


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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

18 July 1952

SUBJECT: NIE-64 (Part I): SOVIET BLOC CAPABILITIES, THROUGH  
MID-1953 (For consideration by the Board)

THE PROBLEM

To estimate Soviet Bloc capabilities for political and  
military warfare, through mid-1953.

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FACTORS AFFECTING BLOC CAPABILITIES

I. INTERNAL POLITICAL FACTORS

A. The USSR

1. The Soviet regime is securely entrenched in power, and there is no apparent prospect of its control being threatened or shaken.

2. Stalin will almost certainly remain undisputed Soviet ruler through the period of this estimate, provided he remains in good health. There probably have been disagreements on major policy matters within the Politburo and rivalry for Stalin's favor and for positions of advantage after Stalin's death. However, it is most unlikely that, within the period of this estimate, these rivalries and disagreements will have any serious effect upon the apparent unity and resolution of the Politburo.

3. The Communist Party of the USSR remains the principal foundation of authority and instrument of rule. Its leadership, organization, and discipline are apparently as firm as in the past. Although there may be stresses within the Communist Party and between the Communist Party, the Secret Police, and the Soviet armed forces, there is no evidence that these do now or will, within the period of this estimate, constitute serious problems for the regime. Moreover, it is probable that

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the unity of the ruling groups would increase if the regime were subjected to increased external pressure.

4. The regime's control over all activity within the USSR remains thorough and apparently effective. Current internal stresses and strains -- such as the dissatisfaction of some of the national minorities, the resistance of the peasants to recent agricultural programs, and dissatisfaction among large numbers of the population over low living standards and over the severity of police controls -- appear less serious than at any time since the early 1930's. Moreover, the effectiveness of the regime's control over the Soviet population will almost certainly increase throughout the period of this estimate.

5. The years of isolation and indoctrination and the current campaign to instill hostility toward the West have almost certainly reduced the reservoir of admiration for the West and of friendship for the US.

6. The areas added to the USSR since 1939 have been effectively integrated into the Soviet system. Local resistance to Soviet acquisition and to Soviet policy has been systematically crushed and eliminated. The economic, political, and demographic reorganizations of those areas have weakened the foundations for opposition to Soviet rule and have created machinery for ensuring continued Soviet control and direction.

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7. The death of Stalin would be a serious shock to the Soviet regime. However, there is no evidence to indicate that the immediate transfer of authority to another leader or to a group would not be effected quietly and peacefully. The Communist Party of the USSR, the Secret Police, and the Soviet armed forces would almost certainly rally behind the new leadership, at least initially. Throughout the period of this estimate, the foreign and domestic policies of the new leadership would almost certainly follow those established during recent years. Discord within the Politburo and between the Communist Party, the Secret Police, and the Soviet armed forces might develop after the first few months, but probable prior arrangements, Communist discipline, and fear of "foreign attack" would almost certainly prevent any discord from developing to the point of open conflict, at least within the period of this estimate.

8. Soviet control of the Satellites would probably not be seriously affected by the death of Stalin. Soviet relations with Communist China after Stalin's death would probably not deteriorate markedly, at least initially. Soviet control over the international Communist movement would probably decline somewhat after Stalin's death, and continued Soviet control over this movement would depend to a large degree upon the unity and resolution displayed by Stalin's successors.

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B. The Satellites<sup>1/</sup>

9. Soviet control over the Satellites is virtually complete. It ensures the subservience and reliability of the governments and continued Soviet economic and military benefit from the area.

10. The Kremlin has maintained and will enlarge its authority over the Satellites through the skillful and experienced use of police and military power and through political, economic, and ideological means.

a. The Kremlin has already decapitated and pulverized the old political parties and opposition groups, but the popular discontent now current in each Satellite will persist and perhaps increase.

b. The Kremlin in the past has shown such skill and resolution in dealing with unrest and in discovering and obliterating hostile forces that we estimate that no issue will develop into more than a nuisance or impediment upon the Communist program within the period of this estimate.

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<sup>1/</sup> For more complete information on this subject, see NIE-33, Soviet Control of the European Satellites and their Economic and Military Contributions to Soviet Power, through 1952 (7 November 1951).

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c. The elimination of all but trusted Stalinists from the Communist hierarchies has been almost completed. "Cleansing" of Communist regimes, however, is a perpetual process, and there will continue to be purges within the Communist Parties, governments, armed forces, and police forces of each of the Satellites.

d. The subservience of the Satellites will be guaranteed by present Soviet authority, Soviet forces stationed within these countries or along their borders, Soviet control over the local Communist Parties, the power of Soviet advisers and missions in the Satellite governments, Soviet economic and military controls, the rigorous education and training programs, and calculated use of terror to create the sense of isolation, hopelessness, and physical and moral fear among the Satellite peoples.

11. A rapid collectivization of agriculture would almost certainly provoke strong resistance and adversely affect agricultural production in the Satellites for some time, but it would probably not shake Soviet control over the Satellites. Although collectivization is fundamental to Stalinist philosophy, it has been proceeding very slowly in the Satellites, and the rate is not likely to be increased significantly during the period of this estimate.

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C. Communist China

12. The Chinese Communist regime has firm control over mainland China, and there is little prospect of its control being threatened or shaken by domestic forces within the period of this estimate.

13. The Chinese Communists have steadily intensified their control since 1949. Military and police power have played the dominant role in this development. However, the regime benefited initially from the considerable popular support it derived from the restoration of order and of financial stability and from the promise it gave of new power and prestige for China. In addition, the regime has been strengthened by the Korean War, which increased the nationalistic appeal of the regime, provided an apparent justification for the increased centralization of authority, and gave China a dramatic fillip with the early Communist triumphs over the "Imperialistic West."

14. However, the Korean War has also increased the number and complexity of the problems facing the Chinese Communist regime. The postponement of the domestic reconstruction program, the concentration of human and material resources upon the war, and the consequent austerity, high taxes, forced levies, and shortages have undermined some of the initial popular enthusiasm.

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However, popular disillusion will almost certainly have little effect upon the regime, which has already crushed and eliminated most opposition and potential opposition forces and which has used terror ruthlessly and effectively to frighten and demoralize the Chinese people.

15. The economic burden of the Korean War has strained the Chinese economy, despite substantial Soviet military aid. Chinese government expenditures probably doubled in 1951 over 1950. Western trade restrictions have deprived Communist China of access to the resources of the non-Communist world. The strain upon the productive plant, particularly the railroads and the energy resources, has been very severe. Nevertheless, the Chinese Communists probably have the economic capability to support their present war effort at its current level for at least a year and at a lower level for the foreseeable future, even without continued Soviet assistance.

D. Sino-Soviet Relations<sup>1/</sup>

16. Communist China is not now a Satellite, although apparently it has voluntarily accepted a political position sub-

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1/ For more complete information on this subject, see NIE-58, Relations Between the Chinese Communist Regime and the USSR: Their Present Character and Probable Future Courses, which is now in process.

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ordinate to that of the USSR in the international Communist movement. The Kremlin has not been able to use the Soviet Army and the military, political, economic, and ideological controls which it obtained in other areas from Soviet occupation to ensure Kremlin authority in China, because the conquest of China was achieved by the Chinese Communists themselves. The Chinese Communist regime retains to a great degree the capacity to pursue its own domestic and foreign policies and to influence Soviet courses of action in the Far East.

17. The current Chinese Communist status in the Soviet Bloc implies that Communist China is willing to make at least a temporary adjustment of its national interests which are incompatible with those of the USSR, to submerge any fears it may have of Soviet expansion, and to substitute a joint Sino-Soviet effort to drive the West from Asia for China's traditional policy of playing foreign powers against one another. It probably also indicates that the Chinese Communist leaders estimate that close Sino-Soviet collaboration will ensure Chinese security from Western counteraction and will provide the economic and military aid necessary for establishing China as a great power, without at the same time destroying China's independence.

18. On the Kremlin side, the Chinese Communist status implies that the Kremlin recognizes that Communist China possesses

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the determination and to a great degree the capacity to pursue its own interests. Moreover, the current relationship provides the Kremlin both an opportunity to extend Communist prestige and control in Asia and the hope of ultimate Soviet domination of Communist China through subversion, through the economic and military dependence of China upon the USSR, and through Soviet pressure upon the borderlands.

19. We believe that the current Sino-Soviet relationship will probably remain relatively constant throughout the period of this estimate. The two states have a common ideology, have designated the West, particularly the US, as the common enemy. In addition, neither state now has the capability of altering the current relationship to its advantage without great cost and grave risks. A Chinese Communist effort unilaterally to revise the relationship or to leave the Bloc would result in the cessation of Soviet economic and military aid and support, serious dissension within the Chinese Communist Party and armed forces, loss of border areas to the USSR, and perhaps an armed conflict with the USSR. Similarly, a Kremlin effort to reduce sharply the status of Communist China within the Bloc or to ignore Chinese Communist interests in the Far East would reduce, if not destroy, Soviet influence and prestige in China, divide and confuse the international Communist movement, and perhaps lead to armed conflict with Communist China.

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II. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL FACTORS

20. The USSR is engaged in a large-scale research and development program. This includes both pure and applied research in almost every field of military application, and concentrates especially upon atomic energy, electronics, jet aircraft, and guided missiles.

21. The Soviet effort in science is revealed by the growth of the number of people engaged in research and in teaching science in the higher educational institutions from 30,000 in 1930 to 150,000 in 1950. The USSR now has a supply of scientific-technical manpower numerically comparable to that of the US. This increase in Soviet scientific-technical manpower resources constitutes a major contribution to Soviet potential strength.

22. The USSR still benefits heavily from the notable Russian scientific tradition which it inherited, and men trained in pre-Revolutionary Russia retain an importance far out of proportion to their number. During the period of rapid expansion in the early 1930's, many incompetent and inadequately trained people became members of the USSR's scientific and technical corps. Standards of most higher educational institutions in most scientific fields now generally approximate those of scientific faculties in most Western countries, and the proportion of mediocre and incompetent people within the Soviet scientific and

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technical corps has probably decreased, particularly in the most recent years. Communist leaders have made attacks upon numerous theories in physics, chemistry, and biology, but there is no evidence that ideology has been permitted to hamper developments directly affecting military capabilities.

23. The USSR in 1945 lagged far behind the other military powers in the application of science to military capabilities. In its efforts to overcome its industrial backwardness and to recover from the emphasis it placed throughout the 1938-1945 period upon conventional weapons, the USSR has profited heavily from the experience and aid of other industrial states. Throughout World War II and in the years immediately following the war, the USSR received many kinds of new Allied equipment and much advanced Allied scientific data. During the war, the USSR captured much equipment from the Germans. Since 1945, the USSR has controlled the scientific manpower and research facilities of Eastern Europe. Moreover, since the war, the USSR has benefited considerably from thorough exploitation of scientific data published in the West and from successful espionage, especially in the field of atomic energy.

24. The expansion and improvement of Soviet science and technology have reduced Soviet reliance upon foreign knowledge.

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Soviet achievements in atomic energy, aircraft design and production, electronics, and other military fields testify concretely to the magnitude of the contribution made by Soviet science and technology to Bloc capabilities.

a. Atomic Weapons. The USSR is now believed capable of quantity production of iranium-235 and plutonium for the manufacture of effective atomic weapons. However, we do not believe that the USSR will be able to develop and produce a thermonuclear weapon within the period of this estimate. We estimate that the USSR now has a stockpile of [redacted]

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[redacted]

b. Aircraft. The notable post-war achievements of the Soviet aircraft industry are based upon very high quality research and development in a number of related scientific and technical fields and upon steadily improving production techniques. The appearance in 1948 of the MIG-15 jet fighter, the subsequent mass production of this aircraft [redacted]

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[redacted] and the performance data from Korea all attest to the capability of Soviet aircraft science-

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technology. The MIG-15 will probably be retained as the standard fighter through mid-1953, but we believe that significant improvements in performance will occur by that date.



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
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Two twin-jet, straight-winged light bombers, the IL-28, and the Type 35, which are already in operational use, will almost certainly constitute standard Soviet equipment by mid-1953.

c. Electronics. The USSR has achieved marked progress in the field of electronics since the end of World War II. The Soviet electronics industry is now capable of independent research and development, although it will certainly continue to adopt and exploit Western discoveries. Future Soviet progress will depend more upon Soviet policy decisions concerning the allocation of resources for production of electronic equipment than upon Soviet scientific and technical capabilities. Soviet ability to develop and to produce increased quantities of effective airborne interception equipment, improved early warning, ground control inter-

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ception, and blind bombing radars, and effective fire control radar and directors has increased Soviet military capabilities considerably. We estimate that this equipment will increase in quantity and quality during the period of this estimate.



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d. Guided Missiles. Soviet research and development in guided missiles also demonstrate Soviet capability for fully exploiting Western ideas, techniques, processes, and equipment. With the aid of German engineers and labor, the USSR has developed a guided missile program based upon German wartime designs. While no guided missiles are known to be operational, we estimate that the USSR is developing and producing copies of the German V-1 with improved accuracy and moderately improved range-speed characteristics. The data available on the Soviet guided missile program is old and fragmentary. However, we estimate that by mid-1953 the USSR may develop and produce:

1. Surface-to-air missiles effective against piston aircraft and with limited capabilities against presently envisaged atomic weapon-carrying aircraft.

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2. An infrared homing missile for use against all contemplated bomber types.

3. Limited quantities of all-weather air-to-surface missiles, with ranges of approximately 10 nautical miles.

e. Chemical Warfare. The USSR, which has an advanced chemical industry and which has had German knowledge and equipment available since 1945, has intensified research upon chemical warfare agents, protective items, and dissemination techniques. It probably has been producing a nerve gas since late 1949, and it probably will have a significant stockpile by mid-1953. Moreover, if current pilot operations are successful, the USSR will be able to begin production of a second nerve gas by mid-1953.

### III. ECONOMIC FACTORS

#### A. Current Status of the Bloc Economy

25. The economy of the USSR had recovered its pre-war level of total production by 1948 and had surpassed that level by about 25 percent by the end of 1951. Moreover, it is continuing to expand at a rapid, although somewhat diminishing rate. The rate of economic expansion in the USSR is rapid compared with that of

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most other advanced industrial states. For example, during the years from 1949 through 1951, the US and the USSR have both shown approximately the same average annual rate of growth -- almost 7 percent -- in gross national product.

26. The USSR since 1948 has annually assigned about one-fourth of its gross national product to investment, even though it has simultaneously maintained a large military establishment, accumulated strategic reserves and inventories of military and items, and slowly raised the Soviet standard of living from the war-time level. Soviet capital development has continued to emphasize those industries which constitute the base both for further industrial growth and for direct military production. As a consequence, the Soviet economy is highly mobilized strategically. It is mobilized for the twin contingencies of hostilities within the foreseeable future as well as for the long-term need to build an economic base for ultimate operations against the West. The pursuit of both of these objectives simultaneously means that each places some limitation upon the accomplishment that might otherwise be possible for the other.

27. The USSR from 1945 through 1950 concentrated upon improving the quality of its military equipment, particularly tanks, jet aircraft, electronic equipment, submarines,

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and long-range aircraft. At the same time, it produced annually about one-fifth as much military equipment as it produced in 1944, its wartime peak. As a consequence, its operational stocks of military end-items are extremely high. Production of conventional military equipment increased only slightly in 1951, but planned direct expenditures for military production in 1952 increased sharply over those of 1951. The comparative stability in production rates of conventional armaments and the rising budget allocations for the armed forces suggest that a considerable part of the current Soviet military production effort is directed toward research, the development of prototypes, and some conversion of production facilities to the output of newly developed military items.

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Estimated Bloc Stocks of Selected Military End Items, July, 1952

<u>Item</u>	<u>USSR</u>	<u>Bloc Total</u>
<u>Aircraft</u>		
Fighter, Jet	8,500	9,959
Fighter, Piston	11,000	11,950
Ground, Attack, Jet	200	200
Ground Attack, Piston	5,800	6,712
Light Bomber, Jet	800	800
Light Bomber, Piston	9,100	9,656
Medium Bomber, Jet	20	20
Medium Bomber, Piston	900	900
Heavy Bomber, Piston	0	0
Transport, Medium	20	20
Transport, Light	2,500	2,906
Reconnaissance, Jet	150	150
Reconnaissance, Piston	950	1,100
Miscellaneous	3,500	3,804
Total	<u>43,440</u>	<u>48,245</u>
<u>Armored Fighting Vehicles</u>		
Guns, Self-propelled	18,600	19,527
Tanks	42,400	45,292
<u>Artillery (75mm and up)</u>	101,725	145,358
<u>Mortars (81mm and up)</u>	78,000	97,303

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28. The Kremlin places a high priority upon stockpiling reserves, not only of military end-items but of food and materials needed for operation of the economy under wartime conditions. In addition to the operational reserves which every industrial system maintains, most Soviet factories maintain "untouchable mobilization reserves" of raw materials and equipment for continuing production in crises and for conversion to war production. However, stocks held in regional base depots constitute the core of the reserve program. Very little evidence is available concerning the size of current Soviet stockpiles, but we estimate that they amount in value to an average of about 5 percent of 1952 Soviet production of the stockpiled items.

29. The Soviet economy has been strengthened by the acquisition of the resources, productive capacities, and potential industrial power of the Satellites. Of current total Bloc production, for example, the Satellites contribute approximately 60 percent of the uranium ores and concentrates, 49 percent of the coal, 29 percent of the electric power, 22 percent of the steel, 26 percent of the sulphuric acid, and 11 percent of the copper. In the engineering industries, the Satellites produce an important proportion of a number of items critical within the Bloc: 42 percent of total Bloc production of electric motors and generators, 44 percent of electronic tubes, and 19 percent of anti-friction bearings.

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30. North Korea and Communist China on a strictly economic balance are liabilities to the USSR. In 1951, shipments from the USSR and the Satellites to Communist China, amounting to about \$1,000,000,000, consisted primarily of military equipment and supplies. Chinese Communist requirements do not now constitute a significant drain upon Bloc resources, and limitations imposed by transportation facilities ensure that present traffic will not increase substantially. Military equipment for the Korean war and for equipping the Chinese armies is probably supplied from large Soviet inventories. The economic goods provided, while important to China, represent a very minor fraction of total Bloc production and supply.

B. Bloc Economic Capabilities

31. Under continued cold war conditions, the Bloc clearly has the capability of expanding its industrial base, of increasing military production, and at the same time of supporting large-scale political warfare. In addition, the USSR has a limited economic capability to increase its trade with Western European and Middle Eastern states. The diversion of some Bloc resources -- such as Polish coal or Soviet coarse grains -- to international trade might hamper somewhat the Bloc's industrial and military programs. On the other hand, we estimate that this trade would constitute an important political warfare weapon and might also obtain for the Bloc critical equipment and materials now difficult or impossible for it to obtain.

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32. The Bloc retains the economic capability of supporting expanded military operations in Korea and Indochina. Transportation facilities, especially within Manchuria, now constitute the major economic limitation upon Soviet support of large-scale military operations in the Far East. However, the USSR is attempting to reduce this limitation by expanding inventories of heavy equipment in the Far East and by developing ammunition and light arms plants in Manchuria and North China.

33. The USSR generally has productive facilities adequate more than to double its current production of military end items, but it would require a long mobilization period to reallocate its labor force and to shift resources. Moreover, one should not assume that the USSR can in fact increase its production of all military end items to the maximum estimated capacity. The principal limiting factor will probably be restrictions upon Soviet ability to divert resources from investment and from consumption to direct military production. Consumption (including the personal consumption of the military forces) amounted to about 47 percent of the gross national product in 1944. It is unlikely that the Kremlin will be able to reduce this share (now 54 percent) much below the 1944 level, which was below the level reached by any other belligerent.<sup>1/</sup>

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<sup>1/</sup> Consumption amounted to 70 percent of the US gross national product in 1949 and to almost 63 percent in 1951.

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34. Under continued cold war conditions, we estimate that the Soviet gross national product could by mid-1953 reach 115 percent of the 1951 level. If military production by mid-1953 claimed 38 percent of Soviet gross national product, as it did in 1944, it would be approximately 2.3 times as great as in 1951 and more than twice as great as Soviet military production plus net gains from abroad (including Lend-Lease) in 1944.

35. Although the Soviet economy is better prepared to support a major war effort than it was in 1940, certain inherent deficiencies remain which would probably become progressively serious during a long war. Although recent evidence indicates that increased production of the materials and equipment most critical in the Soviet economy has reduced the severity of the shortages, precision instruments, bearings, aviation gasoline, and ferro-alloys remain in insufficient supply for a major war effort. Moreover, the Soviet economy is dependent upon a rail system which is neither modern nor efficient. The Soviet strategic stockpile program and the Soviet attempt to establish autonomous economic regions are designed in part to reduce the heavy strain upon the transportation system and to minimize the effect which could be produced by the collapse or destruction of parts of the railroad system. However, Soviet stockpiles in an emergency could not last more than a few months, and the economic independence of the

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various regions can never be attained. For example, even now the Moscow region imports all of its hard coal and seven-eighths of its refined oil, Leningrad all its coal, the East Volga region four-fifths of its coal, and the Urals all their coking coal.

#### IV. ESTIMATED BLOC MILITARY STRENGTH<sup>1/</sup>

##### A. SUMMARY

36. We estimate that the Bloc armed forces now total approximately 10,000,000 men (including security forces), an estimated authorized strength of 23,480 aircraft, including 6,719 jet fighters and 800 medium bombers, and large stocks of conventional weapons and equipment. As a consequence, the Bloc now possesses a significant quantitative superiority over the Western powers in military power and in conventional ground and air armament.

37. We estimate that by mid-1953 Bloc armed forces will grow to approximately 10,350,000 men (including security forces) and an estimated authorized strength of 25,000 aircraft, including 9,950 jet fighters and 1,200 medium bombers. We believe that the armed forces of the Bloc will remain relatively constant in size during the period of this estimate. However,

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<sup>1/</sup> For a more thorough analysis of Bloc military strength, see Tab A.



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the over-all ground and air strength of the Bloc will probably increase considerably during the period of this estimate because of progressive modernization and standardization of weapons and equipment, the intensive training program, the growth of the Soviet atomic weapon stockpile, and the increased combat efficiency of the Satellite armies.

38. With the exception of the Satellite armed forces, which have grown rapidly throughout the past two years, the armed forces of the Bloc have remained relatively constant in size. Moreover, although the atomic stockpile apparently has the first Soviet priority, the principal emphases in the Bloc military effort have been upon improving Bloc defenses, particularly against air attack, improving the quality of existing units and developing and marshaling the military strength of the Satellites.

B. USSR

39. The armed forces of the USSR, which constitute the core of Bloc military power, will almost certainly increase in military strength through mid-1953. If general war does not occur, we believe that Soviet ground forces will remain at approximately their present strength, 2,500,000 troops organized into 175 line divisions (of which 105 are rifle, 40 mechanized, 25 tank, and 5 cavalry), 20 artillery divisions, and 25 anti-aircraft artillery divisions. The armament, mobility, and capability of these forces for sustained combat will continue to improve.

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40. We estimate that the Soviet Air Forces have an authorized strength of some 20,000 aircraft, almost half of which are fighters.<sup>1/</sup> In addition, we estimate that the Soviet stockpile of military aircraft is approximately equal in size to the aircraft in units, but inferior in quality. Although the size of the total air establishment is not likely to change appreciably through mid-1953, a significant increase in over-all operational efficiency will result as conversion to jet fighters and bombers progresses.

41. More than half of the Soviet fighters are now jets. There are indications that the USSR has ceased production of piston-engined fighters and is producing only a few piston-engined bombers. Two light jet bombers are in production, and several hundred of one, the IL-28, are in operational use. We estimate that Soviet Long Range aviation, which now has an estimated authorized strength of 800 TU-4's, will have about 1,200 by mid-1953. Soviet defense against strategic air attack, rapidly improved during the past year, will probably be strengthened further by improved Soviet electronic equipment.

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<sup>1/</sup> We believe that actual strength of Soviet air units averages 85 percent of estimated authorized strength.

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and by the development and production of improved interceptor aircraft and anti-aircraft equipment. However, it will remain incapable of providing adequate protection against air attack.

42. We estimate that the Soviet Navy now has a total of 140 major surface vessels, including 3 old battleships, 18 cruisers of various ages, and 118 destroyers. In addition, we estimate that there are 370 submarines, of which 104 are long-range cruising types with a combat radius of 6,000 nautical miles. The submarine force, already the largest in the world, will pose a greater threat to allied sea communications because of the construction of an estimated 20 long-range and 30 coastal submarines within the period of this estimate. Bloc naval defenses will be strengthened by the construction of additional cruisers and destroyers. However, the Soviet Navy will continue to lack a carrier air force, most of its surface ships will remain outmoded, and most of its personnel will lack extensive operational experience.

### C. Satellites

43. The Satellite armies now have an estimated 1,155,000 troops organized into 69 line divisions (of which 56 are rifle, 9 mechanized, and 4 tank), 3 artillery divisions, 6 anti-aircraft divisions, and various independent brigades and regiments. The Satellite security forces constitute an additional force of at

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least 232,000 troops. Satellite ground forces are growing in strength and quality at a steady pace. We estimate that by mid-1953 they will probably total 1,555,000 men, organized into 118 line divisions, including 300,000 East German troops organized into 24 divisions. These forces will remain generally dependant upon Soviet logistical support.

44. Soviet re-equipping and training of the Satellite armies and air forces should raise their combat efficiency, though not to the level of the Soviet forces. The offensive capabilities of the Satellite air forces will remain negligible. Although the air defense capabilities of the Satellites will improve, they will not be adequate to assure substantial protection for air attack. Satellite forces already constitute a substantial addition to Soviet military strength in Europe. If they advance along the lines projected by the Kremlin, they will offset, at least in part, the growth of Western strength in Europe.

D. Communist China

45. The Chinese Communist Field Forces now number about 2,250,000 troops organized into 69 armies and 227 divisions, of which 11 are artillery, 6 cavalry, and 4 armored. Communist China has enormous manpower reserves, but a severe shortage of equipment limits the Communist capability for mobilizing this man-

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power for military service. The capabilities of the Chinese Communist forces will almost certainly continue to improve, if Soviet assistance is maintained.

46. The morale and combat efficiency of the Chinese Communist soldier are high. Combat effectiveness will continue to be limited by the heterogeneity of the weapons and equipment, deficiencies in heavy weapons, equipment, and training, and lack of supporting services.

47. Although the Chinese Communist Air Force has increased in aircraft strength from 500 in June, 1951, to an estimated 1,800 in July, 1952, the combat efficiency of this force does not correspond to the numerical strength. Pilot proficiency and aircraft maintenance are below the standards of the USSR and of the US. With additional training, combat experience, and Soviet support, the capabilities of this force will almost certainly continue to increase.

E. North Korea

48. We estimate that the North Korean Army now totals 256,000 men, organized into 17 rifle divisions, 1 armored division, 1 mechanized division, and 4 mechanized artillery brigades. Recent evidence indicates that the past twelve months have been used to return the standards of training and equipment

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to the 1950 level. Rigid discipline, experienced leadership, and Soviet staff advice will give the North Koreans a general over-all combat efficiency rating of from fair to good, but these troops will probably not approach the Chinese Communist Army in combat effectiveness.

F. Viet Minh

49. We estimate that the Viet Minh military forces consist of a regular army of 130,000, organized into 6 infantry divisions, 1 artillery division, and numerous independent formations, 70,000 regional troops, and 100,000 poorly armed irregulars. The combat efficiency of the regular Viet Minh forces is considered good by the standards of that area of the world, and morale has remained high.

BLOC MILITARY CAPABILITIES

I. BLOC MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN THE FAR EAST

50. Bloc forces have adequate manpower and material to carry on the present conflicts in Korea and Indochina, to increase the scale and extent of military operations in the Far East, and to support guerrilla warfare in areas contiguous to the Soviet Bloc. Communist Far Eastern requirements for armaments and industrial items thus far have constituted a minor drain on the total capabilities of the Bloc. If operations in

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the Far East were extended and if general war did not result, the manpower and equipment necessary for maintaining a high level of military operations would not place a serious strain upon the Bloc economy during the period of this estimate.

A. Military Capabilities in Korea

51. Communist ground capabilities in Korea have increased substantially since the beginning of the armistice negotiations. Communist ground forces have increased from 502,000 to 950,000 troops, and significant additions of armor and artillery have been made, with a resultant substantial increase in firepower.

52. The capabilities of the Communist Air Force in the Korean area (North Korea, Manchuria, and Northeast China) have improved steadily during the past year. The estimated Communist combat aircraft strength in this area has increased from 500 in June, 1951 to 1,250 aircraft, including 800 jet fighters, in July, 1952. An apparently effective system of air warning is in operation in North Korea. Communist pilots in Manchuria have been engaged in an intensive training program. The Communists have also demonstrated a significant capability to supply a sizeable air force in Manchuria.

53. Communist forces in Korea are credited with a high offensive potential and are believed capable of launching a major

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ground attack with little warning. We estimate that the Communists have the logistical capability to maintain the momentum of a major ground offensive for from 5 to 10 days. The Communist Air Force in the Korean area will not be capable of launching a successful major air attack upon United Nations ground forces, naval and air installations, and lines of communication until additional serviceable airfields in North Korea are made available.

54. We estimate that without the direct commitment of major Soviet units, the Communist forces are not capable of driving the UN forces from Korea during the period of this estimate.

B. Military Capabilities Elsewhere in the Far East

55. The Chinese Communists are capable simultaneously of undertaking military operations elsewhere in the Far East and of maintaining their present position in Korea.

a. Taiwan. Provided that present US policy with respect to Taiwan remains unchanged and provided that US naval and air forces remain available to defend Taiwan, Chinese Communist operations against Taiwan would almost certainly fail.

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b. Hong Kong and Macao. Regardless of the outcome of the armistice negotiations, the Chinese Communists remain capable of launching a successful attack upon Hong Kong and Macao with few preparations and with little advance warning.

c. Southeast Asia.

1. The military threat to Southeast Asia derives from the continued capabilities of the Viet Minh forces to maintain pressure on the French and from the deployment of large forces of Chinese Communist troops in South and Southwest China near the borders of Burma and Indochina.

2. The Viet Minh capability is based primarily upon the considerable increase in Chinese Communist advisory, training, and logistic assistance. However, the Viet Minh will probably be unable to achieve a decisive victory during the period of this estimate without the direct commitment of major Chinese Communist forces.

3. Even if full-scale operations are resumed in Korea, the Chinese Communists have the capability to commit and to support approximately 150,000 troops in Indochina. A force of this size could probably force the French and Vietnam forces to evacuate Tonkin before ef-

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fective assistance could be made available. The Chinese Communists probably could simultaneously commit approximately 50,000 men for sustained operations in Burma. We believe that this force would be capable of bringing Communist control to all North Burma within two or three weeks and to all of the strategic central valley within two or three months.

## II. BLOC MILITARY CAPABILITIES OUTSIDE THE FAR EAST

56. The Bloc, spearheaded by the armed forces of the USSR, has the capability to wage offensive war. Holding a great advantage in land power and tactical air power, the Bloc forces have the capability of striking heavily at peripheral areas at any time within the period of this estimate. However, we estimate that the Bloc will not be capable during the period of this estimate of defeating the entire Western world.

57. We estimate that while the Bloc has ground forces adequate to overrun most of continental Europe, most of the Middle East (except the Indian subcontinent and possibly Turkey), and most of mainland Asia in relatively short periods of time, it does not possess the balanced military forces essential to conduct simultaneous operations on such a vast scale. Moreover,

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the Soviet forces in Europe would require substantial reinforcements in troops, air strength, and material before they could obtain the superiority in armed power estimated necessary for a successful campaign in Western Europe.

58. The Soviet Bloc does not now have and will be unlikely to secure adequate naval forces or sufficient shipping to mount effective amphibious operations against either the Western Hemisphere or even against the UK, Japan, the Philippines, Indonesia, or Taiwan.

59. The air forces of the Soviet Bloc, led by the Soviet Air Forces, are capable of providing adequate tactical support of all ground campaigns which the Bloc might launch. At the same time, the USSR is capable of attempting a strategic air offensive against the US and the UK. However, we estimate that because of the limited size of the Soviet atomic stockpile, the limited Soviet capabilities for BW and CW, and the limited capabilities of Soviet Long Range aviation, the USSR will not be capable of neutralizing or decisively damaging US productive capacity and war potential with mass destruction weapons during the period of this estimate.

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60. The air defense capabilities of the USSR have increased noticeably since 1945, and we believe that an air offensive against the principal Soviet centers would meet vigorous and determined opposition. However, despite the marked improvements in Soviet air defense capabilities, deficiencies still exist. Moreover, present conditions of air warfare grant a marked general superiority to offensive weapons over defensive equipment. Therefore, we estimate that the USSR almost certainly will not be capable of providing effective defense in all strategic areas against air attack during the period of this estimate. The Soviet air defense system will almost certainly not be adequate to insure Soviet industry and communications against attacks which would reduce and perhaps destroy its ability to win a war against the West.

#### BLOC POLITICAL WARFARE CAPABILITIES

61. Political warfare includes all operations designed to weaken the enemy's will and capacity to resist by means other than orthodox military operations.

62. Bloc political warfare techniques include political and economic pressure, diplomatic action in the UN and elsewhere, propoganda and front activities, the action of Communist Parties

and Communist Party-controlled trade unions outside the Bloc, support of various kinds of subversive and revolutionary movements, and psychological warfare. Political warfare plays an unusually important role for Communists, who consider military warfare only an extension of political warfare in their relentless campaign to undermine the strength of the non-Communist world and to hasten the ultimate victory of Communism. Bloc conduct of political warfare benefits greatly from Bloc centralization of leadership and from effective discipline and control, which make possible great flexibility in the selection, use, and revision of particular tactics. The Bloc's unique ability to conceal the realities of life within the Bloc from foreign observation constitutes another important advantage, as do the freedoms and opportunities provided Bloc agents and supporters in the non-Communist world.

I. Bloc Political Warfare Strengths

63. The principal sources of strength upon which Bloc political warfare capabilities are based consist of the size, power, and unity of the Bloc, Communist doctrine, and Communist international organization, a vast network of seventy-two loyal and disciplined national Communist Parties scattered throughout the world. These sources of power are inter-related and inter-dependent. Together they give the Bloc a solid foundation for political warfare.

1. Size, Power, and Unity of the Bloc.

64. The USSR, which is the base of the world revolutionary movement, covers 8,500,000 square miles and has a population of about 200,000,000 people. The Bloc now includes ten states, which control a territory of about 13,320,000 square miles (one-fourth of the world total) and a population of about 765,000,000 (one-third of the world total). The size of the Bloc and the rapidity with which the Communist movement has expanded in the past thirty-five years constitute important elements of Bloc political warfare strength.

65. The military strength and apparent solidity and permanence of the Bloc generate fear and defeatism in some parts of the non-Communist world. As a consequence, many Bloc diplomatic and propaganda stratagems have been effective, particularly upon the immediate neighbors of the USSR and upon those states whose weakness makes them especially susceptible to the Bloc claim that Communism is, indeed, "the wave of the future" and that efforts to resist it are futile and dangerous.

66. The membership of Bloc states in international organizations provides the Bloc an international sounding

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board. The solid core of Bloc votes in organizations such as the UN dramatizes the Bloc's unity and strength, and the Bloc's own international organizations add to its power and prestige. The Bloc has several diplomatic voices, which are used in unison to create an apparently thunderous roar and which are used individually to test non-Communist reactions and to confuse and divide the non-Communist world.

## 2. Communist doctrine

67. Communist doctrine constitutes a vital strength for the international Communist movement. For Communists throughout the world, it provides a system of values, a moral code, and a guide to action. It helps ensure that Communists shall know no doubt. It explains "scientifically" the past, present, and future, and it describes the final and most perfect form of human society. It is the principal source of Communist resolution and of the Communist will and capacity to fight.

68. For fellow travelers, Communist ideology is not so much a rigid secular faith as it is a critique of the inadequacies of non-Communist society and a promise for a better future. Marxist ideas and doctrines and the Marxist vocabulary have softened and corrupted much of the non-Communist world during the past century. Even non-Communists and anti-Communists have

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been infected by Communist doctrine. Communist doctrine, and the appeal it has, constitute the principal advantage Communism possesses over other modern revolutionary movements, such as Fascism and Nazism.

3. Communist international organization

69. The international Communist organization is a vital element of Communist political warfare strength. We estimate that there are now 15,500,000 Communists in the world (there were 30,000 Bolsheviks early in 1917), organized in seventy-two national parties. All of these Communist Parties, with the possible exception of the Chinese, are closely controlled and directed from Moscow. Most Communists live within the Bloc, but about 3,750,000 are scattered throughout the non-Communist world. Approximately 3,000,000 of these are in Western Europe, and about 750,000 are in the Americas, Africa, and Asia (not including Communist China, North Korea, and Viet Minh). These figures do not include the membership of the thousands of front organizations which the national Communist Parties influence or control, nor do they indicate the discipline and extreme fervor of the Parties, which make them far more effective than their size alone indicates.

70. Soviet control of the international Communist movement is virtually complete. Soviet direction of

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the international Communist movement is effected through Soviet definition of ideological orthodoxy, Soviet education of Party leaders from all over the world, Soviet-controlled Communist Party congresses and international conferences, Soviet and Satellite diplomatic representatives, and the assignment of experienced Moscow-trained organizers to the national Parties. Soviet educational institutions, particularly the Lenin Institute, the Communist university for the Working Peoples of the East (the Far Eastern University), the Sun Yat Sen University, and the Mid-European Universities, have educated thousands of non-Soviet Communists in Communist doctrine, organization, propaganda, espionage, sabotage, and orthodox and guerrilla military warfare techniques. The graduates of these universities constitute a loyal and well-disciplined elite corps of professional revolutionaries.

71. Each national Communist Party is tightly controlled and directed. The national Communist Parties serve the interests of the Bloc in their respective countries by exploiting economic and social grievances, by infiltrating government agencies and institutions, by amplifying Bloc ideology and propaganda, and by mobilizing mass support for Bloc policies, and by creating pressure groups to influence local policy to the advantage of the Bloc. The programs vary from area to area,

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according to Bloc immediate concerns, the exploitability of local issues, the capabilities of the national Parties involved, and the effectiveness of the opposition.

72. Communists have always placed a heavy emphasis upon mass media of communication for the diffusion of their ideas. The French Communist Party, for example, now publishes two large Paris daily papers, more than 100 regional, local, and special interest papers, and a large number of periodicals, pamphlets, and books. These propaganda media provide a running critique of the non-Communist world. They also glorify actual or imagined Bloc achievements in production and distribution. They produce the impression that the Bloc is enormously powerful and that the Bloc is the pioneer of many social and economic reforms. This picture of the Soviet Union has been particularly effective in Western Europe, China, and the "colonial" areas of Asia, the Near East, and Africa, where traditional criticism of the inadequacies of the established systems has accelerated readiness to accept legends concerning Soviet successes.

73. The national Communist Parties have shown particular skill in creating and controlling front organizations and governments enlisting the support of unwary or ignorant non-Communists. The Communists use varying methods to control these units. Non-Communists are usually placed in nominal positions of national leadership, but real control remains in the hands of

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Communists. Leadership of front groups at the international level is usually Communist. Generally, the mass following of the front organization is predominantly non-Communist, but skillful manipulation by strategically placed Party members welds large numbers of sympathizers and of the uninformed into an instrument for Communist use.

74. The organizations of workers, intellectuals, women, and students have received especial attention from the Communists. The Japanese Communist Party, for example, has emphasized obtaining control of the Japanese unions. By 1947, about 75 percent of Japan's 6,500,000 union members belonged to organizations under Communist influence or control. By 1949, the Japanese Communist Party had control of the principal unions in the key industries throughout Japan. The current strength of the Japanese Communist Party influence over labor lies in the metal, construction, automobile, railroad, and utility industries.

75. On the international level, the Communist-controlled WFTU (World Federation of Trade Unions) attempts to weld both Communist and non-Communist unions into a cohesive unit to support Bloc policy. Since the withdrawal of the Western non-Communist unions from the WFTU, Communist organizers have increased their activities in the "trade departments," which are

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international organizations of workers by crafts. Thus, when the British Trades Union Congress withdrew from the WFTU, the Communists maintained contact with British labor through affiliating British metal workers and lumber workers with their appropriate "international trade departments."

76. Intellectuals and their organizations have always constituted an important target for Communist efforts. Writers, journalists, lawyers, educators, students, and artists have been organized nationally and internationally, often to fulfill a particular short-range function, such as to influence an election or to support a particular diplomatic move. Intellectuals have been especially prominent in the peace campaigns and the peace congresses, which the Bloc has used in its attempt to recoup recent losses in European mass support. Communist influence among intellectuals [redacted] constitutes a strong component in Bloc political warfare strength.

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II. Probable Development of Bloc Political Warfare Capabilities

77. The development of Bloc political warfare capabilities through the period of this estimate depends to a large degree upon forces and factors which are difficult to establish. For example, measures adopted by the West since 1947 have reduced Bloc capabilities in western Europe to a considerable de-

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gree. Continued progress toward the unification, rearmament, and revival of Western Europe would restrict further the strength of the international Communist movement in Western Europe. Moreover, even though the Bloc enjoys remarkable flexibility in selecting political warfare tactics, we believe that the rigid, centralized Bloc control system and the dogmatism of Bloc ideology will limit Bloc tactical flexibility, blind the Bloc to opportunities, and lead it into miscalculations.

#### Western Europe

78. Communist strength in Western Europe varies from country to country, from the illegal party of an estimated 100 members in Eire to the mass parties of France and Italy. Throughout Western Europe, the Communist Parties since 1946 have suffered severe losses both in membership and in prestige, but the hard core of the Party has been preserved everywhere. We estimate that during the period of this estimate the Bloc will not have the capability of establishing a Communist government anywhere in Western Europe through election or through insurrection.

79. European Communists have been able to exert significant influence over trade union movements only in France and Italy, where Communist leadership is dominant in the largest trade union federations and where Communist control is unlikely


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to be shaken or threatened within the period of this estimate. The Communists have gained their largest following among dockworkers and laborers in the heavy industries, which play a vital role in the rearmament of Western Europe. In general, Western European Communists no longer have the capability of initiating strikes for political purposes but must rely upon unity of action with non-Communist unions in strikes based upon legitimate economic grievances. Nevertheless, the Communists retain limited capabilities to interfere with defense production in peace time and a larger potential for sabotage and espionage in war time.

80. The popular strength of the Communists and Bloc capabilities for political action in Western Europe remain highest in France and Italy, where the Communists are in a strong minority in the parliaments, control many municipal governments, and hold the leadership of the most important trade unions. We estimate that the Communist Party of France now has 500,000 members, compared with the peak of 850,000 in 1946. Moreover, in each national election in France since 1945, the Communist Party has obtained more than 5,000,000 votes, about one-quarter the total vote cast. The Communist Party of Italy is estimated to have 1,500,000 members, compared to only 5,000 in 1943 and to the peak of 2,300,000 in January, 1948. We estimate that the size and power of these Communist Parties will decline, but only slightly, within the period of this estimate.

81. In the other countries of Western Europe, Communist influence is weak and fairly widely scattered. Communists do hold important positions in some trade unions in most countries, but they are much less numerous and influential than they are in France and Italy.

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82. The German question will probably constitute the touchstone for Bloc political warfare capabilities in Western Europe during the period of this estimate.

83. In the event of general war, the Communist Parties would constitute a serious threat in Europe, especially in France and Italy, where the large Communist Parties and Communist trade union strength are reinforced by well-trained Communist para-military organizations with 50,000 and 75,000 members, respectively. All European governments would probably outlaw the Communist Parties and would attempt to arrest known Communists. However, the Communist Parties would probably go underground. The espionage, sabotage, and para-military capabilities of the

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European Communist Parties in the event of war must be considered high, and as Soviet forces approached they would form a formidable menace to Allied communications.

The Near East and Africa

84. We believe that Bloc political warfare capabilities in this area will remain low throughout the period of this estimate, except possibly in Iran. The USSR has devoted little effort to this area, and most of the existing Communist Parties have been formed underground. Of all the Parties organized, only that in Iran and those linked to the French Communist Party in North Africa have thus far had any marked influence. On the other hand, while the Bloc has made few gains, the continued deterioration of Western power and influence will provide increasing opportunities for the Bloc.

85. In Iran, the Bloc agent, the Tudeh Party, has an estimated membership of about 45,000 and has covertly exploited the current situation with some success. The government has thus far been able to keep Tudeh activities under control, although it has not been able to prevent some infiltration into its armed forces and its civilian offices. Communist political warfare capabilities may increase dangerously if conditions resulting from the oil crisis should seriously reduce the effectiveness of

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the armed forces and the police. On the other hand, if general war should break out, Tudeh capabilities would almost certainly be increased by Iranian Communists presently in the USSR and by other Soviet agents. Even so, Iranian Communists could make only a limited contribution to a Soviet invasion of Iran.

86. In the Arab countries, we estimate there are not only 30,000 or 40,000 Communists in a total population of 40,000,000. The Arab governments, even those politically unstable, now have the local Communist Parties under control, and they are believed capable of coping with possible increases of Communist strength and accelerations of political warfare. In the event of war, Communist capabilities for subversion and sabotage would not increase significantly, unless the states were invaded by Bloc forces.

#### South Asia

87. Communism does not now pose a major immediate threat to India, although the Indian Communist Party and allied parties received 6,000,000 votes (of 103,000,000) in the 1952 elections. The Indian Communist Party now has only about 50,000 members, but it has small vocal groups in several state legislatures and the national legislature. The Communist Party in the national legislature will be able to do little more than embarrass the government and to spread propaganda. In those states where Communist

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strength is greatest, the party may be able to obtain representation in coalition governments and even seriously to disrupt parliamentary government.

88. If the Indian Communist Party continues its present tactics, it probably will make additional gains in popular strength. However, we believe that there is very little possibility that the Indian Communists can make sufficient progress seriously to contest the dominant position of the Congress Party. If the Communist Party returns again to direct action, it probably will lose much of its popular support and at the same time cause the government to revive its earlier effective repressive measures.

89. The Pakistan government has acted with vigor and determination against the small and immature Pakistan Communist Party. Bloc political warfare capabilities in Pakistan through the period of this estimate will almost certainly remain limited, although Soviet trade with Pakistan and possible Soviet political manoeuvres on Kashmir may strengthen them somewhat.

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Far East

89. Although the Japanese Communist Party now has only about 100,000 members, it is well-organized and well-disciplined and is now conducting an aggressive political campaign. Communist influence over Japanese labor, over various front organizations, and in the Japanese educational system provides important instruments for disseminating propaganda and for exploiting economic unrest and resentment against the US. The Party has a disciplined hard core with significant capabilities for subversion, espionage, and sabotage. It probably will not be able to persuade the Japanese government or the Japanese people to abandon their fundamentally pro-Western orientation. It will almost certainly lack the capability during the period of this estimate for seizing control of the government.

90. Bloc political warfare capabilities vary throughout Southeast Asia. They are highest and most significant in Indochina, where the Viet Minh, with Chinese Communist advice and military assistance, maintains heavy military pressure upon the French and the Associated States. Bloc political warfare capabilities reflect Viet Minh military strength and the Viet Minh appeal to nationalism. We believe that the Viet Minh will maintain its strong military and political position throughout the period of this estimate.

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91. The Burmese Communists and their sympathizers constitute a serious threat to Burma's security and are capable of creating unrest throughout wide areas of the country. Recent elections have strengthened the unstable government of Burma, which has now begun to attempt to reduce the power of the Communist insurgents. We estimate that the Burmese Communists will not have sufficient strength within the period of this estimate to overthrow the government, unless the government is weakened by internal factional strife and unless the Burmese Communists are given technical and logistical aid by the Chinese Communists.

92. The growth of Communism in Thailand has thus far been confined largely to the Chinese community, and Communist political warfare capabilities in Thailand are very limited. The development of Communist strength in Thailand will probably depend largely upon events in Indochina, Burma, and Malaya. Communist victories in those countries would immediately increase Communist strength in Thailand, where governments have traditionally followed the currents dominant elsewhere in Southeast Asia.

93. The British have the support of most Malaysians and probably will be able to contain Communist political and guerrilla warfare, so long as the remainder of the Southeastern Asian mainland remains outside the Bloc. The organized guerrilla forces, numbering 3000

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to 5000 and supported by at least that number of militia, have thus far evaded destruction by retiring into the jungle and by temporarily merging with the Chinese population. We estimate that the Malayan Communists will retain the capability of harassing the British administration and disturbing the economy. However, we believe that the Communists will not be able to gain wide popular support or seriously to threaten the British position.

94. The Indonesian Communist Party, the third largest party in Indonesia, has a membership of only about 25,000. However, its organization and leadership are excellent, it controls the largest and most important labor federation, it receives Chinese Communist aid, and it has a considerable influence on the large, restless Chinese population. Moreover, it now has 7 percent of the seats in Parliament, and it controls a number of important front organizations for peasants, women, and youth groups. We estimate that the Indonesian Communist Party will not within the period of this estimate be able to seize power or seriously to threaten the government. However, we believe it will retain the support of various insurgent groups for sabotage and insurrectionary activities, especially in Java. It will probably also be able to help keep the present government neutralist. In the event of war, the Communists could obtain control of Indonesia only through the complete collapse of the Western position in Southeast Asia.

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95. In the Philippines, Communist political warfare capabilities have decreased considerably since 1951. Although there are still Huk raids and although the Philippine armed forces and police are not yet strong enough to cope with all raids in all parts of the Philippines, Huk-Communist strength will probably continue to decrease during the period of this estimate. However, organized Communism will not be altogether eliminated. In the event of war, when an added covert influx of Chinese Communist agents may be expected, continued US help will probably be necessary to control the Communists, particularly in strategically important port areas.

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TAB A: ESTIMATED BLOC MILITARY STRENGTH

A. Bloc Ground Strength

1. The Soviet Army

1. We estimate that the Soviet ground forces now total 2,500,000 men, and the internal security forces constitute an additional 400,000 troops. The Soviet Army is estimated to consist of 175 line divisions, of which 105 are rifle divisions, 40 mechanized, 25 tank, and 5 cavalry. In addition, the Soviet ground forces contain 20 artillery divisions and 25 anti-aircraft artillery divisions. On the basis of present mobilization plans, estimated trained reserves, and estimated stocks of military equipment, the Soviet Army and internal security forces can be expanded to a total strength of 8,500,000, organized into 320 line divisions, by M / 30 days. In the absence of general war, however, we believe that the size of the Soviet ground forces will remain at approximately the present level through mid-1953, but that the armament, mobility, and combat efficiency of these forces for sustained combat will continue to improve.

2. The Soviet Army has been reorganized and modernized since the end of World War II, although the various corps, armies, and divisions still vary widely in quality. We believe that current Soviet line divisions probably possess good equipment in adequate quantity. The Soviet ground forces in Eastern Europe probably constitute the best-

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equipped and best-trained units of the Soviet Army. The rigid Soviet training program probably ensures a high degree of combat skill. Discipline is good, and morale is almost certainly high.

3. Certain weaknesses of the Soviet Army will continue to limit the scope and effectiveness of its offensive capabilities during the period of this estimate. The Soviet Army lacks experience and training in large-scale use of motor transport. The complicated logistical problems arising from the size of USSR, from the size of the areas in which campaigns would probably be fought, and from the inadequate road and rail networks intensify this weakness. The Army lacks experience in large-scale combined amphibious operations, and it has never conducted successful airborne operations in wartime. The Army suffers from a shortage of technicians, a weakness that is being met by intensive pre-military and military training and by the recall of some specialists from the reserve. It has also suffered from poor communications, due mainly to insufficient radio communications equipment. This may be the principal cause for inflexibility in past Soviet operations, particularly in the handling of artillery.

2. Bloc European Strength

a. Soviet Forces in Europe

4. The USSR has been strengthening its own forces in Eastern Europe and those of the Satellites to maintain its relative

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advantage over growing Western strength. The highly mechanized Soviet group of armies in Eastern Germany, organized into 22 divisions totalling 385,000 troops, represents the core of Bloc military power in Europe and constitutes a poised threat to the West. These Soviet armies are being supplied with the most modern equipment and are undergoing intensive training.

b. The Satellite Armies

5. We estimate that the Satellite armies (including the East German Alert Police) now total 1,155,000 men, organized into 59 line divisions (56 rifle, 9 mechanized, and 4 tank), 3 artillery divisions, 6 anti-aircraft divisions, and various independent brigades and regiments.<sup>1/</sup> The Satellite security forces constitute an additional force of at least 242,000 troops. Satellite ground forces are growing in strength and quality at a steady rate, and we estimate that by mid 1953 they will total 2,555,000 men, organized into 118 divisions.<sup>2/</sup> Trained reserves of the Satellite ground forces amount to approximately 1,000,000 men (of which only 30 per cent are now considered fully trained), but there is little equipment available for reserves.

<sup>1/</sup> For more complete information, see Tab E, Table 2.

<sup>2/</sup> This includes the estimated expansion of the East German Alert Police to 300,000 men, organized into 24 divisions.

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6. The Satellite armies are equipped largely with Soviet World War II equipment of good quality. The Satellites are now manufacturing for their own use light-armored and non-combat vehicles, light artillery, small arms, ammunition and parts. They are dependent upon the USSR for most of their tanks, self-propelled guns, and heavy artillery, and for some of their light artillery and small arms. The most obvious deficiency is in motor transport; few Satellite divisions are motorized or mechanized. However, a concentrated effort is being made to overcome this weakness by increasing deliveries of motor vehicles from the USSR and from Czechoslovakia and by some vehicle production in other countries. The Satellite ground forces are also weak in communications equipment, and their anti aircraft defenses have little gun-laying radar.

7. Although the Satellite ground forces are being re-organized to conform to the Soviet pattern, differences still exist in training, equipment, morale, and general capabilities. Satellite combat efficiency and reliability vary and in general are only fair. The Bulgarian Army is considered the most formidable of all the Satellite forces. The Hungarian and Polish, and possibly the Rumanian, armies are being pushed rapidly toward the Bulgarian level of achievement. The Czechoslovak Army will not be an effective offensive force before the spring of 1953. The Albanian Army remains capable only of guerrilla operations.

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c. Logistical Position.

8. The Soviet Bloc ground forces in Europe possess a good logistical position. We estimate that military stockpiles west of the Soviet border are sufficient to maintain Soviet forces now in being there for approximately 45 days of active combat. We believe that military stockpiling within the USSR is sufficient for maintaining a mobilized army in combat for several months without recourse to new production, except in the case of POL. The east-west road, rail, and inland waterway nets in Eastern Europe are adequate to move troops and materiel with sufficient speed and efficiency to permit full utilization of those Bloc divisions now in Eastern Europe.

3. Bloc Far Eastern Strength

a. Soviet Forces in the Far East

9. The USSR represents both the foundation and the arsenal of Bloc military power in the Far East. The Soviet ground forces in the Far East operate within an autonomous command structure comprising the territory east of Lake Baikal. These forces total an estimated 427,000 men, organized into 30 line divisions, of which 7 are mechanized and 3 armored. There are also 78,000 Soviet security troops in this area. The ground forces in the Far East are probably comparable to other forces within the USSR in equipment and training. We estimate that the USSR could mobilize an additional 15 divisions from the three military districts which constitute the Soviet Far East.

10. Transportation facilities constitute the major limitation for supporting large-scale military operations in the Far East over an extended period. The Trans-Siberian, which carries at least 90 percent of the military supplies shipped from the western USSR, is reported to be operating at near capacity levels. The USSR has attempted to reduce the transport limitation by building up large reserves of military and other supplies in the Far East. However, the USSR has also equipped and provisioned the North Korean Army and has furnished large amounts of equipment and POL to the Chinese Communists. While it is not known what proportion of these supplies were drawn from stocks in the Far East, we believe minimum stockpile reserves have been maintained. Although precise data on the logistical position of the Soviet Forces in the Far East are lacking, we estimate that these forces now have supplies sufficient to support 30 divisions in combat from 6 months to one year.

b. Chinese Communist Army

11. The over-all strength of the Chinese Communist Field Forces is estimated at 2,250,000 troops, organized into 69 armies and 227 divisions, including 11 artillery, 6 cavalry, and 4 armored divisions. Communist China has enormous manpower reserves, but a severe shortage of equipment limits the Communist capability for mobilizing this manpower for military service. The size of the Chinese Communist Army has not increased appreciably in the past three years, although notable improvements in quality have taken place.

12. The disposition of the Chinese Communist Field Forces by geographical areas is as follows:

<u>Area</u>	<u>Field Forces</u>	<u>Line Divisions</u>	<u>Supporting Divisions</u>
Korea	682,000	53	10
Manchuria	237,000	24	6
North China	133,000	12	3
East China	404,000	38	2
Central-South China	386,000	36	-
Southwest China	306,000	31	-
Tibet	15,000	1	-
Northwest China	77,000	11	-
TOTAL	2,240,000 <sup>1/</sup>	206	21

13. The Chinese Communist forces are basically infantry. Their weapons consist of a heterogeneous assortment of light weapons of European, American, and Soviet manufacture. Soviet supplies are gradually reducing the Chinese Communist shortage of heavy equipment in Korea, but they probably are not sufficient to alter significantly the traditional shortage of equipment elsewhere in China. Most of the armored equipment was apparently shipped to the Chinese Communists during late 1950 and early 1951, but ammunition and other types of

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<sup>1/</sup> This figure does not include 10,000 "advisors" in Indochina.

material are apparently being furnished on a continuing basis. Communist China has become increasingly dependent upon the USSR for continued shipments of ammunition, spare parts, POL, and replacement equipment. We estimate that despite the flow of Soviet material, the disparity between the equipment of the average Chinese Communist division (8-10,000) and that of the average Soviet division (10-12,000) will probably not be reduced significantly in this period.

14. The morale and combat efficiency of the Chinese Communist soldier are high, and the Chinese Communist Army is an effective force with a high degree of local tactical mobility in Korea. Combat effectiveness has been limited, however, by the heterogeneity of the weapons and equipment, deficiencies in heavy weapons, equipment, and training, and the lack of supporting Services. In the past, the combat effectiveness of the Chinese Communist Army has also been limited by the absence of tactical air support.

c. North Korean Army

15. We estimate that the North Korean Army now totals 256,000 men, organized into 17 rifle divisions, 1 armored division, 1 mechanized division, and 4 mechanized artillery brigades. Three North Korean corps are currently engaged in combat on the eastern front. The remaining forces have coastal defense duties or security missions on lines of communication.

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16. The North Korean soldier in 1950 was well trained, but severe casualties forced the induction of large numbers of untrained men into combat units. Recent evidence indicates that the past twelve months have been utilized in an effort to return the standards of training and equipment to the original level. Rigid discipline, experienced leadership, and Soviet staff advice will continue to give the North Koreans a general over-all combat efficiency rating of from fair to good, but these troops will probably not approach the Chinese Communist Army in combat effectiveness.

d. Viet Minh Army

17. We estimate that the Viet Minh military forces consist of a regular army of 130,000, organized into 6 infantry divisions, one artillery division and numerous independent formations, 70,000 regional troops and 100,000 poorly armed irregulars. The combat efficiency of the regular Viet Minh forces is considered good by the standards of that area of the world, and morale has remained high. Three-fourths of the regulars are deployed in the strategic Tonkin area.

18. There has been continuous improvement of transportation routes and facilities from South China into Indochina. Chinese Communist logistic assistance to the Viet Minh continues, and stockpiles are believed to be in excess of Viet Minh requirements for present operations.

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B. Bloc Air Strength

1. Soviet Air Forces

19. We estimate that the Soviet Air Forces have an authorized strength of some 20,400 aircraft, including 9800 fighters (5600 jets), 2660 attack aircraft, 4550 light bombers (670 jets) and 800 medium bombers.<sup>1/</sup> In addition, we estimate that the Soviet stockpile of military aircraft is approximately equal in number to the aircraft in units, but considerably inferior in quality and not identical as to type. Although the size of the total air establishment is not likely to change appreciably through mid-1953, we estimate that a significant increase in over-all operational efficiency will result from the continued substitution of more modern aircraft. We estimate that by mid-1953 the Soviet Air Forces will have an authorized strength of 20,500 aircraft, including 10,000 fighters (8,000 jets), 2,700 attack aircraft (900 jets), 4100 light bombers (1500 jets) and 1200 medium bombers.<sup>2/</sup>

20. More than half of the Soviet fighters are now jets. There are indications that the USSR has ceased production of piston-engined fighters and is producing only a few piston-engined bombers.

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<sup>1/</sup> We estimate that actual strength is generally 85 per cent of authorized strength.

<sup>2/</sup> For more complete information on estimated Soviet air strength, see Tab B, Table 5.



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Two twin-jet light bombers are in serial production and several hundred of one type, the IL-28, are already in operational use. For strategic bombing purposes, the USSR has an estimated authorized strength of 800 TU-4 (B-29 type) aircraft in Long Range Aviation Units. Although a heavy bomber appeared in the July, 1951 air show, there is no evidence that this bomber was an acceptable one or that series production of any heavy bomber has begun.

21. The Soviet Air Forces are becoming increasingly effective, particularly with respect to bomber interception. However, the combat effectiveness of Soviet military aviation is still considered low by US standards. We believe that the general level of training of Soviet ground and air personnel is inferior to that of the United States and United Kingdom personnel. The USSR is conducting an intensive training program to improve this defect.

22. The present logistical position of Soviet military aviation is probably good. The aircraft industry has been maintained in steady operation throughout the post-war period, and since 1948 the industry has concentrated on the production of jet interceptors, notably the MIG-15. We estimate the annual rate of production as follows:

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<u>Type</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1952-1953</u>
Jet fighters	4751	5000
Light and medium bombers	1100	1400
Others	<u>3426</u>	<u>2560</u>
TOTAL	9277	8960

We believe that aircraft production could be accelerated, but that two years would be required for the industry to reach capacity production. We estimate that the present total peacetime requirement of aviation fuels for the Soviet Air Forces amounts to about two-thirds of Bloc production.

23. The modernization of Soviet air strength in the Far East is of especial significance.<sup>1/</sup> Estimated jet fighter strength there has increased

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Jets now constitute about 50 percent of the fighter force in the Far East. However, about 60 percent of total Soviet air strength, including about 65 percent of the jet fighter force and 87 percent of the medium bomber force, is concentrated in Eastern Europe and the western portions of the USSR.

24. There are five major combat components in the Soviet Air Force: The Air Force of the Soviet Army, Fighter Aviation of Air

<sup>1/</sup> For more complete information on the estimated geographical distribution of the Soviet Air Force, see Tab B, Table 4.

Defense, Long Range Aviation, Naval Aviation, and Aviation of Airborne Troops.<sup>1/</sup>

a. The Air Force of the Soviet Army, consisting of units assigned to the four Military District Air Forces and to the 14 Tactical Air Armies, is the largest component of Soviet military aviation, with an estimated authorized strength of 12,100 aircraft, of which 2,850 are jet fighters and 670 twin-jet light bombers. By mid-1953, the number of jet light bombers in units may increase to 1,500. The primary mission of the Air Force of the Soviet Army is to provide tactical support for ground operations. On the whole, the strategic mobility of tactical aviation is high. While the Air Force of the Soviet Army has been strengthened since World War II by re-equipment with jet aircraft, the majority of its aircraft are still World War II types. Use of the IL-10 piston engine attack aircraft as the primary close support weapon results in a heavy fighter escort requirement and reduces the counter-air capability of the fighter force. The tactical bomber force will probably be capable of considerably better performance than in World War II, when its operations were relatively ineffective. In spite of the weaknesses noted above, the Air Force of the Soviet Army is capable of providing effective support for Soviet ground forces.

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<sup>1/</sup> For more complete information concerning the estimated strength of the major components of the Soviet Air Force, see Tab B, Table 5.

b. Fighter Aviation of Air Defense has the mission of defending important target areas in the USSR. This force has an estimated authorized 2,700 interceptor aircraft, of which about three-fourths are jets. Its regiments operate from relatively permanent installations, but their organization appears to parallel that of the Air Force of the Soviet Army and their strategic mobility is correspondingly high. While the Soviet Union has an effective day interceptor aircraft in the MIG-15, this aircraft cannot now be fully exploited because of a shortage of effective ground control radar equipment. We believe that the USSR now has a small number of interim all-weather interceptors with airborne interception radar around a few important Soviet targets. These aircraft probably have only limited interception capabilities, particularly against jet bombers. However, because of Soviet progress in the electronics field and in the production and operation of interceptors, we estimate that the USSR probably will by mid-1953 have limited operational quantities of some type of true all-weather interceptor. We estimate that Soviet day interception capabilities will be good around key target areas. We estimate that night and all-weather capabilities will remain limited throughout the period of this estimate.

c. Long Range Aviation

1. Long Range Aviation, consisting of three Air Armies, one in the Far East and two in western USSR, constitutes the

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strategic striking force of the Bloc. This force has an estimated authorized strength of 1,900 aircraft, including 800 Tu-4 bombers. By mid-1953, we estimate that Soviet Long Range Aviation will probably have about 1,200 Tu-4's and may have a few jet medium bombers and turboprop heavy bombers. The Tu-4, with a normal combat range of 3,320 nautical miles and a combat radius of 1,800 nautical miles with a 10,000 pound payload, is the only known operational Soviet bomber capable of delivering the atomic bomb in the United States. Modified in the manner of the US B-29B, the Tu-4 would have a combat radius of 2150 nautical miles and a one-way range of approximately 4000 miles. At least 30 airfields in the USSR and Satellites are currently suitable for sustained medium bomber operations, and about 75 others for limited medium bomber operations.

2. The centralized control of Long Range Aviation provides flexibility for shifting units to meet strategic requirements, while operationally the mobility of the medium bomber force can be exploited by staging aircraft from interior base areas through forward bases around the Soviet Bloc perimeter. Units of Long Range Aviation are known to be undergoing intensive training for strategic bombing missions by day or night in any weather. This capability has probably not generally been attained at present. It will be extended when radar blind bombing and navigational devices are in more general use, and when additional training has been completed. We believe that the overall

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combat effectiveness of Soviet Long Range Aviation remains well below that of the US and UK strategic air arms. The average Soviet medium bomber crew is less skilled than the average US medium bomber crew of World War II. Soviet staff planners lack the extensive operational experiences obtained by the US and UK.

d. Naval Aviation, which has an estimated authorized 3250 aircraft, of which 750 are jet fighters, is assigned the mission of supporting the Soviet fleet, protecting the seaward flanks of the Soviet Army, and defending coastal areas. It also bears a part of the responsibility for air defense of the USSR. The lack of carriers limits effective fleet operations to a combat radius of 300 to 700 nautical miles. Naval Aviation is probably capable of anti-submarine patrol, aerial reconnaissance of coastal areas, and mining. We estimate that the effectiveness of Naval Aviation will be improved by mid-1953 as additional jet aircraft, both fighters and light bombers, are assigned to naval units.

e. Aviation of Airborne Troops apparently has the mission of conducting airborne training and providing airlift and equipment in actual airborne operations. Its authorized aircraft strength consists of approximately 450 transport aircraft and 190 gliders. It is probable that transport aircraft from other Soviet aviation components and the Civil Air Fleet would be utilized to supplement the aircraft

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of this component for large-scale airborne operations. We estimate that the Soviet Army has approximately 100,000 trained paratroops, organized into from 6 to 10 divisions. In addition, a number of regular rifle division troops -- perhaps as many as 100,000 -- have received limited training in airborne operations.

f. The Civil Air Fleet, while not an operational component of Soviet military aviation, is under the War Ministry. Together with other civil air organizations, it operates about 1,650 transports on scheduled and non-scheduled operations. It could make an estimated 1,000 of these available for military purposes. However, this would produce a corresponding reduction in Soviet domestic air transport.

2. Satellite Air Forces<sup>1/</sup>

25. The present mission of the European Satellite air forces is primarily defensive. These air forces possess approximately 1,280 aircraft in operational units; this number includes 119 jet fighters, 410 piston fighters, 404 ground attack, 150 light bombers, 94 transports, and 103 reconnaissance aircraft. The Satellite forces are almost completely dependent upon the USSR for logistic support, and virtually all aircraft are Soviet types. Jet fighters are appearing in increasing numbers, and intensive Soviet training of carefully

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<sup>1/</sup> For more complete information, see NIE-33, Soviet Control of the European Satellites and Their Contribution to Soviet Power (7 November 1951).

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selected Satellite pilots in assuring Soviet control, techniques, and tactics. On the whole, combat effectiveness is low by Western standards, and the Satellite air forces have only limited defensive and ground attack capabilities.

3. Chinese Communist Air Force<sup>1/</sup>

26. The strength and capabilities of the Chinese Communist Air Force have been increasing steadily. They are estimated to have available a total of approximately 1,800 operational aircraft, including 1,000 jet fighters, 250 piston fighters, 160 ground attack aircraft, 240 piston light bombers, and 150 twin-engine transports. The main concentration of air strength is in the Korean area where approximately 1,250 aircraft, including 800 jet fighters, are based.

27. Although the Chinese Communist Air Force has increased in strength to an estimated 1,800 aircraft, the combat efficiency of this force does not correspond to its numerical strength. The defensive capabilities of this air force have risen appreciably as a result of continued training and combat experience. On the whole, the Chinese Communist Air Force is formidable defensively within the present limited area of operations in Korea. However, it would lose much of its effectiveness if forced to spread its strength. Moreover, it remains wholly dependent upon the USSR for logistic support. Should

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<sup>1/</sup> This includes the North Korean air units and any Russian units which are operating ostensibly as parts of the Chinese Communist Air Force.



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this support be withdrawn or interdicted, the combat efficiency of this force would decline rapidly.

C. Bloc Naval Strength

1. Soviet Naval Forces

28. We estimate that the Soviet Navy has a total of about 140 major surface vessels, including 3 old battleships, 18 cruisers of various ages, and 118 destroyers.<sup>1/</sup> We estimate that there are 370 submarines, of which most are short-range coastal submarines and of which 104 are long-range cruising submarines with a combat radius of 6,000 nautical miles. There are no aircraft carriers, and none are believed in construction.

29. The operating forces of the Soviet Navy are organized into four major fleets because of the widely separated maritime frontiers. Each fleet is assigned primary responsibility for a particular geographic area, the Northern coast, the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and the Pacific. Both the Baltic and Pacific Fleets are subdivided into separate fleet components covering the northern and southern sectors of their respective areas of responsibility. In addition to the fleets, there are three flotillas, which serve as local defense forces in the Amur and Danube Rivers and the Caspian Sea.

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<sup>1/</sup> For more complete information, see Tab B, Table 6.

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30. We estimate that the Soviet Navy has a personnel strength of approximately 675,000 men, exclusive of about 80,000 naval aviation personnel, but including 400,000 General Service and 275,000 Coastal Defense and Naval Infantry personnel.

31. The Soviet submarine force, which is the largest in the world, is the principal offensive weapon of the Soviet Navy. We have no information on the proficiency of this force, but it must be assumed that it has profited from German experience and instruction. We believe that it has the capability of seriously threatening allied sea communications. At present, however, the strategic mobility of this submarine force is limited by the lack of overseas bases. Although there is no reliable evidence of submarine launching of V-1 type missiles, this is considered within Soviet capabilities. It is possible that such weapons might be fitted with atomic warheads.

32. The Soviet fleet maintains a large number of patrol and small craft, some 900 of which are in active service. Most of these are submarine chasers and motor torpedo boats. These small craft are capable of mine warfare in restricted waters, short-haul amphibious lift and support, and defensive action against amphibious raids and assaults.

33. The Soviet Navy has given high priority to the

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construction of cruisers and submarines, and a significant increase in their strength is anticipated. Large numbers of destroyer-escorts, patrol craft and dual purpose mine vessels have been built, but no evidence exists of large-scale construction of amphibious craft, midget units, or hydrofoil craft. There are no indications of construction of battleships, aircraft carriers or support-ship types which would be required for overseas attacks.

34. We believe that the Soviet surface fleet is designed primarily as a defensive weapon to support and protect the seaward flanks of the Soviet ground forces. This is demonstrated by the lack of aircraft carriers and of fast, modern battleships. Cruisers constitute the core of the surface fleet. Soviet cruiser construction has emphasized speed, firepower, and size, with a corresponding sacrifice in endurance.

35. Wide geographical separation of the maritime frontiers of the USSR has required the separation of the Navy into forces which are not mutually supporting. Limited operational experience and technical equipment, lack of aircraft carriers, and absence of advance base facilities make the components of the Soviet Navy second-rate coastal fleets. Adequate supplies of ammunition, stores, and POL are estimated to be available in all areas to service the Soviet Navy for the early months of a general war. POL supplies for Soviet Naval Forces in the

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Far East would probably present a problem after a year, particularly if these forces undertake extensive and sustained operations.

## 2. Satellite and Chinese Communist Navies

36. The capabilities of the Satellite and Chinese Communist navies during the period of this estimate will be negligible. The Naval Forces of the Satellites will probably be capable of aiding the Soviet Navy in such fields as minesweeping, minelaying, escort, and coastal defense duties. The Chinese Communist Navy is small and of uncertain effectiveness. The Soviet Far Eastern Naval Forces are providing training, advisors, and logistic support to this force, but available evidence indicates that within the period of this estimate it will not be an important element in the Far East.

## 3. Bloc Merchant Marine

37. We estimate the combined strength of the Bloc merchant marine at 760 vessels, totalling nearly three and one-third million deadweight tons.<sup>1/</sup> This constitutes only a minor addition to Bloc economic and military capabilities. In general, the Bloc merchant marine is in poor condition, and there is no evidence that its development has a high priority. Although the Bloc merchant marine could, in theory, be used for a troop lift, the present character of this merchant fleet, which lacks tankers and which is a heterogeneous collection of vessels, many obsolescent, precludes its employment in any large scale operation.

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<sup>1/</sup> For more complete information, see Tab B, Table 7.

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D. Bloc Defenses

1. Soviet Air Defense System

38. The USSR possesses a large Anti-Air Defense system (PVO), which includes an extensive early warning network, a force of interceptors estimated at 2,700 (including 2,000 jets), and an estimated 23 anti-aircraft divisions. The early warning, fighter, and anti-aircraft units of the Bloc armed forces are also available for air defense. Considering tactical fighters as well as those in air defense units, we estimate total fighter strength available to the Bloc at about 11,500. Other commitments would prevent utilization of all this force for air defense purposes.


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40. Soviet day interception capabilities have increased considerably with the widespread use of MIG-15 interceptors



The re-equipping of Bloc fighter units outside the USSR with jet interceptors, particularly in the Korea-Manchuria area, has increased Bloc air defense capabilities.

41. Soviet antiaircraft capabilities are gradually increasing as new guns of estimated 100mm caliber, with modern fire control radar and probably with new directors, become available in increasing numbers around important Soviet targets. These guns are capable of accurate fire up to 35,000-40,000 feet. A 57mm gun for attacking high speed aircraft at lower altitudes may already have been introduced. Surface-to-air guided missiles and rockets may be in operational use by mid-1953.

42. Despite definite improvements in Soviet air defense capabilities, major deficiencies in the Soviet air defense system remain. During the period of this estimate, there will probably be insufficient numbers of modern radar, heavy antiaircraft guns, and

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true all-weather interceptors to provide effective defenses for all important targets. Moreover, we believe that the Soviet air defense system, and all of its components, are subject to saturation by large scale air attacks.

## 2. Soviet Civil Defense

43. The USSR has a large, complex, and well-organized civil defense system which is integrated into the over-all Soviet Anti Air Defense system (PVO). The civil defense system includes a full-time civil defense staff organization. Comprehensive plans have been made for the utilization of other existing agencies and facilities, and for training large groups by various mass organizations. In addition, civil defense needs are apparently considered in urban and regional planning, in stockpiling, and in decentralization programs.

44. The USSR probably has a greater civil defense capability now than any other major country, except perhaps the UK. Its present civil defense system appears well-planned and organized, although it may be deficient in preparations against atomic attack. The elaborate totalitarian control system, the highly regimented character of the population and, to some extent, the dispersal of population and industry constitute strong points in the Soviet civil defense system, although the wide separation of various industrial complexes also poses disadvantages. In the event of a civil defense emergency, we believe that a serious shortage of transport facilities and of materials would

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arise, and that a serious fire hazard would develop because of the large proportion of wood used in Soviet construction.

### 3. Soviet Coastal Defenses

45. The Soviet Coastal Defense establishment, which includes radar nets, coast watchers, coast artillery, antiaircraft, and naval infantry, has an aggregate strength of 400,000 men and constitutes an effective third zone of defense. Soviet coastal batteries in World War II demonstrated the traditional effectiveness of Russian gunnery. It is impossible to defend the entire USSR coastline with fixed emplacements and prepared positions in depth, but defenses have been established in important ports, harbors and straits.

### 4. Satellite and Chinese Communist Defenses

46. The European Satellites in the West and Communist China and North Korea in the East deepen the early warning coverage and increase the hostile area over which attackers must fly. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] their interceptor and anti-aircraft forces, which are gradually being re-equipped by the USSR, are an additional asset. However, despite some increase in the air defense capabilities of the Satellites and of Communist China (notably in the Korea-Manchuria area), we estimate that during the period of this estimate they probably will not be adequate to assure any substantial degree of protection from air attack by a capable enemy.

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