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Security Information

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

13 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allan Evans (OIR)  
Colonel Gerald F. Lillard, USA (G-2)  
Captain Allan L. Reed, USN (ONI)  
Colonel Jack E. Thomas, USAF (AFOIN-2B)  
Captain John A. Holbrook, USN (JIG)

SUBJECT : Summary of Oral Contributions to NIE-45:  
"Probable Free World Attitudes in the East-  
West Conflict, through mid-1954, under  
Certain Assumed Conditions"

1. Attached is our working summary of the oral contribu-  
tions to the Latin American section of subject paper. In  
accordance with the understandings accompanying this procedure,  
these are circulated for your comment, which may be by informal  
memorandum, marginal notation, or any other method you deem  
suitable. It is requested that comment be received in this  
office by the close of business on Thursday, 22 January.  
Please note that this summary is not the final paper, which  
will be cast in usual estimate length and will be circulated  
in the usual manner following initial Board review.

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Executive Secretary

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1.

Latin America \*

1. With the exception of Argentina and Guatemala, the countries of Latin America will probably continue generally pro-Western and cooperative with the West during the period of this estimate. Eventually the trend toward exaggerated nationalism, if it continues, will seriously affect Hemisphere solidarity and US security interests in Latin America. For the next several years, however, change is not likely to be so far reaching as to reduce substantially the present degree and scope of Latin American cooperation.

2. There is unlikely to be any great change in Latin American military cooperation. The bilateral military assistance agreements entered into with Brazil and Uruguay will probably be ratified, and an agreement will probably be concluded with the Dominican Republic. There is no likelihood that any other nation now having a US Military Mission would follow Argentina's example and allow the Mission contract to lapse. However, the Latin American countries will generally continue to take a limited view of the importance of Hemisphere defense, and their cooperation will be affected by self-seeking and by

\* See NIE-70, "Conditions and Trends in Latin America Affecting US Security," 12 December 1952, especially paragraphs 6, 36-48, and 53-62.

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some apprehension toward their neighbors, leading to demands for national forces rather than the types of forces best suited to overall planning.]

3. No Latin American country is likely to change its policy on granting bases in time of peace, at least without a substantial quid pro quo. This applies particularly to Venezuela, Nicaragua, Ecuador (with respect to the Galapagos Islands), and Brazil. Although the Latin American countries will remain generally willing to ship strategic materials to the US, difficulties are likely to continue, especially over price.

b. Although Latin American countries will probably continue generally to cooperate in East-West trade restrictions, any decline in the price of raw materials could lead to increased pressure for violating the Battle Act. Chile, with copper, and Bolivia, with tin, would be particularly likely to increase Soviet Bloc trade in this event.

5. Latin American support for the Korean War is almost certain to continue passive, and there may be a total withdrawal of Colombian forces, partly for internal reasons, so that there would remain no Latin American forces there. Within the UN, however, the Latin American countries will probably continue to support the US on the POW issue.

6. In the UN generally, while Latin American cooperation on basic East-West issues such as Korea will probably continue strong, Latin American countries may tend to attempt an independent line especially if there is division between the US and UK. On colonial issues, the Latin American countries may support the Arab-Asian bloc to some degree, but such support would not extend to cases of doubtful legality, such as Tunisia, and the Latin American attitude would also be affected by the identity of the colonial power involved, being friendly to France but hostile to the UK or Belgium. There is little chance of log-rolling by the Latin American and Arab-Asian groups, each for the other, since the Latin American countries have no major issues that can be used for trading purposes.

7. Latin American diplomatic relations with the Soviet Bloc are likely to center around simple questions of diplomatic recognition. There is some possibility that Brazil may eject the two satellite missions now accredited there. Overall, it is unlikely that the Soviet Bloc will be able to add to its diplomatic representation, and it may lose additional posts.

8. With respect to internal Communism, many Latin American governments are likely to take firmer measures, and there may be joint action in such limited fields as restriction of

travel. However, such measures are likely to be balanced by increased Communist opportunities in some countries. Thus, Brazil has recently enacted an anti-Communist law, but the close identification of Communists with Nationalists makes it difficult to take effective measures, and the Prestes "Army of Liberation" may be an increasing threat. In Argentina, the official Communist Party has recently taken a position less hostile to Peron, and the Peron government may avoid any action whatever against Communists. In Guatemala, the situation of Communist penetration of government is likely to continue as at present, with some possibility of further Communist gains from the dislocation of the new agrarian laws. Despite possible Communist gains, the Bolivian government is not taking effective anti-Communist measures and is unlikely to do so. In Venezuela and Cuba, the governing military men will act strongly against overt Communist activity, but the Communists could nonetheless gain in influence through present instability or an overthrow of the government.

9. In general, Latin American attitudes on the East-West conflict are unlikely to be more affected than at present by Soviet Bloc propaganda and tactics within the range of the assumed courses of action. Local Communist efforts to merge their efforts with Nationalist groups will tend to increase

Communist strength, as in Brazil, and Communists will probably continue to contribute significantly to anti-American sentiment.

Should Soviet Bloc tactics succeed in creating serious divisions between the US and Western Europe, Latin America might tend to take the European point of view, which would probably mean a relaxation of defense efforts and cooperation. Latin American popular groups will continue moderately susceptible to Soviet peace propaganda.