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*File*

13 June 1963

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR**

**SUBJECT: NIE 85-63; SITUATION AND PROSPECTS IN CUBA**

1. For upwards of three hours on 13 June, we met with the representatives of the USIB agencies and produced the attached agreed new text of NIE 85-63 on Cuba. (New material is underlined on pages marked with paperclips.) The representatives took no reservations and foresaw no objections on the part of their principals; they will telephone concurrence or objections by noon on 14 June if possible.

2. Most of the discussion was devoted to the problem of transfer of operational control of the SAM sites. We reviewed all known evidence and indications,

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One of the problems was a reconciliation of the discussion of 12 June with a passage in NIE 11-62, "Main Trends in Soviet Foreign Policy," as approved by USIB on 22 May 1963:

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"We expect the Soviets to hand over to Castro their advanced weapons as the Cuban forces are trained to operate them, possibly including control over the surface-to-air missile (SAM) system. We are unable to estimate a date by which Cubans would acquire complete control of the SAM system, but we do not exclude that this could occur as early as the latter part of 1963. This would, in the Soviet view, involve some risk of Cuban attacks upon reconnaissance aircraft which could touch off a new major crisis, but they may regard this risk as preferable to the political cost of either withdrawing the system or trying to keep it indefinitely under their own command." (Page 12, paragraph 27)

3. On balance we felt it unwise to predict flatly that "for the foreseeable future it is highly unlikely" that the Soviets would refuse to take the risk involved in turning over the SAM system to Castro. We felt that the weight of evidence and indications should lead us to infer that they have indeed told Castro that they would do so, though not that they would carry out the agreement if future developments dictate otherwise. These points appear in paragraph D of the Conclusions and paragraph 36 of the text. We also considered it useful to point out in paragraph 37 the slim possibility that turnover of the MIG-21 system [redacted]

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[REDACTED] might with luck be  
used successfully against a US high altitude reconnaissance  
aircraft.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:

SHERMAN KENT  
Chairman

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