

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

KHRUSHCHEV VISIT TO INDIA AND BURMA

- I. Communique issued at end of Khrushchev's visit to India (11-16 Feb) satisfies some of political aims of Khrushchev's goodwill mission, but impact of visit appears considerably less than might have been expected.
- A. In communique, India noted ^{Emphasis} Khrushchev's personal contributions to lessening of world tensions, ^{It also} expressed appreciation of Soviet disarmament proposals and military cutbacks, supported cessation of nuclear tests and prohibition of thermonuclear weapons, and commented on remarkable advances of Soviet science.
- B. Thus, India again on record as approving a number of important Soviet foreign policy positions.
- II. Indian public reaction to visit, however, considerably less enthusiastic than in 1955 and Khrushchev's use of neutral India as cold-war battleground again deplored.
- A. Crowds at Khrushchev functions relatively small, applause perfunctory.
- B. After much press speculation that Khrushchev would help break Sino-Indian border dispute deadlock, Nehru announced he had invited Chou to New Delhi prior to Khrushchev's arrival.
1. No evidence in communique that Khrushchev contributed to any progress on problem. Khrushchev did not mention China publicly until very moment of his departure for Burma when, at prodding of newsmen, he said he hoped India and China could solve dispute peaceably.

13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DOCUMENT NO. _____
NO. _____
CLASS. _____
AUTH. _____
DATE 1-28-80

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP79R00890A001200020014-7

C. Khrushchev's behavior, though more moderate than in 1955, again antagonized Indians. *He looked tired, according to reports*

1. Some Parliament members apparently resented his preaching Marxist ideology and his emphasis on one-party political system.
2. Khrushchev's attacks on West, including criticism of US aid as "dole" and description of US economic system as "lame horse" did not go down well.
3. His boast that USSR is strongest military power in world lessened the impact of his "mission of peace" and his profession of willingness to disarm.
4. No significant new Soviet aid was announced during visit. Only action was official signature of \$375,000,000 aid agreement, concluded last July and initialled in September.

III. Apparent throughout visit that ChiCom actions in Tibet and clashes on Indian border have left residue of suspicion in India regarding Bloc faith in principles of peace and coexistence.

A. Goodwill generated in India by Soviet neutrality on Tibetan border issue and by Soviet expressions of hope for peaceful solution apparently was not increased and may actually have been lessened by Khrushchev visit.

IV. Khrushchev's visit to Burma not desired by ^{*the*} ~~Burmese~~ ^{*govt*} and his ^{*activities were*} ~~reception so far has been~~ kept to the minimum consonant with protocol.

A. He left without satisfaction of joint economic plan

Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP79R00890A001200020014-7

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP79R00890A001200020014-7

- A. Popular reception one of poorest ever accorded visiting dignitary. Only a few thousand people, in city of 750,000, turned out at airport and along 16-mile route to capital.
- V. Khrushchev expected hit stride in Indonesia where he assured of red-carpet treatment, ^{by Sukarno} on extensive tours of islands during ⁽²⁾ 10-day visit.
 - A. Khrushchev's arrival ^{today marked} 18 February marks his first visit to country and host Sukarno anxious please.
 - B. Indonesian-Soviet relations already cordial.
 - C. Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), with estimated 1½ million members and broad popular support, will help make Khrushchev feel at home.

1,000 Indonesian officials and estimated 100,000 people in Djakarta airport area for Khrushchev's arrival.

Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP79R00890A001200020014-7

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~