


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OFFICE OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES

MEMORANDUM

Egypt and the USSR: Friendship Forever (or for Fifteen Years)?

Secret

6 July 1971

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

6 July 1971

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Egypt and the USSR: Friendship Forever (or for
Fifteen years)?

NOTE

Appraisals of the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation have diverged widely. Some have said that it represents a major turning point in Middle Eastern affairs -- a new reality which will affect events significantly for years to come. Others have argued that it is simply a formalization on paper of present realities, suiting the tactical convenience of each party, and so subject to interpretation in light of expediency as to be a matter of very limited importance. This memorandum assesses the factors bearing on these divergent interpretations of the treaty and considers the course of the overall Soviet-Egyptian relationship. Not all who participated in the discussion of the paper are in full accord with its conclusions. These latter appear in summary form in paragraphs 23 and 24.

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
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1. When Nikolay Podgorny and Anwar Sadat met in Cairo in late May, both leaders had reason to be concerned about aspects of their relationship. From Moscow's point of view, the events of the previous few weeks had been extremely disturbing. All the prominent Egyptians publicly associated with the USSR had been unceremoniously dumped in a major purge. A widely publicized visit to Cairo by Secretary Rogers had signaled an apparent improvement in US-Egyptian relations. The USSR had been excluded from negotiations over a possible interim agreement along the Suez Canal. Sadat was apprehensive about the Soviet response. He feared that it might complicate his uneasy political situation at home. He was anxious to reassure his military that weapons would continue to arrive.

2. Podgorny's hastily arranged trip to Cairo resulted in a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (text at Annex). Previously, the Soviets had not entered into bilateral treaties incorporating political engagements with non-communist developing countries, aside from two of their immediate neighbors. The Egyptians had not signed a bilateral treaty with a great power since 1954, when the British agreed to leave the Suez Canal Zone, and all the Arab countries had avoided treaty commitments



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to the great powers since the establishment of Israel, barring Iraq's participation in the Baghdad Pact.* So in a formal sense, at least, the treaty was a considerable departure from past practice.

Genesis

3. The Egyptian-Soviet treaty can be taken as a further step in a long process of increasing intimacy between the USSR and Egypt. Since the 1967 war, Moscow has strengthened its influence in Cairo and expanded its military presence in Egypt. The Egyptians, under the pressures of a disastrous defeat and continuing Israeli occupation of Sinai, have become almost totally dependent on the USSR for military assistance and for diplomatic support. Each side might have seen advantage in formalizing the relationship, and the idea of a treaty appears to have been germinating for some time, though the circumstances in which it was worked out suggest that the specific initiative came from the Soviet side.

* *The Evian Accords between Algeria and France were similar to a treaty in many respects, but they were signed prior to -- and in exchange for -- full Algerian independence.*

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
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4. Both Moscow and Cairo claim that a formal accord was first suggested by the Egyptians, but the language and format of the document signed in May mark it as a Soviet text. We have reports that Nasser proposed in July 1970 that Soviet-Egyptian relations be formalized in a document and that Sadat repeated the idea during his visit to Moscow in March 1971. It seems likely that the Soviets had prepared a draft, on a contingency basis, in response to such suggestions. But the Rogers visit to the Middle East and the purge of the Egyptian government probably seemed to Moscow to call for dramatic counterbalancing action, thus providing the immediate stimulus for the treaty. Whether or not Sadat had second thoughts when the Soviets presented their draft, he had taken steps that jeopardized a relationship he needed and could hardly refuse to make a placatory gesture.

Content

5. The treaty itself contains only one specific, concrete obligation -- continued training of the Egyptian armed forces by the USSR (Article 8). The Soviet obligation to continue providing weapons is implicit but clear. The mutual pledges include an undertaking not to interfere in one another's internal affairs, efforts to achieve peace in the area, consultation on all important

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matters, and avoidance of other obligations that would conflict with the treaty. On policy matters, the only contingency that requires the parties to "concert their positions" rather than simply to "consult" is the development of a situation that both judge to be a danger to peace (Article 7). In addition, there are provisions dealing with technical cooperation and trade exchanges, as well as rhetorical flourishes invoking friendship and fidelity to the anti-imperialist cause.

6. Several omissions and nuances are notable. The treaty clearly places Egypt in a category of special importance, closeness, and concern to the USSR. Egypt is ponderously described not as a socialist state but as a state having "set itself the aim of reconstructing society along socialist lines" (Article 2). This formula gives the USSR ideological justification for close involvement with Egypt but stops short of invoking the Brezhnev Doctrine -- the right of the Soviet Union to interfere in the internal affairs of socialist states. Provisions relating to mutual assistance against aggression are entirely absent.

7. From our fragmentary information on the negotiations in Cairo, it appears that Sadat introduced some changes in the text proposed by the USSR which were intended to make the treaty

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as palatable as possible to him and his Egyptian and Arab constituents. He reportedly insisted on including Cooperation, rather than solely Friendship, in the title, shortened the term from 35 to 15 years, and inserted a statement that existing international commitments are not affected. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the Egyptians wanted a Soviet commitment to defend Egypt against attack; if so, Sadat failed on that point. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Results to Date

8. The treaty already has been useful to its signatories in appealing to some elements of their separate constituencies. For Russian ears, Moscow can point to it as a tangible return on the huge Soviet investment in Egypt. During the ratification procedure, it was hailed as a triumph of Soviet foreign policy. It has greatly cheered pro-Moscow leftists in the Middle East, who had been badly shaken by indications that Sadat was moving

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away from Moscow. The Kremlin also is billing it as evidence of growing cohesion between the socialist countries and world liberation movements. Most importantly, it is a signal that the US has not driven a wedge between the USSR and Egypt or excluded the Soviets from the peace making process.

9. For Sadat, the treaty is implicit Soviet endorsement of his leadership and his policies. It serves to protect him from political adversaries who might contemplate moving against him in the hope or expectation of Soviet help. He has underscored the message to Egyptian leftists by appointing at least two known members of the now-dissolved Egyptian Communist Party to government posts. For his military, the treaty is assurance that further arms and training will be forthcoming. Both for Egyptians and for other militant Arabs, Sadat has been stressing the role that Soviet aid will play in preparing Egypt to move militarily against Israel when settlement efforts founder.

10. In the wake of the treaty, there has been a hiatus in efforts toward a settlement or an interim arrangement between Egypt and Israel. This suspension of action on the negotiating front may not have been intended by either of the signatories. Both the Soviets and the Egyptians have insisted in public and

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in private that the treaty has no effect on Egyptian terms for either partial or total settlement, and the words of the treaty do not, in fact, pose any new obstacles. But the very signing of the treaty has raised serious questions in Washington and in Tel Aviv. At the moment, Moscow probably is enjoying US discomfiture and expecting a larger role in further efforts at settlement. And the harsh tone of Egyptian comments on peace prospects that have followed the signing of the treaty does nothing to expedite the settlement process.

11. Israeli reactions have been contradictory. On the one hand, Tel Aviv dismisses the treaty as an inconsequential codification of an existing relationship. On the other hand, the Israelis insist that the treaty augurs a new flow of arms to Egypt and requires immediate US approval of additional advanced aircraft for Israel. Concurrently, the Israeli government assures the Israeli people that Egypt has no capability to launch a successful attack against Israeli forces and cannot attain such a capability anytime in the foreseeable future.

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Some Longer Run Possibilities

12. With the signing of the Soviet-Egyptian treaty, something new clearly has been injected into the Middle East situation. The treaty does not, of course, stand alone; it is only one manifestation of an evolving bilateral relationship which is affected by the actions, words, and policies of many parties. In large measure, the new element it signifies is a matter of atmosphere and expectations rather than specific change spelled out in the treaty itself. The official and semi-official pronouncements on the treaty from Moscow and Cairo give some indication of the motives and intentions of the two signatories.

13. The Soviets, in their commentary, are making it clear that they are in the Middle East to stay, in spite of any moves the US might make to undermine their position. In their publicity on the treaty, the stress has been on the permanence of Soviet-Arab friendship, a legal foundation for joint Soviet-Egyptian actions of unspecified nature, and -- repeatedly -- peace on terms acceptable to the Arabs. The Soviets have seized on renewed Israeli statements of arms requirements as further evidence of Israeli aggressive intentions and hence of Arab need for defensive assistance. In reference to military cooperation,

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Moscow has hit hard on the importance of Soviet assistance to the Arabs in repelling aggression, although it has carefully avoided any suggestion that the USSR might assist the Arabs directly in liberating the occupied territories.

14. Sadat clearly looks on the treaty as a short term expedient, despite his statement that it is "for eternity". He has downplayed its non-military aspects, claiming that it has only two important facets: the article on military assistance and the rebuff that the treaty itself presents to those who hoped to weaken Egypt by undermining Soviet-Egyptian friendship. In short: Now we are strong enough to make peace and someday we will be strong enough to make war -- both thanks to Moscow.

- Regarding Settlement Efforts

15. By reemphasizing the solidarity of the USSR and Egypt, Moscow probably hopes to impress upon Tel Aviv that the Israeli military option has become very risky and that a settlement by negotiation has become the only prudent course. Both the Soviets and Egyptians may calculate that the Israelis, in the face of the power realities which now prevail, will finally see no choice but

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to work out an agreement -- and an agreement on terms acceptable to Egypt. Whether in fact Israel will come to feel such concern over its security as to become amenable to effective negotiation and compromise seems doubtful. US policies and actions would, of course, be highly important in this regard.

16. The immediate impact on Israel of the Soviet-Egyptian treaty has been to reinforce existing irritations and suspicions. When the Egyptians and Soviets cooperated to violate the stand-still provisions of the cease-fire in 1970, Cairo was attempting to attain a military position strong enough to permit it to negotiate. What the Egyptians either did not realize or did not take seriously was the effect that this move would have on Israeli willingness to entertain notions of compromise. For Israel, Egyptian cheating was one more clear evidence of the unreliability of any Egyptian pledge; the effect was all the worse because of the collusion of the detested Soviets. Given the depth of Israeli antipathy for the Soviet regime, the treaty -- signifying Egyptian approval of a formally entrenched long term Soviet presence -- is one more reason for Israel to remain adamant on all issues.

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- *Regarding Military Relationships*

17. The Soviets, having by the treaty implicitly increased their commitment to Egypt, are likely to be led to increase their military role there. They might want to curtail military activities that principally serve Egyptian interests and involve risks for the USSR, such as direct participation in the defense of Egypt. But Sadat will continue to seek this kind of help and such activities do have the advantage to the Soviets of improving their ability to affect the likelihood and/or outcome of future hostilities. Sadat probably hopes to limit the size and scope of Soviet activities designed principally to serve Soviet interests, such as reconnaissance and fleet support. But the more dependent he becomes upon Moscow, the harder it will be for him to refuse requests for new concessions -- expanded use of Mersa Matruh, for example. He probably will calculate that the Egyptian army will tolerate an increased Soviet impingement on Egyptian sovereignty in exchange for increased Soviet equipment. Over time, therefore, the extent of the Soviet military presence in Egypt is likely to depend increasingly on what the Soviets consider desirable in military terms and acceptable in terms of the risk of involvement in a renewed Egyptian-Israeli conflagration.

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18. There is no reason to believe that Moscow wants to see Sadat renew war with Israel. The Soviets undoubtedly hope that the treaty's requirement for concerting policy in the face of a threat to peace will help to prevent the Egyptians from doing anything rash. However, the presence of Soviet personnel with Egyptian military units and Soviet control over key military equipment such as surface-to-air missiles and advanced aircraft are more dependable restraints on the Egyptians than any treaty commitment.

- Regarding Egyptian and Arab Affairs


19. Similarly, Sadat probably depends more on the inherent limitations on Soviet ability to interfere in his domestic affairs than on their promise not to. There have been two major political crises in Egypt in the past year -- Nasser's death and Sadat's purge of the government. In both cases, the Egyptian authorities acted rapidly and the Soviets remained properly aloof, although no doubt deeply concerned about the outcome.

20. Moscow's forbearance may simply have resulted from recognition that there was little they could do to affect the outcome. Unsuccessful interference would be embarrassing to Soviet international prestige and might, moreover, produce

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


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
domestic political recriminations. Geography and logistics severely limit the military force that the Soviets can bring to bear in Egypt. Political manipulation alone is an uncertain tool at best. Hence, though the extent of their commitment probably will cause the Soviets to want a higher degree of control over the Egyptian political process, they will probably remain careful about direct interference. Nevertheless, Sadat will be aware of their desires and preferences and probably will temper his actions somewhat in order to avoid strong Soviet displeasure.

21. Arab reactions to the treaty are ambivalent. The Arab world is simultaneously disturbed by Sadat's action in signing and understanding of the pressures that brought it about. Egyptian adherence to the treaty has been endorsed, officially or semi-officially, by the governments of Libya, Syria, Lebanon, and South Yemen. Nevertheless, at least the first three are aghast at this breach of neutralism. Colonel Qadhafi of Libya has recently gone out of his way to excoriate the Soviets in a public speech (along with the imperialist US, the atheistic Chinese, the Egyptians, and almost all other foreigners). In these circumstances, the prospects for any meaningful federation of Egypt, Libya, and Syria seem dimmer than ever.

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
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22. With foreign military bases on its soil and a bilateral treaty with a great power, Egypt has further diluted its claim to non-alignment. In so doing, it has lost one of its major appeals to progressive non-Communist Arabs throughout the Arab world. In time, Cairo may find itself the new target for the kind of inter-Arab attack it used so generously in the past against Arab regimes that harbored US and British bases. At this juncture, however, Sadat's relations with the conservatives are relatively good. King Feisal, normally so sensitive about Soviet intrusion in the Middle East, saw fit to visit Cairo and exhibit Arab solidarity in the immediate wake of the treaty. We have no satisfactory explanation, but the visit suggests that Feisal feels he has less to fear from Sadat than from Nasser in terms of his own political position at home and accepts Sadat's explanation that the treaty was a necessary step in the overriding Arab cause -- standing up to Israel.

* * * * *

In Sum

23. The Soviet-Egyptian treaty itself will not determine the future course and development of Soviet-Egyptian relations,



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but it does cast the relationship in a more solid and solemn framework. The Soviets, uneasy over Sadat's independent dealings with the US, have made him promise to consult them in the future and undoubtedly expect this promise to be kept. On their own side, the Soviets have assumed a more formal obligation to Egypt that is likely to affect their behavior in future risk contingencies; they will *feel* that their prestige and honor are more deeply committed. Individual Soviet leaders have associated themselves with an Egyptian policy involving high costs; its failure would entail political risks for them. In Moscow and in Cairo, the treaty is likely to give birth to bureaucratic interests which will identify with the relationship in its new form and which will be determined to have it succeed. Thus, the long-standing trend toward growing Soviet involvement in Egyptian affairs has been institutionalized and made even more difficult to reverse.

24. Sadat appears to have assumed some increased degree of long run risk to Egyptian sovereignty and his own freedom of maneuver, in order to preserve the immediate benefits of the Soviet alliance. Of course some major change -- e.g., Israeli agreement to total withdrawal from Sinai as part of a settlement package -- could deprive the Soviet-Egyptian treaty of

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much of its meaning. In the Arab-Israeli atmosphere that now prevails, however, it appears more likely that the total Soviet-Egyptian relationship formalized by the treaty will develop to the advantage of the Soviets and to the detriment of those Egyptians who remain committed to policies of independence and non-alignment.

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Text of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation Signed by Soviet and Egypt

Following was transmitted in English by Tass, the Soviet press agency, is the text of the Soviet-Egyptian treaty of friendship signed in Cairo yesterday.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Arab Republic, being firmly convinced that the further development of friendship and all-around cooperation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Arab Republic meets the interests of the peoples of both states and helps strengthen world peace. Being inspired by the ideals of struggle against imperialism and colonialism, and for the freedom, independence and social progress of the peoples, and determined to wage a resolute struggle for stronger international peace and security in accordance with the invariable course of their peaceful foreign policy. Realizing their allegiance to the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter. Being driven by a desire to increase friendship between the two states and peoples through concluding a treaty of friendship and cooperation and thus creating a basis for their further development. Agreed on the following:

Article 1

The high contracting parties solemnly declare that unbreakable friendship will always exist between the two countries and their peoples. They will continue to develop and strengthen the existing relations of friendship and all-around cooperation between them in the political, economic, scientific, technological, cultural and other fields on the basis of the principles of respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, noninterference in the internal affairs of each other, equality and mutual benefit.

Article 2

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a socialist state and the United Arab Republic, which has set itself the aim of reconstructing society along socialist lines, will cooperate closely and in all fields in ensuring conditions for preserving and further developing the social and economic gains of their peoples.

Article 3

Being guided by a desire to contribute in every way toward maintaining international peace and the security of the peoples, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Arab Republic will continue with all determination to make efforts toward achieving and ensuring a lasting and fair peace in the Middle East in accordance with

the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter. In pursuing a peace-loving foreign policy, the high contracting parties will come out for peace, relaxation of international tension, achievement of general and complete disarmament and prohibition of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction.

Article 4

Being guided by the ideals of freedom and equality of all the peoples, the high contracting parties condemn imperialism and colonialism in all their forms and manifestations. They will continue to come out against imperialism, for the full and final elimination of colonialism in pursuance of the U.N. declaration on the granting of independence to all colonial countries and peoples, and wage unswervingly the struggle against racialism and apartheid.

Article 5

The high contracting parties will continue to expand and deepen all-around cooperation and exchange of experience in the economic and scientific-technological fields—industry, agriculture, water conservancy, irrigation, development of nautical resources, development of power engineering, the training of national personnel and other fields of economy. The two sides will expand trade and sea shipping be-

tween the two states on the basis of the principles of mutual benefit and most-favored nation treatment.

Article 6

The high contracting parties will further promote cooperation between them in the fields of science, arts, literature, education, health services, the press, radio, television, cinema, tourism, physical culture and other fields.

The two sides will promote wider cooperation and direct connections between political and public organizations of working people, enterprises, cultural and scientific institutions for the purpose of a deeper mutual acquaintance with the life, work and achievements of the peoples of the two countries.

Article 7

Being deeply interested in ensuring peace and the security of the peoples, and attaching great importance to the concertedness of their actions in the international area in the struggle for peace, the high contracting parties will, for this purpose, regularly consult each other at different levels on all important questions affecting the interests of both states. In the event of development of situations creating a danger to peace or violation of peace, they will contact each other without delay

in order to concert their positions with a view to removing the threat that has arisen or reestablishing peace.

Article 8

In the interests of strengthening the defense capacity of the United Arab Republic, the high contracting parties will continue to develop cooperation in the military field on the basis of appropriate agreements between them. Such cooperation will provide specifically for assistance in the training of the U.A.R. military personnel, in mastering the armaments and equipment supplied to the United Arab Republic with a view to strengthening its capacity to eliminate the consequences of aggression as well as increasing its ability to stand up to aggression in general.

Article 9

Proceeding from the aims and principles of this treaty, each of the high contracting parties states that it will not enter into alliances and will not take part in any groupings of states, in actions or measures directed against the other high contracting party.

Article 10

Each of the high contracting parties declares that its commitments under the existing international treaties are not in contradiction with the provisions of this treaty and it undertakes not to

enter into any international agreements incompatible with it.

Article 11

The present treaty will be operative within five years since the day it enters into force.

If neither of the high contracting parties declares a year before the expiry of this term its desire to terminate the treaty, it will remain in force for the next five years and so henceforth until one of the high contracting parties makes a year before the expiry of the current five-year period a written warning on its intention to terminate it.

Article 12

The present treaty shall come into force on the day of exchange of ratification instruments, which will take place in Moscow in the nearest future.

The present treaty is done in two copies, each in Russian and Arabic, with both texts being equally authentic. Done in the city of Cairo on May 27, 1971, which corresponds to 3 Rabi'a Sani, 1391, Hejira.

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

N. PODGORNY.
For the United Arab Republic.

ANWAR SADAT.

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Remarks:

Please distribute.
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 and Packard.
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FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. DATE

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

We have had some feeling that analysis published at the time the Soviet-Egyptian treaty was announced had underplayed its long-term significance. We were pressed hard in this sense by our consultants and the subject remains controversial. Because interpretations of the treaty have a strong bearing on current policy moves in the Middle East, we have made this attempt at a more deliberate and hopefully profounder analysis.

JH
JOHN HUIZENGA
Director, National Estimates

Attachment:

Memorandum dtd 6 Jul 71

"Egypt and the USSR: Friendship Forever (or for Fifteen Years)?"

6 July 1971

(DATE)

cc: DDCI

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable John N. Irwin

The recent Soviet-Egyptian treaty, which may prove to be an important determinant of further developments in the Middle East, received varying appraisals when it was announced. This paper attempts a more deliberate analysis of the treaty's possible long-term significance.

Richard Helms

Attachment:

Memorandum, dated 6 July 1971

"Egypt and the USSR: Friendship Forever (or for Fifteen Years)?"

9 July 1971

(DATE)

A/169
FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

MEMORANDUM FOR: **Dr. Henry A. Kissinger**

The recent Soviet-Egyptian treaty, which may prove to be an important determinant of further developments in the Middle East, received varying appraisals when it was announced. This paper attempts a more deliberate analysis of the treaty's possible long-term significance.

Richard Helms

Attachment:

Memorandum, dated 6 July 71

"Egypt and the USSR: Friendship

Forever (or for Fifteen Years)?" 9 July 1971

(DATE)

#171

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

MEMORANDUM FOR: **The Honorable David Packard**

The recent Soviet-Egyptian treaty, which may prove to be an important determinant of further developments in the Middle East, received varying appraisals when it was announced. This paper attempts a more deliberate analysis of the treaty's possible long-term significance.

Richard Helms

Attachment:

Memorandum, dated 6 July 1971

"Egypt and the USSR: Friendship

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9 July 1971

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FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
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