


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27 April 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: SNIE 36.2-2-59, Probable Reaction to the Communist Threat in Iraq

BACKGROUND

1. This estimate was initiated by O/NE, with the approval of the USIB on 14 April. Our two previous SNIE's on Iraq handled the internal situation adequately, but it was considered desirable to assess more extensively the motives and attitudes of other interested states in the developing situation.

2. We learn that still another crash estimate on the situation will soon be requested by State, one geared to consequences of certain possible Western courses of action. State is now framing assumptions, and will probably request a USIB target date of 19 May for the new paper.

SUBSTANCE

3. We encountered no great difficulties in coordinating this paper with the representatives. The only outstanding problem involves Navy's reservation on the last sentence of Conclusion D (paragraph 27

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in the text). We think the proposition therein made is quite obviously valid, but the Navy representative appears to think it ends the paper on too nervous a note concerning Soviet willingness to assume risks over Iraq.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:

Sherman Kent  
Assistant Director  
National Estimates