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Southeast Asia (Indochina, Burma, Malaya, Thailand, Indonesia)

General Trends and Variables

1. During the period of this estimate the attitude of the non-Communist countries of Southeast Asia will be heavily affected by developments in Indochina, and to a lesser extent by other developments in the East-West struggle. Barring a Western reverse in the Indochina conflict, Burma and Thailand will probably at least maintain and may increase their present degree of pro-Western sentiment and practical cooperation with the West. In Indonesia, attitudes will be somewhat more independent of Indochina events, but are in any event very uncertain and difficult to predict. Malaya is of course a special case, with the UK attitude unlikely to change (see preceding section \_\_\_\_), and the main variable being the native attitude toward the Communist revolt.

2. Thus, in the event of developments plainly unfavorable to the West in Indochina, such as a substantial increase in Communist-held territory or a clear French battle defeat, the effects would be serious in mainland Southeast Asia. It would take very little additional Communist pressure to bring about a Thai accommodation to Communism. However Thailand reacted, Burma's position would become so exposed that there would

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2. [Thus] in the event of developments plainly unfavorable to the West in Indochina, such as a substantial increase in Communist-held territory or a <sup>decisive</sup> <sup>military</sup> clear French battle defeat, the effects would be serious in mainland Southeast Asia. [It would ~~take very little~~ <sup>could</sup> additional Communist pressure to bring about *fairly rapidly* a Thai accommodation to Communism. However Thailand reacted, Burma's position would become <sup>increasingly</sup> <sup>and</sup> so exposed that there would