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5 July 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director, Scientific Intelligence
FROM: Chief, Guided Missiles Division, SI
SUBJECT: GMIC vs. SEC for Coordinating Activities in
the Guided Missile Field

I. Assumptions

a. That the guided missile intelligence problem is of such immediate and critical importance that one inter-community group must be designated to coordinate all facets of the intelligence program, with the exception of physical collection itself.

b. That responsibilities of above designated group regarding collection will be confined to keeping itself closely informed as to activities in this field, submitting guidance to collectors in the form of requirements, collection guides, target dossiers, recommendations concerning new means of collection and recommendations for direct collection action through prescribed channels where indicated.

II. Comparison between GMIC and SEC as coordinating bodies

Discussion: There have been two significant factors added since GMIC was first introduced. These should be considered now in CIA's evaluation of its policy position. Both factors stem from the Clark report and are roughly as follows:

- a. DCID 3/4 should be recinded, including SEC, and SIC should be reconstituted.
- b. State Department should be relieved of its current responsibilities of scientific intelligence and these functions given to CIA.

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Both recommendations, if adopted in the future, would considerably change the activities and responsibilities of OSI/CIA and the inter-community group (SEC - SIC) coordinating this area. The first recommendation, however, will cause quite some controversy, taking quite a few months to resolve; and the resolution of the problem may not be nearly as clear cut as the recommendation. Should such steps ever be taken, however, it appears quite reasonable that the SIC should have permanent subcommittees to consider critical fields and two such fields are currently indicated, e. g., those of atomic energy and guided missiles. It is quite reasonable, also, that in the future other critical fields will be revealed during the early stages of R & D and that designated permanent subcommittees should be cognizant of all phases of intelligence in these fields until such time as the extreme criticality has abated to the extent that the problem can safely be handled by a diverse and more loosely coordinated mechanism. This could well be a long term policy objective of CIA, and such adoption would tend to pull together the dissenting factions of CIA.

The big question to be decided at this time is whether CIA (representing national interests) can be assured that SEC can handle the guided missile problem during the interim period until the much larger, but no more critical, problem can be resolved in the face of certain restrictions and limitations the military and other activities of CIA would like to prescribe. It is felt that the acquirement of guided missile intelligence is so critical to national security that CIA cannot afford to guess as to the quality of the attack on this problem but must press with all possible means the adoption of the most complete solution possible, that of formation of GMIC. Specific disadvantages of the adoption of SEC to handle the problem are listed below:

- a. The guided missile problem cannot be handled fully by SEC alone or with only part time support by subcommittees. Depth and continuity of knowledge would be sacrificed to an unacceptable degree.
- b. The military will not permit any changes in SEC charter, such as authority to set up a permanent subcommittee, which can be construed as reflecting any change to DCID 3/4.

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c. SEC cannot handle the problem without changes made in its charter or without being issued a supplemental listing of powers by IAC, which is tantamount to changes in charter.

d. ORR and EIC are not in accord with SEC handling entire problem.


e. The uncertainties of the quality, amount, and continuance of support that the military would accord SEC in this expanded role is questionable and cannot be assured.

f. The satisfactory functioning of an ad hoc subcommittee to a committee whose authority and capability is questionable is severely questioned.

g. The time lost and "watering down" of any worthwhile coordination or guidance through such a mechanism, described above, is unacceptable.

h. The endorsement by CIA of a questionable solution to this problem is unacceptable.

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cc: DD/I
Ch/IPS/SI

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