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Felds



TS # 141939-d

11 May 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

**SUBJECT: Briefing Note on Coordinated Intelligence Assumptions
For NESC Project, 1959**

1. This material was prepared in response to the request of the Director, NESC, dated 6 March 1959. Its format and scope are generally similar to those of the coordinated assumptions prepared for NESC last October. Because of the short deadline, many of the assumptions in the present paper are simply straight-line projections of those made last October.

2. Please note that the projections continue to be heavily caveated (see Foreward, especially paragraphs 1 and 3). These assumptions should be given the minimum distribution consistent with the needs of the NESC Staff and the USIB principals. Last October, this was ten copies to NESC and two to each USIB Agency.

3. The remaining issues and reservations are:

Section A, p. 5, subpara. (d). Air believes there should be many more AS-1 air-to-surface missiles, on the ground that they are already in widespread use and

that they will continue to be useful for a number of years. We held a small number because we think this first-generation missile will be phasing out by 1963, in view of its poor flight characteristics and the probable availability of a second-generation system.

Section A, p. 5, subpara. (e). Our ICBM assumption is a straight-line projection of the production and deployment program implied in last fall's assumption that the USSR would have an operational capability with 500 ICBMs in mid-1962. We have no basis for accepting either the near-maximum program proposed by Air, or a small program intended almost solely for deterrence, proposed by Navy. Note that GMAIC has not estimated that a second-generation ICBM system will be available in mid-1963, although considerable modification and improvement will have been made.

Section C, page 18. Our statement on Soviet doctrine is paraphrased from NIE II-4-58, where the Soviet view of the importance of surprise was thoroughly debated and Air took a formal dissent. The reservation here carries this dissent forward.

Section D, page 30. Air believes the number of SA-3 low altitude surface-to-air missiles should be smaller, since it no longer accepts the majority estimate of first operational capability date. We have accepted the most recent GMAIC estimate.

Section E, page 39. Air cross-reference to its reservation on Soviet doctrine in Section C and NIE II-4-58.

Section F, Table 1. Navy continues to dissent from the majority estimate of the amount of nuclear material available in the USSR. We have accepted the JAEIC draft of the forthcoming NIE II-2-59, which will come before the USIB in the near future. They will probably also reserve on Section A because its estimate of nuclear materials will not support the numbers of delivery vehicles assumed.

Section G, page 18. Navy reserved to this paragraph in order to check with its operational experts. We have been informed that Navy will accept the section if a few minor changes are made. These, together with a minor change proposed by The Joint Staff, are now being checked with the representatives and we expect all reservations to disappear.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES: