

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Washington D.C. 20301

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S-0064/AP-4

2 Mar 1967

SUBJECT: Request for Preparation of Special National Intelligence Estimate on Chinese Communist Strategic Warning (S)

TO: Chairman, United States Intelligence Board
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

1. (S) CINCPAC has recommended a Special National Intelligence Estimate on the likely extent of advance strategic warning in the event of the introduction of large-scale Chinese Communist combat forces into Southeast Asia. The recommended SNIE would deal only with the introduction of large-scale Chinese combat forces into Southeast Asia from the current posture but within a time frame of the next year or two. CINCPAC looks for a SNIE similar in scope to NIE 11-10-66 ("Warning of Soviet Intention to Attack"), dated 18 August 1966.
2. (S) The question of strategic warning from the USSR has been addressed in NIE 11-10-66. Peking's growing military capabilities, coupled with recent developments, suggest the advisability of a counterpart estimate on China, dealing with the possible move suggested by CINCPAC. While estimates consistently attach little likelihood to this eventuality, the possibility of an excursion to divert attention from internal problems cannot be ruled out during the current turmoil in China. With the introduction of AAA and logistical support units and railroad troops into North Vietnam during the past months, a foundation may have been laid permitting a larger-scale move into Southeast Asia with little or no warning.
3. (C) It is believed that a Special National Intelligence Estimate -- as recommended by CINCPAC -- is the appropriate vehicle for this consideration, since it would provide the considered judgment of the intelligence community. The limitation of the proposed estimate to operations in a specific area and to a relatively short time frame would suggest, in this case, a SNIE rather than a NIE.
4. (S) The enclosure lists certain questions which are implied in the CINCPAC recommendation and could be addressed in the SNIE. Other questions would no doubt come to mind later.

DIA Review Completed

/s/
JOSEPH F. CARROLL
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

1 Enclosure
Suggested Questions to be Addressed in
a SNIE on Chinese Communist Strategic
Warning (S) 1 cy

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SUGGESTED QUESTIONS TO BE ADDRESSED IN A SNIE
ON CHINESE COMMUNIST STRATEGIC WARNING

1. (S) Has the introduction of Chinese Communist units into North Vietnam over the past months laid the foundation for introducing large forces of combat troops with little or no warning?
2. (S) Do the China "indicators," considered over time, indicate that China is in a high state of readiness? Or can they, viewed in their entirety, be considered as logical developments or normal precautions that an alert nation would take in view of the Vietnam war?
3. (c) Should the current turmoil alter our previous judgments?

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DOES NOT APPLY

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