

SECRET

*Meeting*  
*19 March* <sup>25X1</sup>

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

*52*

10 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allan Evans, OIR  
Colonel B. B. Talley, G-2  
Captain Ray Malpass, ONI  
Colonel Edward H. Porter, AFOIN  
Colonel S. M. Lansing, JIG

SUBJECT : Post-Mortem on Intelligence Gaps Revealed in  
the Preparation of NIE-35/1

REFERENCE : Minutes of Meeting on Intelligence Gaps Held  
in O/NE on 13 February 1952

1. As agreed at the meeting on this general subject held on 13 February, it is requested that your representatives be present at 10:00 Tuesday, 18 March, in Room 146 South Building, for a post-mortem meeting on intelligence gaps revealed in the preparation of NIE-35/1, "Probable Developments in Indochina through Mid-1952."

2. It is the opinion of our Staff that NIE-35/1 suffered from insufficient intelligence on a number of questions, and that subsequent estimates concerning Indochina would benefit from any improvement that could be made in filling these intelligence gaps. We suggest the attached questions as the agenda for the meeting. This list is not intended to be definitive, and any suggestions the IAC representatives may wish to make at the meeting will be welcomed.

FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR NATIONAL ESTIMATES:

[Redacted Signature Box]

25X1

MAR 11 1952  
Ne-12

SECRET

MORI/CDF Pages 1-5

**Page Denied**

SECRET



25X1

II. Vietnam developments.

Can more reliable intelligence be obtained concerning the following:

- A. What is the state of morale and political viability within the Vietnam?
- B. To what extent are Vietnamese official statements French sponsored?
- C. To what extent are Vietnamese press statements French sponsored?

*and this a fig.?*

*adren*

25X1

III. Viet Minh developments.

Can more reliable intelligence be obtained on the following points:

- A. What is the state of morale among the Viet Minh leadership, army, and population?
- B. What is the extent of consolidation of control over territories under Viet Minh military control?
- C. What is the present role of Ho Chih Minh? Where is he? Who are the other important figures in the Viet Minh (backgrounds, responsibilities, etc.)?
- D. What frictions, if any, exist between the Viet Minh and the Chinese Communists?

SECRET

- E. What relations are there, if any, between the Viet Minh and the Soviets?
- F. What is the Viet Minh manpower situation? Food situation?

IV. The number and function of Chinese Communist "advisors" with the Viet Minh.

Our present estimates on this subject appear to be largely a matter of guesswork. Can more reliable intelligence be obtained on the following:

- A. How are these people integrated? What functions do they perform? What degree of control, if any, does their "advice" carry?
- B. Are these "advisors" largely technicians, or is there a large percentage of senior personnel?
- C. How are language differences bridged? How are traditional Chinese-Indochinese frictions bridged?

V. The existence and function of Chinese "volunteers" with the Viet Minh.

Can more reliable intelligence be obtained on the following points:

- A. Are any Chinese military units attached to Viet Minh units? Are any Chinese attached as individuals to Viet Minh units? Have any Chinese been definitely identified in combat zones?

SECRET

- B. What is the reliability of reports of Chinese "tribal" or "border" peoples serving with Viet Minh combat units?
- C. Do any Chinese "volunteers" perform garrison, support or rear-area functions?
- D. What is the reliability of reports of Chinese "volunteer" headquarters and training organizations?
- E. Are there any indications of the increased introduction of Chinese "volunteers" with the Viet Minh?

VI. The capability of the Chinese Communists to support logistically an invasion of Indochina.

- A. Is there any method of getting increased and improved intelligence concerning transportation routes and facilities within south China? Within Viet Minh territory?
- B. Is there any method of getting increased and improved intelligence concerning Chinese Communist stockpiling, both in south China and with Viet Minh territory?

- 4 -

SECRET

ILLEGIB

We've made the est. "Prob levels in [redacted] mind 52"

Which is to say that we have put the info/evidence in re the sit in [redacted] to the real acid test.

(eg) is it good enough to satisfy the requirements of our est upon wh an imp. natl prob can be based. ILLEGIB

From the exercise we have questions re the info.

Prob to-day

1. Do we all agree that we are asking the right questions that we are asking all of the questions

2. What do we think we should do about it. ILLEGIB

Should [redacted] agreed conclusions be informally communicated to the collection people

25X1

[redacted] to do they staff work) should they be passed to [redacted]

25X1

Should they be made a formal doc of record for the [redacted] to note or for action by [redacted] of the [redacted] ILLEGIB

ILLEGIB