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OFFICE OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES

MEMORANDUM

Eastern Europe: The New Breed

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

23 April 1970

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Eastern Europe: The New Breed*

PRINCIPAL OBSERVATIONS

In contrast to their old-guard predecessors, who had close ties to Moscow, the rising generation of East European leaders, now in their forties, appears to be more nationalist-minded. Though still communists, many of these men have become disillusioned with Soviet orthodoxy, tend to interpret the scripture largely according to the needs of their own societies, and seem anxious to reduce or eliminate Soviet hegemony. The urgent need of the East European economies for modernization has increased the awareness of the younger leaders, especially those who are economic specialists, that major departures from the Soviet economic model are desirable, perhaps necessary. These leaders may also be encouraged by the Romanian example to try to improve their own political positions by appealing to nationalist sentiments, a process which could proceed only at Soviet expense. Not all of these younger leaders fit the new, national mold, of course; the inclinations of some are conservative, even pro-Soviet, and the views of others remain wholly obscure. Still, as the new leaders come into top positions of power they are likely to present the Soviets with problems of a different degree, and possibly even of a different kind, than those posed by their elders.

* This memorandum was prepared by the Office of National Estimates. It was discussed with representatives of the Office of Current Intelligence, Office of Economic Research, and the Central Reference Service, who concur in its main judgments.

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I. A GENERATIONAL CHANGE

1. Much has happened since the time after World War II when the East European communist parties were dominated exclusively by Comintern veterans, wartime partisan leaders, or Soviet-trained communists who attained power as camp followers of the Red Army. Time has had its impact: now the likes of Rakosi, Dimitrov, and Ana Pauker are gone for good; some of the remaining old-timers -- e.g., Gomulka (65), and Tito (77) -- are visibly slowing down and the Soviets perhaps wish that Ulbricht (77) would, too. In certain of the East European countries, the remnants of the old guard have sought to keep "safe" men -- experienced and undistinguished functionaries usually in their fifties -- in many key party and government positions. But the general tendency has been for a new generation of leaders -- men in their forties -- to move gradually up the ladder and to find their way into increasingly responsible jobs.

2. The pace of this process has varied considerably from country to country. It has advanced particularly far in Yugoslavia, where Tito in the past year or so has placed well-qualified young activists in key party and government positions

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and has forced most members of the old guard to move on. It is also well along in Romania, where Ceausescu, himself only 52, has put many younger men in leading positions. In Hungary and Bulgaria, members of the new generation are now in second ranking positions and will rise sooner or later. In Poland and in East Germany, the older generation still holds most of the key posts, but several promising young people have attained Politburo status and are becoming increasingly influential.

3. It is of course very difficult to generalize about the views of so many men in so many diverse circumstances. To begin with, we know so little about them. Their private conversations and their public remarks are helpful but are not necessarily reliable guides to their present inner convictions or to their future political behavior. Further, what may move a man in Poland may be quite different from what is likely to move his opposite number in, say, Romania. And, finally, we are dealing here with leaders who must function in political systems which, more than most, encourage circumspection and dissembling.

4. Despite all this, some generalizations about these men are possible. We do have bits and pieces of biographic

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information; we do know something about the political environment in each of these countries; and we are aware that all these leaders must respond, one way or the other, to the larger forces operating within and between these societies. Indeed, it is possible for us to draw a general picture of backgrounds and attitudes which suggests quite strongly that many of the younger officials in Eastern Europe are different from their predecessors -- and different in several important ways.

5. The contrast in background and training is especially striking. The old-guard communist leaders of Eastern Europe had usually played an active part in the underground Comintern conspiracy, received extensive training in the USSR, and collaborated with the Soviets both during wartime partisan struggles and the subsequent seizure of power in their own countries. The new, rising generation of leaders has no equivalent old-school-tie relationship with the Soviet party, or, for that matter, among themselves. Most of them have had little or no conspiratorial underground experience. Their formative training and experience have come instead from their activities and relationships as party functionaries -- and sometimes as professional specialists with only rather nominal party affiliation -- in their native lands. They are not held close to

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Moscow or to each other by the bonds of shared wartime or revolutionary exploits; instead, the focus of their effort (and perhaps pride of accomplishment) has been on the development of their own countries. Thus they have developed a sense of national identity, different from both the Soviet-oriented internationalism of their communist elders and the chauvinism of the pre-war regimes.

6. To be sure, most of these younger men apparently think of themselves as good communists. They approve of an authoritarian approach to party and government affairs, they work for the preservation of communist party rule, and they understand that some sort of special relationship with the Soviets is likely to endure. But their definition of communism is no longer the orthodox Soviet definition, and their test of what is a good communist does not necessarily correspond to the Soviet test. Their questions and concerns about the various facets of the communist system are focused increasingly on "How well does it fit the actual conditions here in my country?" and "How well does it work?" In short, they tend to be more pragmatic and less doctrinaire than their predecessors and no more interested in and responsive to Moscow's desires than they judge they have to be. In contrast with

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their elders, their attitudes have been conditioned by the convolutions of Soviet attitudes and policies in the period since World War II, by nationalism, and by the imperatives of economics.

II. CONDITIONING FACTORS

A. Nationalism and Soviet Policy

7. Though not then in high positions, the younger men well remember the Stalinist era, the brutality and militancy of Soviet overlordship and the distinctly second-class status accorded their own states. They also remember the pause following Stalin's death and the ragged efforts -- such as the New Economic Course -- to revise the means and the consequences of Soviet control. Khrushchev's subsequent de-Stalinization campaign offered further opportunities for departures from Soviet orthodoxy and for the expression of individual national interests; it also shook the loyalties and beliefs of many of those party members, young and old, who had somehow retained their faith in the USSR and its communist system.

8. The Soviet invasion of Hungary no doubt further dispelled any lingering illusions about the USSR's real role

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in Eastern Europe, though it certainly did not destroy the hope of many (perhaps including even Kadar) that in time Khrushchev would permit each state a meaningful degree of sovereignty. More recently, Khrushchev's removal in 1964, the general tightening up within the USSR by his successors and, of course, the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 have surely dimmed hopes in Eastern Europe for any early development of a benign Soviet outlook. But these same developments have also probably further discredited the USSR and orthodox communism in the eyes of many of the younger leaders and perhaps reinforced their determination to free their countries from arbitrary Soviet authority.

9. Nationalism obviously remains a potentially powerful force throughout Eastern Europe. There was a time -- even after Yugoslavia's break with the USSR in 1948 -- when this was thought not to be so, when both the Soviets and many Western observers believed that expressions of nationalism were no longer possible in these societies. Events in Poland and Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968 have of course proved otherwise. So too have developments over the past several years in Romania. In fact, the Romanian case may prove to be the most interesting and ultimately most important: the Romanian party, responding essentially to its

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own needs, has developed a program which rests on the proposition that nationalism pays, i.e., that the nationalist (and anti-Soviet) sentiments of the people can be used to bolster the power and prestige of the regime.

10. This is significant for two reasons. First, the added strength which accrues to the regime as a consequence of its more solid popular base can be used -- and in the Romanian instance has been used -- to improve the bargaining position of the regime vis-a-vis the Soviets. (The reverse happened in Poland in 1957 when Gomulka's power, which rested in large measure at the time on nationalist-inspired popular support, was turned back against the people, inter alia to the benefit of the Soviet Union.) Second, and equally important, the Romanian experience, like the Yugoslav before it, demonstrates that a party which hangs together and moves on its own to reduce or eliminate its dependence on the CPSU can survive Soviet pressures to conform. This, obviously, is not the case when a party becomes badly fragmented while seeking to do the same sort of thing in response to internal pressures which have grown mainly outside the party, as in both Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968).

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11. The lesson that the East European party leaders -- young and old alike -- learned from the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was along the lines implied above: the USSR will intervene militarily if it appears to Moscow that a client party is on the verge of collapse (Hungary) or on the point of relinquishing effective monopoly control (Czechoslovakia). But -- especially among the younger leaders -- this lesson by itself may in time prove quite insufficient for Soviet purposes; it does not disallow modest and gradual reform with nationalist undertones, as now practiced in Hungary, nor does it prohibit the formation of regimes dominated by politicians who might seek broad sources of political strength from within their own societies. The emergence of regimes of this character would encourage or even force (as in Romania) the adoption of policies which pursue genuine national (and nationalist) interests. This does not mean that a party leader in these circumstances would find himself a captive of mere public whim; it might mean, however, that it would be easier and politically more sensible for him to take account of political currents at home rather than political currents in Moscow.

B. The Economic Imperative

12. An aspect of Soviet authority most resented by the younger leaders is Moscow's insistence that each state within

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its sphere must conform to an economic model which -- as is now becoming increasingly obvious -- does not even serve the USSR well. The damage done the East European economies by the imposition of Stalinist norms in the late 1940's and early 1950's is well known. The subsequent failure of most of these economies to improve very much through partial reforms and piecemeal measures -- a process still underway -- is also clearly evident. Accordingly, pressures are growing for some fundamental restructuring. Ota Sik, the prominent Czech economist who was anxious to reshape the Czechoslovak economy along lines somewhat akin to Yugoslavia's "market socialism", has of course been repudiated by the present regime in Prague. But Sik's ideas, and those of others like him, retain a sort of underground currency throughout Eastern Europe, a fact at least partially testified to by continuing Soviet nervousness about all such beliefs.

13. The fact is that many knowledgeable East Europeans can now see clear advantages in some form of economic decentralization, whether entirely Sikian or not. At the same time, they can see an available bank of Western know-how and technology far richer than that existing -- or likely soon to exist -- in the USSR. The urge to improve economic results is not confined

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to economists. It also seems to be felt deeply by many who fall within the category of party technocrat -- that class of party professionals whose qualifications and career orientation have led to specialization in economic planning or administration. Sometimes men in this group have acquired some engineering background; sometimes they have obtained academic degrees. Most often, however, their economic expertise has been acquired from practical experience, rather than from academic training.

14. Many party technocrats are involved in the cultivation of economic ties with other countries and in the acquisition of modern technological processes from the West. The quest for economic efficiency usually leads them to become involved as well in experimentation with economic reform. Moreover, the resultant consciousness of the gap between Communist pretensions and actual performance sometimes has an eroding effect on their political views. Sometimes the policies they initiate primarily to introduce change into the economy also entail parallel political innovation. This tendency has long been characteristic of the Yugoslav economic reform; it was present in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and at the present time is apparent in Hungary.*

* See ONE Memorandum, "The Hungarian Experiment: Kadar's Not-so-Middle Way". 5 January 1970.

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15. The technocrat most responsible for the economic reform program in Hungary is Central Committee Secretary and Politburo member Rezso Nyers (46), the party's leading economic expert. Nyers has indicated that he is well aware of the political implications of real economic reform. Indeed, he has said so.

16. Neither in East Germany nor in Poland is there any evidence of movement toward political liberalization. This is certainly not surprising in view of the repressive, neo-Stalinist nature of the Ulbricht regime and the conservatism and fear of experimentation of the Gomulka regime. But technocrats in these countries are aware of developments elsewhere, and it is inconceivable that they could be altogether immune to the pressures for real reform -- including political reform -- which have produced movement elsewhere. The removal of restraints in either country would surely bring reformist ideas to the surface, either quickly -- as in Czechoslovakia where restraints vanished so completely and rapidly -- or gradually and cautiously, as is now the case in Hungary.

17. The chief party technocrats in East Germany, Guenter Mittag (43), and Werner Jarowinsky (42), have both been deeply involved in the limited economic reform program, the "New Economic System", initiated by the regime in 1963. Mittag,

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the youngest Politburo member and the party's leading economic expert, is known to be realistic -- as opposed to doctrinaire -- in economic matters, despite his unquestioned allegiance to the party and to Ulbricht. Jarowinsky, an equally well educated and qualified economist whose specialty is trade and supply matters, has advocated the introduction of modern technological methods into the East German economy. In Poland, the two chief party technocrats, Jaszczuk and Gieruk (in their mid-fifties), have helped to develop Poland's own version of economic reform. Jaszczuk, the principal economic spokesman for the regime, has shown by his speeches that he is decidedly pragmatic in his approach to economic policy. Gierek, party boss and industrial czar in Silesia, combines a somewhat dogmatic approach to politics and ideology with a down-to-earth approach to economic questions. He has not hesitated to rely on the technical intelligentsia to achieve economic efficiency.

18. One of Romania's principal party technocrats is Manea Manescu (53), Chairman of the Economic Council, who as a qualified economist has held many economic posts in the regime. He has also had responsibility in the fields of science and culture, where he was at one time described as a key leader of Romania's cultural thaw. A different type,

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but an example of the able young economic and technical specialists Ceausescu has brought into the party and government leadership is his friend, Cornel Burtica (38), Minister of Foreign Trade, who came from the same part of the country (Oltenie) as Ceausescu, and whose prior experience was primarily in foreign affairs. In his present post Burtica is actively helping to develop Romania's economic ties with the West, at the same time as he promotes greater independence for "Socialist" Romania.

C. Counteracting Forces

19. The force of nationalism and the imperatives of economics do not of course operate within the various East European states unopposed. Even in Yugoslavia there are elements which dislike the tacitly anti-Soviet stance of the dominant group and which resist the reformist bent of the majority in the party. And, elsewhere, there are still many officials -- including younger officials -- who respect orthodoxy, are persuaded by doctrine, and in general fear departures from past, Soviet-oriented practices.

20. Those who tend to be most cautious in these respects are the party functionaries whose jobs concern party organization

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and control -- e.g., supervision of cadres, security matters, ideological/propaganda activities. It seems that those who feel they might someday have to act to keep the lid on are more inclined than their party colleagues to hold to the old and tested ways.

21. One example in Hungary of this more conservative type of party functionary is Bela Biszku (48), who has risen to the number two position in the party after Kadar. In Bulgaria, equivalent types are Stanko Todorov (49), who administers the party for party leader Zhivkov, and Venelin Kotsev (43), party specialist in ideological and cultural affairs. In Poland the chief comers in the party include Stanislaw Kociolek (39), an ideological expert, and two young functionaries of proven ability, Jan Szydlak (44) and Jozef Tejchma (42). A typical example of the tough young East German functionary is Gerhard Grueneberg (48), an agricultural specialist of pronounced hard-line tendencies.

22. Circumstances are of course different in Romania. The regime as a whole is authoritarian, though it is not necessarily bound by ideology and is certainly not sympathetic to the USSR. Some younger Romanian leaders in the

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party apparatus seem to be brothers under the skin of their counterparts elsewhere: e.g., Virgil Trofin (43), cadre chief and number two in the party, and Gheorghe Pana (40), member of the party Secretariat and Presidium and a close associate of Ceausescu.

III. CHARACTER OF THE INDIVIDUAL

23. While their backgrounds and the conditioning factors noted above throw some light on the tendencies of the younger leaders as a group, their tendencies as individuals are more difficult to assess. As careerists, of course, many of them are bound to be strongly influenced by opportunism. But the behavior of each is a product of many factors, including sociological and environmental background, career experience, relationships between these men and their colleagues, and the position of their country vis-a-vis the outside world, especially its neighbors.

24. By no means least important is the character and personality of the individual leader himself. Unfortunately, information available to us on these matters is not very helpful. The sort of information which frequently is available in the files, largely sociological data and the career record of the leader himself, provides only a limited insight

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into probable political behavior. Both Alexander Dubcek and Imre Nagy for example, had records as reliable party functionaries before they played their particular roles in history.

25. Dubcek was educated in the USSR before the war, and in the midst of his career in the Slovak party in the mid-fifties was sent to Moscow for three years' training at the Higher Party School. His pro-Soviet credentials were impressive, as was his record as a Slovak party careerist. By the mid-sixties there was little in his record to suggest his subsequent behavior. The Hungarian national deviationist, Imre Nagy, spent about half his life in the Soviet Union. A trusted "Muscovite" communist, he returned to Hungary after the war, hanging on to the coattails of the Red Army. He had a long career as a trusted party functionary (including prewar underground experience in Hungary), and his background suggested he would be staunchly loyal to the party and to Moscow. Indeed, he first became Prime Minister in Hungary in July 1953 at Soviet behest.

26. Certain factors in the careers of Dubcek and Nagy later proved to have an important influence on their subsequent political attitudes, but it would have been difficult to conclude so at the time. Thus, when Dubcek attended

Higher Party School in Moscow he was deeply influenced by Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign, which affected his later desire to redress Stalinist injustices at home. Imre Nagy's long experience in the USSR only strengthened his deep conviction that socialism should be developed differently in Hungary.

IV. SOME PROBLEMS AND IMPLICATIONS

27. If what we have said about their general tendencies is correct, then the younger communist leaders who will be gradually rising to the top in Eastern Europe during the next few years will present the Soviets with problems of a different degree and perhaps even of a different kind than those posed by their predecessors. Their background and training, which is clearly different from that of their elders, together with the various forces tending to influence them toward more pragmatic, more independent behavior, make it clear that the problem of preserving order and discipline in the future -- a period in which Western economic and technological influence in Eastern Europe will steadily increase -- will be increasingly difficult for Moscow. At a minimum, the tendencies of the new leaders will add to the already considerable difficulties of

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maintaining the status quo and manipulating events to Soviet advantage in Eastern Europe. All factors, of course, are not working in this same direction. The tendencies of these men are far from uniform, and the impact of the younger leaders on their countries as they ascend to power is likely to be uneven.

28. One reason for this is the considerable variation in local circumstances and national traditions, which will affect both the courses adopted by individual leaders and the manner in which the local populace responds. Thus, a severe political crisis in, say, Poland would be unlikely to develop in the same way as the 1968 crisis in Czechoslovakia. The Czechs, though pressing very hard during the "Prague Spring" for basic changes in the system, did so in a moderate, non-violent way, in conformity with national traditions. The Poles, on the other hand, have a heritage of militant nationalism in which futile but heroic acts of resistance have played a significant role, as often as not against Russian oppressors. The chances are that a crisis in Poland (and probably in Hungary too) would escalate much more quickly to dramatic proportions. Facets of national character and tradition will,

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in fact, help to mold events and to shape the attitudes of the younger leaders in all of the East European states.

29. The impact of the new leaders will also be affected importantly by the Soviet attitude and behavior toward Eastern Europe -- in particular how the Soviets manage their relations with these new leaders. This is a complicated matter, as revealed on the one hand by the Soviet decision to invade Czechoslovakia, and on the other by continued tolerance of maverick Romania. The course of Soviet foreign policy will also have an important bearing on Soviet attitudes in Eastern Europe, especially the development of relations with the US, with Western Europe, and with China. And in coming years Soviet behavior will perhaps be further complicated by yet other questions, such as whether and to what extent a liberal trend will be allowed to develop in the Soviet Union itself, or whether changes in the East European leaderships will be paralleled by changes in the Soviet hierarchy.

30. Still, certain assumptions can be made about Soviet behavior -- e.g., that it will continue to tread a wavering median line between determination to preserve the communist order in Eastern Europe and, on the other hand, reluctance

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to intervene with force unless a clear and present danger to communist control should develop. On this assumption, we would expect the impact of the new leaders in the various East European countries to be felt, in the near term, more or less along the following lines:

31. GDR. In East Germany, second-echelon leaders are not yet in positions from which they are likely to achieve primacy during the next few years. In the event of Ulbricht's death or incapacitation, power seems likely to be divided among somewhat older party and government functionaries -- e.g., Honecker and Stoph -- although it will be shared increasingly by younger, well-trained, pragmatic functionaries, such as Guenter Mittag, who are valued for their ability and expertise. Though the Soviets probably will take care to see that the adherents of Ulbricht's ideological views will remain in the ascendancy, the present regime-encouraged trend toward greater pragmatism and use of Western technology in the economy seems likely to continue.

32. Poland. Younger, second-echelon leaders in Poland are still only on the periphery of power and are thus unlikely to achieve top positions quickly even in the event of a change

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at the top. Their influence, however, is likely to be felt increasingly in top party councils, and if a factional struggle should arise following Gomulka's demise, one or another of their number might well end up at the top. Moreover, if one of them proved to have real qualities as a political leader, he might feel tempted to play (a la Moczar) on the long-suppressed national feelings of the Poles in order to strengthen his own position.

33. Romania. As a result of Ceausescu's efforts, the Romanian regime probably will continue to be dominated largely by younger leaders who seem disposed to continue the present nationalist, albeit internally conservative policy, provided, of course, that the Soviets do not intervene with force.

34. Bulgaria. Though Zhivkov also has brought some younger leaders into the top echelons of the party, including the present party cadre chief, Todorov, a younger leader probably will continue Bulgaria's pro-Soviet orientation, which in Zhivkov's case has been fairly obsequious, and probably will be equally reluctant to countenance liberal domestic policies. One very good reason for such reluctance, of course, is the presence and potentially contagious influence of liberalism in neighboring Yugoslavia.

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35. Hungary. If, for some reason or other, Kadar should be displaced during the next few years, one of the younger leaders he has groomed for the leadership, such as Biszku or Komocsin, might well succeed him. If so, it is conceivable that a conservative type such as Biszku might seek to reverse the economic and political reforms. However, the economic reform program (the "New Economic Mechanism") seems fairly solidly established by now and, whatever his inclination, Kadar's successor may find it extremely difficult to reverse it. Indeed, he might well find it politically expedient to continue the present liberal program, or even to step up the pace. Moreover, a new leader might not appreciate the dangers of increasing the tempo or be able to control it as well as Kadar does, in which case the Soviets might well be presented at some point with another crisis.

36. Yugoslavia. Tito has made great efforts to establish the basis for an orderly transition on his departure from power. But when this occurs leadership will pass into collective hands, and it will be surprising if after his departure factionalism and regional antagonisms do not produce some turmoil in the party and country. Nevertheless, there seems to be enough

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support for his variant model of communism so that an attempt to revert to the Soviet model would be unlikely to succeed. Indeed, the younger Yugoslav leaders are more likely to continue the present trend in the direction of a Western-type political and economic system.

37. Czechoslovakia. Since the Soviet intervention in August 1968, the most promising younger liberal party leaders (e.g., Mlynar, Cisar, Slavik, Spacek, Simon) gradually have been weeded out of positions of influence in the regime. What remains of the younger element of leaders is for the most part a combination of conservatives, ultra-conservatives, and opportunists. Should Husak be displaced at some point, any younger leader who would be likely to succeed him is unlikely to be able to alter the present repressive, conservative trend, for quite some time, or to permit any resurgence of liberalism, at least so long as the Soviets remain in the country.

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ANNEX

The attached annex lists selected promising younger leaders from each of the East European countries whose backgrounds were examined in the preparation of this paper. It is intended to supplement the paper by providing some insight into the backgrounds, training, and career experience of these men.

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ANNEX

	<u>Age</u>	<u>Education</u>	<u>Training</u>	<u>Specialty</u>	<u>Post</u>
<u>Poland</u>					
Stanislaw Kociolek	36	Univ (Dr)		Party Fnctry	Politburo
Jan Szydlak	43	Party Sch		Ideolog Aff	Party Sec't
Boleslaw Jaszczuk	56	Technical	Engineering	Economics	Party Sec't
					Politburo
Josef Tejchma	42	Party Sch	Engineering	Agr/Youth	Party Sec't
					Politburo
Stefan Olszowski	38	Univ		Ideolog Aff	Party Sec't
		Party Sch			
Mieczyslaw Moczar	56	Elementary	Partisan	Sec Matters	Party Sec't
Edward Gierek	56	Univ (Eng)	Engineering	Economics	Politburo
<u>Hungary</u>					
Bela Biszku	48	Secondary	Party Acad	Party Fnctry	Party Sec't
		Party Sch			Politburo
Rezso Nyers	46	Elementary	Technical	Economics	Party Sec't
					Politburo
Zoltan Komocsin	46	Elementary	Higher Party	Intrabloc	Party Sec't
			Sch (Moscow)	Relations	Politburo
Karoly Erdelyi	42	University	Higher Party	Foreign Aff	Minister
			School		
Peter Varkonyi	39	University		Ideolog Aff	Dep Minister
Karoly Nemeth	47	Party Sch		Party Fnctry	(Cand Member)
					Politburo
Gyorgy Aczel	52	University	Economics	Ideolog Aff	Party Sec't
				Cultural Aff	
<u>East Germany</u>					
Guenter Mittag	43	Univ (Dr)		Economics	Politburo
					Party Sec't
Werner Jarowinsky	42	Univ (Dr)		Economics	Party Sec't
Gerhard Grueneberg	48	Elementary		Party Fnctry	Politburo
				Agriculture	Party Sec't
Guenther Kleiber	38	University	Elec Engrg	Data Proces-	Politburo
				sing	(Cand Member)
Werner Lamberz	40	Party Sch		Party Fnctry	Party Sec't
				Ideolog Aff	

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	<u>Age</u>	<u>Education</u>	<u>Training</u>	<u>Specialty</u>	<u>Post</u>
<u>Romania</u>					
Virgil Trofin	44	Elementary		Party Fnctry Youth Agriculture	Presidium Party Sec't
Paul Niculescu- Mizil	46	Security Party Sch	Teacher (Marxism- Leninism)	Ideolog Aff Cultural Aff	Presidium Party Sec't
Cornel Burtica	38	Technical	Elec Engrg	Economics Foreign Aff	Minister
Ilie Verdet	44	Technical Party Sch	Party Acad	Party Fnctry	Presidium 1st Dep Prem
Dimitriu Popescu	41	?	?	Party Fnctry Ideolog Aff Cultural Aff	Party Sec't
Gheorghe Pana	40	?	?	Party Fnctry	Presidium Party Sec't
Ion Iliescu	43	Technical	Engineering (USSR)	Youth	Minister
<u>Bulgaria</u>					
Luchezar Avramov	48	University	Elec Engrg	Party Fnctry Economics	Minister Politburo (Cand Member)
Stanko Todorov	49	University		Party Fnctry	Politburo Party Sec't
Venelin Kotsev	44	?	Higher Party Sch	Ideolog Aff Cultural Aff	Party Sec't
Krustyu Trichkov	43	Elementary	Higher Party Sch	Party Fnctry	Politburo (Cand Member)
Tano Tsolov	51	Secondary		Party Fnctry Economics	Politburo Dep Premier
<u>Albania</u>					
Ramiz Alia	44	Secondary	?	Ideolog Aff Cultural Aff	Party Sec't Politburo
Nesti Nase	47	Secondary	?	Foreign Aff	Minister
Nexhmije Hoxha (Enver Hoxha's wife)	48	Secondary	?	Party Fnctry	Govt Post
Rita Marko	50	Elementary	Higher Party Sch	Party Fnctry	Politburo

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<u>Yugoslavia</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Education</u>	<u>Training</u>	<u>Specialty</u>	<u>Post</u>
Krste Crvenkovski	48	University		Party Fnctry Cultural Aff	Exec Bureau
Marko Nikezic	48	University		Foreign Aff	Central Comm
Mirko Tepavac	47	Secondary Party Sch		Party Fnctry Foreign Aff	Minister
Kiro Gligorov	52	University Law		Economics	Exec Bureau
Dimce Belovski	46	University Law		Foreign Aff	LCY Presidium
Miroslav Pecujlic	40	Univ (Dr)	Teacher	Party Fnctry	Exec Bureau
Budislav Soskic	44	University		Ideolog Aff Party Fnctry Cultural Aff	Exec Bureau
Mika Tripalo	43	University Law		Party Fnctry	Exec Bureau
Stane Dolanc	44	University Law	Teacher Marxism- Leninism	Party Fnctry	Exec Bureau
Mitja Ribicic	50	University Law	Security Matters	Party Fnctry	Prime Minister
<u>Czechoslovakia</u>					
Zdenek Mlynar	39	University Law		Legal Aff	Purged after Aug '68 (Liberal)
Vaclav Slavik	49	University		Party Fnctry Ideolog Aff	Purged after Aug '68 (Liberal)
Josef Spacek	42	Secondary Party Sch	Party Sch	Party Fnctry	Purged after Aug '68 (Liberal)
Cestmir Cisar	50	Univ (Dr)		Ideolog Aff Cultural Aff	Purged after Aug '68 (Liberal)
Bohumil Simon	49			Party Fnctry Economics	Purged after Aug '68 (Liberal)
Lubomir Strougal	45	Univ (Dr)		Party Fnctry	Premier
Antonin Kapek	47	Technical	Engineering	Party Fnctry Economics	Presidium
Jan Piller	47	Technical	Party Sch	Party Fnctry Economics	Presidium
Drahomir Kolder	44	Elementary	Party Sch	Party Fnctry Economics	Govt Post
Alois Indra	49			Party Fnctry	Party Sec't

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