

ILLEGIB



18 May 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: SNIE 36.2-3-59. IMPLICATIONS OF A COMMUNIST
RECOVERY IN IRAQ

BACKGROUND

1. This estimate was undertaken on a crash basis at the State Department's request (letter from Ambassador Cunningham to the DCL, 30 April 1959). It is designed to take account of certain specific possible contingencies not fully explored in previous SNIEs on the situation.

SUBSTANCE

2. For the most part, the estimate was coordinated without difficulty. The only unresolved question arises over the estimate of the chances of Soviet military counter-intervention in the event that Western forces went into Iraq. (Paragraphs 11 and 24).

3. At one extreme, the Air Force believes that the chances of such counter-intervention are slight. The Board's position is that they are less than even, but cannot be discounted quite so far.

The other agencies' views are somewhere in between. We will offer a new suggestion at the briefing this afternoon which may help some of the agencies though probably not the Air Force.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

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National Estimates