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ALBANIA

MILITARY STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

4618

29 JUN 1951

Although Albania has no air force and there is no evidence of any Soviet intention to establish an Albanian Air Force, there are potential airfield sites and a few established airfields in Albania which may be developed by 1954 to accomodate military aircraft. The location of Albania, from the Soviet point of view, is important with respect to possible air campaigns against Greece, Italy, Mediterranean shipping, or Allied bases in North Africa. In view of the established Soviet program of airfield improvement in other Satellite nations it is logical to assume that there will be some improvement in existing air facilities in the near future at least in the Tirana area. However, Albania's exposed position and the probably logistical difficulties the Soviets would encounter in supporting armed forces in Albania in the event of hostilities will probably be a deterrent to the creation of any significant air strength in this satellite. Military air bases, if built, will be primarily intended for possible use by Soviet military air forces.

The only evidence of military aircraft in Albania is the presence of Soviet manned aircraft used to patrol Albania to prevent overflights of the country. There is also evidence of the storage of disassembled Soviet aircraft in Albania.

There have been several unconfirmed reports of a few politically reliable Albanian youths receiving flight training in the Soviet Union. Also of importance as an indication of a possible rebirth of the Albanian Air Force is the presence of Soviet Air Officers acting as "Advisors" to the government.

The government and the military of Albania are under the direct control of the Soviets and it has been reported that the Soviet Union has 10,000 security troops based in Albania. Even the Albanian Civil Air Fleet is under the direct supervision of Soviet Officers.

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BULGARIA

I. ILITARY STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

A. Current strength of the Air Force, including trained and security forces.

AIRCRAFT STRENGTH AND TYPES

ROLE	NUMBER	TYPE AIRCRAFT
Fighter		
Jet	---	---
Conv.	100	Yak-9
Attack	100	IL-10
Lgt. Bomber	100	Pe-2
	45	TU-2
Med. Bomber	---	---
Transport	30	Ju-52
Reconn.	10	Fi-156
TOTAL	385	

DISPOSITION OF TACTICAL UNITS

UNIT	NO. & MAKE AIRCRAFT	LOCATION
Hq. 5th. BMR Liv.		Graf Ignatiev
15th. Lt. Bmr. Regt.	20 Pe-2	Graf Ignatiev
25th. Lt. Bmr. Regt.	20 TU-2	Balcik
35th. Lt. Bmr. Regt.	20 Pe-2	Varna/Sea Sevnes
Hq. 6th FTR. DIV		Bojuriste
16th FTR. Regt.	20 Yak-9	Bojuriste
26th FTR Regt.	20 Yak-9	Karlovo
36th FTR. Regt.	20 Yak-9	Stara/Za Gora
Hq. 2nd. G.A. DIV.		Plovdiv
12th. G.A. Regt.	22 IL-10	Plovdiv
22nd. G.A. Regt.	22 IL-10	Gorna/Orehovitsa
32nd. G.A. Regt.	22 IL-10	Krumovo
631 st. Reconn. Regt.	10 FI-156	Yambol
Transport Regt.	10 JU-52	Vrajdebna
	206	

PERSONNEL STRENGTH

Pilots	390
Total Personnel	7800

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1. Changes since 1 January 1950?

During the last year one Light Bomber Regiment, one Fighter Regiment and one Ground Attack Regiment have been added to the Bulgarian Air Force.

2. Changes likely to occur through 1952?

Apparently the cycle of Soviet infiltration is nearing completion in Bulgaria. Moscow seems to place greater trust in Bulgaria than in any of the other Satellites and no less than 3,500 Soviet officers and enlisted men are reportedly engaged in reactivating the Bulgarian armed forces. As the airfield improvement program progresses it is logical to assume that the Bulgarian Air Force will be further enlarged and also augmented with Soviet units. There have been reliable reports of Soviet jet fighters stationed in Bulgaria. Other reports of lesser reliability have indicated that conventional Soviet aircraft may be based on various Bulgarian airfields. There are, however, no identified SAF units known to be based in Bulgaria. While there is no firm evidence indicating a build-up of Soviet air strength in Bulgaria at this time, such a build-up would be entirely logical in view of the confirmed Soviet Air Force expansion in other satellite countries.

B. What is the current status of equipment?

The aircraft assigned to the Bulgarian Air Force are of Soviet or German manufacture. The majority of the aircraft are of WW II vintage. Maintenance and serviceability are low.

1. What change does this represent since 1 January 1950?

There has been no change in the type of equipment in the Bulgarian Air Force in the last year. As mentioned previously however, there has been an increase of three regiments since 1 January 1950. Due to the age of the equipment, and the lack of adequate spare parts, and the lack of trained aircrewmen and mechanics the serviceability and effectiveness of the Bulbarian Air Force are low.

2. Changes likely to occur through 1952?

Continued reequipment will probably be carried out in the Bulgarian Air Force by the Soviets as equipment becomes available and as

the airfield improvement program provides suitable fields. It is estimated that in the near future the Bulgarian Air Force will be augmented by Soviet air units.

C. Current Status of Air Facilities:

There are 37 airfields in Bulgaria, some of which are currently under construction. Prior to current airfield improvement program, only 2 fields, Sofia/Vrazhdebna, and Graf Ignatiev, had permanent runways and the longest was that at Graf Ignatiev (4,980 feet).

1. Changes since 1 January 1950:

A wide-spread program of airfield development is now underway in Bulgaria under the direction of Soviet authority. No particular urgency appears to be attached to the work underway; in fact, judging from the type of construction laborer used and from the relative lack of heavy equipment in use, there are indications that some of the airfield improvement may be in the nature of "made work". Three implications rising from the construction picture are interesting: a. a pattern of underground hangars (one large hangar, divided into 4 bays, with each bay suitable for 30 fighters) is becoming apparent; b. a pattern of 8,500 foot concrete urnways seems to be emerging; and c. the Yambol area, west of Burgas and near the Black Sea, seems to be a focal point of construction. Two new airfields and one old airfield in the Yambol area now undergoing improvement may eventually prove to have 8,500 foot runways (Bezmer, 42 27N 26 23E; Sredets, 42 21N 27 11E; Alatitsa, 42 11N 26 43E) Four fields are reported to have underground hangars under construction as described; Bezmer; Dobric 43 36N 27 49E; Mokren, 42 45N26 36E, and Okop, 42 23N 26 34E. Of the four, three are in the vicinity of Yambol. It appears that a program of expansion of natural surface landing fields and improvement of buildings is a corollary to concrete runway construction.

2. Changes likely to occur through 1952:

See paragraph one above

D. Present Status of Air Defense:

Continued reliance upon visual and sonic methods of early warning is reported. Air warning in this country, as in all the Satellites, probably serves primarily to warn the Soviet Union rather than to protect Bulgaria. However, there have been reports within the last year that air-raid precautions have been taken throughout the country and that AAA guns are located in the vicinity of the principal cities particularly in the Sofia area.

1. Changes since 1 January 1950?

The Air Defense system of Bulgaria is under Soviet control and is being slowly expanded by them. There are some unconfirmed reports that the early warning net in Bulgaria is being augmented by Soviet radar.

2. Changes likely to occur through 1952:

It is believed that the Soviets will continue to build up the early warning net in Bulgaria and that there will be relatively extensive placement of early warning radar in the vicinity of the Yambol area where the majority of the airfield improvement is taking place.

E. Current Status of Training and Political Reliability:

The cycle of Soviet infiltration is nearing completion in Bulgaria. Gaps in the Air Force ranks resulting from drastic purging of loyalist personnel are being filled with airmen trained in the latest Soviet operational techniques by Soviet instructors, both in Bulgaria and the Soviet Union. The pilot training program is Soviet sponsored and directed. Many of the politically reliable cadets are being sent to the Soviet Union for training.

1. Changes since 1 January 1950:

Bulgarian tactical doctrines, tactics, and techniques are being continually oriented to Soviet theory and practice. Translations of Soviet manuals and military literature are now widely disseminated within the air force, while Soviet advisors and instructors, in all echelons down to company level, are held responsible for assisting Bulgarian commanders to learn Soviet tactics and techniques. Recent unconfirmed reports state that Bulgarian pilots are being given jet instruction in the Soviet Union.

2. Changes likely to occur through 1952:

The Bulgarian Air Force is now under the absolute domination and control of the Soviets and it is believed that through 1952 there will be an even greater integration of Soviet officers into the air force. Political indoctrination will continue to be emphasized throughout the training program. It appears that the Soviets are making a decided effort to boost the morale of the air force by stimulating trust and respect for the Soviet Air Force, increasing training, and assigning responsible tasks to the Bulgarian Air Force.

F. Status of Soviet Control and Direction:

The Bulgarian Air Force is under the absolute domination and control of the Soviet Union. The integration of Soviet officers extends down through company level. Soviet "advisors" are attached to all units. Bulgarian tactical doctrines, tactics, and techniques are thoroughly oriented to Soviet theory and practice.

1. Changes likely to occur through 1952:

It is believed that the present situation will continue and that the Soviets will continue to develop a politically reliable and efficient fighting force in Bulgaria. It is evident from the airfield improvement program now in progress that the Soviets have plans for building up the offensive and defensive air capabilities of Bulgaria either with Bulgaria's Air Force or their own.

G. Present and Future Degree of Efficiency, Dependability and Capabilities of the Bulgarian Air Force:

The combat value of the Bulgarian Air Force is negligible in relation to nations of comparable size or as a satellite supporter of the Soviet Union at present. With the recent completion of the purging of the politically unreliable from the armed forces it is believed that the Bulgarian Air Force is considered dependable by the Soviet Union. If the Soviets continue the present buildup of the air force and supplies the needed instructors and equipment it is considered that the efficiency and effectiveness of the Bulgarian Air Force will increase considerably in the next few years.

H. Military Program for War Readiness:

While efforts are being made by the Soviets to build the individual Satellite air forces into effective fighting units, there appears to be no great urgency to achieve this goal in Bulgaria. As in all of the Satellites the buildup seems to follow a set pattern: a. the airfield improvement program, b. the reequipment of units with newer aircraft, and c. the building of permanent facilities.

I. Military Strengths and Weaknesses.

A. Current Strength of the Air Force:

Role	Number	Type Aircraft
Fighter (jet)	10	ME-262
	5	Type-16
Conventional Fighter	150	ME-109
	4	LA-5
	2	LA-7
Attack	20	IL-2
	25	IL-10
Light Bomber	20	PE-2
	20	Mosquito-6
Transport	20	C-47
	15	JU-52
	6	Siebel
Reconnaissance	30	Siebel
	7	FI-156
Trainers	15	ME-109 (dual)
	3	Type-26 (dual)
	4	Mosquito-6
	8	LA-5
	8	Siebel
	14	Arado-96
Miscellaneous	78	FI-156
	81	Siebel
	86	Arado-96
	10	L-4
	80	Bucher
Total	721	

Personnel Strength: Total 8000 (of which 300 are pilots)

1. Changes since 1 January 1950.

With the exception of a few Soviet built jet aircraft the increase of some 70 aircraft since Jan 1950 is composed of World War II type aircraft.

		L. B.	ATT	FTR.	FTR. JET	TRANSP.	MISC.	TOTAL
Jan.	In Tac Units	40	20	68	10	19	92	249
1950	Total No. A/C	46	20	149	10	27	400	652
June	In Tac Units	40	45	123	-	29	70	312
1951	Total No. A/C	40	45	156	15	41	424	721

2. Changes likely to occur through 1952.

The CAF at present is probably the lowest in combat value of all the satellites. The morale is at a very low ebb and the political reliability is practically nil. Recent unconfirmed reports that an all out effort is being made to recruit political reliable aviation cadets may indicate an interest in the rebirth of the Czech Air Force. The introduction of 5 type 16 and 3 type 26 Soviet jet aircraft for training purposes in addition to Czech cadets reportedly undertaking flight training in the USSR may indicate a greater political reliability and therefore more support from the Soviet Union in the near future.

B. Current Status of Equipment.

(see par. A)

The equipment of the Czechoslovakian Air Force is a miscellaneous collection of Soviet, German and British aircraft of World War II vintage. The maintenance is poor due to lack of replacement parts, and also due to purges of former RAF-trained Czechs who were carrying the maintenance load.

1. Changes since 1 January 1950.

The present status of the Czech Air Force equipment does not represent a change since January 1950 except for the appearance of a few jet aircraft of Soviet manufacture.

2. Changes likely to occur through 1952.

Up to the introduction of jet aircraft in late 1950 and the early part of 1951 it appeared that the Soviets were perfectly willing to let the Czechoslovakian Air Force die on the vine except for limited caretaker action. Reviewed interest in flying training, however, and the introduction of Soviet jet aircraft may be the beginning of a gradual reequipment program.

C. Current Status of Air Facilities.

At present there are 56 airfields located within Czechoslovakia.

Four (4) are fully suitable for sustained operation of Heavy and Medium bombers and jet aircraft.

Two (2) are suitable for limited operation of Heavy and Medium bombers and jet interceptor aircraft.

One (1) is a potential field for the sustained operation of Heavy and medium bombers and jet interceptor aircraft.

Four (4) are suitable for operation of conventional type fighter aircraft, ground attack, Light bomber and transport aircraft.

These fields are also suitable for limited operation of jet fighters.

The remaining fields are potentially important with a minimum runway length of 2000' with either permanent, temporary or natural surfaces.

1. Changes since 1 January 1950.

The current status of air facilities in Czechoslovakia represents a gain of four concrete runways, 8500' long and one 6000' long since January 1950.

2. Changes likely to occur through 1952.

Additional runways possibly 8500' long are expected at Pilzen and Praha Kbely, the latter representing an extension of a newly built 5250' runway.

D. Present Status of Air Defense.

Civilian Defense in Czechoslovakia has been limited to the construction or repair of a few bomb shelters, most of these in the capitol itself. Black-out paper also has been distributed for use in industry.

Early warning radar coverage in the gap between Germany and Austria is currently provided by the Czechs, utilizing old German equipment. Although this equipment is obsolescent, it is capable of providing relatively complete coverage. There has been no indication that the Soviets have made any effort to improve the situation with more modern equipment.

1. Changes since January 1950.

The current status of the Civilian Defense does not represent a change since January 1950.

2. Changes likely to occur through 1952.

There is no indication of any changes to take place in the present civilian defense system in Czechoslovakia.

E. Current status of training and political reliability.

(see par A2)

Since taking over the Czechoslovakian government, the Moscow controlled communists have successfully purged the CAF of approximately 95 percent of its pro-western elements. In spite of this purge, never-ceasing political indoctrination and personnel policies designed to produce politically stable officers, strong control has been markedly slow in developing.

Concomitant with communist inability to develop strong control, the CAF deteriorated to a point where its combat effectiveness all but disappeared. Recent events have indicated however, that control measures are beginning to produce the desired result--at least to a degree. In April 1951, thirtyfive CAF pilots were reported to have completed jet transition training in the USSR. These are positive indications that some progress has been made in political indoctrination. This may be the reason for the introduction of Soviet jets in the CAF. The Soviets are expected to place more reliability on the Czech Air Force.

F. Status of Soviet Control and Direction.

There is no known Soviet officers integrated into the Czech Air Force, however, roving advisor teams are attached to the Czech Air Force. The function of the advisor is to check on the progress of Soviet indoctrination in training and political reliability of officer personnel.

G. Present and Future Degree of Efficiency, Dependability and Capabilities of the Czech Air Force.

The present degree of efficiency and dependability of the Czech Air Force limits its capabilities for Internal Security, Defensive and Offensive action. However, with the increased degree of political reliability and the consequent introduction of Soviet fighter aircraft, training activities have increased. Due to these changes the capability for internal security and defensive action will probably increase. Offensive action capability will depend entirely on the amount of support given by the USSR.

H. Military Program for War Readiness.

There is no indication that Czechoslovakia's military air program intends to achieve war readiness by an early date. The jet aircraft training now being conducted may lead to the formation of an air defense unit.

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Soviet Zone of Germany

The Soviet Zone of Germany has no air force similar to the air forces which exist in other satellite countries, however, reports received during the past year indicate that cadres of politically reliable East German youths were being organized and trained to form an Air Police in the Soviet Zone of Germany. Early in 1950 all Volkspolizei schools and Alert Police units were ordered to compile lists of all former German Air Force personnel. In mid-1950 the East German Administration for Labor ordered its regional officers to register all former Luftwaffe personnel. It appears that a headquarters element of the Luftpolizie (the air arm of the Volkpolizie) was established early in 1951. Firm evidence, however, is not available on the extent of the formation of an Air Police organization. In any event, it appears that such organization is in an embryonic stage. A cadre of politically reliable former Luftwaffe officers have been assigned to it. The number of aircraft and airfields assigned to the organization is not known. Training is believed to be in the early stages of implementation. Reports indicate the Air Police may be using Soviet and former German World War II aircraft types for training purposes. The possibility that pilots for the Air Police may be in training either in Poland or the Soviet Union should also be considered. A training course for glider instructors under sponsorship of the Free German Youth (FDJ), the official East German youth organization, has been reported with attendance almost exclusively from the Volkspolizei. The FDJ, through its glider training schools, undoubtedly could be able to furnish an organized, partly trained, politically reliable manpower for an Air Police or a similar organization. An Air Police in time probably could be rapidly expanded into a formal Air Force since it has or will have access to a considerable number of partly or wholly trained personnel from the FDJ, the Volkspolizei, and former Luftwaffe pilots and groundcrews. An Air Police would serve as the air supplement to the existing Alert Police ground and Maritime Police units, thereby providing the final necessary component for a future formal armed force in East Germany.

The most extensive airfield construction of any of the Satellite countries is in progress in this zone. In addition to extension of existing

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runways and building new long runways, a widespread program of rehabilitation and construction of hangars, personnel accomodations, and fuel tank installations is being pursued. The Soviet Zone of Germany, has at present seven airfields capable of supporting sustained heavy bomber/medium bomber operations with permanent runways in excess of 7,000 feet; thirteen airfields are suitable for limited heavy bomber/medium bomber operations. Another fourteen fields have runways of 6,000 feet or more. The runways of seven other fields are being lengthened to 6,000 feet and possibly 8,200 feet. The Soviets have a total of fifty two airfields in this zone. The airfield improvement program surpasses the requirements of aircraft types currently based in the Soviet Zone of Germany, and can be expected to continue at the same pace through 1952.

The Hungarian Air Force, reactivated in April 1948, is an autonomous service on the same level as the Army. Its mission is to provide tactical air support for the Hungarian ground forces and to defend the country against aerial attack. The Air Force is believed to have about 340 aircraft, an increase of 180 over January 1950. The number of tactical aircraft available to the H.A.F.'s mission has increased since January 1950 from 86 to 235, while the number of tactical units has approximately doubled and now consist of two fighter regiments, two attack regiments, and a reconnaissance squadron. The H.A.F. has no bomber units. The U.S.S.R. has recently supplied Hungary with approximately 100 YAK-9's and 100 IL-10's. It is not believed that the acquisition of these aircraft has yet produced a significant change in the low combat capability of the Hungarian Air Force. The present combat value of the H.A.F. is considered to be low in relation to the air forces of neighboring states and as a contributing satellite of the U.S.S.R. The low level of training and frequent purges of qualified personnel have reduced the efficiency of the organization. Personnel strength has increased to about 5700 officers and enlisted from the estimated 2500 officers and enlisted personnel in January 1950.

The Hungarian Air Force, which hitherto has received relatively little Soviet attention now appears to be undergoing rapid build-up. With continued logistical support by the Soviets the combat effectiveness of the H.A.F. can be expected to improve through 1952.

Equipment

Current H.A.F. equipment consists primarily of Soviet World War II type aircraft. The 100 YAK-9's recently received are believed to be aircraft reconditioned subsequent to being replaced with jet aircraft in the Soviet 24th Tactical Air Army in Germany. Since January 1950 the H.A.F.'s IL-2 attack aircraft have been replaced by the higher performance IL-10's. The Hungarian budgetary appropriations for the purchase of aircraft and the maintenance of airfields have been increased from $110,000 in 1950 to $4,000,000 in 1951. The aircraft strength has been more than doubled since January 1950. The serviceability of aircraft is believed to be fair with continued improvement expected through 1952 as additional qualified personnel are trained.

Air Facilities

Airfield construction since 1949 has greatly increased Hungary's airfield potential, and the planned building program is believed to be nearing completion. Of the 27 air facilities in Hungary, five have permanent runways of more than 8,000 feet, one has a natural surfaced runway of more than 7,000 feet, and still another has a natural surfaced runway of more than 6,000 feet. Construction in progress will provide an additional field with a permanent runway of 8,000 feet. The airfield improvement program surpasses the requirements of aircraft types currently based in Hungary. It is expected that future efforts will be devoted to making field installations and improving airfield facilities.

Air Defense

There are indications of a planned program of air defense in Hungary. This has taken on the appearance of a slow but steady effort and is believed to be in the early stage of development. Little is known of the air warning system. However, a network of spotters is believed to exist on the Austrian and Yugoslav frontiers. Plan is being implemented to ring the Budapest area with AA installations, searchlights, and radar. American World War II early warning and ground control intercept radars were recently observed on an airfield used as a Hungarian Air Force training base. Any improvement of the Hungarian air defense capability will depend upon the degree of assistance received from the U.S.S.R.

Training and Political Reliability

Extensive training is being conducted for pilots and a parallel course of instruction is being given enlisted personnel. A substantial number of H.A.F. pilots have received jet aircraft transitional training in the U.S.S.R. The current level of proficiency however is considered low because the pilots have had limited experience in tactical aircraft. Operational units are not fully qualified. The H.A.F. was seen operating with ground forces for the first time in the autumn of 1950. The political reliability of the H.A.F. is believed to be relatively high as a result of frequent purges and continuing political indoctrination. Emphasis on political indoctrination and improvement of combat efficiency is expected to continue through 1952.

Status of Soviet Control and Direction

Soviet personnel are serving with the Hungarian Air Force at the top levels of command, and are possibly serving in an advisory capacity in the lower echelons. This supervision by the Soviets can be expected to continue through 1952.

Present and Future Degree of Efficiency, Dependability and Capabilities of the Hungarian Air Force.

The number of aircraft and tactical units in the Hungarian Air Force has increased considerably since January 1950. Significantly, the airfield construction program in this Satellite is nearing completion. Just recently the Soviets have supplied 100 fighter and 100 ground attack aircraft to the H.A.F. However, these factors have not yet produced a significant change in the low combat value of the H.A.F. an intensive training program is underway, both well-rounded pilot and groundcrew training program is being aggressively pursued. This training program is expected to appreciably raise by 1952 the present low combat effectiveness, both offensive and defensive, of the H.A.F. As in all Satellite, nations, however, the future capability of this air force will depend to a great extent upon the amount of assistance furnished by the U.S.S.R.

Military Program for War Readiness.

While efforts are being made to increase the combat efficiency of the Hungarian Air Force, there are no indications of any intention to achieve war readiness by an early date. If such intentions do exist, the emphasis appears on a defensive rather than an offensive role for the Hungarian Air Force.

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Hungary

Table I

Summary of Aircraft Strengths

ROLE	NUMBER	TYPE AIRCRAFT
Fighter		
Jet	--	--
Conventional	145*	Yak-9
Attack	90	IL-10
Light Bomber	--	--
Medium Bomber	--	--
Transport	4	LI-2
Reconnaissance	--	--
Trainers	16	YAK-18
	5	C-47
	7	Yak-9
	4	Yak-11
	12	IL-10
	6	ZLIN
Miscellaneous	3	Aero-45
	12	Arado-96
	3	Kanya
	32	UT-2
	4	Bucher
TOTAL	343	

* 100 of these delivered in early 1951. Assignment unreported.

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HUNGARY

TABLE II

SUMMARY AND DISPOSITION OF TACTICAL UNITS AND MISSION AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED

UNIT	MISSION AIRCRAFT	LOCATION
Hq Tactical Air Division		Budapest
Ftr Regt	12 Yak-9	Tokol
Ftr Regt	30 Yak-9	Veszprem
G/A Regt	30 IL-10	Tokol
G/A Regt	30 IL-10	Veszprem
Reconn Sqdn	? Yak-9	Szekesfehervar
Potential Mission a/c	103 Yak-9	
	30 IL-10	
	TOTAL 235	

TABLE III

PERSONNEL STRENGTH

	Officer	Enlisted	TOTAL
Pilots	260	400	660
Other aircrew	--	240	240
Other	446	4391	4837
TOTAL	706	5031	5737

POLAND

I. Military Strengths and Weaknesses

A. Current Strength of the Air Force.

Poland has the most effective air force of the European Satellites countries. The aircraft are better maintained and the Polish Air Force receives relatively better logistic support from the USSR than do the other Western Satellites. The Air Force, and independent force on the same organizational level as the Army and Navy, has approximately 520 aircraft compared to about 440 in January 1950. The current total personnel strength is approximately 9,500, a slight increase over the January 1950 figure, including Soviet personnel who are serving as members of the P.A.F. The present strength is considered to be its current maximum mobilization potential. The reserve system, which appears to be presently in the planning stage, consists of numerous air force sponsored paramilitary organizations and the "company" schools for reserve officers' training.

The combat value of the P.A.F. would be good in the role of home defense. The acquisition of 40 jet fighters from the USSR in the spring of 1951 and the activation of a new air defense fighter unit has undoubtedly increased this capability.

Poland also has a small Naval Air Arm, organized into one naval air regiment directly subordinate to the Chief of the Polish Navy. It has about 50 aircraft and 1200 personnel, an increase over the approximately 300 personnel and a dozen aircraft in January 1950.

Improvement of combat efficiency and political indoctrination of personnel in both the Air Force and the Naval Air Arm are expected to be emphasized through 1952 in conjunction with continued Soviet logistical support.

B. Current Status of Equipment.

The P.A.F. is believed to have received 36 Type 16 jet fighters and four Type 26 (two-place jet transitional trainers) from the Soviets. Other P.A.F. fighter units are equipped with Yak-9P aircraft, a type which became operational in the Soviet Air Force in 1946. The majority of the light bombers

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are Pe-2's which were operational in 1942 although the P.A.F. is believed to have six TU-2's, a modern Soviet medium bomber. The P.A.F.'s IL-2 attack aircraft, operational in 1941, are being replaced with IL-10's, operational in 1944.

Equipment of the Naval Air Arm includes TU-2's, IL-10's and Yak-9P's.

POLISH AIR FORCE

SUMMARY OF AIRCRAFT STRENGTH

ROLE	NUMBER	TYPE AIRCRAFT
Fighter		
Jet	36	Type-16
Conventional	170	Yak-9P
Attack	125	IL-10
	15	IL-2
Light Bomber	53	PE-2
	6	TU-2
Medium Bomber	--	----
Transport	6	C-47
	6	LI-2
	2	IL-12
Reconnaissance	10	PO-2
	2	FI-156
	6	Siebel
Trainers	4	Type-26 (two place jet)
	50	PO-2
	20	UT-2
Miscellaneous	6	Siebel
	2	FI-156
TOTAL	519	

POLISH NAVAL AIR ARM

Fighter		
Jet	--	----
Conventional	12	Yak-9
Attack	10	IL-10
	10	IL-2
Light Bomber	10	PE-2
	2	TU-2
Medium Bomber	--	----
Transport	--	----
Reconnaissance	8	PO-2
Trainers	--	----
Miscellaneous	--	----
TOTAL	52	

1. Changes since 1 January 1950.

The assignment of jet fighters, IL-10 attack aircraft and TU-2 bombers to the P.A.F. has taken place since 1 January 1950.

2. Changes Likely to Occur Through 1951.

It is probable that the Soviets will continue this re-equipment program through 1952. The fact that the Polish Air Force is receiving some of the better performing aircraft is an indication of the importance of Poland in Soviet Planning.

C. Status of Air Facilities.

The airfield development program which the Soviets have been conducting throughout the Satellites since the end of World War II has brought two formerly unimportant Polish airfields, Stolp/Reitz and Praust, into prominence. These air facilities are or will be, capable of supporting sustained jet-interceptor operations. They are also potential heavy and medium bomber airfields. Warsaw/Bornerowo, with a runway more than 8,000 feet long has been completed. Poland now has a total of 88 air facilities, but only seven have runways 5,000 feet or longer. Six seaplane stations are not active although an occasional aircraft is seen at one. It is probable that air facility improvement work will be vigorous in Poland through 1952.

D. Status of Air Defense

Air defense in Poland is a joint responsibility of the Polish Air Force and the new Polish air defense organization, O.P.L., which was authorized in February 1950. The O.P.L. has demonstrated marked similarity to the P.V.O. system of the USSR. Although there is no information available concerning coordination between O.P.L. and P.V.O., the presence of Soviet military personnel in O.P.L. command and staff positions indicates that it will be close. Heretofore, the Polish forces have played practically no part in the air defense of Poland, primarily because of equipment and limitations. Activation of new anti-aircraft artillery units, believed supplied and trained by Headquarters, Artillery, Polish Army, have been reported. Anti-aircraft artillery equipment includes the Soviet 37 mm, 76.2 mm, and 85 mm guns. Fire-control equipment, including radar, has been observed.

There is no known Polish Warning or Intercept System in operation. With the exception of a few radar units apparently used by the Polish Air Force for training purposes, all radar in Poland is under the direct control of Soviet units. Any warning system, visual or electronic, in operation in Poland is probably tied in with existing telecommunications systems and would be controlled by the Soviets. The north and east approaches to Poland are covered by Soviet radar warning systems in Germany and on the Baltic Coast.

The assignment of jet fighters and modern ground equipment to Poland along with other measures indicates that the Soviets are taking forceful steps to build up the Polish air defense capabilities. This program is expected to be maintained through 1952.

E. Status of Training and Political Reliability.

The Polish Air Force is apparently considered politically reliable by the Soviets following frequent purges to remove personnel considered unreliable. Soviet personnel have been integrated into the P.A.F. which assists in its close supervision and absolute control by the Russians. Air training is completely dominated by the Soviets. The proficiency of Polish airmen exceeds that of the other European Satellites but below that of the Soviets. Training production is believed adequate for present requirements and is capable of considerable expansion. Propaganda occupies a large portion of the training agenda as political indoctrination continues to be emphasized. It appears that the Soviets are making a decided effort to boost Polish morale and gain valuable allies by stimulating trust and respect for the Soviet Air Force, increasing training, and assigning responsible tasks to the Polish Air Force.

F. Status of Soviet Control and Direction.

The Polish Air Force is under the absolute domination and control of the Soviets. Compared to other European Satellite air forces, it has an abnormally high percentage of Soviet Air Force personnel serving in its ranks. The integration of Soviet officers extends from the Commander, Polish Air Force, all the way down to the squadron commanders and pilots. A large percentage of the enlisted men are also former Soviet airmen. The commander of the Polish Air Force is directly responsible to the Marshal of Poland, Komntanty K. Rokossovski, a well-known Soviet officer. Integration of Soviet personnel into the Air Force will be continued through 1952 to the extent the Soviet considers necessary to retain control and domination.

G. PRESENT AND FUTURE DEGREE OF EFFICIENCY, DEPENDABILITY AND CAPABILITIES OF THE POLISH AIR FORCE.

The Polish air force is the most effective of the European Satellite Air Forces. The P.A.F. receives relatively better logistic support from the USSR than do the other Western Satellites. Any estimate of the capabilities of the Polish Air Force must take into consideration the factor of U.S.S.R. assistance. Its capability in the future will depend in large measure on the degree of support supplied by the Soviets. The present combat value of the Polish Air Force would be relatively good in the role of home defense. The acquisition of 40 jet fighters in the spring of 1951 and the activation of a new air defense organization has increased this capability. Offensively, the P.A.F. would be fairly effective against such a minor power as Yugoslavia but would be completely outclassed by Sweden. The Soviets would probably hesitate to use the Poles in an agressive role because of the political reliability question. It is more likely that the trend is toward creating in the Polish Air Force a valuable adjunct for the air defense of the USSR and the Baltic areas under its control.

H. MILITARY PROGRAM FOR WAR READINESS.

While efforts are being made to increase the combat efficiency of the Polish Air Force, there are no indications of any intention to achieve war readiness by an early date. If such intentions do exist, the emphasis appears on a defensive rather than an offensive role for the Polish Air Force.

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RUMANIA

I. MILITARY STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES.

A. Current Strength of the Air Force.

The combat value of the Rumanian Air Force is limited in comparison to neighboring countries and its contribution as an ally of the U.S.S.R. would be negligible. Its strength consists of approximately 330 World War II type aircraft and 12,000 officers and men. The aircraft and personnel strength has not changed significantly since January 1950. The air force, however, has been in the process of reorganization under Soviet direction since that time. This has included the adoption of Soviet tactical organization, training procedures and combat procedures. It may be expected that the revitalization program will continue during 1952 and that higher performance aircraft will be furnished by the Soviets as soon as they consider it expedient to do so.

B. Current and Future Status of Equipment.

Although aircraft equipment is predominantly of Soviet design, it also consists of German and Rumanian types. Fighter aircraft in operational units, for example, are believed to consist of 40 ME-109G's (German), 32 Yak-9's (Soviet) and 25 IAR-80 (Rumanian). Other aircraft in the force have a similar performance level. Maintenance and serviceability are low due to continual purges of personnel and the failure of the Soviets to provide adequate logistic support. The situation surrounding equipment has not changed significantly since 1950. In view of the assistance the Soviets are beginning to give other Western Satellites, however, it may be that they will initiate some build-up of the Rumanian force by the end of 1952.

AIR FACILITIES:

Rumania has 52 airfields and seaplane stations but only one of them has permanent runways 6,000 feet long or longer. Lack of hard-surfaced runways and taxiways limits their potential for year-around operation.

An extensive runway construction program has been initiated since 1950, however and this airfield development program is likely to be continued through 1952.

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AIR DEFENSE:

At present, Rumania is without an effective air defense system, and the situation has not changed a great deal since January 1950. Reliance upon visual and sonic methods of early warning continues. Antiaircraft artillery has been undergoing expansion for some time, however, in the Rumanian army. In the past nine months, gun defenses have been established in the Ploesti and Bucharest areas and increased air raid precautions, such as the building of shelters and the organization of civil defense, have been taken. Any significant improvement in the Rumanian air defense capability through 1952 will depend upon the assistance supplied by the Soviets. During World War II, the Germans established extensive radar defense networks in Rumania, primarily for the protection of the Ploesti oil fields. Many of the operative and maintenance personnel were Rumanian. With the end of the war, however, the equipment fell into disuse.

TRAINING AND POLITICAL RELIABILITY:

Training within the Rumanian Air Force is believed to be increasing in tempo. Recently 18 officers of this force were reported to have begun training by the Soviets in jet aircraft. The tactical organization, training procedures and combat doctrines in the R. A. F. follow those of the U. S. S. R. Like other Satellites, purges since World War II of capable officers and men considered unreliable have reduced the efficiency of the R. A. F. The degree of the political reliability of the R. A. F. is not known but the stepped up training suggest that it is considered improved by the Soviets. Emphasis on training and political indoctrination probably can be expected through 1952.

SOVIET CONTROL AND DIRECTION:

Soviet Air Force personnel are on duty with the Rumanian Air Force throughout the various sections of the high command and probably with the training establishments and tactical units down to Division level. Soviet personnel function as advisers to the R. A. F. section heads and commanders and undoubtedly have a great deal of authority. The situation surrounding Soviet control and direction has changed little since January 1950 and the Soviets are expected to maintain their close supervision.

G. PRESENT AND FUTURE DEGREE OF EFFICIENCY, DEPENDABILITY AND CAPABILITIES OF THE RUMANIAN AIR FORCE.

Present confirmed information indicates the combat value of Rumanian Air Force is extremely limited. The Air Force was reliably reported to have undergone a large-scale reorganization in January, 1951, involving the activation of many new units and the introduction of Soviet medium bombers and jet fighters. Because of many inconsistencies in the report and the absence of any confirming evidence, this information is mentioned only as a possibility. The amount of Soviet support is the key to the future capability of this Satellite Air Force. Present confirmed evidence indicates its capability has not changed significantly since 1950. The R.A.F.'s effectiveness appears negligible offensively and low defensively.

H. MILITARY PROGRAM FOR WAR READINESS.

The Rumanian military program does not indicate any intention to achieve war readiness by an early date.

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RUMANIAN AIR FORCE

TABLE I

SUMMARY OF AIRCRAFT STRENGTH

ROLE	NUMBER	TYPE AIRCRAFT
Fighter		
Jet	—	—
Conventional	40	ME-109G
	50	Yak-9
Attack	30	IL-2
	25	IAR-80
	15	IAR-81
Light Bomber	15	PE-2
Medium Bomber	—	—
Transport	5	JU-52
	5	SM-79
	5	C-60
Reconnaissance	30	PO-2
	10	FI-156
	25	IAR-39
Trainers	20	Yak-11
	20	PO-2
Miscellaneous	15	Nardi-305
	5	Fi-58
	3	JU-88
	15	Zlin
Total	333	

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RUMANIAN AIR FORCE

TABLE II

SUMMARY AND DISPOSITION OF TACTICAL UNITS AND MISSION AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED

UNIT	MISSION AIRCRAFT	LOCATION
1st Air Division		Bucharest
1st Ftr Regt	13 ME-109-G 16 Yak-9	Bucharest/Pipera
2nd Ftr Regt	13 ME-109-G 16 Yak-9	Craiova
3rd Ftr Regt	14 Me-109-G Unknown (probably Yak-9	Targsorul Nou
2nd Air Div		Brasov
4th G/A Regt	25 IAR-80 7 PE-2	Galati
5th Rcn Regt	30 PO-2	Turda & Mamaia
6th Bmr Regt	30 IL-2	Brasov & Craiova
7th Air Regt	--	Galati
8th Trans Regt	5 JU-52 5 SM-79 5 C-60	
9th Liaison Regt	10 FI-156	
Potential Mission a/c	18 Yak-9 15 IAR-81 8 PE-2	
Total	230	

TABLE III

PERSONNEL STRENGTH

Personnel all categories	12,040 (Estimated)

PART II: THE SATELLITES AS A COLLECTIVE UNIT.

I. HOW EFFECTIVE ARE THE SATELLITES AS A COLLECTIVE MILITARY INSTRUMENT?

A. There is no evidence of any attempt by the USSR to organize and coordinate the Satellite Air Forces as a unit and no evidence of joint maneuvers among the Satellites. However there is a similarity in organization. Some satellite Air Forces are a component part of the army while others share equal status. All are controlled by Soviet Air Force advisers if not actually directly commanded by Soviet Air Force officers. Of interest is that all Satellite Air Forces are now using Soviet training manuals.

The equipment in the Satellite Air Forces has not been completely standardized up to now but the influx in the past nine months has shown a tendency to standardize the fighter regiments with Yak 9's, the ground assault regiments with IL-10's and the light bomber regiments with Pe-2 and Tu-2's. By 1952 all Satellite Air Forces are expected to be standardized.

Although the Satellite Air Forces have been politically conditioned it is doubtful at the present time that they could operate as a unified force. Little information is available on the nature and estimated capability of the reported inter-satellite organized guerrilla force. Major problems that the USSR would face in attempting to use Satellite Forces collectively are (1) Language difficulty. (2) Problem of cooperation due to nationalist feelings. (3) Standardization of equipment has not improved enough as yet to solve the problems of serviceability.

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