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**COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN CUBA
(EXTRACTS)**

The first part of this special estimate reviews the trend of events in Cuba, the acceptance of local Communists "as participants in the process of remaking Cuba," and the development of "significant contacts with the Bloc." It states, "Prolongation of the present situation will result in even greater Communist influence in Cuba and will further encourage Communists and other anti-US elements throughout Latin America," and continues:

"6. However, Fidel Castro remains the dominant element in the regime and we believe that he is not disposed to accept actual direction from any foreign source.... We consider it extremely unlikely that the PSP Communist Party...could soon develop sufficient strength to make openly an effective bid for power on its own....

"7. We believe that for some time Communist leaders will continue to concentrate on influencing the formulation and implementation of policy and on covert infiltration of the government--and that they will avoid any challenge to Fidel Castro's authority or any claim to formal PSP participation in the government.... The Soviet leaders probably believe that the present state of affairs is weakening the US position and advancing their interests, not only in Cuba, but throughout Latin America. The Communists probably also believe that the US will lose in influence and prestige so long as Castro's successful defiance of the US (including his acceptance of Bloc assistance) continues and that the US is faced with the dilemma of tolerating an increasingly Communist-oriented Cuba or of arousing widespread Latin American opposition by intervening. Above all, the Soviets probably wish to avoid a situation in which the US could secure broad Latin American support for action to curb Castro. While Castro's regime has lost

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prestige in Latin America, ... few popular leaders in the area are prepared to dismiss Castro as merely a pro-Communist demagogue....

~~AND WILL NOT BE~~
"8. We believe that Fidel Castro and his government are not now demonstrably under the domination or control of the international Communist movement.... Yet, we believe that the Cuban regime is in practice following the line set for Latin American Communist parties at the time of the 21st Party Congress in Moscow in February 1959 and that it will continue to pursue policies advantageous to the Communists and to accept Communist assistance and advice in carrying them out.... Castro appears intent on pressing ahead with his anti-US campaign, which might come to involve attempted expulsion of the US from its Guantanamo Base, abandonment of Cuba's privileged position in the US sugar market, a complete diplomatic rupture, and danger to the lives of American citizens. The more he becomes embroiled with the US, the more he will look to the Bloc for support, including provision of military equipment, although both the Bloc and the Cubans would probably seek to avoid any accusation that Cuba was being made into a Soviet base. Should the Castro regime be threatened, the USSR would probably do what it could to support the regime. However, the USSR would not hesitate to write off the Castro regime before involving itself in a direct military confrontation with the US over Cuba, or, at least during the present state of Soviet policy, in a major diplomatic crisis with the US."

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