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13 May 1966

**MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE**

**SUBJECT: Request for Special National Intelligence Estimate  
(SNIE) (U)**

1. As an input to our NATO planning, I am interested in further exploring the factors affecting the USSR's assessment of the political/military reliability of the East European Warsaw Pact nations. I would appreciate your requesting from the USIB a Special National Intelligence Estimate which would discuss the reliability of the East European governments and their armed forces in the terms outlined below.

2. The estimate should focus on the extent to which the Soviets believe they could depend on the East European governments and armed forces in their planning for the contingency of non-nuclear conflict in Europe. The estimate should canvass the general factors influencing East European reliability from the Soviet point of view, including the responsiveness of governments to Soviet direction; the loyalty of military personnel; the efficiency of the Warsaw Pact command structure and other means of control which

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the Soviets might employ; the effect of national enmities among the East European nations; and the effect, insofar as these are relevant, of possible future changes in NATO and relationships among the European countries.

3. In order to be useful for NATO planning, the estimate should assess East European reliability under the following possible circumstances in which the USSR might conceivably plan to engage the West in non-nuclear combat:

a. A Berlin crisis, arising either out of local issues or as a Soviet response to US actions outside Europe.

b. A deliberate non-nuclear attack on Western Europe, either using only forces in place so as to provide no warning or using a 50-60 division force after a prior buildup.

c. A conflict arising by accident, arising for example from some autobahn misunderstanding or an uprising in East Germany which was not immediately suppressed.

4. I request that this SNIE be completed in July.

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	<b>CONCURRENCE</b>	<b>INFORMATION</b>	<b>SIGNATURE</b>
<b>Remarks:</b> Our redraft of a DoD <sup>draft</sup> request for an estimate. DoD likes it, is checking it out, and expects Mac Namara to sign + despatch it to DCI any day now. — JW			
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