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*Sen. Counsel
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THE EUROPEAN DEPENDENCIES IN THE CARIBBEAN AREA



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THE EUROPEAN DEPENDENCIES IN THE CARIBBEAN AREA

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the current situation and probable developments in the British, French, and Dutch dependencies in the Caribbean area, with particular reference to internal security; and to evaluate the current attitudes of the Latin American republics toward those dependencies.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The European possessions¹ in the Caribbean area are of strategic importance to the US primarily because of their geographic position. In time of general war, US military bases in most of the dependencies would be essential to the security of strategically vital US and Western Hemisphere areas, installations, and lines of communication. Conversely, control or even covert use of any of the dependencies by enemies of the US could in wartime threaten vital US interests.

2. Certain dependencies are also important producers of strategic bauxite and petroleum products. Dutch Guiana (Surinam), British Guiana, and Jamaica currently produce approximately 59 percent of the Free World's supply of bauxite ore. They provide nearly 50 percent of the total US supply and the major part of Canada's supply. The capacity of the petroleum refineries of Dutch Aruba and Curacao amounts to about 6 percent of Free World capacity. In the event of war, the importance of the Caribbean

sources of these commodities would be greatly enhanced, and might become critical, owing to the distance and vulnerability of other major sources.

3. For the most part, the dependencies are characterized by political immaturity and depressed social and economic conditions. Political tensions within the dependencies are unlikely to abate, and local disorders will continue to occur. However, for the foreseeable future, the European authorities will retain the capability to restore order with their police and military forces.

4. The Communist movement in the dependencies is connected with that in the respective metropolises and with the WFTU, rather than with Communists in Latin America, and we believe that this situation will continue. The Communists are strongest in Martinique and Guadeloupe, where the French authorities impose no restrictions on their organizational or propaganda activities. The Communists there could probably organize serious disorders, and their capabilities in this respect are growing.

¹ A list of these possessions, including their population and racial composition, is in Annex A.

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Nevertheless, the French authorities could restore order unless the Communists were armed from overseas. If, however, in the event of war or paralyzing social disorders in France, the Communists were given arms and instructions to seize power, loyal French security forces in the area would probably be unable to restore order without external assistance.

5. In the British West Indies, Communism is presently weak, but its influence is growing, particularly in Jamaica and Trinidad. In British Guiana its influence is strong. The Communists have capabilities for sabotage in each of these colonies, and they can be expected to have an increasing capability in Jamaica and Trinidad for fomenting or abetting disorders. We believe that the control of

British Guiana will remain in the hands of British officials backed by troops and a strong police force. In British Honduras there is as yet no evidence of Communist activity, although the population would be susceptible to Communist agitation.

6. In the Netherlands dependencies there is as yet no significant Communist movement.

7. Preservation of European authority in the Caribbean dependencies tends to insure the availability of the strategic materials and bases in the area. However, US support for the European position occasions difficulties in relations with friendly but anticolonial powers, primarily the Latin American republics.

DISCUSSION

I. THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE CARIBBEAN DEPENDENCIES

8. *Geographic.* The Caribbean dependencies are of strategic importance to the US primarily because of their geographic position. In time of general war, US air and naval bases and radar sites in most of the dependencies would be essential to the security of strategically vital US and Western Hemisphere areas, installations, and lines of communication. In World War II, US forces used facilities in the Bahamas, Jamaica, Antigua, St. Lucia, Trinidad, Aruba, Curacao, and all the Guianas.

9. Conversely, control or even covert use of any of the dependencies by enemies of the US could in wartime threaten vital US interests, since their location would make feasible their utilization as bases or staging areas for infiltration, sabotage, or commando-type operations, and for submarine supply.

10. *Military.* Apart from the extensive World War II naval and air base facilities, most of which would have to be redeveloped

to support sustained military operations, the military resources in the dependencies are meager. Each of the three metropolises maintains small armed forces in the area.² In addition, each has colonial police forces and reserve police units in its dependencies. The mission of all these forces is to preserve internal security. In event of general war, they could be augmented somewhat by local recruitment, but they could not be expected to perform missions other than local security. The dependencies could provide an estimated maximum of 360,000 untrained men of poor quality and limited utility for military service. The entire burden of financing, training, and equipping this personnel, however, would have to be borne by the metropole or by the US.

11. In event of general war or imminent threat of war, the British, French, and Dutch Governments would almost certainly make available needed base facilities and sites in the dependencies to US forces. In addition to

² These forces are detailed in Annex B.

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the present US naval station in Trinidad, the US enjoys leaseholds through the year 2040 on base sites in Trinidad, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Antigua, the Bahamas, and British Guiana. Facilities in the French and Dutch possessions could be obtained without serious difficulties, provided friendly governments retained authority. In any event, the seaward defenses of the whole Caribbean area would almost certainly fall to US responsibility.

12. *Economic.* The European dependencies are important producers of two strategic commodities, bauxite and petroleum products. In the event of general war, the importance of the Caribbean sources of these commodities would be greatly enhanced and might become critical, owing to the distances and vulnerability of other major sources: France and West Africa in the case of bauxite, and the Middle East in the case of petroleum.

13. Currently, Dutch Guiana (Surinam), British Guiana, and Jamaica respectively produce about 25, 21, and 13 percent of the Free World's supply of bauxite. Exports to the US amount to about 80 percent of total US imports of the ore, i.e., nearly 50 percent of the total US supply. In addition, Canada obtains the major part of its supply from the same dependencies. The transshipment facilities at Trinidad are important in the overseas movement of bauxite from the Guianas. In French Guiana, extensive bauxite deposits have been proved, but exploitation has not yet begun.

14. The petroleum refineries at Curacao and Aruba are among the world's largest. Supplied by Venezuelan crude, these refineries have a capacity amounting to about 6 percent of Free World capacity. The refineries produce virtually every kind of petroleum product, including motor and aviation gas, jet fuels, special fuel oils used by the US Navy, and POL used by the US Army. Trinidad makes a minor petroleum contribution, currently less than 1 percent of both crude production and refinery output of the Free World. Trinidad's pitch lake is an important source of pure asphalt.

15. Finally, relatively small quantities of the strategic minerals, columbite and tantalite, are produced in British Guiana, amounting in 1953 to 2 or 3 percent of Free World supply. Manganese explorations in that colony show promise.

16. Although the bauxite production of the European territories in the Caribbean area is of vital strategic importance to the Free World and petroleum production is of considerable importance, these territories generally are not essential to the economies of the metropolitan powers.

II. CONDITIONS AND TRENDS IN THE CARIBBEAN DEPENDENCIES

General

17. The Caribbean dependencies of the UK, France, and the Netherlands have a rapidly expanding population of some 4.5 million. The great majority is Negro-mulatto, and only about 2 percent is white. There are large Asian minorities in Dutch and British Guiana and Trinidad.³ The economies of the dependencies (excepting the Dutch West Indies) are based wholly or largely on agriculture. For the most part, the area is characterized by political immaturity and depressed social and economic conditions, with increasing overpopulation, chronic unemployment, high disease rates, ignorance, and underdeveloped economies.

18. Such adverse conditions, combined with post-World War II political currents which are operating in most of the world's dependent areas, have produced widespread local pressures (except in the French territories) for improvement through increased self-government and ultimate autonomy. Numerous radical and demagogic native leaders — including Communists and Communist sympathizers — have risen in nearly all the dependencies to organize and direct mass followings. The resultant tensions, which at times erupt into disorders, have posed a continuous threat to stability in most parts of the area, and

³ The estimated population and racial composition of each of the dependencies are contained in Annex A.

they require the metropolises to maintain in the Caribbean trained military units as well as large police forces.

19. The Communist movement in the dependencies is connected with that in the respective metropolises and with the WFTU, rather than with Communists in Latin America. This pattern conforms to that of the dependencies limited overseas contacts and is likely to continue indefinitely.

20. Despite the generally insignificant contributions of the dependencies to the metropolitan economies and the financial and administrative burdens they impose, the UK, France, and the Netherlands intend to hold on to them, largely for prestige reasons. The two basic problems which the metropolises must meet if explosive discontent is to be eliminated from the dependencies are: (a) economic development to provide adequate levels of living, and (b) except in the French colonies, new political relationships between metropole and dependency involving concessions to local pressures and aspirations.

21. In the postwar period, the metropolitan powers have each sponsored increased native participation in local government, but not at the pace demanded by many native leaders. For the improvement of economic and social conditions, the powers have sponsored and financed investment schemes which have been generous in relation to the metropolises' own postwar resources, but usually inadequate in relation to the needs of the area, especially in view of the rapid population growth. Thus, the outlook for the abatement of tensions in the Caribbean dependencies is not bright, and occasional local disorders will continue to occur.

British West Indies (Bahamas, Jamaica, Leeward Islands, Windward Islands, Barbados, Trinidad)

22. The central problem of the BWI is economic. The area contains more people than it can adequately support, and the population is increasing rapidly. On the basis of existing trends, the population is expected to double in the next thirty years. Even in the best

of times, unemployment is serious and living conditions are extremely poor. Prospects for relief through large-scale emigration and birth control are practically nil. UK-financed programs for agricultural and industrial development, as well as some foreign private investment in mining and secondary industry, have helped to alleviate the situation. However, the feasible rate of such expansion and development can probably do little more than maintain present living conditions for the growing population.

23. Poor living conditions, constant economic difficulties, and urban crowding have produced chronic instability and occasional strife in the region. Despite these obstacles to orderly political development, and also the political apathy and immaturity of the masses, Britain has granted each of the colonies in the last decade new constitutions containing substantial advances toward local self-government. In the last four years, the major colonies — Jamaica, Barbados, and Trinidad — all acquired virtual control of their domestic affairs, although the British-appointed governors retain ultimate emergency powers. In view of the numerous hazards to stability, as well as the factionalism, corruption, demagoguery, and inexperience that characterize West Indian politics, these new constitutional systems may break down, notably in Jamaica and Trinidad. In such event, the British governors would act to enforce order as in British Guiana in October 1953.

24. In the small islands, the powers of the legislatures, which generally have leftist majorities representing the negro working class, are still very limited, and the governors do not hesitate to suppress disorders by force.

25. Within a few years, the BWI (excepting the Bahamas) are likely to federate under a constitution which grants something approaching Commonwealth status. With British financial aid for some years, which has been promised, such regionalization of common problems may somewhat enhance economic and political stability in the area.

26. *Communism.* The Communist movement in the BWI is weak but growing in numbers and influence. Trained Communist leaders

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are so far very few in number, but organizational efforts have been increased, with funds and advice forthcoming from both the British Communist Party and the Communist-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). No Communist party appears to have been organized as yet in any of the islands, but Communists and fellow-travelers have been actively building front organizations involving political, labor, youth, cultural, and "peace" groups. Considerable quantities of Communist literature have been coming to the BWI through the mails from Europe.

27. The typical Communist tactic in the BWI is to organize study groups, and then turn them into activist front movements. The Communists generally concentrate on fanning social and economic grievances, and on preaching the evils of capitalism and imperialism rather than on advocating Communism. The Communists advocate self-government, as a necessary step toward Communist control.

28. Although there are some Communists active in all the colonies, Communism has so far emerged as a significant problem only in Jamaica and Trinidad. Communist leaders in both islands have maintained contacts with European Communists and they appear to be getting increasing aid and advice from Europe. However, no outstanding popular leaders have emerged. In Jamaica, the Communists were expelled from the People's National Party and from its affiliated Trades Union Congress (TUC), which they had infiltrated. Nevertheless, Jamaican Communists are actively proselytizing Jamaican youth, sugar workers, and also the large Chinese community. Prominent members of the latter group belong to the Chinese Benevolent Society, which is dominated by Communist China. Other front organizations are the People's Educational Organization, an embryo Communist Party of possibly 500 members, and the recently organized Federation of Trade Unions, a rival to the TUC. The influence of both is small so far.

29. In Trinidad, Communists generally dominate the Trades Union Congress and the recently organized West Indian Independence Party. Their Oilfield Workers' Trade Union is

the main union in the oil industry. In the last two years, they have become increasingly bold in propagating the Communist line. However, the Communists suffered a setback last November, when second-rank union leaders forced withdrawal of the TUC from the WFTU.

30. Spurred by the incidents in British Guiana, British authorities are increasingly alert to Communist activities. They have increased their efforts to obstruct the inflow of Communist publications and the intercolony movements of Communist organizers. Moreover, the British will have the help of local anti-Communist political leaders, who are increasingly aware of Communist aims. At the same time, the British programs in the social, economic, and political field may partially alleviate the worst popular discontents which the Communists have exploited.

31. The outlook over the next few years is for a limited increase in Communist numbers and influence. Although the Communists will have capabilities for sabotage and for fomenting disorder, the British will continue to be able to maintain a reasonable degree of internal security. However, in the event of a serious economic recession in the area, Communist strength and capabilities would probably grow rapidly, and the difficulty of maintaining internal security would increase.

British Guiana

32. In the past few years, a few exceptionally able Communists built in British Guiana a well-organized, militant, and popular party, the People's Progressive Party (PPP), with a program for broad social and economic reform. The PPP last year swept the first elections to be held under a new, more liberal constitution, and, as a result, took over the important ministries of the local government. The subsequent disruptive and undemocratic behavior of the PPP Ministers led the British Governor in October 1953 to call in security troops, suspend the constitution, and assume control of the government.

33. Thus, the most immediate problem in British Guiana is the replacement of a very

popular Communist leadership in local politics and labor organizations. To deal with the economic and social grievances which the Communists have exploited, the UK has hastened to draw up a broad-scale economic development plan, and has allotted funds to finance it. This plan includes a program for housing and other social welfare measures which should alleviate the worst grievances. The British hope that, in time, general economic and social conditions will appreciably improve.

34. *Communism.* Hard-core Communists are probably few in number. Also, they may have lost a small part of their mass following since October 1953. However, they still control the PPP, and they control or strongly influence several leading labor unions. They maintain contacts with the British Communist Party and the WFTU.

35. The PPP is continuing to pour out propaganda against the government, employers, opposition groups, imperialism, and capitalism. It does not openly advocate Communism, but rather advocates self-government with sweeping social and economic reforms. The Communists' immediate aim is probably to extend their influence in the trade unions, preserve PPP solidarity and popularity until the next election, whenever that may come, and stir up as much discontent and damage to the economy as possible. Their ultimate objective is a self-governing British Guiana under Communist control.

36. Although the Communists will have capabilities for widespread sabotage and for fomenting disorder, the British can almost certainly maintain general order in the colony. They are restricting the movements of PPP leaders within the colony, the holding of meetings, and the circulation of propaganda. They are making vigorous efforts to alleviate the worst popular grievances and they are holding out the promise of appreciably improved living conditions in the future. Also, they are encouraging opposition political groups and are attempting to split the PPP followers from their leaders.

37. However, the PPP remains in an advantageous position to retain popularity. The

opposition is poorly organized and lacks any broad appeal, while general economic and social improvement will come slowly. Therefore, we believe that constitutional government will continue to be suspended, and that the control of the colony will remain in the hands of British officials backed by troops and a strong police force.

British Honduras

38. Like most other colonies in the Caribbean, British Honduras suffers from the poor living conditions inherent in a stagnant plantation economy. Resultant discontents boil up occasionally in disorders, fomented by local extremist leaders who are anticolonial and anti-British, but not Communist. Such disorders are likely to continue to occur, but the police and British troops will almost certainly retain the capability to cope with them. Though the population would be susceptible to Communist agitation, there is as yet no evidence of Communist activity in British Honduras.

39. Elections this year under a liberalized constitution, if held, will probably reflect the rise to dominant political influence of the People's United Party (PUP). PUP leaders are militant nationalists who appear to have organized a mass following. They have probably received funds from Guatemala, which has long aspired to absorb the colony, but British Hondurans see few attractions in such a fusion.

French West Indies (Martinique and Guadeloupe) and French Guiana

40. Like most other Caribbean dependencies, the French colonies have underdeveloped, plantation economies. Living standards are low and disease rates high. Since the populations of Martinique and Guadeloupe are growing rapidly, living standards are likely to fall even further unless substantial economic development is undertaken. France in the postwar years has devoted substantial sums to the colonies, mainly for education, transportation, and sanitary improvements, but economic development has not yet gone

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far beyond the survey stage. The inability of the colonial economies to provide a satisfactory living for the population is the source of constant social tension. This tension is reflected in the resentment of the workers toward the controlling interests, composed largely of a few white families, and gives rise to strong racial antagonisms.

41. In contrast to the British and Dutch dependencies, the French possessions have a mutually satisfactory political relationship with the metropole. The three possessions are "overseas departments," in theory assimilated to metropolitan France. They send elected representatives to the Chambers of the French Parliament and are administered by the French Ministry of the Interior. There is no significant opinion favoring local autonomy or separation from France.

42. However, this situation has had adverse consequences for security and stability in the French Caribbean territories, for the political party divisions in France are mirrored in the dependencies and aggravated there by local antagonisms. In postwar elections, the Left secured a dominant position in local politics. The Communists gained a stronghold in Martinique and Guadeloupe which they have been able to retain, since opposition parties are less well-organized and have less dynamic leadership.

43. *Communism.* Communism is considerably stronger in the French West Indies than anywhere else in the Caribbean. In Martinique and Guadeloupe, respectively, the Communists' electoral strength is over 60 and over 40 percent. The delegates they succeed in electing to the French National Assembly form part of the Communist bloc there. Communist strength is concentrated in densely populated areas, which include the important administrative centers, and the Communists dominate the labor force. The Communist parties are under the direction of the French party, with which they maintain easy contact through their delegates to the French parliament and through periodic visits to the area by French party officials. They have no known intercourse with Communists in non-French Caribbean territories.

44. Locally, the party has the standard cell and politburo organization, but discipline appears to be much less strict than that of the European parties. On the basis of scanty intelligence, we believe that the number of hard-core Communists is small. The great majority of Communist voters are concerned solely with improving their material conditions. The party's tactics appear aimed at preserving its electoral strength by advocating worker benefits, at improving party cohesiveness by fanning economic grievances and racial resentments, and at educating party members and followers on international questions and doctrine. The success of the last aim has been dubious. At least in Martinique, the party has a school for training militant cadres. The long-range Communist objectives depend on those of the French party.

45. The Communists of Martinique and Guadeloupe could probably organize serious disorders, and their capabilities in this respect are growing. Nevertheless, the police, the elite security force, and the French military in the islands could restore order, unless the Communists were armed from overseas. If, however, in the event of war or paralyzing social disorders in France, the Communist leaders were given arms and instructions to seize power, loyal French security forces in the area would probably be unable to restore order without external assistance. If the Communists could tie such an insurrection to some popular emotion like racial bitterness, and thus obtain wider cooperation, they could probably seize power unless external assistance was rapidly given the local French forces.

46. In French Guiana, Communist influence is weak. There appear to be no tight party machinery and few hard-core militants. Communist electoral strength depends on the personal popularity of an individual who polled 21.3 percent of vote in the 1951 election to the French National Assembly. Aside from the small branch of the French Communist-controlled trade union organization (CGT), the Communists have created no front organizations. Their capabilities will remain limited to isolated acts of sabotage.

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47. Maintenance of internal security in the French dependencies is the responsibility of prefects appointed by and responsible to the government in Paris. These officials probably maintain surveillance of Communist leaders, but as long as the Communist party remains a legal party in France, they are highly unlikely to restrict Communist organizational or propaganda activities in the dependencies unless the local Communists produce a clear challenge to public security.

Netherlands West Indies (Curacao, Aruba, and the minor islands) and Dutch Guiana (Surinam)

48. The main problem of the Netherlands dependencies is the establishment of mutually satisfactory political relationships with the metropole. The NWI comprise the most prosperous European territory in the Caribbean area, since the oil refining industry provides a relatively high standard of living and virtually full employment. Dutch Guiana is poor by contrast with the NWI, despite its important bauxite industry, but it is relatively well off when compared to other Caribbean territories.

49. The Netherlands in recent years has granted a considerable measure of self-government to the dependencies in pursuance of pledges to grant a status in the kingdom equal to its own, but has retained decisive authority in major fields. Occasional conflicts between the metropolitan and local authorities are therefore likely. Local party politics reflects the immaturity and extreme factionalism characteristic of the whole Caribbean area, and interparty and interracial friction almost certainly will produce occasional minor disorders. It is unlikely, however, that such disorders will pose a threat to internal stability or the Netherlands position.

50. *Communism.* There is no significant Communist movement or influence in the Netherlands dependencies, though reports indicate the presence of a few Communists and the existence of a few minor fellow-traveling groups with tenuous European connections.

A small amount of Communist literature is smuggled in, mainly by seamen, but Dutch security forces maintain a fairly efficient intelligence net. Immigration is strictly controlled, and suspected subversives are summarily deported. Local police and oil company police cooperate to prevent infiltration of the oil industry of NWI. In Dutch Guiana, security at the bauxite installations appears effective, though transport is vulnerable.

III. THE ATTITUDES AND POLICIES OF LATIN AMERICA TOWARD THE DEPENDENCIES

51. Throughout the Latin American republics there has traditionally been a strong current of opinion opposed to colonialism. This attitude has been manifested officially in unilateral and joint statements calling for elimination of European control over territories in the Western Hemisphere. Such expressions have been voiced most often and most forcefully by Guatemala, Argentina, and Chile, countries whose interest in principle is reinforced by self-interest. Each has territorial claims against the UK.

52. It is significant that most Latin American official and public opinion denounced the British action in British Guiana last fall, subordinating dislike of Communism to that of colonialism, despite US support for the UK. However, the Latin American republics have produced no positive program for action on the colonial issue. For the foreseeable future, they are unlikely to resort to direct action, unless the people of a colony should undertake to fight for independence. In such case, unless the revolt was clearly Communist-led, some republics might give material aid to the revolutionaries, especially to those in the mainland dependencies. Meanwhile, the republics will almost certainly air the issue at every opportunity. The dispute over the colonies between Latin America and Europe, especially the UK, will continue to be a source of some friction, but it will almost certainly not seriously affect political or commercial relations between the metropolises and Latin America.

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IV. THE EFFECT OF EUROPEAN CONTROL OF THE DEPENDENCIES

53. For the foreseeable future, preservation of European authority in the dependencies tends to insure the availability of the strategic materials and bases in the area. The levels of stability and order maintained by the metropolises in the dependencies contrast favorably with those of many of the independent Caribbean states.

54. Ultimate European responsibility for government and order in the dependencies protects from local political vagaries the operations of US and foreign companies engaged in bauxite production, in the petroleum industry, and in other enterprises. European responsibility for the economies probably relieves the US of financial burdens; if the

colonies were independent, they would probably demand much greater aid than that provided through FOA programs.

55. Since Britain, France, and the Netherlands intend to maintain dominance in their possessions, any US opposition to such a position would raise serious difficulties with these allies.

56. European possession of the dependencies occasions difficulties in US relations with friendly but anticolonial powers, primarily the Latin American republics. Nationalist, Communist, and other anti-US groups in these countries make capital of the apparent discrepancy between the traditional anticolonial position of the US and its support of European "imperialism."

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ANNEX A

ESTIMATED POPULATION AND RACIAL COMPOSITION OF THE
EUROPEAN DEPENDENCIES IN THE CARIBBEAN

TERRITORY	NEGRO- MULATTO PERCENT	WHITE PERCENT	ASIAN PERCENT	OTHERS PERCENT	TOTAL POPULATION
BRITISH					
British Guiana	48.2	2.9	44.5	4.4	444,000
British Honduras	69.3	4.0	2.6	24.1 ¹	70,000
Jamaica	95.6	1.1	3.1	insig	1,464,000
Trinidad	61.0	2.7	36.3	insig	664,000
Barbados	94.8	5.1	insig	insig	216,000
Windward and Leeward Islands	96.1	1.3	2.3	insig	412,800
Bahamas	88.0	11.5	insig	insig	83,000
TOTAL British subjects					3,353,800
FRENCH					
French Guiana)	over	insig	insig	3.0 ¹	30,000
Martinique)	95.0	1.0	insig	insig	261,000
Guadeloupe)		under 1.0	insig	insig	271,000
TOTAL French subjects					562,000
DUTCH					
Dutch Guiana (Surinam)	49.0	under 1.0	48.0	1.0 ¹	208,000
Aruba)	85.0	15.0	insig	insig	51,100
Curacao)					95,200
Other islands)					8,600
TOTAL Dutch subjects					362,900

¹ Chiefly aboriginal Indians.~~SECRET~~

ANNEX B

MILITARY FORCES IN THE CARIBBEAN DEPENDENCIES

British. *Ground Forces.* In Jamaica, the British have one metropolitan battalion (less one company stationed in British Honduras) and one colonial battalion, which serve as a security force for the entire British Caribbean area. The total strength of the two battalions is 1,450 men. There are also 650 metropolitan troops temporarily in British Guiana. It is planned to activate a second colonial battalion of 500 men in Trinidad. There are active army reserve units of 360 colonials in Barbados and 200 colonials in British Honduras.

Navy. Royal Navy ships available for rapid deployment in the Caribbean area are assigned to the Bermuda station. The squadron normally maintained on station consists of one light cruiser and three frigates, one of which is usually in the Caribbean area. This force is expected soon to be reduced by one frigate. The remaining three ships will have a total peacetime complement of about 1,100 men.

Air Force. - None.

French. *Ground Forces.* The French army in the area is largely colonial, consisting of 700 troops in Martinique, 200 in Guadeloupe, and 200 in French Guiana.

Navy. The French maintain one submarine chaser and 30 men based on Martinique.

Air Force. None.

Dutch. *Ground Forces.* The Dutch have one metropolitan infantry battalion of 750 men in Surinam and one marine battalion of 650 men divided between Curacao and Aruba.

Navy. Currently, one gunboat is on station at Curacao. Five hundred naval personnel are assigned to the ship and the naval operating base.

Naval Air Force. One squadron of conventional engine fighters, with 75 officers and men, is based on Curacao.



