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Jen 120

7 January 1955

MEMORANDUM TO:

STAT

SUBJECT: Random Thoughts on our next big Soviet paper

1. An excellent set of T/R's! I like particularly the thrust of the covering memo, which indicates, John, hopes to do one of the main things I thought should be done, i.e., cut down the overweening size of 11-4. These estimates will simply not have their proper impact if they are too bulky to wade through. Their emphasis should be more selective than comprehensive, and John has the right pitch.

2. However, there is one additional area of selectivity he hasn't come to grips with. This is: to what extent should the big Soviet paper cover in detail all local Bloc courses of action and the prospects of all local Communist parties? I feel myself, that the 11-4 series should be fairly generalized, leaving to specific country or problem papers all feasible details. For example, in his I.A-4 need we ask "are any of these (foreign) Communist parties likely to be able to seize power, etc.?" Or in III B, 2, should we get down into too much detail on specific forecasts of probable Soviet courses of action vis-a-vis too many countries? No doubt this is primarily a problem of drafting, and no harm in asking the questions in the T/R.

3. I do not feel that the relationship between Soviet dogma, doctrine, ideology (or what have you) and actions is adequately covered in 11-4 (cf. Gallagher's recent memos). This subject may be controversial and we don't want to waste too much space on it, but it may merit some exploration.

4. I think that the estimate itself should include a brief summation of the changes in Soviet leadership attitudes since Stalin's death. Has anything really changed? A lot of people don't think so, which makes this an important point. With the longer perspective of 1955 we may be able to tape this more precisely than when we wrote 11-4. Do the Kremlin leaders really believe what Joxe told Malenkov, i.e., that Stalin's policies got the USSR into its present international spot? If so, it must have a real impact on Soviet policy. We can't merely content ourselves with reiteration of Mose Harvey's dictum that Soviet objectives never change, therefore neither do their policies. Therefore, I suggest a section in the T/Rs asking for a brief statement of probable effects on Soviet attitudes and policies of shift to new leadership after Stalin's death.

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5. In Section II, I feel we should devote at least a subheading to the crucial question of how approaching nuclear plenty must affect Soviet policy, just as it has had such an effect on our own. I am convinced that the Soviets (now that they've exploded plenty of their own stuff), must be at least as worried as we are over war in an era of nuclear plenty, per Malenkov's remark last March on the perils of nuclear war. Moreover, the question as to whether the Soviets would become more or less aggressive in a period of plenty was one of the major disputed points in NSC 5440/1, the recent redo of Basic National Security Policy. The para. in 11-4, which leans to the aggressive side, needs a lot of rethinking in my view.

6. I agree fully with the proposed greater emphasis on strategic policy and concepts in the military section, at the expense of too much listing of hardware. But shouldn't I, D, 1 be beefed up some more to ask some of the questions raised by us and the British in our recent strategy papers, such as: (1) Is Soviet doctrine still tied more to a conventional World War II type strategy and force basis (partly from continued dominance of ground generals); (2) Is the balance of Soviet forces slowly changing, as ours is; (3) Are the Soviets really building toward all-out attack on the US if war comes or does their force pattern suggest a more limited strategic concept (as the British suggest); (4) Might the Soviets come to believe at any time during the period under review that they could decisively damage US war-making capacity? Our Soviet paper should draw the necessary over-all inferences from what the USSR is doing in the military field, and not content itself with a mere recitation of hardware.

7. I myself feel that the economic section of our big Soviet papers is in danger of becoming almost as routinized as the military section, i.e., a straight recitation of the trends and statistics in various economic fields similar to the listing of military figures. Section V in NIE 11-4- is a good over-all statement about the historical development of the Soviet economy. Could we not parallel this in the new estimate with a few over-all paras. on how the inter-relationships of the various trends and problems projected are likely to change the face of the Soviet economy over the next several years? In other words tie all the separate projections together in something more than GNP terms. Where is the USSR heading economically? Does it have a maturing economy? How will increases in consumer goods output affect future demand patterns? How will trade increases affect the autarky policy?

8. I recognize that most of the above suggestions may relate more to the drafting stage than to the T/R stage. Nevertheless, shouldn't we ask a few more questions about some of them?

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4 January 1955

Staff Memorandum No. _____

Subject: Soviet Bloc Paper (NIE 11-3-55)

1. The attached terms of reference for NIE 11-3-55 "Soviet Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action Through Mid-1960" largely follow the pattern adopted for NIE 11-4-54. However, there are extensive sections of the latter paper which we do not think require repetition this year. These include numerous paragraphs in the political and economic sections which were descriptive of the nature of the Soviet system and which were put in last year because we felt that no previous NIE on the Soviet Bloc had dealt adequately with certain fundamental and continuing aspects of Soviet society. We hope this year to confine ourselves more strictly to an account of recent ~~developments~~ developments of significance and to a forecast of probable developments.

2. In the political section, for example, the essential estimates to be made have to do with the relationships within the top leadership, the relationships between regime and the general population, and the bearing of these on the stability and authority of the Soviet government as well as upon its ability to pursue its objectives freely and to choose among alternative courses of action without reference to the internal stability of the Soviet power.

3. In the economic field we intend to continue our practice of charting the prospects for Soviet economic growth, and to provide as much detail as the economists can be induced to agree upon. We should again give particular attention to the long-run prospects in the agricultural field, which is now receiving the regime's special attention. We should further examine in detail the regime's probable policy with respect to the scale of its military effort, particularly in the light of probable developments in the West, and the likely consequences for the Soviet economic situation of any major shift in this respect which might be undertaken.

4. We hope to save space in NIE 11-3-55 by reducing still more of the purely numerical data in the military section of the paper to tabular form. Emphasis should be placed on the strategic concepts governing Soviet military policy, on significant new developments in weapons systems, and on the estimate of over-all Bloc military capabilities.

5. The section on the "Soviet Estimate of the World Situation" introduced for the first time in NIE 11-4-54 has, we think, proved its value both as an educational exercise and as an essential ingredient in the logic of the paper as a whole. We ~~propose~~ propose to keep it possibly to shorten it somewhat by eliminating its "quarterly review" features if possible. We ~~propose~~ propose to keep it as much as possible.

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6. The section on "Courses of Action" should probably remain pretty much unchanged both in size and content. The essential question to be answered here, of course, will be whether, in the light of recent developments in the West or those likely to take place (especially German rearmament or its failure) the USSR's generally "mild" policy of the last year or two is likely to undergo any radical shift.

7. To meet the 1 May deadline set for ~~this~~ this paper, the meetings of the IAC representatives should begin no later than 4 April. Contributions ought therefore to be submitted by 11 March.



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JHSUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: NIE 11-3-55: SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE SOVIET COURSES
OF ACTION THROUGH MID-1960 (Draft for Board consideration)

THE PROBLEM

To examine the political, economic, scientific, and military strengths and weaknesses of the USSR and to estimate probable Soviet courses of action through mid-1960.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The present terms of reference are designed to bring out significant changes and elicit additional information on aspects of the problem which have become apparent since the publication of NIE 11-4-54. Significant changes in the conclusions and discussion of NIE 11-4-54, not reflected in the responses to the questions below, should be pointed out in the contributions.

I. MAIN FACTORS AFFECTING SOVIET COURSES OF ACTIONA. Political Factors1. USSR

- a. Have there been significant changes in the composition of ^{or} the relations within the Soviet ruling group since mid-1954? Have there been developments in domestic and foreign policy which seem likely to produce strains within the Soviet leadership? Are changes likely to occur within this group during the period of this estimate which would affect the authority of the regime and its freedom of action in domestic and foreign policy?
- b. Have significant changes occurred in the institutional bases of Soviet authority (party, police, military)? Are changes likely to occur in the power relationships between these groups which would affect the authority of the regime and its freedom of action in domestic and foreign policy?
- c. Have significant changes occurred in the regime's policies toward the population at large and toward selected social classes, or are they likely to occur? Are any domestic policies or political or social issues within the USSR likely to develop in such a way as either to weaken or strengthen the authority of the regime and its freedom of action in domestic and foreign policy?

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- d. What is the status of the regime's policies to ameliorate living conditions and to restrict the arbitrary exercise of the police power against the population? Are these policies likely to be continued or are there signs of factors developing which will alter the regime's intention to carry through such policies? What has been the development of popular, non-Party attitudes toward the regime in the post-Stalin period?

2. Soviet-Satellite Relations

- a. Have significant changes occurred or are they likely to occur in Moscow's relations with the Satellites? Are there any developments likely to occur within the Satellites or in the free world which would affect Moscow's authority?
- b. To what extent have developments within the Satellites affected Moscow's freedom of action in domestic and foreign policy? Are changes likely to occur within the Satellites which would affect Moscow's freedom of action within the Satellites and Moscow's policies toward the free world?

3. Sino-Soviet Relations

- a. Have significant developments taken place in Sino-Soviet relations? Is it likely that the political, economic, and military issues involved in ~~the~~ Sino-Soviet relations will develop in such a way as to affect the relationship between Moscow and Peiping or the freedom of action exercised by each in its respective foreign and domestic policies?
- b. Have changes occurred or are they likely to occur in the respective roles of Moscow and Peiping in the Viet Minh and North Korean regimes? Are changes likely to occur which would affect Moscow's or Peiping's freedom of action with respect to these regimes and Bloc policies toward the non-Communist world?

4. Foreign Communist Parties

- a. Have any significant changes occurred or are they likely to occur in Moscow's relations with foreign Communist parties? Are any of these Communist parties likely to be able to seize power or increase their influence significantly during the period of this estimate?

B. Economic Factors

1. Economic Policy and Quantitative Trends

- a. What were the main trends in Soviet economic policy in 1954? Have significant changes in economic policy taken place recently or are they likely to take place during the period of the estimate? What will be the critical factors in Moscow's decisions on economic policy?

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- b. What were the main trends in Soviet GNP in 1954: in the growth of GNP, in the allocation of GNP to defense, investment, and consumption, and in the growth of the various sectors of the economy? What is the significance of these trends in terms of the continued growth of the economy? What comparisons can be made between Soviet and US GNP?
- c. What will be the probable growth rate of Soviet GNP during and beyond the period of this estimate? What would be the effect on the growth rate of alternative allocations of resources (e. g., a sharp increase in defense expenditures)?

2. Economic Resources

- a. What were the main trends in 1954 in the growth of the Soviet population, in the size and composition of the labor force, in the supply of basic raw materials and finished products, in the stockpiling program, and in the transportation system?
- b. Is it likely that human and material resources will limit the growth of the Soviet economy during and beyond the period of this estimate? Will there be serious bottlenecks?

3. Developments in the Principal Economic Sectors

- a. What were the main trends in 1954 in the three sectors of Soviet industrial production (capital goods, consumer goods, military production), and how do these trends compare with the past? What were the trends in administrative efficiency, labor productivity, and technological development? What will be the probable growth rates of these sectors in the period of the estimate?
- b. What were the trends (quantitative) in the production of ground, naval, and air weapons in 1954, and how do these trends compare with the past? What comparisons can be made between Soviet and US trends in the production of military end-items? How would a renewed military build-up affect the other sectors of the economy? What will be the effect of the increasing complexity and cost of modern weapons on levels of Soviet military expenditure?
- c. What were the main developments in Soviet agriculture in 1954? What are the principal geographic and natural limitations on the expansion of agricultural production, including the present land expansion program? What will be the critical economic factors affecting the implementation of agricultural policy? What will be the probable growth rate during the period of this estimate?

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d. What were the main trends in urban and rural living standards in 1954?

In food consumption, in the supply of consumer durables and textiles, in the level of housing, and in real income? What will be the probable trends during this period? What will be the critical factors affecting the growth of living standards?

e. What economic effects would result from either a significant ~~underfulfillment~~ underfulfillment of the regime's welfare goals or a reversal of its program to increase consumer benefits?4. Foreign Trade

a. What were the principal developments in the volume, composition, and direction of Soviet trade in 1954 with the Satellites, Communist China, and the West?

How do these trends compare with the past? How have Soviet shipments to Communist China and the Satellites affected Soviet domestic economic programs? What will be the probable trends in Soviet trade during this period?

b. What were the trends in Soviet balance of payments in trade with the West, including the role of gold sales? What are the prospects for a shift in Soviet trade policy from exports of agricultural products to exports of capital goods?

C. Scientific and Technical Factors Affecting Soviet Capabilities

1. Quantitative. (Use charts and graphs wherever possible. Include figures for mid-1955, mid-1958, and mid-1960.) What are total scientific assets of the USSR, i. e., manpower, facilities, financial support, etc.? How do USSR figures compare with the US? What proportions of these totals are engaged in activities directly affecting military capabilities, specifically in the physical sciences, and in basic industry, light industry, health, and agricultural research and technology?
2. Qualitative. What is the quality of Soviet scientific training and research in major scientific fields? How do these compare with the West? How does ideology affect quality and independence of research?
3. Satellite and Communist Chinese Contribution. What contributions to Soviet scientific capabilities are made by the Satellites and Communist China?
4. Probable Major Developments During the Period of this Estimate. What will be the major strengths and weaknesses of Soviet sciences? What are Soviet capabilities in the most important scientific and technological fields, the probable

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developments in each field, and the weapons and weapons systems (including nuclear) which will probably be developed and produced? In general terms, will Soviet (and Bloc) scientific capabilities meet Soviet (and Bloc) requirements during this period?

D. Bloc Military Capabilities (By National Units)

(Detailed statements on method of analysis and probable margins of error should be included for all production and inventory figures and statistical tables.)

1. Probable Soviet Military Strategy

- a. In general terms what has been the probable Soviet military strategy in case of general war, and what are the basic factors which have determined this strategy?
- b. Are any significant changes in Soviet military strategy likely to occur during this period, and if so, what are the probable determining factors?

2. Bloc Military Forces (By National Units)

- a. Quantitative. (Use charts whenever possible and include figures for updating Tables 1-8, Appendix D, NIE 11-4-54. Include figures for mid-1955, mid-1958, and mid-1960.)

- (1) What is Bloc armed strength: TO&E, and where possible, actual? What is the composition of Bloc armed forces, including security forces? What is the disposition of Bloc armed forces?
- (2) What is the size of the military manpower pool? Of trained reserves? What is the mobilization capacity of the Bloc for M /30, M / 180, in terms of manpower, military organization, and units?
- (3) What is the size of the inventories and reserve stocks of major military weapons, including mass destruction weapons?
- (4) What will be the probable annual production of major military end-items during this period? What would the probable annual production be, assuming (a) a constant absolute level of defense expenditures (1953-1954 level); and (b) a 10% annual increase of military expenditures? A 20% increase? In general terms, how will estimated Soviet strategic requirements and the increasing unit cost and complexity of major weapons affect weapons priorities and thus the level of production within major sectors (ground, sea, air, nuclear, and guided missiles) of the defense establishment?

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b. Qualitative. (Indicate probable basic trends during this period.)

What is the quality of the Bloc armed forces from the point of view of effectiveness, political reliability, and morale? What is the quality of combat support services? What is the general quality of major items of Soviet equipment? What is the degree of coordination between the major military services and between the national units of the Bloc? To what extent would logistic weaknesses limit the effectiveness of Soviet or Bloc forces in specific areas?

3. Over-all Capabilities

- a. In general terms, how do the major Soviet Bloc political, economic, scientific, and military strengths and weaknesses affect Soviet military capabilities? To what extent will new Soviet military developments during this period modify present capabilities to pursue both offensive and defensive action for localized or general war?
- b. In very general terms, what are the capabilities of the Soviet economy to support simultaneous land campaigns (EIG P-6)?
- c. Also in general terms, what are the recuperative capabilities of the Soviet economy against attacks by mass destruction weapons (stockpiles, concentration of industry, communications lines)?

II. SOVIET ESTIMATE OF THE WORLD SITUATION

- A. In the Soviet view, what are the major developments during the past year which have had an effect, actually or potentially, upon the strategic position of the Soviet Bloc vis-a-vis the non-Communist world? In particular, what is the Soviet estimate of the world balance of forces and how in the Soviet view will the relative military strength of the Soviet Bloc and the West develop in the future? What dangers to Soviet security, and what opportunities for the advancement of Soviet interests have emerged or are likely to emerge as a result of these developments?
- B. What is the Soviet estimate of the actual and potential effect of those developments upon the cohesiveness and policies of the Western alliance?
- C. What is the Soviet estimate of the vulnerabilities in the non-Communist world? In the Soviet view, what issues are potential sources of friction among the Western allies, and what other weaknesses of a moral, political, or economic nature appear susceptible of exploitation?
- D. Are there major differences between Soviet and Chinese Communist estimates with respect to any of the above questions?

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PROBABLE SOVIET OBJECTIVES AND COURSES OF ACTIONA. Probable Soviet Objectives

1. Have the developments discussed above, or other factors, caused the Soviet leaders to modify in any way their short-term aims? Have they caused the Soviet leaders to change their estimate of the likelihood (or the timing) of the achievement of their aims?
2. Have they caused the Soviet leaders to modify their methods?
3. To what extent would Soviet aims or methods be modified or extended in the event of a major change in the world situation, such as, for example, a major increment in Western military strength?

B. Probable Soviet Courses of Action

1. In general, what courses of action will the Soviet leaders pursue during the course of this estimate? What areas of the world will they consider most important, both for the immediate future and for the longer run? What major issues will they attempt to exploit? In what ways?
2. In particular, what courses of action will the Soviet leaders pursue in each area of the world? (Contributions should include brief summaries of major developments in each area of the world during the past year which may affect Soviet courses of action. For example, recent developments in Soviet relations with such countries as Japan, Afghanistan, Iran, Yugoslavia, and Finland should be adequately documented. The trends in Soviet foreign trade and technical assistance policies, and the political implications thereof, should also be discussed.)
3. Has the parallelism of Soviet and Communist Chinese policies in the Far East been affected by developments within the past year? In what ways might the Chinese Communists try to modify Soviet decisions and courses of action as set forth in the answers to questions 1 and 2 above? Might the Chinese Communists take courses of action contrary to the desires of the Kremlin? If so, what are these courses of action, and under what conditions might they be taken?

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