

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DRW - Mr. R. Scammon

DATE: July 7, 1951

FROM : DRW/NWR - Rene Tron *RT*

SUBJECT: NIE 34, Appendix B

1. The "rate at which Spain can mobilize her manpower" chart appears unrealistic (p. 9). It is stated on the following page that the ammunition supply for 40 divisions is adequate for only 3 to 12 days of combat. Factors such as this should be related to the mobilization picture.

2. Some of the material in the economic section more properly belongs in the military appendix. For example, the last two sentences on page 4 on defense of the Pyrenees and the railroad situation would seem to belong under subsection 6 of Appendix B.

3. The point at issue is not whether the Pyrenees line can be defended, but whether Spain can be utilized under certain conditions as an effective base. There is no discussion here of the problems posed by the possible use of Soviet paratroops or by sea invasion, particularly in connection with the Spanish Terrain. The same factors that make the Pyrenees an effective bastion_x would render it difficult to eliminate enemy elements that had by-passed the Spanish defenses.

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RT:zn