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EXTRACTS FROM MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD REGARDING MR. DULLES'
BRIEFING OF MR. TRUMAN, 12 AUGUST 1958

6. The Director made it clear that Khrushchev's demand for a meeting of the General Assembly on the Mid-East problem was a return to earlier resolutions, in one of which the U.S. itself had proposed to refer the Mid-Eastern problem to the General Assembly. Khrushchev's shift in tactics following the visit to Peiping did not mean an abandonment of the request for a summit conference. The Director developed the significance of Khrushchev's visit to Peiping in the context of a Sino-Soviet desire for a summit conference in which the Chinese Communists would have an insistent voice. When the Director described the Chinese Communist military and political pressure on the Chinese Nationalist position in the Taiwan Strait area, as part of the coordinated moves by the Sino-Soviet bloc against the West, Mr. Truman responded with concern.

7. Mr. Truman immediately asked about the situation in Korea and on being told that the Chinese Communists had been withdrawing troops from North Korea he said that he had wondered if the pressure against Formosa might be a ruse or distraction to cover a revival of pressure in Korea. He went on the express his doubts and suspicions concerning the Chinese Communists and remarked on the difficulties which an American has in understanding the Chinese. He sometimes thought he should have permitted General MacArthur to go after them. Mr. Truman

indicated his acute consciousness of the continuing danger to us arising out of the Chinese Communist threat in the Far East. As before, on the occasion of his briefing on 30 July, he alluded to his interest in Sino-Soviet relations, adding this time that he was convinced the Russians were afraid of the Chinese.