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1 February 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Significant Change in the US G-2 Estimate of Chinese Communist Capability to Support an Invasion of Southeast Asia

1. The G-2 contribution to NIE-35/1, "Probable Developments in Indochina through Mid-1952," gives the Chinese Communists a much greater capability to support logistically an invasion in Southeast Asia than did NIE-55, "Communist Capabilities and Intentions in Korea," dated 7 December 1951.

2. Specifically, the present G-2 estimates, compared to those of NIE-55, are as follows:

- a. Chinese Communists have the capability to support logistically 150,000 troops, instead of 100,000, for an invasion of Indochina.
- b. Chinese Communists have the capability to support logistically 90,000 troops, instead of 50,000, for an invasion of Burma.
- c. Chinese Communists have the capability to support concurrent invasions of both Indochina and Burma instead of the inability to support such invasions concurrently.


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3. G-2 bases its present estimate of Chinese Communist capabilities on the intelligence received since the preparation of NIE-55, indicating the following:

- a. A significant improvement in the effectiveness, vigor and coordination of recent Viet Minh attacks in Tonkin.
- b. Substantial improvement in supply routes and facilities from South China into Indochina.

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
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
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SHERMAN KEINT  
Assistant Director  
National Estimates



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