

20 February 1959

NEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: SNIE 190-2-59: "Probable Soviet Courses of Action Regarding Berlin and Germany"

- 1. This paper was written in response to a series of questions posed by the Department of State in respect of various contingencies which might arise in connection with the development of the crisis in Berlin. The paper thus represents a specialized supplement to SNIE 100-13-58 "Seviet Objectives in the Berlin Crisis." 23 December 1958.
- 2. The estimate proved difficult of coordination, partly because of the great complexity of the tactical situation in and around Berlin, and partly because of certain basic disagreements among the representatives as noted below. In general, State, Army, and CIA tended to take one side of an issue. Air Force and The Joint Staff the other, with Navy's position not always clear.
- 3. The most important disagreement is represented by the dissents in paras. 23, 25, and para. G of the Conclusions.

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Air Force and The Joint Staff are firmly of the opinion that a show of force on the local scene, once access controls had been turned over to the East Germans, would cause the Soviets to retreat, whereas the other agencies believe as firmly in the probability of the contrary development.

- 4. A second important disagreement is reflected by the State reservations in pares. 7 and pare. B of the Conclusions. In each instance, State wishes to add to the minima upon which Soviet negotiations would insist the requirement that any takes between Pankow and Bonn on reunification must be limited to the Soviet scheme of confederation. This defference reflects a broader disagreement between CIA and State on the extent to which the Soviet leaders are genuinely interested in negotiations on a broader scale.
- 5. The Navy reservation to para. G can probably be removed by bringing up one or two parases from the text. The Navy reservation on para. 13 is not entirely clear but does not appear to be serious.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:



SHERMAN KENT Assistant Director National Estimates