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ANNUAL REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
ON THE  
STATUS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM  
(as of 30 June 1957)

Submitted by  
Intelligence Advisory Committee

September 1957

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SUMMARY

Evaluation of U. S. Capabilities to Provide

Warning of Attack

The difficulties for intelligence in giving warning prior to the launching of a Soviet attack against the U. S. or U. S. forces are increasing. This is true particularly because the USSR's growing strength in advanced weapons--modern jet aircraft, guided missiles, submarines, and nuclear bombs and warheads--is increasing from year to year Soviet capabilities for large-scale surprise attack.

At present, as a rough estimate, a force up to 300 long-range aircraft could probably be launched concurrently without producing indications permitting intelligence to give warning of possible attack. Generally speaking, the probability of obtaining warning indications would increase as the numbers of aircraft increased. There is no basis for judging at what point the chances of receiving warning indications would be about even; it is believed, however, that if the number of aircraft launched concurrently was as great as about 800, the chances of their producing warning indications would be considerably greater than even. If received, these indications would probably permit intelligence to warn of a possible attack some 4-8 hours before attacking aircraft could reach radar warning lines.

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Warning of possible attack in Western Europe by Soviet forces stationed in Germany might range from a few hours to a week, depending on whether units were at some field-training phase of the annual training cycle or at home stations.

If a Soviet attack was preceded by full mobilization of the USSR's military establishment, warning of possible attack could probably be given a few weeks in advance. Intelligence might during the course of mobilization be able to forecast the approximate date at which military preparations would be complete, but it would always be possible for the USSR to attack with its ready forces at an earlier date.

Warning of attack by clandestine means would depend primarily on the possibility that some part of the Soviet clandestine plan had miscarried or on chance discovery. Thus, there could be no assurance that intelligence would be able to warn of such forms of attack.

Once surface-to-surface guided missiles were positioned for launching, advance warning of their use would be unlikely.

With respect to the warning problem, the Intelligence Advisory Committee has undertaken a survey of sources of warning information to determine how fully and promptly present and potential collection methods, sources, and transmission channels can provide information essential to advance warning of Sino-Soviet Bloc hostile action.

### Evaluation and Estimates

#### A. Soviet Bloc

With respect to developments in the Soviet Bloc, the struggle for dominance within the Soviet leadership since Stalin's death resulted in an increasing exposure to intelligence of the inner workings of the regime and of the issues which divide the leadership. The public justifications made by the victorious factions in the successive crises since 1953 have enabled intelligence to check its

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information and thus to formulate its views on a sounder footing of evidence. This does not mean that we are in a very much better position to predict particular developments in the USSR, such as the rise or fall of individual personalities, but it does mean that we can delimit more confidently the range of possible developments on the Soviet internal scene. Similarly, the relatively greater openness of discussion in the USSR and the greater accessibility of Soviet personalities at all levels have given us a better insight into the motivations and tactics of Soviet foreign policy. However, these gains are more significant for short-term estimates than for long-term ones. The Soviet leadership, for example, seems likely to be presented with difficult choices of policy. Already it must reconsider its economic policies at a time when military costs and the claims of consumption are pressing ever harder on the traditional priority given to investment to sustain a high rate of economic growth. It must reconsider the shape of its military programs during a period of revolutionary change in weapons. Relations with the restive Satellites and Communist China have evidently called for redefinition. There is evidence that the regime has increasing difficulty in retaining the loyalty of students and intellectuals and needs to provide more nourishing ideological fare. Such fundamental problems affecting future developments in the USSR are extremely complex, slow-moving in their resolution, and do not lend themselves readily to reliable estimating on the basis of the kinds of evidence ordinarily available to intelligence.

In the field of military intelligence, valuable additional information was obtained on the Soviet military establishment, including data on those elements posing the most direct threat to U. S. security interests. Military intelligence information on the Sino-Soviet Bloc is adequate to support broad assessments of the current capabilities of the armed forces of those countries and to discern general trends in their development. This information, however, remains inadequate in critical fields to provide a firm intelligence basis for U. S. military plans, operations, and research and development. Moreover, the rapidity of change in military technology is increasing our difficulties in collecting hard evidence to support future projections of Soviet military capabilities. Extensive travel by U. S. Service attaches, as

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well as thorough exploitation of open source materials and defectors from the Bloc, have resulted in gains in certain categories of military information despite Bloc security measures. A continued expansion of clandestine activities is being undertaken to intensify the collection of military intelligence on the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Increased attention is also being given to the development of scientific and technical equipment and methods for overcoming security measures in target areas.

Gains in economic intelligence on the Sino-Soviet Bloc have resulted from a growing return on our effort in research and analysis over several years and from a continuing increase in published data within the Bloc, particularly the USSR. Serious deficiencies remain, however, particularly as related to the extent, cost, and economic burden of Bloc military programs. To reduce this deficiency indirect research techniques have been developed.

There has been continued improvement in scientific intelligence on the Sino-Soviet Bloc, both through research and through information gained from increased contacts with Soviet nationals. During the past year, significant information has been obtained on Soviet nuclear weapons testing, but there is inadequate information on Soviet production of fissionable materials and nuclear weapons. Although there has been a continued improvement in the quality of our guided missile intelligence information, it is still inadequate to meet our minimum intelligence requirements. Highest priority continues to be given to this problem, with special emphasis being placed on technical collection methods.

#### B. Non-Bloc Areas

The periodic preparation of National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates on Non-Bloc areas, constituting a substantial proportion of all estimates published during the period, has been directed towards providing a meaningful measure of probable political, economic, and military developments bearing upon U.S. security interests. As a result of its continuing program of current intelligence research and analysis of political, economic, and military affairs throughout the world the IAC has also been able to

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provide advance intelligence support to policy-makers at all levels of the government regarding significant trends and events. Support in depth of both policy-making and policy-executing arms of the government has continued through the production of basic intelligence studies including the NIS series.

### Collection

The list of Priority National Intelligence Objectives was again revised and continued to emphasize Sino-Soviet strategy, intentions or plans related to the initiation of hostilities. The highest priority was also assigned to Soviet capabilities for nuclear attack, defense against air (including missiles) attack, and the clandestine delivery of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons against the U. S. or key U. S. overseas installations. There was intensive exploitation of new collection opportunities including increased travel in some areas, more open discussions in the USSR and Satellites, greater availability of certain types of Soviet Bloc publications, access to [REDACTED] and the general stimulation to collection activities arising from the Middle Eastern and Eastern European crises. Intelligence gains also resulted from better technical collection techniques and from a general improvement of collection capabilities, both overt and clandestine.

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Despite these gains, deficiencies continue to exist in many fields, particularly with respect to our collection activities directed against the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Increased opportunities for travel in presently restricted areas, freer access to Bloc personalities or publications and a general improvement in existing collection and processing facilities show promise of reducing political and economic intelligence deficiencies. Further development of our technical collection techniques and expanded clandestine efforts will be necessary to reduce significantly critical deficiencies in the military and scientific and technical fields. In any event, factors such as security restrictions and rapidly advancing technology will continue to limit our ability to achieve a significant reduction in our most critical intelligence deficiencies by an early date.

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## REPORT

### A. Warning of Attack\*

#### 1. Evaluation of U. S. Capabilities

a. The difficulties for intelligence in giving warning prior to the launching of a Soviet attack against the U. S. or U. S. forces are increasing. This is particularly true because the USSR's growing strength in advanced weapons--modern jet aircraft, guided missiles, submarines, and nuclear bombs and warheads--is increasing from year to year Soviet capabilities for large-scale surprise attack.

b. At present, as a rough estimate, a force up to 300 long-range aircraft could probably be launched concurrently without producing indications permitting intelligence to give warning of possible attack. Generally speaking, the probability of obtaining warning indications would increase as the numbers of aircraft increased. There is no basis for judging at what point the chances of receiving warning indications would be about even; it is believed, however, that if the number of aircraft launched concurrently was as great as about 800, the chances of their producing warning indications would be considerably greater than even. If received, these indications would probably permit intelligence to warn of a possible attack some 4-8 hours before attacking aircraft could reach radar warning lines.

c. Warning of possible attack in Western Europe by Soviet forces stationed in Germany might range from a few hours to a week, depending on whether units were at some field-training phase of the annual training cycle or at home stations.

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\* The most recent comprehensive review of this problem by the intelligence community appears in NIE 11-3-57, "Probable Intelligence Warning of Soviet Attack on the US," approved by the IAC on 18 June 1957.

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d. If a Soviet attack was preceded by full mobilization of the USSR's military establishment, warning of possible attack could probably be given a few weeks in advance. Intelligence might during the course of mobilization be able to forecast the approximate date at which military preparations would be complete, but it would always be possible for the USSR to attack with its ready forces at an earlier date.

e. Warning of attack by clandestine means would depend primarily on the possibility that some part of the Soviet clandestine plan had miscarried or on chance discovery. Thus, there could be no assurance that intelligence would be able to warn of such forms of attack.

f. Once surface-to-surface guided missiles were positioned for launching advance warning of their use would be unlikely.

## 2. The Watch Committee of the IAC


a. The Watch Committee has continued its examination of intelligence information for indications of Soviet/Communist intentions to initiate hostilities and, as directed by the IAC in February 1956, for possible indications of a resumption of Arab-Israeli hostilities. Under this procedure, the Watch Committee, in October 1956, provided several days<sup>0</sup> advance warning of the imminent possibility of Israeli-Egyptian hostilities and 24 hours<sup>0</sup> specific warning of Israel's intention to attack Egypt with French and tacit British support. The critical developments of October-November 1956 confronted the Watch Committee with a major test of its alertness and ability to achieve prompt common evaluations as to Soviet intentions, particularly with reference to the employment of military force in critical situations. The National Indications Center (the 24-hour staff of the Watch Committee) has used the experience gained during the crisis period to refine further its lists of potential indicators of hostile Sino-Soviet Bloc intentions.

b. The Intelligence Advisory Committee has undertaken a survey of sources of warning information to determine how fully and promptly

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present and potential collection methods, sources, and transmission channels can provide information essential to advance warning of Sino-Soviet Bloc hostile action.


3. USAF Indications System



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5. "Crisis Situation" Review by IAC

Under a procedure initiated in the past year, the IAC at its weekly meetings regularly reviews as a body intelligence and information bearing on actual or potential "crisis situations" anywhere in the world. This has proved to be a valuable stimulant for the

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regular exchange of views, at the highest level in the intelligence community, on matters of both immediate and long-range intelligence interest. The new procedure has also assisted in scheduling estimates, and has provided a mechanism for inspiring suggestions and crystallizing the community viewpoint with respect to matters on which the Director of Intelligence may brief the National Security Council.

6. Taiwan Strait Coverage

The Ad Hoc Current Intelligence Group for the Taiwan Strait Problem, established by the IAC in March 1955 in response to the President's desire for coordinated intelligence coverage of this area, continues to meet regularly, at least once a month. Since early December 1956 its reports have been prepared on a monthly basis, except during June 1957 when two reports were issued because of unusual military activity in the area. The Group also prepared a special assessment of intelligence related to Chinese Nationalist intentions in February 1957.

7. The Arab-Israeli Situation

The Ad Hoc IAC Working Group on the Arab-Israeli Situation, which was set up in March 1956, assisted in meeting the increased intelligence requirements arising from the Middle Eastern crisis. The Group, whose work supplemented that of the Watch Committee and the individual IAC agencies, issued four complete revisions of its basic report during the past year.

B. Evaluation and Estimates

1. National Intelligence Estimates (NIE's)

a. Production of NIE's continued to be guided largely by the needs of the NSC and related bodies. Of the 57 NIE's published during the last year, 35 were related to specific NSC papers or policy actions.

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b. The IAC continued to provide estimates in support of the reports to the NSC on the "net evaluation" of the capabilities of the USSR to inflict direct injury on the continental U. S. The main estimates for the 1956 report, keyed to the focal period of mid-1959, were NIE 11-56, "Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attack on the US and Key Overseas Installations and Forces Through Mid-1959" and NIE 11-2-56, "The Soviet Atomic Energy Program." The 1956 report was also supported by NIE 11-4-56, "Soviet Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action Through 1961." Estimative support for the net evaluation to be submitted in late 1957 will include SNIE 11-6-57, "Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attack on the Continental US in Mid-1960," NIE 11-5-57, "Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in the Guided Missile Field," NIE 11-2-57, "The Soviet Atomic Energy Program" and NIE 11-3-57, "Probable Intelligence Warning of Soviet Attack on the US."

c. The work of the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament was supported by NIE 100-6-57, "Nuclear Weapons Production in Fourth Countries--Likelihood and Consequences."

d. A substantial proportion of the NIE's and SNIE's were devoted principally to problems of the Non-Bloc world. A number of these were on emergency situations such as those in the Middle East and Eastern Europe.

e. The post-mortem procedure on NIE's continues to be a valuable method of highlighting intelligence gaps and providing guidance for future intelligence collection. Pursuant to the recommendation of the post-mortem on NIE 11-5-57, "Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in the Guided Missile Field," for example, the IAC established an "Ad Hoc Weapons Systems Study Committee." This Committee is studying methods for evaluating the comparative effectiveness of competing Soviet weapons systems in order to assist in the formulation of national estimates on Soviet military programs.

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2. National Intelligence Surveys (NIS)

a. During the year NIS production essentially fulfilled the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) annual production requirement, and brought the total of the NIS production thus far to over 3,700 sections. This represents more than 65 percent of the total world coverage, and on the JCS high priority areas coverage is now over 90 percent complete. Nearly one-third of the production effort during the year was directed towards maintenance revision of published NIS sections.

b. A major accomplishment this year has been the comprehensive revision of the NIS Standard Instructions, and the development of the NIS Reference Guide to provide for a better understanding and more effective use of the NIS among the growing body of NIS recipients. Other noteworthy activities during the year included the production of the NIS on the Arctic two years ahead of schedule, the attainment of world-wide NIS Gazetteer coverage on all foreign areas, and the development by the Defense agencies of formal NIS Control and Coordination Directives.

c. In summary, this has been a year of solid accomplishment, characterized by excellent interagency support and coordination, and reflecting a gradual improvement in collection guidance and acquisition, better administrative controls, and more efficient interagency procedures.

d. If present production capabilities are maintained the NIS program will meet the JCS annual requirement for the next three years. This would result in 85 percent to 90 percent coverage of world areas by 30 June 1960, and the revision of one-third of all published NIS under the maintenance program.

3. Military Intelligence

a. Military intelligence information on the Sino-Soviet Bloc is adequate to support broad assessments of the current capabilities of the Armed Forces of those countries and to discern general trends

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in their development. This information, however, remains inadequate in critical fields to provide a firm intelligence basis for U. S. military plans, operations, and research and development. Moreover, the rapidity of change in military technology is increasing our difficulties in collecting hard evidence to support future projections of Soviet military capabilities.

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b. The quality and quantity of certain types of military intelligence information on the Sino-Soviet Bloc improved during the past year. This may be attributed in part to wider travel by U. S. officials in some areas, observations of Soviet forces in Germany and, particularly, [REDACTED] With respect to Soviet ground forces, specific improvements were noted in data on the location and identification of Soviet divisions and on certain items of ground equipment. Much tactical information obtained previously was also confirmed. However, deficiencies continued in categories such as order of battle on non-divisional units, strength level of units, and in information relating to the design, characteristics and production of both conventional and new-type weapons and equipment. Our knowledge of Soviet naval vessels was improved through increased photographic coverage of Soviet fleet exercises and through naval visits by elements of the Soviet fleet to Western European countries. Nevertheless, we still lack specific information regarding new weapons systems and related techniques which the Soviets intend to introduce into their navy, especially their submarine arm. With regard to the air forces of the Soviet Union, improved [REDACTED] collection has increased our knowledge of the types, performance characteristics, and production of military and civil aircraft, as well as our information on the current organizational structure of the air establishment. Future projections of Soviet air capabilities continue to be hampered by the lack of detailed information on aviation research and development programs as well as on the performance characteristics of new weapons and equipment that may be introduced.

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c. Improvements were registered in certain aspects of intelligence on Satellite ground forces during the past year. Gains occurred with respect to the Polish Army and on the Hungarian Army prior to

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the revolt. However, the collection effort in Hungary has faced increasing difficulties and little data has been received as yet on the new Hungarian Army. Intelligence on the 1956 reorganization of the East German Army was generally adequate except for information on the High Command. Order of battle data on the Chinese Communist Army continues to be relatively good although not quite at last year's level. However, intelligence on both this Army and the North Korean Army is inadequate to assure advance warning of impending military operations. Reliable reporting on Viet Minh military forces continues to be very limited although collection efforts by the Vietnamese have improved slightly.

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d. Principally due to the stimulus toward greater coverage furnished by the Suez crisis, the quantity, and, in some respects, the quality, of intelligence on the Middle East have improved during the past year. Information available is sufficient to support broad estimates of the military capabilities of these countries. In par-

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Nevertheless, in varying degrees, order of battle data on Israel and neighboring Arab states, with the exception of Lebanon, remain deficient. Firm and detailed information is lacking particularly with respect to the identification, composition and deployment of military units in Egypt and Syria and the quantity and utilization of Soviet Bloc weapons recently acquired by these countries. However, capabilities have improved for providing early warning of the imminence of hostilities between Israel and the Arab states.

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
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25X9  f. Our efforts to overcome deficiencies in military intelligence continue to be severely restricted by the security measures imposed by other countries. The factors and conditions which have limited access to the most critical information continue to be studied in order to develop more successful collection resources, through both overt and clandestine means. However, it is not now possible to predict a significant alleviation of major deficiencies by an early date.

g. Substantial improvement in the production of air target materials has been realized during the period of this report, due principally to the realignments of production resources under the



#### 4. Political Intelligence

a. Political intelligence continued to provide policy-makers throughout the government with both current and basic finished intelligence to assist in the assessment of foreign situations. For example, through newly developing procedures in support of the Operations Coordinating Board, political intelligence is being increasingly utilized in policy development and implementation.

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b. Political intelligence on the USSR and the Satellites has continued to show some improvement, principally due to factors such as revelations incident to factional struggles in the USSR, the appearance of opposition forces in the Satellites and the greater freedom of diplomatic and other forms of contact which have developed in the post-Stalin period. With respect to Communist China, political intelligence remains a major problem and is still highly inadequate for an assessment of Communist China's motives and possible future actions.

c. Political intelligence during the past year was characterized particularly by the unusual demands on resources generated by the Middle Eastern and Eastern European crises. More active Soviet participation in affairs of the Middle East and the expanding Soviet "economic offensive" have created continuing burdens. Despite these growing responsibilities, high-level governmental requests and essential requirements of the intelligence community for political intelligence have generally been met.

##### 5. Economic Intelligence

a. Economic intelligence on the Sino-Soviet Bloc has improved as a result of exploitation of the greater volume of economic data published by a number of Bloc countries during the year. This has permitted the filling of important gaps in intelligence, and has provided a firmer basis for estimates of future economic activity. For example, one important result has been a downward revision in estimates of the Soviet population and labor force available to carry out ambitious economic plans.

b. Serious deficiencies still remain, however, in the availability of information on some Bloc economic activities, particularly those related to military production and programs. This latter deficiency has led to the development of indirect research techniques for estimating the extent, cost, and economic burden of Bloc military programs. The economic estimates so obtained, while subject to a substantial margin of error, do provide an independent check on military estimates derived by conventional means. These economic

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estimates were helpful in arriving at estimates of the size and composition of the guided missile, air defense and heavy bomber weapons systems. Similar techniques are being applied to the economic analysis of the Soviet nuclear energy program.

c. An increasing volume of reports has been published on current economic developments in the Bloc, including special evaluations of developments in Poland and Hungary, and appraisals of the reorganization of the Soviet economy and its effect on economic capabilities. Economic intelligence has also provided support to the London disarmament negotiations, the Paris negotiations relating to controls on trade with Communist China, the Washington talks on US-Polish trade and assistance, and consideration of US-Bloc exchange visits.

d. Interagency coordination of economic research through the Economic Intelligence Committee of the IAC has continued. Coordinated reports have been issued on Communist China's trade and transport, Sino-Soviet Bloc economic activities in underdeveloped areas, and other subjects. The current status of economic intelligence has been reviewed as a guide for programming by the individual agencies. The EIC prepared a revised statement of "Priority National Economic Intelligence Objectives" for guidance in economic intelligence collection and production. CIA has arranged to provide annual production data for certain Soviet industries in support of Air Force targeting studies, thereby obtaining more efficient utilization of community resources in this field of research.

e. With respect to economic intelligence on Free World areas, important shifts in emphasis have occurred. The prolonged crisis in the Middle East, for example, resulted in greatly increased demands on intelligence agencies for research on the economic affairs of that area. As a result of the closing of Suez and the threat to pipelines, additional research was directed to world-wide petroleum problems. Special attention has been given to the economic problems of countries susceptible to Sino-Soviet Bloc economic penetration and to the inter-relations between economic development and political factors in these countries.

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f. The economic problems of U. S. allies, including the relationships of current economic affairs to future military capabilities and problems relating to trade controls, have been under review. Studies of the likely nature and effect of a European Common Market and Free Trade Area were produced to assist the Council on Foreign Economic Policy in establishing the basic U. S. position regarding these moves towards European integration. Some research is being conducted on problems relating to the nonweapons application of atomic energy, in anticipation of the formation of regional and international agencies to foster atomic development.

6. Scientific and Technical Intelligence

25X1C a. General. There has been continued improvement in scientific intelligence on the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Our understanding has grown with respect to the quality and quantity of Soviet scientific manpower and developments in specific fields of basic and applied science. As a result, we have greater confidence in our estimates of Soviet technological capabilities. Further significant intelligence was developed on the Soviet atomic energy program, particularly in the fields of thermonuclear weapons development and testing and in the production of fissionable materials. In addition, special studies were prepared on several aspects of the general problem posed by possible international agreement for limitations on nuclear tests. Valuable information on various facets of Soviet technology has been

unless much critically-needed information remains unavailable through present collection efforts. In recognition of this continuing problem, an intensified effort has been made to develop and employ new technical means to collect and reduce technological data for use in scientific intelligence estimates. In addition, the Priority National Scientific and Technical Intelligence Objectives were revised during the past year.

b. Capabilities and Trends of Soviet Science and Technology. The first National Intelligence Estimate (NIE 11-6-56) devoted exclusively to this subject was completed during the year. The

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Scientific Estimates Committee, in collaboration with the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, the Guided Missile Intelligence Committee and the Economic Intelligence Committee within their respective spheres, coordinated the basic studies from which the estimate was prepared.

25X1D c. Atomic Energy




New evidence suggests that nuclear weapons

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hardware has been issued to at least some operational long-range aircraft units.


Convincing evidence was received that caused us to double our previous figures for the uranium output of East Germany and Czechoslovakia. The start of major uranium mining activity in Hungary (interrupted by the revolution) and an expansion in other Satellites has been noted. The magnitude of the uranium mining effort within the USSR remains an enigma.

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
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Soviet announcements indicate a severe cutback in their originally planned nuclear electric power program for the period 1957-1960, suggesting technical difficulties. Adequate information on plant locations and the progress of their construction is still lacking. Evidence has been received on the construction and characteristics of a nuclear powered icebreaker. We have little evidence on Soviet efforts to apply nuclear propulsion to submarines, aircraft, and missiles although open publications continue to express interest in these developments.

Soviet activity at international conferences on atomic energy subjects has been at a reduced level during the past fiscal year and few advances in our knowledge of Soviet atomic energy research have been made.



In summary, we have made significant gains in our atomic energy intelligence, but there remain many critical gaps which require attention to resolve uncertainties about foreign weapons programs, the implications of a nuclear test moratorium, and other important problems.

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d. Guided Missiles

Significant information on the Soviet guided missile program has been obtained in all basic categories during the past year. This data proved valuable in the production of a new national intelligence estimate on the Soviet program. In particular, additional data on developments in the Soviet research and development program contributed to our knowledge of Soviet surface-to-surface guided missiles. Definite associations were also established between the Soviet guided missile and atomic energy programs. Advanced technical collection techniques contributed materially to the progress made in this field. Some of this information was also obtained

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A summary of agreements, minor differences and recommendations resulting from the joint conference has been submitted to and approved by the IAC.

Although the information received during the past year has increased our general knowledge of the Soviet guided missile program, we still lack specific information regarding the characteristics of missile systems in existence or under development. There is almost a complete lack of evidence on Soviet missile production capabilities and facilities and on operational deployment. Specific evidence is lacking on Soviet military doctrine pertaining to the current and future relationship of guided missiles to a balanced military program.

The intelligence community, recognizing the overriding importance of guided missile intelligence, is continuing energetically both to strengthen the community approach and to stimulate individual action in this field. The Guided Missile Intelligence Committee (GMIC), the established interagency mechanism, is increasing its efforts to close existing intelligence gaps. Along these lines, GMIC recently established a subcommittee to coordinate more effectively collection guidance.

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e. Biological Warfare

The first community-wide estimate (1954) in the field was revised and updated. The current publication estimates the almost certain existence of an active Soviet biological warfare program and assesses Soviet capabilities in offensive and defensive biological warfare. Although progress has been made in BW intelligence through improved analysis of material at hand and through new information, little progress has been made in determining the scope and magnitude of the Soviet BW effort, particularly with respect to offensive biological warfare.


f. Chemical Warfare

An agreed statement of general conclusions on Soviet offensive and defensive chemical warfare capabilities was developed on the working level of the intelligence community. The statement concludes that the USSR has a well-established and capably-staffed CW research and development program but points out wide gaps in our knowledge with respect to the over-all Soviet CW program.

g. Electronics


Significant advances were made in almost every category of intelligence related to Soviet electronics, particularly on radars, telecommunications, and missile guidance systems. These contribu-

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A coordinated study on technical characteristics of Sino-Soviet Bloc radars was completed and served as a basis for the first community-wide estimate of their operational capabilities.

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will review, at a working level, significant electronics intelligence developments occurring since the last conference in April 1956.

## 7. Geographic Intelligence

a. A new interagency program has been initiated in support of unconventional warfare planning. Geographic intelligence is contributing to this program by the selection and analysis of areas within the Sino-Soviet Bloc that fulfill multi-purpose unconventional warfare requirements.

b. As a consequence of Soviet activities in Antarctica, conducted in association with the International Geophysical Year Program, attention has been directed to the appraisal of advantages that might be gained by the USSR from its Antarctic operations, particularly with respect to its possible territorial aspirations and bipolar geodetic research as an aid to its long-range guided missile program.

## C. Collection

### 1. Priority National Intelligence Objectives

In accordance with NSCID No. 4 the list of Priority National Intelligence Objectives was again revised (DCID 4/6). First Priority Objectives continued to emphasize Sino-Soviet strategy, intentions or plans related to the initiation of hostilities. The highest priority was also assigned to Soviet capabilities for nuclear attack, defense against air (including missiles) attack, and the clandestine delivery of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons against the U. S. or key U. S. overseas installations. These priority objectives provide the basic guidance for reappraising collection requirements and planning intelligence production throughout the intelligence community. They have also furnished a stimulus and framework for the development of more refined priority objectives in the economic and scientific and technical fields, as well as in the sphere of international communism.

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2. The Foreign Service

a. The Foreign Service continued to be a major source of overt intelligence information. [REDACTED]

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However, the general quality of the reporting remained high, despite increased consumer demands and budgetary limitations which both imposed personnel shortages and restricted the travel and representation funds available. Nevertheless, deficiencies in reporting exist at a few posts. These are occasioned in part by the increasing demands on officers' time arising from official and private visitors and special pressures created by developments such as the Suez or Hungarian crises. The eleven new posts opened during the past year have already increased the amount of information provided to the Department. Of indirect benefit to the over-all foreign intelligence program was the stimulus to greater coordination provided by a Presidential directive to all American Diplomatic Missions. In essence, this directive reiterates the role of the Chief of Mission as the President's personal representative abroad, and vests with him, as the senior American governmental representative, responsibility for supervision and leadership in connection with activities of all U. S. agencies and representatives affecting relations between the U. S. and the country to which he is accredited.

b. The standard of the reporting on the Sino-Soviet Bloc remained high, particularly in the light of the difficulties under which most U. S. missions operated in Moscow and other Soviet Bloc capitals. Reporting officers continued to be handicapped by interference with their travel.

c. Over-all reporting on Sino-Soviet Bloc countries was materially aided by peripheral reporting and information obtained from friendly foreign ministries. Foreign offices or missions of these friendly countries, for example, have provided information to U. S. Embassy officers on political developments in areas such as Albania and Bulgaria.

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d. Trade fair reporting shed considerable light on Sino-Soviet Bloc industrial production. Information obtained from visitors to Sino-Soviet Bloc countries has been a valuable source of economic data.

e. In the Far East, although political reporting on Communist China in general remains a serious problem, reporting on that area from the Consulate General at Hong Kong was especially valuable, particularly the post's excellent analysis of economic and political developments. Gaps in information on North Vietnam and North Korea continue. A limited amount of information on North Vietnam is received from friendly foreign missions or sources in that area. Information received through such exchanges with foreign governments has been valuable.

f. Reporting from Free World posts, generally speaking, maintained previous high standards for timeliness and analytical content. While developments of the past year have stimulated and improved political reporting in most of the Middle East, they have also increased the need for more detailed coverage of areas such as the Arabian Peninsula, Sudan and Israel and have produced additional impediments to reporting from Egypt and Syria. With respect to Western Europe, political reporting is generally adequate in quantity and quality. Political intelligence on Latin America continues to be relatively good. The volume and general coverage of political reporting from Africa have steadily improved.

### 3. The Service Attache System

a. The Service Attache System continues to be a major source of intelligence information, particularly military. During the past



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
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6. Exchange Visits with the Soviet Bloc

a. The IAC Ad Hoc Committee on Exchanges has continued to furnish intelligence advice during the past year in support of the State Department's handling of exchanges of delegations with the Soviet Bloc. Planning was active during the summer and fall of 1956, but all activity in this field came to a halt as a result of the

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Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolt. Subsequently, in April 1957, the President authorized a gradual resumption of exchanges, and planning activity has once again become substantial. However, only a limited number of exchanges were completed during the year, and the principal activity since resumption has consisted of attendance at conferences in the U. S. and USSR, usually on a firm reciprocal basis. A total of seven formal government-negotiated exchanges were carried out with the USSR during FY 1957. There were also a number of exchanges with the European Satellites.

b. The small volume of exchanges with the USSR and the reciprocal conferences during the year produced a substantial quantity of economic and scientific reporting, rated as valuable. Intelligence obtained from Satellite exchanges has been largely in the political field.

c. With a view to an expected increase in exchanges, the Committee on Exchanges has prepared about 20 projects which, in its judgment, could be carried out with net intelligence advantage to the U. S., i. e., intelligence gain to the U. S. exceeding the sum of the intelligence and technological gain to the USSR. A number of these projects are now in active negotiation. A systematic survey and evaluation of the intelligence results of exchanges, conferences, and private travel to the USSR and the Bloc will be made in the fall of 1957.

#### 7. The Foreign Language Publications Program


The increase in availability of Soviet Bloc publications, previously prohibited for export, has continued. One of the highlights of the period was the increase in military information included in Soviet and Satellite periodicals, with [REDACTED] proving to be a particularly fruitful source of data on Soviet materiel. The Soviets have expanded the publication and release of handbooks containing statistical data on whole segments of their economic development. These handbooks have been translated for the intelligence community. There appears to be a determined effort to release selected Soviet Bloc published source materials on an exchange basis. Scientific and technical open-source foreign literature has proved

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valuable as a source of information for estimating foreign research and development capabilities and reducing the change of technological surprise. In order to insure the proper exploitation of this increased volume for the intelligence community, steps have been taken to augment the work of current facilities through external contractual arrangements. The procurement of foreign language publications has also been made more efficient through an active program of coordination of requirements in Washington and of collection in the field. The exchange-of-publications programs of the several member agencies of the Advisory Committee on Foreign Language Publications were exploited to obtain scarce or otherwise difficult to procure titles. Special reports on the Chinese Communist press in Peking and book publication in Mongolia were submitted by USIA. As the reporting period closed, a paper was in preparation to evaluate the contribution of foreign publications to intelligence research.

8. Geographic Intelligence Collection

a. Under the coordinated foreign map procurement program, opportunities in the Free World for acquisition of maps and for geographic reporting have been increased by reestablishment of a Geographic Attache position in Buenos Aires and the authorization of three new Foreign Service Geographic Attache positions for Beirut, New Delhi, and Copenhagen. 

b. Acquisition of special subject maps on areas of the Sino-Soviet Bloc has trebled during the past year, and an exchange of nautical charts has been initiated with the USSR. However, practically no topographic maps on these areas have been collected since the end of World War II. Little progress was made during the year in the collection of cartographic and geodetic information on the Sino-Soviet Bloc urgently required for U. S. missile employment and other military purposes.

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9. International Communism


The Committee on International Communism, established by the IAC in January 1956, completed its examination of intelligence production and collection in the field of international communism. It concluded that while both fall far short of the ideal, both are reasonably close to attainable limits at the present time. The Committee has formulated a system of priorities designed to facilitate collection of needed intelligence information. It has also agreed upon a new procedure for the development of coordinated clandestine collection requirements to help fill existing gaps in intelligence on international communism.

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


11. Foreign Radio and Television Broadcasts

a. During the past year the foreign radio monitoring program continued to provide significant current intelligence information. This proved particularly valuable during the Hungarian and Suez crises.

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c. Television monitoring is expected to increase in importance with the multiplying of foreign stations and the improvement in technical facilities. Experiments are being conducted with recording and photographic equipment for the monitoring of telecasts.



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12. Foreign Materials and Equipment

Requirements in the past year have continued to stress the need for Soviet Bloc scientific and military devices, rather than for commercial items, which are more easily obtained. Collection efforts have therefore been less extensive in the procurement of consumer goods and more concentrated on weapons and equipment.

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14. Coordination of Information Processing

The Ad Hoc Committee on Information Processing agreed on standards of quality and procedure for many phases of document handling, and emphasized the importance of compatibility among IAC document systems. Many important projects have been initiated by the intelligence community during the past year in the complex field of document storage, indexing and subject retrieval.

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Most of these seek the development of film and electronic equipment which will increase processing speeds and assure access to the very large quantities of documents involved. The Committee has made special efforts to advise the IAC agencies on developments in this field.

25X1C 15. Domestic Collection under NSCID No. 7

The number of information reports collected within the US concerning the Soviet Bloc increased by 84% during the year. 25X1C

25X1C [REDACTED] Increased travel to and from the Soviet Bloc and more extensive exploitation of international conferences also contributed to the expansion in the volume of these reports. Reporting on the Bloc is expected to decrease with the tapering off of [REDACTED] 25X1C

25X1C [REDACTED] but it is believed that this trend will be partly counteracted by the resumption of the US/Soviet exchange program.

25X1C [REDACTED] sources continues to provide valuable information on Sino-Soviet Bloc ports.

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
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
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i. Military Services Activities. Coordination of military services activities under DCID 5/1 has continued. During the period

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


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j. Interagency Source Control Register. The IAC approved the establishment of an Interagency Source Register. This register is designed to provide a centralized file of clandestine sources in order to preclude multiple recruitment of sources and to facilitate the elimination of "paper mills" and fabricators.

#### D. Coordination

##### 1. Review of National Security Council Intelligence Directives

During the past year the intelligence community took action with respect to various recommendations by the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities. In this connection, the IAC commenced a comprehensive review of all of the National Security Council Intelligence Directives, and it is anticipated that suggested revisions of these basic directives will be submitted for NSC approval early in FY 1958.

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