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8 April 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: SE-40: Communist Reactions to US Establishment of a "Volunteer Freedom Corps"

BACKGROUND

1. SE-40 was prepared at the request of the Ad Hoc Committee established pursuant to NSC 143. Mr. [redacted] who has participated with General Wackerling in the work of that Committee, assures us that SE-40 is of proper scope to meet the Committee's requirements.

2. You used a preliminary draft of SE-40 in your discussion with the Ad Hoc Committee on 30 March.

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SUBSTANCE

3. In the coordination process the G-2 representative has pressed for amendments having the mutually contradictory tendencies of increasing the Kremlin's estimate of the military importance of the VFC and diminishing the estimated Communist reaction. This attitude is at variance with G-2's oral contribution and appears to be the result of pressure from Army psychological warfare elements.

4. At the clean-up session this G-2 effort was reduced to two proposals, as follows:

a. An elaborate revision of paragraph 6 which, in the judgment of the Board and the other Agency representatives, would nullify the estimate of probable reaction in paragraph 6 without offering an alternative estimate, and so would abdicate the estimative function. The Board and other representatives held that although the Communists could, and therefore might, ignore the VFC, all that was known of them supported the estimate of probable reaction in paragraph 6 and no case had been made for any other estimate.

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h. The addition to paragraph 9 of an estimate that the Communists would not succeed in penetrating the VFC to any serious extent. This was rejected as wargaming and outside the scope of the problem. The present text gives an estimate of what the Communists would attempt to do. Whether they would succeed depends on factors outside the scope of positive intelligence.

5. The G-2 representative made no reservations on these points, but his principal may bring them up at the IAC. Present indications are that the other Agencies will support the estimate as it stands.

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[Redacted]
Acting Assistant Director
National Estimates

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