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NSC BRIEFING

23 May 1960

BACKGROUND NOTE: POSSIBLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

- I. In current exceedingly complex situation, long-term direction of Soviet policy virtually incalculable.
 - A. Although Khrushchev clearly does not now intend a fundamental reversal of his detente line, this not entirely under his control.
 1. At a minimum, official US-Soviet relations will be strained, and this, perforce, will effect to some degree all Soviet relations with Free World.
 2. Further effects of Khrushchev's animus toward President, feeling of injured pride, generally vindictive mood in Paris, difficult to assess. He may wish to "punish" US and seek out opportunities to embarrass its leaders.
 - B. Specific Soviet foreign policy behavior in the months ahead may go along the following lines:
 1. In relations with US, Moscow may effect an across the board reduction of official contacts.
 2. Soviets may suspend or sharply curtail exchange of official (though not private) delegations. (Note visit of US railroadmen authorized on 19 May, but visas for USAF jazz band scheduled to play in Moscow were withdrawn.)
 3. In Geneva, Soviet attitude at disarmament talks likely to toughen, delegates will seek to exploit U-2 incident. May stiffen demands at nuclear test talks.

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- a. Khrushchev claimed in Paris USSR ready to sign test ban "at any time."
 - b. But may demand participation in planned US nuclear experimental explosions (with right to inspect US devices) and insist on very small number of explosions.
4. We do not expect cut-back in Khrushchev's travels and personal diplomacy.
- a. Scheduled for Austria next month, Africa in fall. Said he would go to Latin America if invited.
5. We expect Soviets to seize every opportunity in Latin America to make trouble in US "backyard."
- a. Signs of impending arms deal with Cuba.
6. In respect to underdeveloped areas, Soviets not likely to cut down on economic assistance. May even step up aid to some countries (e.g., UAR, Ethiopia, Afghanistan) in order to "show up" US.
- a. At same time, Moscow likely to step up pressures against US bases (in Libya, Turkey, Pakistan, Japan, etc.).
 - b. May heighten subversive campaign too, with Greece and Iran likely targets. Unpleasant incidents involving American personnel (as in South Vietnam) a possibility.
7. Together with Chinese Communists (or Chinese alone) could revert to "shooting" campaigns in Far East.
- a. Guerrilla activity in Laos, South Vietnam--assets in place.
 - b. Heightened tension in Taiwan Strait--air combat, artillery duels. (We think all-out assault on offshore island or Taiwan itself unlikely, especially if it were unilateral Chinese action.)

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