

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

NTL 78  
d. m. j. j. j.

FEB 25 1953



September 16, 1952

Dear Sherman:

As we agreed yesterday, I am sending you herewith the request from FE for an NIE on Burma.

I should point out that we hope the Estimate will include the element of Chinese intentions, and will peer into the future as far as light is visible -- looking ahead a twelvemonth at least.

Our estimate of the degree of urgency coincides with your category "Priority".

We shall, of course, be glad to discuss the objectives of this exercise with your staff, who may be referred directly to DRF. I understand DRF is prepared to produce its contribution in a matter of three weeks after the signals are clear.

Sincerely yours,

Allan Evans  
Director

Office of Intelligence Research

Attachment: Memo from Allison to Armstrong,  
9/9/52, re Request for Revision  
of NIE No. 36 on an Urgent Basis. (S)

Mr. Sherman Kent,  
114 South Bldg.,  
Central Intelligence Agency.

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Security Information

Review of this document by CIA has determined that

- CIA has no objection to declass
- It contains information of CIA interest that must remain classified at TS S C
- Authority: NR 70-2

It contains nothing of CIA interest  
Date 10 APR 81 Reviewer, 009256

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : R - Mr. Armstrong

DATE: September 9, 1952

FROM : FE - Mr. Allison *JA*

SUBJECT: Request for Revision of NIE No. 36 on an Urgent Basis

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OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT, INTELLIGENCE

On August 1, 1951, NIE No. 36 entitled "Prospects for the Survival of a Non-Communist Regime in Burma" considered the Government of Burma to be seriously threatened.

On November 28, 1951 this estimate was reviewed in NIE 36/1 and it was concluded that the political and military situation in Burma was deteriorating even more rapidly than had been estimated in NIE No. 36.

Although conditions at the time of writing these estimates may have justified such pessimism, during the months since they were published, numerous political and military intelligence reports have suggested to this Bureau that a new and more favorable trend is emerging in Burma. Some components of this trend appear to be:

1. A realistic representation in the cabinet of the foci of political power, with a resultant strengthening of the government's internal position.

2. A resolve on the part of the Government to reject Communist offers of reconciliation, and to reduce the Communist insurgencies by force.

3. Inability of the Communist insurgents to hold important base areas, and the apparent frustration of their attempts to build an effective coalition with non-Communist insurgents.

4. Failure of the Chinese Communists to follow through with significant aid to the Burmese Communists.

5. Intention of Government leaders to reorganize the Burmese Government for increased efficiency,

and

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and to concentrate on promoting public welfare and economic development.

Since the National Intelligence Estimate is used as a basic document for determining policy particularly in the military, economic and technical assistance fields, it is requested that consideration be given to revising NIE No. 36 on an urgent basis.

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FE:PSA:RHoster:ves  
*W* *W*

FE-Mr. Ogburn  
*W*

*PH*  
FE-Mr. Peake

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