


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**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES**

26 July 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL ESTIMATES BOARD


VIA: Chief, Estimates Staff

FROM:



**SUBJECT: Planning Project #21 "The Current Situation in Albania,
with Particular Reference to Greek, Yugoslav and Italian
Interests and Pretensions"**

1. Attached are draft terms of reference for Planning Project #21. There are several aspects to this problem which the Board should probably consider before deciding upon the action to be taken on this subject.



3. The problem, by its nature, has to be considered in somewhat artificial terms. Conflicting Yugoslav, Greek and Italian interests in Albania would only become critical in the event of Hoxha's fall from power, and most observers agree that there is little immediate prospect of this. The problem is matter of current concern, however, in that mutual suspicions, even at the present stage, could be an obstacle to a coordinated defense effort. Although no substantial steps have been taken toward the coordination of Yugoslav, Italian and Greek military plans, this is a logical step in the Western defense effort and an intelligence study such as this might well be of considerable value in that connection.

4. A key factor in the Albanian resistance problem is the attitude of Yugoslavia. As indicated in Staff Memorandum 89, Western observers in Belgrade do not anticipate any early Yugoslav attempt to develop a pro-Tito movement in Albania, largely for fear of inviting

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
Soviet or satellite intervention. Should Western and Yugoslav strength develop as planned, however, reducing the Soviet threat in Southeastern Europe, Tito can hardly be expected to continue to refrain from efforts to orient Albania towards Yugoslavia. In the interim period, it would obviously be to U.S. advantage for Yugoslavia, Greece and Italy to reach some understanding with regard to Albania. An intelligence estimate of the situation might emphasize this desirability to the policy planners.

5. We have limited this project to a consideration of Greek, Italian and Yugoslav interests as they relate to Western security and have excluded consideration of Soviet reaction to possible developments in Albania. This was done in the belief that consideration of the Soviet reaction would require the examination of broader problems which might obscure the question of possible conflicts of interest among Yugoslavia, Greece and Italy and their bearing on Western defense planning for the Mediterranean.

6. It is recommended that this project be scheduled as an NIE and also that ORG be requested to participate.

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Attachment



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