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14 NOVEMBER 1956

NSC BRIEFING

BACKGROUND--UN "POLICE" FORCE ISSUES

- I. UN members offering troops now total 23. From the Commonwealth--6: Australia, Canada, ^{Ceylon} India, New Zealand, Pakistan. From Europe --8: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden. From Latin America--3: Brazil, ^{Ecuador} and Colombia. From Asia--3: Burma, ~~Malaya~~, Indonesia, Philippines. From Soviet Bloc--2: Czechoslovakia and Rumania. Independent--1: Yugoslavia.
- II. Egyptians and Hammarskjold have agreed on use of 8 of these: troops from Colombia, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, India, Indonesia and Yugoslavia.
- A. Canadian participation has also been accepted by Egypt "in principle," but subject to negotiations between Nasr and Hammarskjold this week in Cairo. Nasr reportedly fears that Canadian troops' resemblance to British might create incidents.
- B. Egypt rejected Pakistani participation because of Pakistan's Baghdad Pact ties. The similar Egyptian objection to Danish and Norwegian troops, because of NATO ties, was overcome by Hammarskjold.
- C. Hammarskjold has rejected Czech and Rumanian troop offers. He believes that Indonesian troops will never materialize.
- III. Hammarskjold believes that clearance of the Suez Canal is not within the mandate of the UN force, but subject to negotiation--along with arrangements for control and operation of the canal--in accordance with the "six principles" previously developed in UN discussion.

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- A. Hammarskjold is optimistic about getting Egyptian consent for Danish and Norwegian technicians to clear the canal on a commercial basis. He has already asked both Danish and ² Dutch firms for estimates.
- IV. During weekend back-and-forth, Nasr voiced his particular fear that UN force in Canal Zone might "violate" Egyptian sovereignty. In addition to specification of countries which might contribute to "police" force, Nasr attempted:
- A. To establish Egypt's right to say when the UN force must leave.
 - B. To insist that the UN force have "no function" in the Canal Zone, once British and French troops withdraw. Hammarskjold was apparently successful in persuading Nasr to leave question of these conditions in abeyance.
- V. On Tuesday, however, Embassy Cairo reported that Nasr, claiming disagreement with Hammarskjold on "duration of stay" point, had "requested" UN force delay arrival.
- A. Nasr thought Hammarskjold has agreed Monday that Egyptian consent required on "duration of stay," but discovered UN position this point still "reserved" in subsequent Hammarskjold memo of understanding.
 - B. Nasr has suggested that point be resolved on arrival Hammarskjold in Cairo (due Thursday).
 - C. Nasr emphasized to our Ambassador that, as long as this point unresolved, he could not allow entry of UN forces.

VI. DESPITE THIS APPARENT ROAD-BLOCK, HAMMARSKJOLD ANNOUNCED ON WEDNESDAY THAT THE FIRST UN UNITS WOULD LEAVE NAPLES FOR EGYPT EARLY THURSDAY MORNING.