

Kent

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

27 July 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: US-Pakistan Relations *

SUMMARY

The US-Pakistan relationship is coming under increasing strain because of growing recognition on both sides that each looks for something different from the alliance. The US wants support [redacted] in the East-West confrontation. Pakistan wants reinforcement for its position vis-a-vis India. This underlying incongruity will increasingly irritate relations, although an outright repudiation of Pakistan's pro-Western stance is unlikely, at least as long as President Ayub remains in control.

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* This memorandum has been discussed with DD/P which concurs generally in its substance.

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1. US-Pakistan relations have experienced growing strains over the past two years. President Ayub has sharply criticized Washington for failure to support its allies fully in their struggles with neutralist countries, and has expressed great skepticism about the value of CENTO and SEATO. His recent refusal to send troops to Thailand to support the Western position in Southeast Asia is in striking contrast to his willingness to do so a year earlier. Ayub has sought to improve relations with Communist China in full knowledge that such moves would displease the US. Meanwhile, many of the politicians in the newly elected parliament are calling for a more independent foreign policy, and important elements of the press are arguing that the alliance with the West cost Pakistan the friendship of the Communist and neutral nations while providing no comparable benefits.

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Basic Attitudes

2. US-Pakistan relations have long been hampered by the differing aims of the two countries. For the US, Pakistan was and is an ally in the struggle with the Communist Bloc. Pakistan, on the other hand, accepted special ties with the US almost entirely in the hope of strengthening its position vis-a-vis India, which it has always regarded as the major threat to its security. Given Pakistan's all-consuming fear of and pre-occupation with India, combined with US commitments to help India in economic development, the path of US-Pakistan relations could hardly be smooth.

3. New and more serious strains have emerged in the past two years. The U-2 affair brought home to both the Pakistani leaders and public their vulnerability to Soviet pressures and their dependence on the US -- whose handling of the plane incident Ayub found less than impressive. He quickly experimented with accepting Soviet economic aid (for oil exploration) in the hope of reducing Soviet pressure on Pakistan. Of even greater concern to the Pakistani leaders has been the prominence in the present US administration of elements friendly to India and believed to be critical of Asian military pacts. Ayub's successful

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US visit in mid-1961 only temporarily dampened down the fears of Pakistani leaders that the US would attempt to disengage from its close alliance with Pakistan. Many of them probably feel that only the importance of the special US facilities in Pakistan prevents the US from giving top priority to its relations with India.

4. In addition, divergent attitudes toward Afghanistan have been a source of friction between Pakistan and the US. Afghanistan's Pushtoonistan policy has long irritated Pakistan, and Ayub appears convinced that the only way to force the Afghans to back down is by a tough policy. Thus he closed the Afghan consulates and trade agencies in late 1961 without consulting the US, and has tended to see US efforts to mediate the quarrel and to maintain a Western position in Afghanistan as undercutting his policy.

5. More important than any specific problem, however, is the growing awareness that the alliance with the US is unlikely to enable Pakistan to gain what it wants most -- "victory" over India, specifically on the Kashmir issue. Indeed, many Pakistanis now appear to have considerable doubt that the alliance really provides them with much security against India. Uncertain as to how effectively the US would aid them in the event of war

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with India, they are convinced that the development of a more aggressive Indian nationalism following Goa means that the threat from India has increased sharply. Though they claim that such aggression is a present danger, their real concern probably is with the period a few years hence when Indian defense production capabilities are greater and India's reduced dependence on foreign suppliers also lessens the restraining influence of other countries.

6. To complicate matters further, few Pakistanis are proud of the country's record in domestic affairs. Pakistan has still to prove it can achieve a stable political system. Conflicts between East and West Pakistan -- as well as within the latter -- remain strong, thus hampering national integration. Despite impressive economic progress in recent years, the country's basic economic limitations loom as large as ever. Thus all the ingredients for intense national frustration are present, and the US easily qualifies as a scapegoat -- especially when it appears to be making concessions to India and Afghanistan that Pakistan regards as inimical to its interests.

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Outlook

7. Clearly, future trends in US-Pakistan relations will depend heavily on US policy toward India -- and to a lesser extent, Afghanistan -- as well as toward Pakistan. Should there be a marked change in US policy favorable to Pakistan, e.g. more military aid and greater support in its quarrels with its neighbors, many of the present doubts and suspicions would recede. On the other hand, should the Pakistanis become convinced that US policy had taken a clear cut turn in favor of India, including US provision of significant military aid, the reaction, as indicated in SNIE 31/32-62, "Probable Reaction of Pakistan to the Provision of Supersonic Fighter Aircraft to India by the US or Other Western Countries," dated 6 June 1962, would be strongly adverse, possibly including Pakistan's withdrawal from CENTO and SEATO, elimination of the special US facilities, and adoption of a neutralist foreign policy.

8. Assuming that the US continues to treat both India and Pakistan about as it has in the past, the present irritating relationship in which Pakistan remains aligned with the West and seeks greater US commitments and support while at the same time

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acting independently in a number of matters of concern to the West as a whole is likely to continue indefinitely. There will be less consultation on policies regarding India, Afghanistan, Communist China, and the UN, and in general, the relationship will probably be characterized by fairly hard and cynical bargaining on Pakistan's part. Every possible concession will be extracted from the US in return for the special facilities. US efforts to explain the importance of these facilities for the security of the entire Free World may only raise the price of Pakistan's cooperation.

9. As long as Ayub remains in control, there is unlikely to be any clear-cut repudiation of Pakistan's pro-Western stance. However, over the longerrun, as the doubts about the value of the alliance felt by important sectors of the politically conscious public make themselves felt and as trust and confidence are eroded by constant irritation, the alliance could come to have less and less practical significance. Should the politicians once again come to exercise dominant influence over Pakistan's policies, a formal shift to non-alignment might occur.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES



SHERMAN KENT
Chairman

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