeria develops. If it moves toward negotiation and early independence, the Communists would almost certainly support the government, and would hope that the Socialists would be deserted by the right, forced to rely on Communist support, and thereby move towards a genuine popular front. If the Mollet policy moves toward continued and costly repression, the Communists may conclude that they have more to gain by openly opposing the government and stepping up their efforts to win over some of the Socialist rank-and-file.

24. *Socialists.* The Socialists (SFIO) were relatively successful in the January elections, but are in a difficult position as governmental leaders forced to deal with the Algerian problem. The Socialists realize that they cannot enact reformist legislation without Communist support in parliament, and that they cannot continue their present Algerian policy without rightist parliamentary backing. Mollet has adopted a more conciliatory attitude toward both the Soviet Union and the PCF, while pressing forward with a left-oriented social program within France. This has covered his left flank and has made it more difficult for the Communists to attack him. He has covered his right flank, in effect, by pursuing a repressive policy in Algeria which the rightist parties favor but to which the Socialists, by virtue of their traditional anticolonialism, would normally be opposed. The contradictory aspects of such policies have accentuated conflicts within the SFIO.

25. The Communists will seek to exploit such contradictions on Algerian and other issues to turn the Socialist rank-and-file against their leaders. This political duel between the Communist and the Socialist leaders will probably be a continuing feature of the present Assembly. In large measure, the gains of the one party are the loss of the other. The PCF has the advantages of having almost twice the electoral support of the Socialists and a much larger and more effective political organization. It has the power of the USSR behind it, and it enjoys a position of political irresponsibility.

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bility. The Socialists have the power of government influence, but will be walking a tight-rope as long as they are in the government: to incline too far to the right will cause them to lose rank-and-file to the Communists; to incline too far to the left will enhance the possibility of a popular front.

26. *Radical Socialists.* The Radicals, long characterized by strong factionalism, are divided between the followers of Mendes-France and of former Premier Edgar Faure. The majority faction led by Mendes was relatively successful in the January elections and entered the Socialist-led government. However, trapped by his inability to influence government policy and by the impossibility of a rapprochement with the right, Mendes left the Mollet government in protest over its Algerian policy. He apparently believes that the present Algerian policy will fail and that France may turn to him for a solution. In any event, whether under Mendes or another Radical leader, the party has a strong parliamentary position despite its divisions, and will be the pivot between leftist-oriented and rightist-oriented governments drawn from the present Assembly.

27. *Popular Republican Movement (MRP).* In steady decline since the elections of 1951 and moving increasingly to the right, the MRP is apparently unable to decide whether in the long run it is to be a party of the left or of the right. On the one hand, it is drawn towards European integration, Catholic social and economic reforms, and collaboration with the Socialists and Mendesian Radicals; and it desires to be clearly differentiated from the conservative Independent and Peasants party. On the other hand, it is repelled by the anti-clerical position of the Socialists and of many Radicals, by the attitude of some Socialist leaders toward the Soviet Union, and by the memory of Mendes' opposition to EDC. Nevertheless, because the MRP is particularly anxious to regain its position in the government and to prevent the Socialists from allying with the Communists, it is likely to cooperate increasingly with the Socialists unless the issue of government support to church schools becomes acute.

28. *Social Republicans.* The Social Republicans are the only ex-RPF group which has retained its parliamentary identity. It is a reformist party, which permits it to participate in the present government, but its nationalist and pro-French Union character also encompasses rightist interests. It is in the van of those seeking constitutional changes and a stronger executive. However, its organization is undeveloped; it is in fact a group of loosely disciplined political personalities with no future as a mass party unless De Gaulle returns to power.

29. *Independents and Peasants for Social Action (Modérés).* This party, though now possessed of a somewhat stronger national organization, remains a pot-pourri of conservative agricultural and business interests, mainly narrow and local in scope, and generally clerical in outlook. Because of their personal or economic ties and conservative outlook, most party members favor a strong colonial policy and repression where necessary. The *Modérés* were joined in the 1956 elections by a former Gaullist group which had been cooperating with them since 1952. This combined group lost considerably in votes as well as seats in the 1956 elections. Many of these *Modérés*, especially those from Southern France, represent local interests similar to those supporting Pujade. Although as a party the *Modérés* are Republican, some of them tend to the Pujadist outlook, and would probably be quick to cast their lot with Pujadism if it appeared to be an effective way of heading off a popular front. It is more likely, however, that the *Modérés* will seek to render Pujadism innocuous by absorbing it.

30. *Pujadists (UFF).* The emergence of the Pujadists as a distinct extreme right with 52 seats<sup>3</sup> was the most startling result of the 1956 elections. Much of the narrow-interest, antitax, antiadministration, antiparlamentarian, antisemitic, and antiforeign support they received was probably present but obscured in the heterogeneous vote the Gaullists received in 1951. They probably captured much of the traditional antiparlia-

<sup>3</sup> Since reduced to 42 as a result of parliamentary disqualification votes.

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mentary right which has existed in France for many years. Nonetheless, they now represent a direct actionist group with some capacity for disturbing the public order.

31. The Poujadist leaders have never clarified their political objectives. They have been clearly antiparliamentarian, and are talking of convoking an "Estates-General." Should they succeed in maintaining unity and unvarnished antiparliamentarianism, they might attract additional support, particularly if public order degenerated over the Algerian issue, or if the parliamentary system broke down for any other reason. We believe it more likely, however, that they will follow the path of similar groups which have appeared on the French political scene in the past, and which have been bought off, subverted, or otherwise deprived of appreciable power.

#### IV. GOVERNMENTAL PROSPECTS

##### Governmental Alternatives in the Present Assembly

32. A constitutional change of 1955 permitting investiture of minority governments<sup>4</sup> has facilitated the task of forming governing coalitions. Two factors, moreover, presently militate against extreme parliamentary instability: (a) the overriding importance of the Algerian issue, and (b) the narrow base from which moderate governments can be drawn. Both considerations currently inhibit the moderate parties from overthrowing a government capriciously. Nevertheless, if the government's Algerian policy fails, or if the parties become deadlocked over a controversial domestic issue, the parliamentary situation might change rapidly for the worse.

33. The distribution of seats in the present Assembly makes possible five alternative governing coalitions:

a. A popular front majority led by Socialists and Radicals, consistently opposed by the center and right but kept in office by Communist votes.

<sup>4</sup> Investiture now requires only a majority of the deputies voting, rather than an absolute majority of the Assembly.

b. A "national union" majority supported by all parties except the Communists and Poujadists.

c. A right-center majority supported by all parties to the right of the Socialists and Communists.

d. A minority coalition of the center and the democratic left, like the present Mollet government, under a succession of leaders drawn from the Radical Socialist and Socialist parties.

e. A minority coalition of the center and moderate right, excluding the Poujadists and depending on Socialist benevolence in the form of voting support or abstention.

34. Clearly the Socialists hold a key position. Their acquiescence, support, or participation is necessary to four out of the five possible coalitions. The fifth possibility — the right-center majority — is highly unlikely because the Poujadists will probably continue to reject all parliamentary alliances on principle, and because many Radicals, Popular Republicans, and even some Independents would probably refuse to enter any government dependent on Poujadist support.

35. A popular front government<sup>5</sup> is becoming slightly more feasible as the Communists gradually emerge from political isolation. Under some extreme provocation, such as a threatened rightist *coup*, Socialist and Radical leaders might accept an alliance with the Communist party. However, we believe it unlikely that a popular front government will be formed during the life of the present Assembly. Despite the changes which have already occurred in Communist tactics and the probability of still further changes, we believe that the gulf between the Communists on the one hand, and the Radical Socialists and Socialists on the other, will remain too great to be bridged, except on an *ad hoc* basis, during the next several years. Moreover, center and rightist groups have a strong interest in preventing a popular front and will probably

<sup>5</sup> A "popular front" government as used herein is defined as one led by Socialists and Radicals — Communists would not necessarily hold any cabinet posts — consistently opposed by the center and right, but kept in office by Communist votes.

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make great efforts to do so by concessions to the Socialists and Radical Socialists should this prove necessary.

36. A national union majority, comprising all parties save Communists and Poujadists, is rendered improbable by serious divisions among the moderate parties. Such a government would be most likely to be formed only in a serious emergency — possibly one arising from the Algerian issue — and would have limited and well-defined objectives. It is also possible that moderate rightists and Socialists might sink their differences in such a coalition in order to prevent the seizure of power by a "strong man," or to deal with systematic opposition by both Communists and Poujadists, especially if public disorder became widespread. In the circumstances most likely to arise during the life of the present Assembly, however, a national union government is a virtual impossibility.

37. Of the various alternatives, we believe that minority coalitions made up like the Mollet government from the center and democratic left are most likely during the life of the present parliament. Occasional reversion to a minority coalition of the center and moderate right is also probable, but such a government would require benevolent support by the Socialists, who would probably not extend it for long. The center-moderate left coalitions will probably from time to time depend on Communist votes to carry through some measures; circumstances may be such that the influence of the Communists on governmental policy increases considerably during the present Assembly. We do not believe, however, that the democratic left will allow itself to drift into continuing and systematic dependence on Communist support. It will probably stop short of a genuine popular front and seek to offset Communist influence by frequently leaning towards the moderate right, as Mollet has done.

38. Except for extremists on the right, and possibly on the left, the deputies will almost certainly seek to avoid dissolution. Accordingly, the present Assembly will probably last for virtually its full term of five years.

### Effect of the Algerian Problem<sup>6</sup>

39. At the moment French politics are dominated by the Algerian problem. The government's announced policy is that it will negotiate with representatives of the Algerian people freely chosen in a reformed electoral system. This policy presupposes the establishment of sufficient order to carry out elections. Having received special powers from the Assembly — by an overwhelming majority, including the Communists — Mollet has applied increasing increments of force in an effort to restore order. But despite the large number of forces despatched to Algeria, and signs that these forces are meeting with some success, order is far from being restored.

40. We believe a majority of the French people will continue to support military operations against the Algerian rebels, though probably without enthusiasm, through the summer of 1956, and perhaps longer. However, among Mollet's own followers, there is increasing restiveness over the policy of repression and a tendency to regard the eventual independence of Algeria as inevitable. Mollet himself apparently does not intend to press for pacification by military means alone. He has already introduced substantial reforms, his representatives have held preliminary and unofficial conversations with rebel leaders, and he has announced his intention to seek local agreements wherever possible. If public impatience for an early solution grows, he will probably make more serious efforts to negotiate with the rebels from the position of strength created by a force of 400,000 troops, rather than to push forward with a costly campaign of complete pacification. Thus he might hope to find a compromise solution which, though falling short of Algerian demands, might be accepted by Algerians as an alternative to further attrition and, though short of French wishes, might be accepted in France because of lack of faith in ultimate victory.

41. We believe such a compromise is unlikely in the near future. The rebels will almost certainly not withdraw their demand for na-

<sup>6</sup> NIE 71.1-56: *Outlook in Algeria* is being prepared for publication in August 1956.

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tional independence as a prerequisite to negotiations, nor will the French grant this demand. However, there is no reason why the French military effort of pacification cannot go on for some time without serious losses, and it might achieve considerable successes. Mollet may therefore be able to report progress when parliament reconvenes in the fall, and such a report would probably be sufficient to prevent his fall over the Algerian question. We do not believe that a major political crisis over this question is necessarily imminent.

42. Although the French have the military strength to maintain themselves in Algeria indefinitely, at some time during the next several years the present French government or a successor will be faced with the necessity of a reassessment of policy, involving a decision either to grant independence or indefinitely to commit French resources to a policy of limited autonomy maintained by force. Which course the government then in office would take would depend in large measure upon the situation in Algeria and France then existing. We believe that an increasing proportion of the French population will eventually come to oppose the economic and military costs of maintaining the repressive effort, and become gradually less concerned over the fate of the colons in Algeria. Eventually, therefore, a government pledged to close out the Algerian affair will probably take office. If this occurs, the political temperature in France will rise. If a settlement is attempted that is made possible only by Communist support, or if certain elements of the right should be unreconciled to it, there might be a danger to the maintenance of the French parliamentary regime.

### De Gaulle and the Extreme Right

43. The Algerian question has generated strong feelings in France; the prospect of the loss of Algeria is viewed with a sense of outrage, especially by powerful minority groups. These emotions are superimposed upon a situation in which an atmosphere of political crisis is unusually prevalent, and fears for the future of France are freely expressed. This situation has been produced by other factors

as well as by Algeria; by the continued strife among moderate parties, the unexpected success of the Poujadists, the increase of Communist representation in parliament, the prevalence of talk about a popular front government, and the series of setbacks to the international position of France. There is widespread desire for constitutional reform, without any clear perception of how reform can practically be achieved. In these circumstances supporters of the parliamentary regime are inclined towards pessimism. They are concerned over the capacity of the Republic to withstand any future catastrophe such as a serious defeat in Algeria.

44. Two main possibilities involving intervention by the extreme right present themselves:

a. If it should appear that Algeria were about to be lost as a consequence of military setbacks or of a cabinet decision to grant substantial independence (especially if the decision could be put through parliament only with Communist votes), colonial interests, Poujadists, and possibly elements of the army might coalesce to force a reversal of policy, and in the process seize control of the state;

b. If the Socialists and Radicals came to terms with the Communists and a popular front government appeared imminent, forces of the moderate right might repudiate republican institutions and rally behind a strong authoritarian leader.

A third possibility, less extreme in its implications, is that a prolonged cabinet crisis might persuade a majority in the National Assembly to invest as premier an elder statesman with broad powers to revise the constitution. In that event the Fourth Republic might be ended legally, but whether it would be replaced by another form of democratic government or by an authoritarian regime would depend on circumstances at the time.

45. General De Gaulle is an obvious choice to lead rightist forces or to preside over a legal liquidation of the present regime. He has indicated that he is willing to assume leadership of the government, provided he is given broad powers to carry through a basic constitutional revision. We think it improbable, however,

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that De Gaulle would lend himself to any rightist adventure unless it had almost a certainty of success. In the past he has shown much regard for legality, and would probably accept political leadership on no other basis. His record of arrogance and rigidity in dealing with politicians, however, makes it unlikely that parliament would accept him on these terms. The Assembly would be reluctant to invest any elder statesman with extraordinary powers to effect a constitutional revision; if it did so, it would probably select a more amenable leader, such as former President of the Republic Vincent Auriol.

46. We believe that none of the three alternatives discussed is likely during the next several years, although there has been more speculation recently on the possible return of De Gaulle than at any time since 1947-1948. There are serious obstacles to the assumption of leadership by De Gaulle, and no other potential leader appears to command the degree of political and military support which would be required. A severe political crisis over Algeria is by no means certain; if it should occur it might prove the catalyst to set off a rightist move. We think it more likely, however, that a crisis over Algeria or over some divisive domestic issue would simply resemble many of the crises which have occurred in the past. It might be serious and prolonged, it might be accompanied by disorders and riots, but the French parliamentary system has demonstrated a remarkable ability to live through crises. Most Frenchmen, however much they complain about the regime's institutions or toy with the idea of fundamentally altering it, find the Third and Fourth Republics consistent with their way of life.

## V. PROBABLE GOVERNMENT POLICIES

### Domestic

47. Assuming that minority center-moderate left governments will continue, picking up parliamentary support wherever they can throughout the parliamentary spectrum, the outlook for domestic affairs is fairly encouraging. The perennial problems of inflationary controls, the budget, and wage rates will con-

tinue to strain weak governments. However, because of the relatively sound condition of the economy, there will be few other serious economic issues. Although the Socialists have given priority to social legislation, they have so far behaved in a restrained manner. They have given no sign of trying to nationalize additional industries. Regarding the social measures in the present government's program which have not already been enacted, the present government shows no disposition to make speed.

48. Over the next few years, it is probable that the so-called "modernization" program for the French economy will be continued, modest wage increases granted, improved working conditions established, low-cost housing developments accelerated, and social security improved and expanded. The Socialists are, by and large, prepared to levy new taxes to finance new expenditures, but obviously would prefer to reduce defense commitments wherever possible. The problem of tax reform in general will create difficulties for any government, but modest changes and alterations are probable.

49. One thorny domestic issue likely to trouble moderate left-center governments is that of state aid to church schools. It is probable that, if the issue were brought to the Assembly floor, a majority would vote for withdrawal of existing subsidies, and the Communists will almost certainly attempt to force such a measure through. We do not believe that the Radicals and Socialists are anxious to make an issue of it. If they were to do so, it would further widen the gap between the moderate left and moderate right.

### International

50. Premier Mollet and Foreign Minister Pineau have made a strong effort to exhibit an independent line in the conduct of French foreign policy. They have been insistent on full French participation with the US and UK in the political leadership of the Western alliance, and they have laid great emphasis on efforts to reduce international tension by such means as East-West contacts and disarmament. In part, this effort at independ-

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ence has been politically responsive to French national feelings. Since the loss of Indochina, the French have become acutely aware of the decline of their world position. Persisting overseas and internal problems have made them extremely sensitive to what many of them consider the neglect and disregard of France by its allies. Assertions and manifestations of France's independence are therefore very popular with the French people. Both the Mollet government and its successors, following the example of the Mendes-France government of 1954-1955, will almost certainly give this continuing factor serious weight in their policy-making, and even more in their public declarations.

51. The relaxation of tensions in Europe and the increasing belief, after the Summit Conference of 1955, that the danger of war had receded, has convinced the Mollet government, as well as much of the French public, that the opportunity has arrived for new courses of action. They regard the present period as one of competitive coexistence between the Sino-Soviet Bloc and the Western Powers. In particular, they consider that the Western Powers have overemphasized the military aspect of their security policies and thus have permitted the USSR to win popular support by posing as the sole defender of peace. The West must therefore strengthen its posture as a champion of peace by promoting disarmament, economic and cultural contacts between East and West, and economic assistance to underdeveloped countries (which, according to the so-called Pineau plan, should be extended through international agencies rather than by individual states). These ideas are widely held in France, but are particularly emphasized by the Socialist party, and are based on its belief that it is necessary to compete with Communism both within France and in the world on its own ground by supporting economic and social reform and, above all, by conspicuously promoting peace.

52. Nevertheless, the present French government, like its predecessors, is committed to the alliance of the Western democracies as the basis of French foreign policy. Despite its varied overseas interests and periodic colonial

preoccupations, France has long been faced with the problem of guaranteeing its security as a European power. As such, it has required allies, and it still requires them. Most Frenchmen would probably prefer to do without allies if they could dispense with them, but they recognize that their security will be threatened, if at all, from the East, namely from Germany or the USSR. Thus the Atlantic alliance, based essentially upon British and American pledges, is regarded as fundamental to national security.

53. The meaning of the Atlantic alliance is not the same, however, for France as for the US. The French accepted the North Atlantic pact because it clearly placed Western Europe under the protection of American power, and they welcomed the presence of American and British troops on the continent as a restraint on Germany as well as on the USSR. At the same time they wished to keep at a minimum their dependence on US policy. In addition, they expected to gain support from their Atlantic allies for their own overseas policies. With respect to the broader purposes of the alliance, they wish to emphasize its nonmilitary aspects and to provide for increased political and economic consultation and cooperation among the members.

54. The Mollet government is apparently sincere in its stated willingness to talk with the USSR about any issue and at any time, and despite the absence of any positive results from their recent visit to Moscow, French leaders have not been deflected from this attitude. They see no inconsistency between such an effort and their firm adherence to the North Atlantic alliance; in their eyes, NATO forms a protective shield and a position of strength from which it is possible to explore possibilities for solution of outstanding East-West issues. Any likely French government will probably have similar convictions, and will continue to be concerned with its purely European power position, which involves a check upon German as well as Soviet power.

55. *Disarmament.* It is principally in the disarmament field that the French leaders have been attempting to work towards agreement with the USSR. For domestic political and

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economic reasons as well as to reduce the external dangers to France, disarmament has been treated as a subject of great importance. Although differences with the US still exist, the French strongly adhere to the principle of adequate inspection and control, and they have agreed that the advanced stages of a disarmament plan should be implemented only in conjunction with a European security agreement and German reunification. While some weakening of the French position may occur, we do not believe that the present government or any likely successor would depart substantially from an agreed US-UK position on disarmament.

56. *East-West trade.* The French probably also feel that, apart from the political advantage to be gained by making concessions to domestic economic groups, they can make some contribution toward the further relaxation of tensions in Europe by pushing for a relaxation of trade controls against the Sino-Soviet Bloc. While we do not believe they would withdraw from either the COCOM or CHINCOM machinery, we believe they are likely to exert continuous pressure to eliminate the COCOM-CHINCOM differentials and to reduce the number of controlled items. They will almost certainly use every legal loophole to escape the obligations of the systems.

57. *Germany.* French fears of Germany have not been eliminated by the events of the past 10 years. Relations with West Germany have improved to the point of cordiality, but there is a residual concern that Germany may again disturb the peace. Distrust of Germany will grow if the nationalist tendencies recently emerging in Germany increase in strength and influence. The French are apprehensive of a rearmed West Germany, not so much because of the direct threat it could pose to France, but more importantly because of the threat it could pose to the peace of Europe so long as Germany is divided. They believe reunification could more easily be obtained within the framework of a broad disarmament agreement, and there is a good chance that France will support a neutralized and reunited Germany, provided that France is pro-

tected by a security arrangement which would prevent new German military adventures. The Saar issue has now been settled between the two governments in principle, and once technical questions are disposed of, this issue will probably be eliminated as a major source of Franco-German friction.

58. *European Integration.* Some revival of French interest in European integration schemes began under the conservative Faure government and has continued under Mollet. In part this is owing to a genuine devotion to the European idea. More particularly, the government is interested in EURATOM (the European Atomic Energy Community) as a device both to place atomic energy in public hands and to devote it to peaceful purposes. We believe that the Assembly will ratify a EURATOM agreement, provided the question of atomic weapons can be worked out. Mollet also supports the principle of the Common Market among the members of the Coal-Steel Community, but at the present time does not believe he has any chance of getting the necessary parliamentary support for an international agreement.

59. *Near East.* Despite the sharp decline in French power and influence in the Near East following French ejection from the Levant states at the end of World War II, the French still have fairly extensive commercial and cultural interests in the area and have a strong desire to retain their historic status as a Near East power. This desire, recently reinforced by concern over Arab support for the North African nationalists and over the global implications of increasing Sino-Soviet Bloc activity in the Near East, has been manifested by continuing efforts to insure that France participates in US-UK planning regarding the Near East. The French opposed establishment of the Baghdad Pact, in part because of fear of extension of British or US influence, and in part because of concern that the existence of the pact would stimulate Arab xenophobia and stand in the way of a general accommodation between the Soviet Bloc and the West. However, the French today officially accept the pact as an established fact and urge that emphasis be shifted to its nonmili-

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tary possibilities. Their more immediate concern is to prevent the spread of pan-Arabism across North Africa. They have therefore an interest in curbing Egypt and are extending support to Israel. Over the longer period their policy will probably evolve toward the support of Western-oriented nationalism.

60. *Far East.* French interest in maintaining a position in the Far East has diminished since the Geneva Conference on Indochina. While making an effort to retain a foothold in the Indochinese states through military and technical assistance, their more persistent efforts have turned to economic and cultural influence in Asia as a whole. The French government is supporting a heavier economic, as opposed to military, emphasis in SEATO. Resentment against the US role in Indochina and against Vietnam President Diem persists in France, but the French are unlikely to renew efforts to remove him. On the other hand, accelerated movement toward recognition of North Vietnam and Communist China is probable, although outright formal recognition is unlikely in the near future.

61. *Effect on French Foreign Policy of Increased Communist Influence.* We have estimated above that governments made up from the center and moderate left would probably, from time to time, depend on Communist votes for the passage of certain measures, and that Communist influence might thus increase considerably in the course of this parliament. The effects of such an increase would be to strengthen tendencies toward negotiation and accommodation with the USSR and Communist China, toward cutting defense expenditures and increasing expenditures on social and economic reform, and toward a generally more neutralist line of policy. However, we do not believe that Communist influence will increase to the point of disturbing the basic elements of French foreign policy, that ties with the West would be broken, NATO disrupted, COCOM abandoned, or defense gravely curtailed. Governments would continue to be dominated by Socialist and Radical ministers, not by Communists, and these ministers would almost certainly not abandon or basically modify their pro-Western orientation.

## Overseas Possessions and Dependencies

62. The loss of Indochina, Morocco, and Tunisia has struck a near fatal blow to France's traditional policy of linking overseas territories and dependencies with the metropole either by direct integration or indirectly through the concept of a French Union. Algeria may also go, and French policy toward its remaining overseas territories is in a state of transition.

63. *Morocco and Tunisia.* Independence has been granted to Morocco and Tunisia, subject to formal approval by the French parliament, and negotiations are in progress to define their "interdependence" with France. The most difficult remaining problems are those of foreign policy and defense. Under recently concluded agreements, both countries have received virtually complete freedom in foreign affairs. However, the French are trying to retain a special place in Moroccan and Tunisian foreign relations, and in particular hope to prevent the two new states from gravitating toward either the Arab-Asian or Sino-Soviet Blocs. On military questions, the French are vitally concerned with preventing assistance to Algerian rebel forces emanating from Morocco and Tunisia. To this end, and in the hope of keeping North Africa within a French zone of military defense, they are trying to retain control over, or at a minimum, influence in and access to, the military establishments in the two new states. Economically, the French desire to keep the two countries in the franc zone and to maintain a favored position in trade and investments. These negotiations are proving difficult, and it is probable that the French will be obliged to make further concessions in order to obtain agreement on essentials. However, serious dangers exist. One is that the comparatively moderate policies of the existing governments will be increasingly undermined by French delay in making concessions and that extremist elements will either triumph in the government councils or seize control. Another danger is that Moroccans and Tunisians, with or without the support of their governments, will create a series of incidents involving French forces or French residents, or will in-

tervene directly in Algeria. In such an event, order might rapidly deteriorate and the French might feel compelled to undertake large-scale military action outside of Algeria.

64. *US Bases in Morocco.* The French and Moroccan governments have not yet determined the US base question in their conventions defining interdependence. While the Moroccan government, for obvious reasons of advantage, will seek to exercise its sovereignty and to treat the base question bilaterally with the US, the French will almost certainly continue to demand that such negotiations be carried out trilaterally in an effort: (a) to utilize France's present responsibility for the security of the US bases as a means to maintain French military influence and forces in Morocco, and (b) to minimize the direct influence of the US in Moroccan affairs.

65. *Other Overseas Territories.* The present government, prompted by its difficulties in North Africa, has taken steps toward reforms in its other overseas territories. Under new legislation now in process the government would be permitted to introduce reforms by decree, and it apparently plans to eliminate separate electoral colleges, to grant universal suffrage, to increase the legislative and executive powers granted to territorial governments, and to encourage responsible self-government generally. At present, pressure for independence in France's other territories is not great, though it is increasing. Moderate left-center governments, if they continue in France, will probably continue to recognize that the flexible policy now initiated must be rapidly implemented if presently dependent peoples are to be kept in some form of association with France.

#### **Effect on French Policy of Popular Front or Rightist Regimes**

66. If a popular front government should come to power, involving a firm alliance between Communists, Socialists, and Radical Socialists against the opposition of all parties to the right, the effects on French policy would be great and adverse to US interests. Such a front would not necessarily carry into effect the full Communist line — there is no

reason to suppose that the Socialists and Radicals would totally surrender their principles. Its foreign policy, however, would be at least neutralist, and almost certainly neutralist with a sharp leaning toward the USSR. It might abandon NATO. If France remained technically in NATO, a popular front government would assuredly be hostile to it and NATO security arrangements would become virtually worthless. Defense expenditures would be sharply cut; Algeria abandoned. We believe it probable that popular front policies would provoke such rightist reaction as to lead to violence; perhaps to civil war. On the other hand, if a popular front government comes into being at all (and we have estimated that it is unlikely to do so) it will be only because the Communists have managed to establish for themselves a considerable degree of respectability and of identification with national interests; and because the anti-Communist and pro-Western convictions of moderate men have profoundly weakened. In these circumstances, the nature of the French state would have greatly changed, and its policies would have changed with it.

67. The coming to power of an authoritarian rightist regime — which we also estimate to be unlikely — would almost certainly be attended with domestic violence which would, at least for a time, further weaken France. The foreign policies of such a government would be strongly anti-Communist, but might also involve expensive commitments in Algeria which would prevent the return of French forces for NATO assignments. The strongly nationalist attitude which such a government would take in and out of NATO councils would also prove difficult to deal with.

68. If the Assembly should entrust to some elder statesman extraordinary powers to alter the constitution, the domestic effects would not necessarily be violent. If the statesman were De Gaulle, however, his highly nationalist outlook would almost certainly result in considerable difficulties for France's allies. He would probably attempt to reduce US preponderance in the NATO alliance, and to make whatever bilateral deals he could to strengthen France's position. While Commu-

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nist influence on French policy would probably diminish, De Gaulle's parochial patriotism might indirectly serve Communist ends by a destructive attack upon the security arrangements so laboriously built up since 1948. At the same time, a Gaullist government would be more outspokenly critical of US attitudes on France's colonial problems.

## VI. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

69. The military position of France, and particularly its contribution to the military posture of NATO, are strongly influenced by France's domestic political situation and its North African problem. By the time French plans for the reinforcement of Algeria are complete, the French ground force commitment to NATO in Europe will be virtually nullified. French forces in West Germany have been reduced to one armored and one infantry division, each at two-thirds strength. In metropolitan France there will remain three infantry and one armored divisions, of which only the last would be effective within M+ 30 days. Thus, six of a total of 17 French divisions remain in Europe but all six have important subordinate units in North Africa. The situation in Algeria has not yet seriously affected French air or naval commitments to NATO.

70. Since it appears likely that the substantial numbers of regular and reserve units will have to remain in Algeria for some time to come, the immediate ground force capabilities of NATO will remain at a reduced level. This troubles the French, but they consider pacification of Algeria to be an overriding national interest and they have obtained acknowledgment from NATO of the importance to NATO of security in this area.

71. It is not only the North African problem which has provided difficulties for the French military organization. The longer range problem, still unresolved, is that of reorganizing and re-equipping French forces in line with the current NATO strategic concept. This concept, based upon the use of tactical atomic weapons and designed to prevent the quick conquest of Western Europe by Soviet forces, was accepted by France and plans to imple-

ment it have been drawn up. Nevertheless, the additional broad military and budgetary decisions required for implementation have not been made, and, so long as the Algerian problem is not resolved, prospects for implementation of the NATO concept in France are nil.

72. In any circumstances, French governments are likely to be anxious both to reduce tensions and to advance disarmament. In part, this results from a desire to reduce military expenditures, and to utilize the savings in social and economic programs. In part it reflects a conviction that general war is unlikely and that implementation of a military program based upon a nuclear strategy would not advance the cause of peace. There will continue to be, on the part of almost any likely French government, concern that the goal envisioned by the new strategy may be unattainable as a practical proposition, that the new strategy continues to expose France to nuclear attack without guaranteeing adequate protection from it, that the cost of an adequate defense system is prohibitive, and that the real deterrent to nuclear warfare rests with the nuclear balance between the US and USSR. They also believe that — as demonstrated by the North African problem — an effective conventional force is required to maintain France's position in its overseas possessions.

73. Nevertheless, once the Algerian situation is settled, we believe French military policy will represent a compromise between the views just described and the more positive and forward-looking desires of French military authorities. There will probably be gradual reductions in military personnel, but military expenditures will probably remain slightly above the pre-Algeria level as units are recast in the light of new weapons developments. Some limited progress has been made during the past year. In the air force replacement of obsolescent types is underway, and 11 new squadrons have been activated. Three major and 11 minor combatant vessels have been added to the fleet, and the naval air arm has been strengthened by the acquisition of 50 jet

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fighters. While we believe some modest progress will continue, at least through completion of programs already begun, any substan-

tial progress must wait some relaxation of the demands now imposed by the North African operations.

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## APPENDIX

VALID VOTES IN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS  
(Metropole Only)

	<u>1946</u>	<u>Per- cent</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>Per- cent</u>	<u>1956</u>	<u>Per- cent</u>
Communists and Allies	5,489,288	28.6	4,910,547	25.9	5,492,328	25.8
Minor Left Wing Groups <sup>a</sup>	—	—	184,451	1.	356,916	1.7
Socialists (SFIO)	3,431,954	17.9	2,744,842	14.5	3,187,890	15.1
Radical Socialists, UDSR and RGR	2,381,384	12.4	1,887,583	9.9	2,952,567	13.9
MRP	5,058,307	26.4	2,369,778	12.5	2,355,873	11.1
<i>Modérés</i>	2,465,526	12.8	2,656,995	14.	3,084,576	14.5
Gaullists <sup>b</sup>	312,635	1.6	4,125,492	21.7	911,450	4.2
National Rally	—	—	—	—	337,486	1.5
Poujadists (UFF)	—	—	—	—	2,445,588	11.5
Miscellaneous	<u>63,976</u>	.3	<u>87,346</u>	.5	<u>161,893</u>	.7
Total <sup>c</sup>	19,203,070		18,967,034		21,286,565	

<sup>a</sup> Left wing groups included in Miscellaneous in 1946 figures.

<sup>b</sup> Gaullist Union (1946), RPF (1951), Social Republicans (1956).

<sup>c</sup> The official total valid vote for 1951 and 1956 is 19,129,064 and 21,478,142, slightly greater in each case than the totals given in the table. The apparent discrepancy arises from the fact that voters were permitted to strike names from the ballots. Incomplete ballots were counted as whole votes in terms of electoral participation but as fractions of a vote for a particular party list.

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